23 January 1942. Batavia, Java.
allanpcameron
Donor
23 January 1942. Batavia, Java.
General Auchinleck’s appointment as Supreme Commander of ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) forces had finally been agreed after a great deal of negotiation. Auchinleck in particular, had been keen to make sure that the job was clear about what the various battles going on against the Japanese would have some kind of overall direction, without interfering in each country’s own position. This was a fine balancing act, which would be difficult to get right.
The Americans had withdrawn to their final defensive line on the Bataan Peninsula where they continued to resist the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. The problem was that, in Auchinleck’s view, they had conceded the rest of the islands to the Japanese. Of particular concern was Davao, which now seemed to be a base for Japanese aggression. The Asiatic Fleet of the United States Navy seemed to have lost their overall strategic visions having been chased out of the Philippines. They were working with the Dutch, but not decisively, their submarine force in particular seemed to be underperforming.
The British position in Malaya was holding, though under pressure. There were enough reinforcements being rushed to Burma and Singapore, giving Auchinleck some confidence in the position there. The Royal Navy were split between protecting the convoys of reinforcements, and Admiral Phillip’s Force Z which was hoping to deal a blow to the Japanese in the Makassar Strait.
The Dutch were resisting in Borneo and Celebes, though the loss of Tarakan and Manado had given the Japanese airfields to cover their advance. The Dutch Koninklijke Marine had been doing a reasonable job, especially the submarine force, but Admiral Conrad Helfrich and the American Admiral Thomas Hart didn’t seem to see eye to eye about the best way to cooperate.
The Dutch were going all out to support Phillip’s Force Z, and the Americans were concentrating to the east of Celebes in the Banda Sea. To increase a sense of comradeship, it had been agreed with the Australian and New Zealand governments that two light cruisers (HMAS Perth and HMNZS Achilles) and two destroyers (HMAS Vampire and Voyager) would be assigned to the American Task Force 5 (USS Houston, Marblehead and Boise, along with eight USN destroyers). The rest of the Royal Australian Navy, along with the New Zealanders, were doing their best to maintain the open sea lanes back towards America.
The Australian force in Rabual had reported strong attacks from carrier based aircraft and that all of their own fighters and bombers were either destroyed or withdrawn. Radio communications were patchy, but the recent messages were reporting Japanese invasion forces being resisted.
Auchinleck had accepted his role knowing full well that each of the countries would be focussed on their own particular problems, and with the exception of the navies, would be unable to really collaborate. The thing that Auchinleck had noted from each and every battle was the overwhelming power exercised by the Japanese Army and Navy air forces. The destruction wraught at Pearl Harbour now seemed to be falling on Rabaul. The American Volunteer Group in Rangoon were, so far, the only fighter group that seemed to be capable of taking on and defeating the Japanese fighters and bombers. The arrival of Hurricanes and Tomahawks at Singapore might have the same effect, but it remained to be seen if the RAF pilots would take on board the lessons the AFG were offering.
There was a growing American Army Air Corps presence, mostly aircraft and pilots that were meant to be defending the Philippines. As these reinforcements had arrived too late, the bombers and fighters could play an important role, if only they could be concentrated and properly integrated. The obvious place was alongside the Dutch ML-KNIL. Auchinleck had spent a good hour with the various air force commanders. Air Marshall Richard Pierse was to be in overall command of ABDA Air, having lost his job as AOC-in-C Bomber Command, but wasn’t yet arrived in the Far East. Pierse’s American deputy, Major-General Lewis Brereton was the one Auchinleck really wanted to convince of the need for closer cooperation. Even although he was now out from under the command of Douglas MacArthur, Brereton was still sore from losing most of his bomber force on the ground on the first day of the war with Japan. To Auchinleck’s delight his own deputy, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett (USAAF) was fully on board with this plan and was keen to support Auchinleck’s proposals.
