Sir John Valentine Carden survives.

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The question is, would the Sherman actually exist in it's OTL form? It's obviously not as good as the Valiant II will be (they will be contempories). Its mobility and armour aren't terrible, but the gun really isn't great.
So... would the US produce the M4 with a higher velocity gun (coming much closer to the Valiant), or will they stick with it as the heresy of tanks fighting tanks (rather than those TD's lurking about in the rear somewhere) cannot be countenanced.
 
That was an interesting article, thanks for sharing it. It is a good question though, if the Valiant is good enough for the British army, will they need to keep more of the production for themselves and less to export as lend-lease. Especially if we see the Valiant II with the 6-pdr gun sooner or the Valiant III with a (yet to be determined) 75mm dual purpose gun. The chances are the need for some many Shermans will be reduced, perhaps having more of them shipped to the USSR.

It would be interesting if the proportion of Cromwells and Churchills was inverted with Shermans for Operation Overlord!
Sorry I'm having trouble with the quote inserts here. My stuff is this font.
So many things will go into this.

Firstly, what are the tanks in play. Valiant and Sherman, pretty much identical, Sherman is slightly faster, has less armour and a gun with better HE but worse AP. It's basically pick your poison between the two and their is probably no wrong answer. Of the two Britain would likely go Valiant because it is both the home grown design and it has the better gun for taking out tanks, that fits in with the doctrine of tanks kill tanks. The only other tank in play is the Replacement for the Valiant (I'm picturing an improved Comet) with a Meteor and the 75mm/3" HV gun, 3" probably being more likely. This tank is the winner over any other it will likely be as fast if not faster, have better armour and a gun that has better HE (just) than the US 75mm and better AP than the 6pdr (by a lot). The other tanks like Crusader, Matilda II and the Churchill analogue are likely not going to be in play in all likelihood at least in Europe.
Secondly how does British doctrine develop, If the Valiant proves it's worth early enough both in (very, very) small numbers in France and en mass in North Africa then you could well see Britain adopting the Universal tank principal in 41. If it does then the question is which of the above three tanks does it fully settle on. This again suits the Valiant as the Sherman isn't a thing in 41.
Thirdly, how far along is the Valiant's replacement in development. We already know some work has been put in by Carden on this tank however it is likely to be very little by the point we are in TL. Now Assuming he starts serious work on it around mid 1940 and it takes 2 years to design and another year to set up production then we could see it being ready by mid 43, a not unreasonable date. That poses some interesting questions for the British.
  1. Do they keep going with the Valiant as much as possible whilst slowly switching to the new tank?. That positives are it keeps Britain in home grown tanks as much as possible and it minimises risk of production delays. The downside however is it slows the introduction of the new true universal tank.
  2. Do they go for a fast change over to the new tank at the expense of Valiant production and use American tanks to fill in the gaps? That get's Britain the true universal tank a lot sooner and in far higher quantities but relies on the Americans playing ball and you have to hope their are no hiccups in the switchover.
You then have other butterflies like Britain doing far better in North Africa meaning either no German participation or a much shorter campaign that is over in 42 so is a much lower drain on resources meaning more tanks are both not lost in combat or to mechanical fault etc but more can also be given to the forces Britain has in other areas.
Let's say as a thought experiment now that Operation Torch in this TL is an invasion of Sicily. That will likely have the same logistical issues as OTL and will limit the amount of Armour that can be landed. Given it will also likely be a joint operation I could see only American Tanks being used. That let's the Americans use their own equipment in combat and lessens the Logistical nightmare. That again means British Valiant production can be stockpiled for any invasion of France. A counterpoint however could be that more tanks are sent to the Far east limiting the ability and you could end up as OTL in Europe but with Sherman's, Valiant's and whatever the Valiant replacement is called whilst in the Far East their are far more UK designed and produced tanks.

Basically Allan, good luck.
 
24 April 1940. Salisbury Plain, England.
24 April 1940. Salisbury Plain, England.

2nd Armoured Brigade had been hard at it for the last couple of weeks. Word on the fighting in Norway had spurred on the three armoured regiments. So far only a troop of 3rd Kings Own Hussars from the Royal Armoured Corps, were expected to be shipped over the North Sea along with 15th Infantry Brigade from 2nd Infantry Division. In their light tanks the 3rd Hussars would be acting as the reconnaissance element for the Brigade, as the Cavalry Regiments attached to Infantry Divisions were trained to do.

