Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

British need more subs in theatre first I think were they could be pulled from though would probably be the Home Islands I think since in the Med they will be playing wack a ship with whats left of the Italian fleet and Merchant Marine.
More than likely all the T class boats will be sent to the Pacific (its where they were designed for ) rather than the Med (they were too large and so took heavier losses) as no need for every sub possible to intercept supply convoys to Africa.
 
More than likely all the T class boats will be sent to the Pacific (its where they were designed for ) rather than the Med (they were too large and so took heavier losses) as no need for every sub possible to intercept supply convoys to Africa.
Yep, I suspect eleven boats might well avoid their OTL fates, namely, Thunderbolt (sunk 14 March 1942), Triumph (lost 14 January 1942), Tigris (sunk 17 February 1943), Talisman (lost 17 September 1942), Tetrarch (lost 27 October 1941), Tempest (sunk 13 February 1942), Thorn (sunk 6 August 1942), Traveller (lost 12 December 1942), Trooper (lost 14 October 1943), Turbulent (lost March 1943) and P311 (lost before being named, either late December 1942 or Early January 1943).
 
It seems the Japanese are very reliant on their outflanking and infiltrating operations, which are by now getting shut down before they start as often as not. When they realize that, the viability of the timetable might be questioned, though I doubt that Yamashita would be too willing to let his bosses know that.
'Imperial General Headquarters estimated that, in the absence of serious interference by the Allied navies, the first period (invasion of Philippines, Malaya, Borneo) would be completed in accordance with the following timetable: Philippines ~ 50 days; Malaya. ~100; Netherlands East Indies ~150.'
Considering the fact that the British and Dutch Navy might be on their way to interfere, by the time they realized that, perhaps Yamashita had a convenient scapegoat for the timetable "adjustments".
 
Considering the fact that the British and Dutch Navy might be on their way to interfere, by the time they realized that, perhaps Yamashita had a convenient scapegoat for the timetable "adjustments".
It is going to be a happy time for both the Dutch and British submarines out there.
 
It is going to be a happy time for both the Dutch and British submarines out there.
So long as they have enough Jolly Roger flags to record their kills and brooms to tie to the periscopes.

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It is going to be a happy time for both the Dutch and British submarines out there.
I wouldn't run up the Jolly Roger just yet - invasion convoys tend to be a tough target for submarines. Compared to merchant/supply convoys they tend to be faster and better escorted - and worse yet they're scarce and hard to predict. The real Happy Time will come when the Japanese try to get their oil home from Balikpapan, if the Allies still have an operational submarine base closer than Brisbane. And that's six months off, at least.
 
I wouldn't run up the Jolly Roger just yet - invasion convoys tend to be a tough target for submarines. Compared to merchant/supply convoys they tend to be faster and better escorted - and worse yet they're scarce and hard to predict. The real Happy Time will come when the Japanese try to get their oil home from Balikpapan, if the Allies still have an operational submarine base closer than Brisbane. And that's six months off, at least.
Um, the primary Dutch navy base is at Surabaya, less than 900 km by sea from Balikpapan, and the Makassar Strait is a very good submarine hunting ground, especially at the mouth at the northern end, where it's less than 120 km wide.
 
A 17 pounder in a 69" is always going to be a tight fit. In a tl with a tank in production designed to take the 17 pounder I doubt the Firefly concept ever occurs to anyone.