Lieutenant-General Ludolph van Oyen, C-in-C ML-KNIL, had witnessed first hand the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. He and Brereton had much in common. Both the USAAF and ML-KNIL were short of everything, and desperate to stop the Japanese. Auchinleck had the difficult task to try to get the two men to get past their natural inclination to think first of their own needs, and somehow to work together to create not only a unified command, but a real collaboration.
The basis for this had been established to some degree by the reconnaissance units. Kapitein ter Zee G. G. Bozuwa of Marineluchtvaartdienst (MLD) had been working well with the other operators of the PBY equipped squadrons including USN Patrol Wing 10 and No. 205 Squadron RAF. These most valuable assets had been covering various areas, but reporting back to Bozuwa as well as their own chain of command. Bozuwa’s staff were therefore in a position to update everyone’s intelligence sections about Japanese shipping movements.
Auchinleck had Brereton and van Oyen meet together, along with Brett, to see if some kind of deal could be hashed out. General Marshall had informed Brereton by radio it was the War Department's fixed policy to seek the enemy's defeat by a unified effort under the leadership of General Auchinleck. Brereton's mission, as Marshall succinctly added, was to execute the orders issued by Auchinleck.
The Dutch had prepared numerous airdromes on Java, with seven military fields and three commercial airports as well as a considerable number of emergency landing fields well distributed across the countryside. The Dutch had also constructed modern airfields on Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and Amboina, and suitable at least for use by pursuit planes were the fields on Timor, Soemba, and Bali. But the government of the Netherlands East Indies lacked a modern air force. In January 1942 its approximately 150 planes were obsolescent. The only real hope were the reinforcements coming to the USAAF.
So far, Brereton had command of 18 P40s, fifty-two A24s (delivered to Australia) and fourteen B17s (escaped from the Philippines). 180 pursuit planes (P40s), with crews had now arrived in Australia, and another complete pursuit group with 80 planes had left San Diego on 10 January. 20 B-17's and 6 LB-30's had arrived by the South Pacific route, an additional 45 B-17's and 9 LB-30's were to follow.
This was going to be a formidable force, but Brereton rightly noted that throwing aircraft into battle, without a chance to properly prepare the aircraft and train the pilots was a recipe for disaster. Brereton wanted time to for his force to be combat ready. Van Oyen was seeing his ML-KNIL force being ground down far too quickly. He was desperate for American assistance. Auchinleck, knowing that the RAF were struggling with the same problems in Burma and Malaya could well appreciate the position of both men.
To add to the mix, Air Commodore Del Wilson, the senior RAAF officer had briefed Brett noting that nearly all the effective RAAF squadrons were defending Singapore, and he had almost nothing at home to protect Northern Australia. As had just become clear at Rabual, a few Wirraway trainers were no match for the Japanese aircraft. Wilson also wanted the American build up to happen in Australia, where they could be used in its defence.
The final agreement was for the American Army Air Forces reinforcements to concentrate on the eastern side of the Dutch East Indies, as Australia was becoming the main operating base from which the Americans would have their logistical support structure in place. The current pursuit and bomber aircraft already in place would concentrate on Java from where the bombers would be able to operate over the wider area, and the P40s protect the island itself. Nobody was entirely happy with this outcome, but Auchinleck knew that the concentration of American forces at Darwin would become crucial in the next phase of operations.
Regarding troops on the ground, some American and British army units were on Borneo and Celebes supporting the KNIL, but otherwise there was no real abililty to project power. The job of the allies would be to upset the Japanese plans as far as possible, and then, figure out how to knock them back.
With Admiral Phillips’ Force Z the only real force in the area, it would fall to him in HMS Nelson, with HMS Warspite, HMS Ark Royal, and the various British and Dutch cruisers and destroyers to try to upset the Japanese plans. The Dutch had spotted a Japanese fleet of transports and escorts sailing south from Tarakan, expected to arrive off Balikpapan during the night. The weather was poor, but the Dutch had collected as many bombers and fighters as possible, along with a couple of submarines to attempt to harry the Japanese, allowing Force Z to close with them and, if their luck held, put them to the sword.
