Sir John Valentine Carden survives.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
- Status
All the same drivers, but with better than OTL tanks in service. I'm not saying the Centurion won't be built. I just don't see any reason for it to be earlier.
Agreed. Hells, with better tanks beforehand, it might be delayed over OTL. OTOH, with the improved reputation of British tanks, it might well see more nations willing to buy it, rather than it only being used by Commonwealth nations.
It won't be years earlier, but a Centurion equivalent should be able to enter limited service by January 1945. Something between a Cromwell and a Comet should be possible 18 months earlier than that. Hopefully for the crews the word will have gotten back to the designers that large easy to open hatches save lives when the tank brews up.
True, very true, and that's an impressive ramp-up OTL given the strategic situation and the number of other things competing for resources. The point I was trying to make is that currently (early 1940) British tank production is close to an order of magnitude too low to support large-scale armoured operations. That was eventually fixed OTL and will likely be fixed TTL, but you'll note from the table that the real ramp-up didn't occur until the second half of 1941 (and they still ended 2,000+ tanks short of where they wanted to be). If the Valiant is only available in numbers from late 1941, when the Germans are fielding the PzIIIJ/L and PzIVF, its impact will be much reduced compared to if it was available six months earlier.
The comment about Sherman production was both to underline just how many tanks you need for mass armoured warfare and how irrelevant British tank production is liable to become once the Great Detroit Tank Machine hits top gear. Unless British tank production is significantly increased compared to OTL, the British Army will be going ashore on D-Day in Lend-Leased Shermans regardless of how good Sir John's designs are.
It would be a pity if after all this, TTL ended with "The Valiant was one of the best pre-war tank designs, and had it been available in numbers, might have been decisive in the North African campaigns of 1940-41. When it finally appeared, however, it found itself outmatched by the latest German designs, and delays in producing an upgraded version with a 6-pdr gun led to it being largely replaced in British service by the Grant. The bulk of the late-production Valiants were sent as Lend-Lease deliveries to Russia, where they were popular with Soviet troops and retained in service into 1945."
Consider my mind boggled. How they kept all this straight baffles me.
I'll actually disagree with this - looking at the table (thanks for the table, BTW), infantry tank production ramps up far faster than cruisers in the second half of 1941 (about 3/4 of the tanks produced in the last quarter were infantry types). I'm guessing that that's Valentine production ramping up (too early for the Churchill and the Matilda was always slow to build)..
It was mentioned in various books on German uniforms that I used to have. I have passed them onto my brother. I will check with him.
8 March 1940. Hampshire, England.
allanpcameron
Donor
8 March 1940. Hampshire, England.
The headquarters of 1st Armoured Division was at Hale House and General Evans had brought together his senior officers along with other luminaries of the Royal Armoured Corps. Vyvyan Pope, CO of 1st (Heavy) Armoured Brigade, Richard McCreery, CO of 2nd (Light) Armoured Brigade, and most of the staff officers had been joined by the recently promoted Major General Frederick Hotblack, commander of the embryonic 2nd Armoured Division.
The Army Council had stipulated that the organisation of the Armoured Division had to be looked at again given the present state of tank production. It was unanimously agreed that the designation of Light and Heavy Brigades needed to be dropped. The original idea that there would be separate light and heavy cruisers hadn’t really come to pass. The armour on the A10 was now being matched by that on the A13 Mark II, and armament wise there was no differences. The meeting agreed that what was needed was that the whole Division had to have homogenous equipment, i.e. all Cruisers. Each of the six regiments, three in each Brigade, would likewise be homogenous. This couldn’t be done immediately, there would still have to be a lot of Light Tanks among the regiments until they could be replaced with cruisers.
After discussion it was felt that the ideal organisation of an Armoured Regiment should be made up of three squadrons, each of which would comprise of a Headquarters of four tanks, and four troops each of three tanks. The Regimental HQ would also have four tanks, so each regiment would require 52 tanks. The Brigade HQ would have a further ten tanks and the Divisional HQ another eight, giving a divisional total of 340 tanks, nine less than the previous arrangement. There had been a suggestion that an extra 18 tanks would be helpful so that each Squadron HQ would have an extra tank for the second-in-command. Currently the second-in-command travelled in what was known as the rear link tank, a tank which held back to transmit radio signals back and forth between higher command and the squadron ahead. This proposal wouldn’t in fact be taken up.