Kinda late, but the reason why the Firefly was so cramped with the 17pdr is that the Shermans that the British received from the US (which a portion of became Fireflies) had the original, smaller turret, one that was designed for the 75mm gun. US Shermans with the 76mm had a larger turret, originally meant for the T20/T23; it wouldn't have been such a tight fit to put the 17pdr in the Firefly if the British had been given those versions of the Sherman to work with.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The major problem for the Japanese Army, is having fought a poorly equipped, badly led and mostly inadequately trained opposition for so many years. It has basically become a two trick force, ether strait down the middle with overwhelming numbers, or slip around the side and isolate its opponent from the rest of its forces. However it is now facing in Malaya, reasonable well equipped, especially with artillery, comparatively well trained, and competently well led forces. The various ‘British’ forces be they Anglo Indian, Australian, Anglo Native, or British, are not going to as the majority of the Chinese did, just fade away if pushed hard. Now they have gotten over in the case of the Anglo Indian and Anglo Native troops and British prewar regulars, the initial shock of combat, they are beginning to develop tactics to deal effectively with the Japanese attacks. The British are now at 1.5 in methods to deal with Japanese attacks, as it wasn’t until 1944 during the OTL Burma campaign that they got to 3, and were able to fully exploit their strengths and the Japanese weaknesses. At present if the Japanese go for a straight frontal attack, the British response is simple, attempt to break up the attack during the formation stage, with artillery and mortars, then meet any attack with overwhelming machine gun fire, and well prepared positions. Given the lack of heavy artillery that the Japanese have, to enact counter battery fire, and the limited ability of the British to provide air cover, any Japanese frontal attack is going to be extremely costly, and fail more times than it succeeds. Plus the RAF, is able to provide limited air cover, which takes some of the sting out of Japanese air strikes.


The ability of the Japanese to slip around the flanks of British forces, and cut them off from their supply chain, while subjecting them to flank attacks, is steadily being eroded. While the British are not yet able to turn this tactic into a loosing proposition, which will come later. By staying in place, forming a defensive box, attacking the flanking force as it deploys, and relying on air drops for resupply. With distant artillery providing fire support, long range groups interdicting the Japanese logistics train, and constant air cover, and strikes. What they can do at present, is attempt to disrupt and ambush the flanking attack, while salting the ground with various bobby traps, and having a strong counter force, able to clear any road blocks established. Remember unlike the Chinese who were always short on even basic military supplies, the British who might be slightly short of the big ticket items, had plenty of the basics. So take a an empty ration tin, that’s big enough to fit a hand-grenade in, take grenade and attach a length of string to it, place grenade into tin and remove the safety pin. Stretch the string out across the trail, or clearing, and tie of to suitable point. The British don’t need dedicated land mines, they have enough ordnance that can be adapted as bobby traps. And the British have the artillery and the communications to provide fire missions in support of units that have been cut off from their parent formation, something that the Chinese couldn’t do. While it’s going to take time for the British to fully get their act together, by the close of the campaign season they should be at 2. And once they have air superiority, along with the transport aircraft, they will quickly move towards a 3 on the how to deal with the Japanese scale. Once the monsoon season is over, and the British have received even more reinforcements, the Japanese are going to be on a long losing streak.

RR.
 
Um, the primary Dutch navy base is at Surabaya, less than 900 km by sea from Balikpapan, and the Makassar Strait is a very good submarine hunting ground, especially at the mouth at the northern end, where it's less than 120 km wide.
Exactly. OTL, by the time the Japanese got the Balikpapan oilfields back into production, Java and Singapore had both been lost, and the submarines were operating from Australia. TTL....?

And if the Japanese don't make it to Balikpapan - or suitable oilfields elsewhere, such as North Borneo - then the submarines are liable to become irrelevant as no ships will be moving - which brings up another point. As things stand, the Japanese have almost no option other than to keep going for the Borneo oil until they succeed or lose their fleet trying. There's no point in holding major units back for The Decisive Battle if they're going to have to fight it without fuel.
 
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When 5th Division’s frontal attack on Kuala Kampar began it was meant to be supported by the Imperial Guards Division’s flanking attack. Instead, two separate battles were fought, allowing Murray-Lyons to concentrate most of his force on holding the 5th Division’s attack.
I'll just note that Yamashita has a reputation as a very competent commander, so IMHO it's unlikely that he'd just go blindly ahead with his frontal attack if he knows his flanking units haven't reached their intended positions. Particularly since his plan is to break the British/Indian centre, so he needs those flanking units to tie down British forces that could otherwise reinforce the crunch point at Kuala Kangsar. I'd expect him to hold off on the main thrust until he heard the Imperial Guards had made contact with something more solid than a skirmish screen fighting a delaying action.
 