General Auchinleck’s appointment as Supreme Commander of ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) forces had finally been agreed after a great deal of negotiation. Auchinleck in particular, had been keen to make sure that the job was clear about what the various battles going on against the Japanese would have some kind of overall direction, without interfering in each country’s own position. This was a fine balancing act, which would be difficult to get right.
The Americans had withdrawn to their final defensive line on the Bataan Peninsula where they continued to resist the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. The problem was that, in Auchinleck’s view, they had conceded the rest of the islands to the Japanese. Of particular concern was Davao, which now seemed to be a base for Japanese aggression. The Asiatic Fleet of the United States Navy seemed to have lost their overall strategic visions having been chased out of the Philippines. They were working with the Dutch, but not decisively, their submarine force in particular seemed to be underperforming.
The British position in Malaya was holding, though under pressure. There were enough reinforcements being rushed to Burma and Singapore, giving Auchinleck some confidence in the position there. The Royal Navy were split between protecting the convoys of reinforcements, and Admiral Phillip’s Force Z which was hoping to deal a blow to the Japanese in the Makassar Strait.
The Dutch were resisting in Borneo and Celebes, though the loss of Tarakan and Manado had given the Japanese airfields to cover their advance. The Dutch Koninklijke Marine had been doing a reasonable job, especially the submarine force, but Admiral Conrad Helfrich and the American Admiral Thomas Hart didn’t seem to see eye to eye about the best way to cooperate.
The Dutch were going all out to support Phillip’s Force Z, and the Americans were concentrating to the east of Celebes in the Banda Sea. To increase a sense of comradeship, it had been agreed with the Australian and New Zealand governments that two light cruisers (HMAS Perth and HMNZS Achilles) and two destroyers (HMAS Vampire and Voyager) would be assigned to the American Task Force 5 (USS Houston, Marblehead and Boise, along with eight USN destroyers). The rest of the Royal Australian Navy, along with the New Zealanders, were doing their best to maintain the open sea lanes back towards America.
The Australian force in Rabual had reported strong attacks from carrier based aircraft and that all of their own fighters and bombers were either destroyed or withdrawn. Radio communications were patchy, but the recent messages were reporting Japanese invasion forces being resisted.
Auchinleck had accepted his role knowing full well that each of the countries would be focussed on their own particular problems, and with the exception of the navies, would be unable to really collaborate. The thing that Auchinleck had noted from each and every battle was the overwhelming power exercised by the Japanese Army and Navy air forces. The destruction wraught at Pearl Harbour now seemed to be falling on Rabaul. The American Volunteer Group in Rangoon were, so far, the only fighter group that seemed to be capable of taking on and defeating the Japanese fighters and bombers. The arrival of Hurricanes and Tomahawks at Singapore might have the same effect, but it remained to be seen if the RAF pilots would take on board the lessons the AFG were offering.
There was a growing American Army Air Corps presence, mostly aircraft and pilots that were meant to be defending the Philippines. As these reinforcements had arrived too late, the bombers and fighters could play an important role, if only they could be concentrated and properly integrated. The obvious place was alongside the Dutch ML-KNIL. Auchinleck had spent a good hour with the various air force commanders. Air Marshall Richard Pierse was to be in overall command of ABDA Air, having lost his job as AOC-in-C Bomber Command, but wasn’t yet arrived in the Far East. Pierse’s American deputy, Major-General Lewis Brereton was the one Auchinleck really wanted to convince of the need for closer cooperation. Even although he was now out from under the command of Douglas MacArthur, Brereton was still sore from losing most of his bomber force on the ground on the first day of the war with Japan. To Auchinleck’s delight his own deputy, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett (USAAF) was fully on board with this plan and was keen to support Auchinleck’s proposals.