Until there were enough cruiser tanks, the six armoured regiments would have to be ‘mixed’, with two Cruiser squadrons and one of Light Tanks. Even with that, the Cruiser squadrons would have three troops of cruisers and one of Light Tanks. This meant that currently each mixed Regiment would have almost exactly one third of its tanks as Lights Tanks rather than Cruisers. As more Cruisers were delivered, then the Light Tanks would be passed on to one of the Cavalry Regiments as they continued being mechanised.
Part of the discussion at the meeting concerned the Support Group which was still not fully functional. The Royal Horse Artillery Regiment still hadn’t been assigned, since both the 1st and 2nd RHA had been reassigned in October 1939 to the BEF GHQ. The 60th Anti-Tank Regiment had been replaced with the 101st Light Anti-Aircraft/Anti-Tank Regiment, an odd and somewhat experimental combination. The two Motorised Infantry Battalions, 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade and 2nd Battalion Kings Royal Rifle Corps, were part of the Support Group currently, but there was no guarantee that they too wouldn’t find themselves reassigned in an emergency. What Evans demanded was that 1st Field Squadron and 1st Field Park Troop of the Royal Engineers should no longer be considered part of the Support Group, but, along with the Royal Signals, would actually be part of 1st Armoured Division, under the direct command of the Divisional Headquarters. At least that way, the chances of losing the engineers, the way they had lost the artillery, was much reduced. Like the rest of the Division the Royal Engineers were still very short of their establishment in men and equipment. There was no way the Division could go to France without their engineering support.
There was some disappointment expressed at the meeting that the A10 was 10mph slower that any of the other cruisers. This threw off the balance of being homogenous, if a percentage of the tanks moved at a much slower pace than the rest. It was therefore decided to keep the A10s primarily as HQ tanks, where the slower speed was less of an issue.
Each Armoured Regiment would continue to be equipped with eight Close Support tanks armed with the QF 3.7-inch tank mortar. There was a case for making the majority of Close Support tanks A10s as they would generally be kept with the Regimental and Squadron HQs. Thirty A10s had been ordered as Close Support variants, a letter went out after the meeting asking for these to be prioritised, and if possible, for another 18 be procured to have the same type throughout the Division.
The A9s were faster than the A10 and therefore more useful in the Cruiser Squadrons, though still slower than the A13s. The faster speed of the A13 made it the more popular tank with the Divisional Staff, but there was a growing awareness that the new tracks on the A9 and A10s were going a long way to improve their reliability. There was only a total of 125 A9s on order, and with some already sent to Egypt, it would be better if most of them had the 2-pdr main armament to take their place in the Cruiser Squadrons rather having some of them as Close Support tanks. This was agreed, and whenever a tank had to be overhauled, the A9 CS tanks swapped over their main armament with A10s, a relatively straightforward, but heavy job as the turrets were almost identical except in armour thickness.
Once the main points of the meeting were agreed by the War Office, as of 14 April 1940, the 1st (Heavy) Brigade would be renamed 3rd Armoured Brigade. At the same time 2nd Armoured Brigade would lose the designation (Light). The six Armoured Regiments would remain as they were within the two Brigades: 2, 3 and 5 Battalions RTR making up the newly named 3rd Brigade; while the Queens Bays, 10th Hussars and 9th Lancers comprised 2nd Armoured Brigade. The War Office also agreed to the change of structure regarding the Royal Engineers being part of the Division rather than the Support Group. All these changes became known as Basic Organisation II, replacing that of May 1939.
The headquarters of 1st Armoured Division was at Hale House and General Evans had brought together his senior officers along with other luminaries of the Royal Armoured Corps. Vyvyan Pope, CO of 1st (Heavy) Armoured Brigade, Richard McCreery, CO of 2nd (Light) Armoured Brigade, and most of the staff officers had been joined by the recently promoted Major General Frederick Hotblack, commander of the embryonic 2nd Armoured Division.