Orry

Donor
Monthly Donor
I'll just note that Yamashita has a reputation as a very competent commander, so IMHO it's unlikely that he'd just go blindly ahead with his frontal attack if he knows his flanking units haven't reached their intended positions. Particularly since his plan is to break the British/Indian centre, so he needs those flanking units to tie down British forces that could otherwise reinforce the crunch point at Kuala Kangsar. I'd expect him to hold off on the main thrust until he heard the Imperial Guards had made contact with something more solid than a skirmish screen fighting a delaying action.

But what would he hear

The IG did not do very well in their last battle - which probably cost them a number of their most competant and agressive officers

So maybe they want to big up their success this time

We are heavily engaged but are driving the British back........
 
The major problem for the Japanese Army, is having fought a poorly equipped, badly led and mostly inadequately trained opposition for so many years. It has basically become a two trick force, ether strait down the middle with overwhelming numbers, or slip around the side and isolate its opponent from the rest of its forces. However it is now facing in Malaya, reasonable well equipped, especially with artillery, comparatively well trained, and competently well led forces. The various ‘British’ forces be they Anglo Indian, Australian, Anglo Native, or British, are not going to as the majority of the Chinese did, just fade away if pushed hard. Now they have gotten over in the case of the Anglo Indian and Anglo Native troops and British prewar regulars, the initial shock of combat, they are beginning to develop tactics to deal effectively with the Japanese attacks. The British are now at 1.5 in methods to deal with Japanese attacks, as it wasn’t until 1944 during the OTL Burma campaign that they got to 3, and were able to fully exploit their strengths and the Japanese weaknesses. At present if the Japanese go for a straight frontal attack, the British response is simple, attempt to break up the attack during the formation stage, with artillery and mortars, then meet any attack with overwhelming machine gun fire, and well prepared positions. Given the lack of heavy artillery that the Japanese have, to enact counter battery fire, and the limited ability of the British to provide air cover, any Japanese frontal attack is going to be extremely costly, and fail more times than it succeeds. Plus the RAF, is able to provide limited air cover, which takes some of the sting out of Japanese air strikes.


The ability of the Japanese to slip around the flanks of British forces, and cut them off from their supply chain, while subjecting them to flank attacks, is steadily being eroded. While the British are not yet able to turn this tactic into a loosing proposition, which will come later. By staying in place, forming a defensive box, attacking the flanking force as it deploys, and relying on air drops for resupply. With distant artillery providing fire support, long range groups interdicting the Japanese logistics train, and constant air cover, and strikes. What they can do at present, is attempt to disrupt and ambush the flanking attack, while salting the ground with various bobby traps, and having a strong counter force, able to clear any road blocks established. Remember unlike the Chinese who were always short on even basic military supplies, the British who might be slightly short of the big ticket items, had plenty of the basics. So take a an empty ration tin, that’s big enough to fit a hand-grenade in, take grenade and attach a length of string to it, place grenade into tin and remove the safety pin. Stretch the string out across the trail, or clearing, and tie of to suitable point. The British don’t need dedicated land mines, they have enough ordnance that can be adapted as bobby traps. And the British have the artillery and the communications to provide fire missions in support of units that have been cut off from their parent formation, something that the Chinese couldn’t do. While it’s going to take time for the British to fully get their act together, by the close of the campaign season they should be at 2. And once they have air superiority, along with the transport aircraft, they will quickly move towards a 3 on the how to deal with the Japanese scale. Once the monsoon season is over, and the British have received even more reinforcements, the Japanese are going to be on a long losing streak.