Lieutenant-General Ludolph van Oyen, C-in-C ML-KNIL, had witnessed first hand the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. He and Brereton had much in common. Both the USAAF and ML-KNIL were short of everything, and desperate to stop the Japanese. Auchinleck had the difficult task to try to get the two men to get past their natural inclination to think first of their own needs, and somehow to work together to create not only a unified command, but a real collaboration.
The basis for this had been established to some degree by the reconnaissance units. Kapitein ter Zee G. G. Bozuwa of Marineluchtvaartdienst (MLD) had been working well with the other operators of the PBY equipped squadrons including USN Patrol Wing 10 and No. 205 Squadron RAF. These most valuable assets had been covering various areas, but reporting back to Bozuwa as well as their own chain of command. Bozuwa’s staff were therefore in a position to update everyone’s intelligence sections about Japanese shipping movements.
Auchinleck had Brereton and van Oyen meet together, along with Brett, to see if some kind of deal could be hashed out. General Marshall had informed Brereton by radio it was the War Department's fixed policy to seek the enemy's defeat by a unified effort under the leadership of General Auchinleck. Brereton's mission, as Marshall succinctly added, was to execute the orders issued by Auchinleck.
The Dutch had prepared numerous airdromes on Java, with seven military fields and three commercial airports as well as a considerable number of emergency landing fields well distributed across the countryside. The Dutch had also constructed modern airfields on Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and Amboina, and suitable at least for use by pursuit planes were the fields on Timor, Soemba, and Bali. But the government of the Netherlands East Indies lacked a modern air force. In January 1942 its approximately 150 planes were obsolescent. The only real hope were the reinforcements coming to the USAAF.
So far, Brereton had command of 18 P40s, fifty-two A24s (delivered to Australia) and fourteen B17s (escaped from the Philippines). 180 pursuit planes (P40s), with crews had now arrived in Australia, and another complete pursuit group with 80 planes had left San Diego on 10 January. 20 B-17's and 6 LB-30's had arrived by the South Pacific route, an additional 45 B-17's and 9 LB-30's were to follow.
This was going to be a formidable force, but Brereton rightly noted that throwing aircraft into battle, without a chance to properly prepare the aircraft and train the pilots was a recipe for disaster. Brereton wanted time to for his force to be combat ready. Van Oyen was seeing his ML-KNIL force being ground down far too quickly. He was desperate for American assistance. Auchinleck, knowing that the RAF were struggling with the same problems in Burma and Malaya could well appreciate the position of both men.
To add to the mix, Air Commodore Del Wilson, the senior RAAF officer had briefed Brett noting that nearly all the effective RAAF squadrons were defending Singapore, and he had almost nothing at home to protect Northern Australia. As had just become clear at Rabual, a few Wirraway trainers were no match for the Japanese aircraft. Wilson also wanted the American build up to happen in Australia, where they could be used in its defence.
The final agreement was for the American Army Air Forces reinforcements to concentrate on the eastern side of the Dutch East Indies, as Australia was becoming the main operating base from which the Americans would have their logistical support structure in place. The current pursuit and bomber aircraft already in place would concentrate on Java from where the bombers would be able to operate over the wider area, and the P40s protect the island itself. Nobody was entirely happy with this outcome, but Auchinleck knew that the concentration of American forces at Darwin would become crucial in the next phase of operations.
Regarding troops on the ground, some American and British army units were on Borneo and Celebes supporting the KNIL, but otherwise there was no real abililty to project power. The job of the allies would be to upset the Japanese plans as far as possible, and then, figure out how to knock them back.
With Admiral Phillips’ Force Z the only real force in the area, it would fall to him in HMS Nelson, with HMS Warspite, HMS Ark Royal, and the various British and Dutch cruisers and destroyers to try to upset the Japanese plans. The Dutch had spotted a Japanese fleet of transports and escorts sailing south from Tarakan, expected to arrive off Balikpapan during the night. The weather was poor, but the Dutch had collected as many bombers and fighters as possible, along with a couple of submarines to attempt to harry the Japanese, allowing Force Z to close with them and, if their luck held, put them to the sword.