The three Cavalry Regiments that made up 2nd Armoured Brigade however had a different purpose. A few days before, the Queens Bays had acted in the reconnaissance role as they and the 9th Lancers and 10th Hussars had made the road march to Salisbury Plain as the first element of their weeks training. This was a chance to get used to the new organisation, no longer were they the Light Armoured Brigade.

Word came through to the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Christopher Peto before the morning briefing from the War Office that 1st Armoured Division were to be mobilised for service overseas by 1st June 1940. At the briefing, Peto noted that the 9th Lancers’ war establishment of 52 Cruiser tanks, was actually 18 A13 and 4 A10 (*) Cruiser tanks and 35 Light Tanks, a mixture of Mark VI B and Cs.

The previous week the 9th Lancers had spent their time at the firing range at Linney Head. Since all their tanks were to be Cruisers armed with 2-pdr guns, it was necessary to train the whole regiment in their use. On the range from 09:00hrs until 17:00hrs, every gunner and wireless operator had a chance to get used to the new Besa co-axial machine gun. Every commander, gunner and wireless operator also had firing practice with the 2-pdr and .303 Vickers Machine Gun, which still made up the majority of co-axial machine guns.

On the last two days on the firing range, each troop had a battle practice. This took place over a special course at Linney Head where the tanks were expected to move and engage various stationary and mechanically operated targets. Each troop had one experience of this, which was important because it gave both stationary and moving gunnery experience, but also it provided a chance to get used to handling a troop in cross country movement, something they weren’t able to do normally. If tanks went off the road outside of practice ranges, they would have to pay compensation to land owners for damaging crops.

During their week at Linney Head, the Regiment fired off 2500 rounds of 2-pdr ammunition 17000 rounds of Besa 7.92mm, and 22ooo rounds of .303. Coming together on Salisbury Plain was the next part of the honing of the skills that would include working with the other two regiments in the Armoured Brigade.

Having only 22 Cruiser Tanks was a major problem for the Regiment. As it was now expected that all the Light Tanks would eventually be replaced with Cruisers, this meant that all the drivers in the Regiment needed to be trained on them. Those used to the Vickers Mark VI would have to learn how to drive an A10 or an A13. The shortage of Cruisers was compounded as at least several of them were in the Regimental Workshop and RAOC Advance Depots for overhaul at any one time. The army stipulated that no Cruiser was to be shipped overseas if it exceeded 1000 miles. The overhaul mileage for an A13 had been set at 1500 miles, so if a tank was sent overseas with less than 1000 miles, it would have a theoretical minimum of 500 miles of useful life remaining before going in for an overhaul.

Everyone knew that the nearer a tank came to its 1500 mile overhaul it was more likely to suffer from mechanical ailments. The chances were that the last 500 miles were likely to be a tank's ‘worst’ miles. Ideally, any tank would have a considerably greater mileage in hand before being sent overseas. So, the 9th Lancers, and all the other regiments of 1st Armoured Division were caught in the predicament of having to conduct as much training as possible with less tanks than it should have, while simultaneously trying to avoid them being subjected to excessive wear and tear. What the regiments were finding was that the 1000 mile limit was eaten up very quickly in intensive training, two or three months at most.

9th Lancers were for the most part receiving the Mark II version of the A13, with the extra armour bolted on. The first 65 A13 Mark I, with the maximum 0.55 inch (14mm) armour were concentrated in the 3rd Armoured Brigade. However, all six regiments were having to send tanks to each other to allow for the mixture agreed upon to happen. If one regiment had more A10s than it needed for the Headquarters Troop, then the spare would be sent to another Regiment, or even to the Brigade or Divisional Headquarters. As the A13s slowly increased in number, those approaching their overhaul would be sent off to the Depot and the newer tanks replace them in the training. It wasn’t unheard of, in fact it was normal practice, for a Regiment, if they had a spare tank, to send off one with deficiencies to a sister unit, rather than a good runner.

Lt-Col Peto was informed by the Regiment’s Quarter Master that the 9th Lancers were also deficient in ‘B’ vehicles (wheeled), gun parts and spare parts. Peto was also informed that they were short of 30 Driver Mechanics, 54 Driver Operators, 4 Electricians, 5 fitters and 15 motor mechanics. Peto asked that all of this information be passed onto Brigadier McCreery, 2nd Armoured Brigade’s Officer Commanding. Meanwhile the Regiment had another couple of days on Salisbury Plain, and with a lot to do, everyone had to make the most of it.

(*) This is the only change to OTL, in fact they had 18 cruisers and 39 light tanks.
 