The Army Council had stipulated that the organisation of the Armoured Division had to be looked at again given the present state of tank production. It was unanimously agreed that the designation of Light and Heavy Brigades needed to be dropped. The original idea that there would be separate light and heavy cruisers hadn’t really come to pass. The armour on the A10 was now being matched by that on the A13 Mark II, and armament wise there was no differences. The meeting agreed that what was needed was that the whole Division had to have homogenous equipment, i.e. all Cruisers. Each of the six regiments, three in each Brigade, would likewise be homogenous. This couldn’t be done immediately, there would still have to be a lot of Light Tanks among the regiments until they could be replaced with cruisers.
After discussion it was felt that the ideal organisation of an Armoured Regiment should be made up of three squadrons, each of which would comprise of a Headquarters of four tanks, and four troops each of three tanks. The Regimental HQ would also have four tanks, so each regiment would require 52 tanks. The Brigade HQ would have a further ten tanks and the Divisional HQ another eight, giving a divisional total of 340 tanks, nine less than the previous arrangement. There had been a suggestion that an extra 18 tanks would be helpful so that each Squadron HQ would have an extra tank for the second-in-command. Currently the second-in-command travelled in what was known as the rear link tank, a tank which held back to transmit radio signals back and forth between higher command and the squadron ahead. This proposal wouldn’t in fact be taken up.
Until there were enough cruiser tanks, the six armoured regiments would have to be ‘mixed’, with two Cruiser squadrons and one of Light Tanks. Even with that, the Cruiser squadrons would have three troops of cruisers and one of Light Tanks. This meant that currently each mixed Regiment would have almost exactly one third of its tanks as Lights Tanks rather than Cruisers. As more Cruisers were delivered, then the Light Tanks would be passed on to one of the Cavalry Regiments as they continued being mechanised.
Part of the discussion at the meeting concerned the Support Group which was still not fully functional. The Royal Horse Artillery Regiment still hadn’t been assigned, since both the 1st and 2nd RHA had been reassigned in October 1939 to the BEF GHQ. The 60th Anti-Tank Regiment had been replaced with the 101st Light Anti-Aircraft/Anti-Tank Regiment, an odd and somewhat experimental combination. The two Motorised Infantry Battalions, 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade and 2nd Battalion Kings Royal Rifle Corps, were part of the Support Group currently, but there was no guarantee that they too wouldn’t find themselves reassigned in an emergency. What Evans demanded was that 1st Field Squadron and 1st Field Park Troop of the Royal Engineers should no longer be considered part of the Support Group, but, along with the Royal Signals, would actually be part of 1st Armoured Division, under the direct command of the Divisional Headquarters. At least that way, the chances of losing the engineers, the way they had lost the artillery, was much reduced. Like the rest of the Division the Royal Engineers were still very short of their establishment in men and equipment. There was no way the Division could go to France without their engineering support.
There was some disappointment expressed at the meeting that the A10 was 10mph slower that any of the other cruisers. This threw off the balance of being homogenous, if a percentage of the tanks moved at a much slower pace than the rest. It was therefore decided to keep the A10s primarily as HQ tanks, where the slower speed was less of an issue.
Each Armoured Regiment would continue to be equipped with eight Close Support tanks armed with the QF 3.7-inch tank mortar. There was a case for making the majority of Close Support tanks A10s as they would generally be kept with the Regimental and Squadron HQs. Thirty A10s had been ordered as Close Support variants, a letter went out after the meeting asking for these to be prioritised, and if possible, for another 18 be procured to have the same type throughout the Division.
The A9s were faster than the A10 and therefore more useful in the Cruiser Squadrons, though still slower than the A13s. The faster speed of the A13 made it the more popular tank with the Divisional Staff, but there was a growing awareness that the new tracks on the A9 and A10s were going a long way to improve their reliability. There was only a total of 125 A9s on order, and with some already sent to Egypt, it would be better if most of them had the 2-pdr main armament to take their place in the Cruiser Squadrons rather having some of them as Close Support tanks. This was agreed, and whenever a tank had to be overhauled, the A9 CS tanks swapped over their main armament with A10s, a relatively straightforward, but heavy job as the turrets were almost identical except in armour thickness.