RR.
Potentially the biggest problem the Japanese will have is their intellectual response to the setbacks against the British. Given the previous (yes a couple of decades old at this point) close relationship between Britain and Japan I strongly suspect that the response will be that of course the British are doing well, they used to work with us or something to that effect. That will lead them to doubling down on failing tactics and strategies rather than adapting to the setbacks in what limited ways they can.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
While the British and Japanese did have for some years a close relationship, it was always one of expediency, based on mutual interests. Britain also had the advantage that it hadn’t been the one to force Japan to open itself up to western interests, that was America. Japan also felt that it had more in common with the British than the Americans, both are and were Island nations with a Monarchy and a rich history. As opposed to brash young American Republic, which was a continental power, who apposed Monarchy and paid very little reverence to tradition. In addition when it came time to modernise, in particular the Army and the Navy, the Japanese looked to the most powerful Armies and Navies in the world at the time, which wasn’t the American. The Japanese Army modelled itself on the Prussian/German Army, while the Japanese Navy took as its mentor the Royal Navy, one more reason for their hostility towards each other. Add to this the fact that Navies are by their nature outwardly looking, having frequently contact with other Navies, in the normal conduct of their duties. And have elaborate traditions of mutual respect, along with frequent meetings, port visits, joint operations during natural disasters and inclement weather. Where as most Armies are very inward looking, and will very rarely meet with other Armies, other than those on a contested border, or during a mutual intervention in a minor nation. The prime case of which was the formation of an international force during the Boxer Rebellion in China, though it should be noted, other than the British Empire contingent, which in normal British practice, was made up of long service regulars and volunteers from various British colonies. The majority of the European troops, were members of that nations regular colonial forces, and not their home conscript army.

Up until the post WWII era, and in particular the formation of NATO, the idea of holding regular multi nation military exercises, was unheard of. The British and the French who were to be close Allies against the Germans, which was obvious by 1937, didn’t once hold a combined military exercise, even after the outbreak of war, let alone pre war. For the majority of a nation’s troops , they could go through their entire military service life, without ever meeting a soldier from another nation, were as most sailors of a major naval force, would have met, played games especially tug of war and soccer, and fought during drunken barroom brawls, with sailors of a host of other nations. The majority of the Japanese troops fighting in Malaya including their officers, will prior to the invasion of Malaya, never have seen a live European, Indian or Malay. While they will have for those who have seen combat, fought against Chinese, fighting the various British Empire factions, is going to come as a shock. They are now fighting a very different army to that they fought in China, one that like the Soviets in 1939, isn’t short of ammunition, or artillery, even if a lot of it is by European standards slightly outdated. The British also have limited armour, some of which is virtually immune to anything that the Japanese have. In China the Chinese were lucky to have a few 75mm American mountain guns, with limited ammunition and basically only fired over open sights. In Malaya the British have 2 lb Anti Tank guns, old 18 lb field artillery, and 4.5 inch old howitzers, along with the new 25 lb gun/howitzer, plus modernised 6 inch howitzers, with 3.7 inch Anti Aircraft Guns. The British artillery can fire blind, on an unseen target, directed by radio/wireless, by a forward observation officer. And as they replace older guns in North Africa and the Middle East, with newer guns, such as the 5.5 inch gun, they can redeploy those older but still functional guns to Malaya. While the Japanese Navy had had much experience with and contact with the Royal Navy, the Japanese Army however hadn’t, and given its own historical record and experience. It’s going to find it difficult to adjust to the realities of fighting against a first rate power, especially while enjoying significant success against another first rate power America.

RR.
 
19 January 1942. Kuala Kangsar, Malaya.
19 January 1942. Kuala Kangsar, Malaya.

Lt-Col Ian Stewart couldn’t have been prouder of his 2nd Bn Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Ever since they’d arrived in Singapore Stewart had trained the men to live and fight in the worst terrain Malaya had to offer. Now that they were finally able to put that training into practice, Stewart kept finding wherever he went in the Battalion’s positions that the men were in high spirits.

General Murray-Lyon had agreed to Stewart’s request to stay on the western side of the Perak for as long as possible. He wanted to give the Japanese a taste of their own medicine, even though he was short of one full Infantry Company detached in various places. The men of the Administrative and Pioneer Platoons had volunteered to a man to leave their normal jobs to strengthen the fighting strength of the Battalion. Stewart joked with the Padre that he seemed the only man not sporting at least a handgun. But the Padre was up with a party of stretcher-bearers with A Company, so Stewart had no complaints about the Church of Scotland minister. The Pipe Major accompanied the Battalion CO wherever he went, acting as a personal bodyguard, along with his own and Stewart’s batman.