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The question is, would the Sherman actually exist in it's OTL form? It's obviously not as good as the Valiant II will be (they will be contempories). Its mobility and armour aren't terrible, but the gun really isn't great.
So... would the US produce the M4 with a higher velocity gun (coming much closer to the Valiant), or will they stick with it as the heresy of tanks fighting tanks (rather than those TD's lurking about in the rear somewhere) cannot be countenanced.

It would. The M4 was ordered and designed based on the Fall of France, the Valiant won't have anywhere near enough of an impact to alter that. By the time the Valiant will have really proven itself in North Africa it will be too far along to see changes realistically. Plus any British success against Italy will not be as impressive as the German success against the British. Basically why copy the guys who just got steamrollered when the guys who steamrolled them are still around.
 
Nice update, really shows how much of a shoestring the British army was on as it tried to assemble an effective armoured force pre Fall of France.
 
<snip>

This looks at total tank production year on year. I see no reason why British tank production couldn't be quite a bit over the 4-5000 or so tanks made in 41 and could well pass the 10000 mark in 42. Yes Britain will never compete with America but it does not have to. It only has to meet it's own and the empire's needs. The Valiant may also change the Graph in other ways. The first is with Britain relying less on American tanks it's own tank production may well plateau more in 43 and 44 rather than have the sharp drop off. The second is a drop during a switch to the Valiant's successor, whichever year that is, say 43 then a climb in 44 as production of that tank ramps up prior to D-Day then a fall again. OTL a big reason for the declining rate of Tank production in Britain post 42 was a combination of a potential switch to just relying on American Tanks and the lack of having anything really worth building until mid 43 and Cromwell.
Thanks for the graph. As I've said upthread, the key for improving things for the British isn't being able to produce 10,000 or even 15,000 Sherman equivalents in 1944. From mid-1943 onwards they can have all the Shermans they want, so unless what they're building is significantly better than the Sherman they don't gain a lot from building it. The critical thing is getting enough tanks to the front in 1941-2, when American production is not available and OTL the British were both short of numbers and burdened with a some heavily-compromised designs. From the graph, while they did ramp up production faster than the Germans(!), they never approached the take-off velocities of either the USA or the USSR.

Some drawdown of British tank production in the late war is pretty much inevitable, given their resource constraints and the strategic situation. There's no point in churning out tanks you don't have the crews, supplies or support units for, and changing that would mean (among other things) de-prioritising the bomber offensive compared to OTL. I suppose that a successful North Africa campaign and the prospect of a Sicily invasion in 1942 might make them stop seeing Bomber Command as the only offensive going, but it feels unlikely.

Edit 2; Does that Graph make anyone else feel a little sorry for Japan in how low their production total is and Italy for not even being worth including?
That graph does a really good job of showing just how one-sided WW2 was at the level of sheer industrial muscle. The UK and USSR were separately close to Germany's output, the USA laughed at both of them and the Italians and Japanese really didn't add up to a whole lot of anything.
That said, I'm still rather grateful that Speer was not unleashed early to get the Germans up to their OTL 1944 numbers in 1942-3.

I was reading last night the sorry story of 1st Armoured Division's experience in France, preparing for future updates. My inclination is to rewrite the history because of the extra 75ish tanks they have TTL. But the story of incompetence, unpreparedness, failures of leadership and communication, compared with the bravery of the poor buggers sent off to die needlessly is a Tragedy worthy of a Shakespearean play. That's part of the reason why I'm reticent about making this more than it can be. The Tank Scandal wasn't just about poor tanks, though that aggravated the problem, it was one of poor doctrine, incomplete training, sheer bloody-mindedness, and failure at all levels, except the bravery and resourcefulness of the fighting men.
And this is the necessary reminder that wars, even between industrialised nations are not fought simply by totting up production numbers. Planning, doctrine, training, leadership, communications and flexibility may not be as fun to debate on the Internet as gun calibres or engine sizes, but they have a massive effect in the field. And even getting the right tools in the right hands at the right time is no guarantee that they'll be used effectively, particularly if they're deployed in an environment dominated by poor organization, worse communication, outdated attitudes and flat-out wishful thinking. It's a sobering thought that if the Germans and the British/French had swapped equipment in 1940, it's quite likely that the Allies would have wound up being thrashed even harder...
 
And this is the necessary reminder that wars, even between industrialised nations are not fought simply by totting up production numbers. Planning, doctrine, training, leadership, communications and flexibility may not be as fun to debate on the Internet as gun calibres or engine sizes, but they have a massive effect in the field. And even getting the right tools in the right hands at the right time is no guarantee that they'll be used effectively, particularly if they're deployed in an environment dominated by poor organization, worse communication, outdated attitudes and flat-out wishful thinking. It's a sobering thought that if the Germans and the British/French had swapped equipment in 1940, it's quite likely that the Allies would have wound up being thrashed even harder...