Once the main points of the meeting were agreed by the War Office, as of 14 April 1940, the 1st (Heavy) Brigade would be renamed 3rd Armoured Brigade. At the same time 2nd Armoured Brigade would lose the designation (Light). The six Armoured Regiments would remain as they were within the two Brigades: 2, 3 and 5 Battalions RTR making up the newly named 3rd Brigade; while the Queens Bays, 10th Hussars and 9th Lancers comprised 2nd Armoured Brigade. The War Office also agreed to the change of structure regarding the Royal Engineers being part of the Division rather than the Support Group. All these changes became known as Basic Organisation II, replacing that of May 1939.
allanpcameron
Donor
Again all this is OTL, date of the meeting and Basic Organisation II coming in on 14 April 1940. The only change is to concentrate on having the A10 as the primary CS tank, which is for a good reason later. The other difference ITTL is that the numbers of A10s is higher than OTL because they were put into production earlier. OTL 1st Armoured Division expected by June '40 to have 37 A10s. Here, I'm working on the premise that they have those already in March, instead of the 11 they actually had. As far as I can see, deliveries of about 18 per month are achieved in my time frame. If they use the A10 as HQ tanks (as OTL) and as CS tanks (less so) then that's 90 total needed. They're still short, but in May they'll have nearly 80, about 50 more than OTL.
The Armoured Division (Egypt) which also takes on the same Basic Organisation on 14 April. It looks like the A9s were preferred to go to Egypt, OTL there were 68 there in May 40, while 1st Armoured only had 18! Total A9 losses in France were 6 cruisers and 18 CS. OTL the total order of 125 A9s were delivered by July 40, at around 6 per month. Because of the simplification of the ATL A9 and Harland & Wolff doing a bit better, I'm supposing that the order is complete by March 40, a few months ahead of schedule. So, instead of just 24 A9s going to France, here more like 50 can go, and 75 end up in Egypt. So, between 50 A10s and 25 A9s, that gives 1st Armoured Division 75 more tanks than it had OTL. They also had 108 A13s, which gives them 183 cruiser tanks, still far short of the 340 they should have had, so about 150 Light Tanks make up the difference.
I hope that makes some kind of sense, as it is now well past my bedtime!
Allan
The Armoured Division (Egypt) which also takes on the same Basic Organisation on 14 April. It looks like the A9s were preferred to go to Egypt, OTL there were 68 there in May 40, while 1st Armoured only had 18! Total A9 losses in France were 6 cruisers and 18 CS. OTL the total order of 125 A9s were delivered by July 40, at around 6 per month. Because of the simplification of the ATL A9 and Harland & Wolff doing a bit better, I'm supposing that the order is complete by March 40, a few months ahead of schedule. So, instead of just 24 A9s going to France, here more like 50 can go, and 75 end up in Egypt. So, between 50 A10s and 25 A9s, that gives 1st Armoured Division 75 more tanks than it had OTL. They also had 108 A13s, which gives them 183 cruiser tanks, still far short of the 340 they should have had, so about 150 Light Tanks make up the difference.
I hope that makes some kind of sense, as it is now well past my bedtime!
Allan
That was what I meant to imply but I laid it on too thick. I could see the riveted Valiant staying in production a while depending on decisions on keeping building something that works over mixing up production to something better but loosing numbers in the short term. Add to that if any issues surrounding the other two manufacturers crop up it becomes one of the only sources of cruiser production for a period so will be kept going.
Again, was never meant to be doom and gloom, more a series of small niggles that may well spoil the reputation of an overall good tank.
AFAIK the riveted Valiant won't use a composite construction like the OTL Cruisers or Churchill so the weight growth will be limited to a few hundred kgs.
allanpcameron
Donor
Carden felt the cruiser variant is a compromise to the Army's intransigence towards the Infantry/Cruiser split. What the diesel Valiant does is it closes the gap between the two, that way, hopefully the Army will realise it doesn't need two different types, but one type, let's call it 'Universal' for arguments sake.
See, that's what I said!
So did everybody else.