Stewart had managed to beg, borrow or steal (mostly steal) enough Thompson submachine guns so that there was at least one in each section of infantry, most of the infantry Companies managed two per squad. Much of the work done by the men would be up close and personal, and there was something of the Jimmy Cagney ‘gangster’ look that the men liked. With the Carrier Platoon not using their vehicles, the extra Bren teams were spread among the platoons. Extra bags of grenades were carried in each section, and most of the men, since they were moving from one prepared position to another, carried as little kit as possible except for ammunition.

The battle had begun the previous day when just after dawn the Japanese artillery opened up after an air raid. The road from Taiping to Kuala Kangsar went through a fairly narrow valley, which Stewart had chosen to be the place where he would show the Japanese what jungle fighting was really like. It was an obvious chokepoint, and Major-General Kawamura’s 9th Brigade led the way with 11th Regiment, supported by two companies of 2nd Tank Regiment. The leading battalions had deployed expecting a fight, one battalion pushing up each hill on either side of the valley. Most of the tanks concentrated on the road, attempting to support the infantry with cannon and machine gun fire, a few enterprising tank commanders attempted to accompany the infantry through the jungle.

Stewart had organised his signal platoon to work with a pair of Royal Artillery Forward Observers on each hill, who’d had time to work out fire plans. As the Japanese advanced, they were under almost constant, accurate bombardment. The Argylls had been preparing for this battle for over a week. Just about every foot of ground had been gone over, sorting out firing positions, withdrawal routes, and having prepared killing grounds, often created with the help of the 15 Field Company Queen Victoria’s Own Madras Sappers and Miners, and a good supply of mines and explosives.

All that preparation was immediately effective as the first platoons of Japanese troops, usually showing signs of being undertrained, fell into trap after trap. No sooner had an officer or NCO tried to bring some kind of order into the Japanese movements than Scottish snipers cut them down. The Scots weren’t interested in a stand-up fight. They drew increasing numbers of Japanese troops into the killing zones, and then withdraw to do it all again. By the middle of the day, both Japanese Battalion commanders were dead, and their units’ strength was depleted. The road itself was pockmarked with craters rapidly filling with water from the heavy rain showers that covered the battlefield in the early afternoon. Kawamura had ordered the third battalion of 11th Regiment to stop for nothing but to get to the far side of the valley. With great bravery the men set off to do so, but the concentration of a British Division’s worth of artillery raining down HE on them, and with a Machine Gun battalion putting down indirect fire along the road, their bravery didn’t stop them dying in large numbers.

Brigadier Paris (CO 12th Indian Brigade) had 5th Bn, 2nd Punjab Regiment support the Argylls, ready to cover them as they withdrew eventually the river crossing. The Punjabis had put up a roadblock at the eastern end of the valley which the survivors of 11th Regiment didn’t have the strength to even attempt to attack. A battery of 2-pdrs were on hand to persuade the Japanese tank commanders that forward movement wasn’t a solution to their problems.

The problems encountered by the Japanese 11th Infantry Regiment had in no way dissuaded Yamashita from his expectation of victory. He was well aware that this was never going to be easy. Some of his staff had suggested earlier in December that by 18 January his men would be in Johore readying for the final attack on Singapore that should fall by the middle of February! Fanciful nonsense of course.

The order to Major-General Kawamura was for the rest of his Brigade to advance and keep up the momentum. For every Japanese soldier killed, at least one British soldier must also have died. Kawamura requested, and got, more artillery to try to counter the British artillery. 25th Army’s twenty-eight 150mm guns were already concentrated and were given special permission to use more shells than they were normally allowed. In addition, another Battalion of 81mm mortars were released to Kawamura from Army reserves. An extra 36 mortars would certainly make life difficult for the British in the hills.

Lt Col Stewart had his Pipe Major play the Regimental Quick March “The Campbells are Coming” during a lull in the fighting. The tired men of the Argylls hearing the pipes recognised the ‘well done’ from their CO. If they heard ‘Hielan’ Laddie’ they would know it was time to withdraw. As part of their reconnaissance of the battlefield the Argylls had planted stores of ammunition, fresh water, cold rations and medical kits at various points. These replenished the men, with each platoon trying to make sure that every section had time to get their breath back, clean their weapons, recharge their ammo supplies and if possible, get something to eat.