All very true and unfortunately all too easy to ignore in the typical debates you get around any equipment centric thread. Quantifying and debating "soft" factors is hard and arguing about guns and other "hard" factors is fun so equipment centric threads tend to devolve into that sort of debate.

When it gets to be a bit too much or too rancorous I just start using the threadmarks to skip it all. Best thing about the new forums.
 

Glyndwr01

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The thing you are missing is the more tanks Britain produce and use themselves the less British gold is going to America. Churchill will be less inclined to give the family jewel's away (Tizard mission) for nothing! Britain might be a bit less in debt at the end of the war.
 
Thanks for the graph. As I've said upthread, the key for improving things for the British isn't being able to produce 10,000 or even 15,000 Sherman equivalents in 1944. From mid-1943 onwards they can have all the Shermans they want, so unless what they're building is significantly better than the Sherman they don't gain a lot from building it. The critical thing is getting enough tanks to the front in 1941-2, when American production is not available and OTL the British were both short of numbers and burdened with a some heavily-compromised designs. From the graph, while they did ramp up production faster than the Germans(!), they never approached the take-off velocities of either the USA or the USSR.

Some drawdown of British tank production in the late war is pretty much inevitable, given their resource constraints and the strategic situation. There's no point in churning out tanks you don't have the crews, supplies or support units for, and changing that would mean (among other things) de-prioritising the bomber offensive compared to OTL. I suppose that a successful North Africa campaign and the prospect of a Sicily invasion in 1942 might make them stop seeing Bomber Command as the only offensive going, but it feels unlikely.
Part of the reason Britain slowed down tank production was because they realised they had nothing really worth building. TTL they do, the thing is Britain may not need all the tanks it could produce if the tanks it does have are surviving more, more reliable and enable Britain to recover more knocked out but repairable tanks due to doing better in Battles. Also their is a good possibility Britain will have the tank it want's to replace the Valiant developed by mid 42. If it does it could if it really wanted too stop all Valiant production and rely on the Tanks it already has and lend lease Sherman's whilst switching all production almost en mass over to the new tank. That means Britain has until the until the end of 43 using Sherman's by which time the replacement tank has both entered production and arrived in sufficient numbers to enter service in large numbers. Won't happen more than likely but could be a good way to take advantage of American industrial capacity in order to make a switch up in production as effective and fast as possible.

I agree that a drawdown is an inevitability, for a start Britain will still focus on the air war, bombers will get built in huge numbers over tanks. Also their will be some form of production switch at some point, that will result in a drop of in production. Add to all that the catch up in tank numbers will have happened so the mad rush wont have to continue.
 

Glyndwr01

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If Bomber Command had carpet bombed the German airfields in France etc. the Blitz would not be as bad and production not interrupted so much!
 
If Bomber Command had carpet bombed the German airfields in France etc. the Blitz would not be as bad and production not interrupted so much!
Bomber command couldn't hit France at night if it tried during the Blitz, no way they could bomb the airfields at night. If they tried during the day Bomber command get's massacred.
 
Bomber command couldn't hit France at night if it tried during the Blitz, no way they could bomb the airfields at night. If they tried during the day Bomber command get's massacred.
You are assuming they can find the airfield - with the early war RAF, not a given!
 
If Bomber Command had carpet bombed the German airfields in France etc. the Blitz would not be as bad and production not interrupted so much!
Carpet bombing requires a number of things
1. Enough available bombers to meet the criteria of Carpet Bombing. Bomber command had how many front line bombers in Sept 1940?
2, The ability to identify critical Luftwaffe airfields. Possible but not guaranteed. Ultra was still in it's infancy and the T/A sections were still gearing up. And which ones to hit tonight, given your limited bombing capacity? Bombers of fighters and are you sure you have identified the right airfields?
3. The ability to locate those airfields at night. Not a given at this time of the war. Yes, somewhere under us is France. Where in France? no idea Skipper!
4. The expectation that carpet bombing would deny the Luftwaffe use of those airfields. Most airfields at that time were grass strips. A few bomb holes and it's a matter of calling in the local bulldozer operator and issue shovels to the ground staff. If you can find a path across those grass strips without a hole, you are good to go.
 
The biggest problem that the RAF face at the moment is the quality of their current bomb stock, some of which, in the early days of WWII, allegedly dated from 1919.
 
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