The vast majority of British tanks for the vast majority of the war were riveted. I don't imagine this is actually going to worry anybody.
Nor do I, well except...
The Valiant is going into production in early 1940, replacing the A9, A10 and A11s which are all being completed around that time. The first fully equipped and trained units will be in service by Autumn 1940. The ramp up in production TTL is likely to last quarter of 40/first quarter of 41.
Quite probably, but perhaps with a higher proportion of British tanks (OTL Cromwells and Churchills) in the British armoured divisions. The Valentine was pretty much dead and gone by '44, perhaps a Valiant Mk III or IV will still be kicking around.
This is the very thing I'm trying to avoid. TTL the Valiant should be ahead of the curve, rather than behind it.
Its the War Office. Enough said.
The post Dunkirk panic caused the back and forth between prioritising Cruisers and Infantry. The Army Tank Battalions were needed to support the infantry against an invasion force, so they got first call, then as North Africa ramped up, Cruisers were what was needed for speed etc.
The French had plenty of tanks, quite a lot of them quite good. The Germans rolled over them quite easily. The British might do slightly better because they have slightly more and slightly better tanks, but it will be a slight difference. The pre-war doctrine hampers the use of tanks, and the Panzers, as somebody else noted are much better at working collaboratively with infantry, artillery and air power. They also are much better equipped in communications and their training is much more advanced, and they have the lessons of Poland under their belt, and they roll a lot of sixes.
Really? Because I distinctly recall the early-war British and French, and late-war German designs ran into significant reliability issues.
They'll be heavier than designed, and more dangerous if they're hit though.
Probably as engineering vehicles or some such.
The BEF was better organised, better trained, and better led. The fact that they now have more (and often better) tanks, will result in more (though how much is debatable) German blood being spilled, and depending on the luck of the draw, possibly also some local delays.
Last edited:
I think the French tankies that hammered PzDiv 3 and 4 in the Gembleux Gap might argue against being rolled over.
From what I remember they ended up tack welding the rivets to reduce that problem. Any fool can hold a welding rod in one place long enough for that, rather than making a nice strong welded seam.
Definitely, The Chieftan's M3 video makes a point of showing that the one in the Tank Museum has welded rivets to stop spalling.
Maybe this time there maybe some snakes eyes in there as well.........
On Tank production we really need to know the capacity of the two tank factories and how they are set up.
If its more American in nature so low/semi skilled labour in mass production assembly line type then the potential production numbers could be very high. If its more basically British style skilled labour then it is more limited.
American style factories could have (depending on size) a capacity as high as 150 tanks a month. That could be the upper limit say but having the two factories able to produce 200 to 300 tanks a month alone. Yes that would be the top end production but even to begin with the two factories could be making 25 to 50 a month within a month or two of them starting up. That adds a big number of tanks in 1940 even with a 4-5 months of production if they are ready in time.
The questions though are will the extra production be on top of OTL production or will it replace some of it allowing those replaced companies to switch to other needed production.
How big will the factories be? Is the maximum production 50 a month? 100? 150? Or even 200 a month say per factory. If it is the upper numbers Britain will rely a lot less on American tanks.
If its more American in nature so low/semi skilled labour in mass production assembly line type then the potential production numbers could be very high. If its more basically British style skilled labour then it is more limited.
American style factories could have (depending on size) a capacity as high as 150 tanks a month. That could be the upper limit say but having the two factories able to produce 200 to 300 tanks a month alone. Yes that would be the top end production but even to begin with the two factories could be making 25 to 50 a month within a month or two of them starting up. That adds a big number of tanks in 1940 even with a 4-5 months of production if they are ready in time.
The questions though are will the extra production be on top of OTL production or will it replace some of it allowing those replaced companies to switch to other needed production.
How big will the factories be? Is the maximum production 50 a month? 100? 150? Or even 200 a month say per factory. If it is the upper numbers Britain will rely a lot less on American tanks.
Great Minds.
That also adds weight to the idea Carden may slip up a bit by overlooking the initial Cruiser Valiant production leading to a disappointing (relatively) tank.
They'll have to be on the American pattern as the pool of skilled labour is already committed elsewhere.
- Status