The fighting went on in the hills until failing light and exhaustion had the Japanese halt and try to consolidate their gains. The nightly resupply was brought up and carried up to the forward companies. The Argyll’s ‘goodnight’ to their opponents was a barrage of 2-inch mortar rounds, and a few rousing reels on the bagpipes. Once darkness had fallen completely each platoon sent out a squad split into two four-man patrols. Using all the skills honed in pre-war exercises, many a Japanese sentry was found the next morning dead, with the occasional crash of a handful of grenades being thrown into Japanese positions. Not many Japanese soldiers slept at all that night, almost none slept well, even those completely exhausted by their efforts of the day.

To the north, on the road from Grik, the Imperial Guards Division’s problems continued, and once more it was a Scottish Regiment causing them difficulty. Trying to move a large body of men over very poor roads and tracks had its own problems. If the men were carrying heavy equipment, manhandling artillery pieces, and under the occasional ambush, then that was a whole other problem. The objective of putting in a flanking attack meant the Division had to cover fifty miles from Grik to Kuala Kangsar. They managed just five miles, and to make matters worse, four RAAF Hudsons appeared and managed to land their sticks of bombs pretty accurately near the crossroads at Grik where an ammunition dump had been set up. The RAAF crews noted in their briefing that they had seen secondary explosions as they left the area. At the scene itself large numbers of casualties had been caused, especially among the Division’s supply troops.

To the south, the 1st Duke of York’s Own Skinners Horse, with their various supporting units, had given up ten miles to Major-General Sakurai’s 33rd Division. In doing so the Indian cavalry had managed to frustrate Sakurai who ordered the commander of 214th Infantry Regiment to allow no level of casualties to slow down the advance. Without the width, or speed, to flank and envelop the Indian Cavalry, there was no way the Regiment could achieve anything other than being bled at just about every turn in the road. Even the intervention of Japanese bombers and fighters to support 33rd Division’s progress couldn’t derail the Cavalry’s slowing of the Japanese advance.

To the east, Lieutenant-General Watanabe’s 56th Division (113 and 148 Regiments) had relied on the railway on Thailand’s east coast to bring the men and equipment most of the way to the front line. The Australian Rose Force had been doing their best, with the occasional help from a Dutch or British submarine, to infiltrate and do whatever damage they could to the railway, concentrating on the bridges. Two groups had been captured and killed, but others had got away scot-free and the Japanese railway units, along with engineers and impressed Thai workers were doing their best to keep the line open. The delays meant that most of the men of 113th Regiment had arrived, but much of their heavier equipment and ammunition resupply hadn’t.

Two battalions of 113th Regiment moved up to reinforce the men of 143rd Regiment, who in turn had taken over from 142nd Regiment. 143rd Regiment, having been reassigned from the southern tip of Burma, hadn’t had much chance to make progress against the 9th Indian Division. Japanese probes were finding that the Indians were firmly seated in well prepared defences, with their supply line was keeping them well provisioned. The efforts of those who had attempted to defeat the Indians never managed to get the weight of men necessary to break through the Indian’s lines. The arrival of 113th and 148th Regiments to strengthen 143rd Regiment would finally give at least parity with the three Indian Brigades, though the British had a far higher number of artillery units than the Japanese did.
 
Another great update on the Battle of Kuala Kangsar. The Japanese HQ really made a gamble on a basis that the British will not suddenly launch an attack from Burma with the amount of troops it withdrew from the Burma front.
And so the Japanese feed ever more men into the meat-grinder.
Not just any meat-grinder, this is a royal-grade, Eton(or at least the Malay equivalent)-educated meat grinder. Any person (including those people who is probably supporting the Japanese) ITTL that read about this battle will immediately turn into an Japanese-bashing Anglophile. (/s,BTW, unless it turned out to be very bad for the Japanese)
 
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