Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Hm, Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, Mussolini... Is it just me, or are national leaders are more of a benefit to their enemies than their own side?
I don't think anyone could reasonably believe Churchill was more beneficial to the Germans than the British, if he had been there would have been peace in 1940.
 
I don't think anyone could reasonably believe Churchill was more beneficial to the Germans than the British, if he had been there would have been peace in 1940.
I think you could argue that national leaders playing at C-in-C and overruling the professionals were often of more benefit to the enemy than their own side. The saving grace of Churchill is most of the time he did listen to professionals (eventually).
 
I suppose one thing about Churchill is that he'd been in numerous different offices in the past, including First Sea Lord during WW1 (although his actions during were perhaps not the best, considering Gallipoli...) Still, given that he was the leader of a democracy he did have one benefit there; in that Churchill had people that were willing to say no to him, and tell him why things he suggested were bad ideas, even if he still did want some of them done (the least bad ideas, I suppose).
 

Ramontxo

Donor
Who lose the Empire by choosing the wrong allies in WW2? I meet a lot of people that held that opinion. Of course they were unashamed Francoists
 
I might be misremembering things here, but wasn't there an earlier chapter that had some of the A11s with the pom-poms shipped off to Malaya? If so what happened to them?
 
I might be misremembering things here, but wasn't there an earlier chapter that had some of the A11s with the pom-poms shipped off to Malaya? If so what happened to them?
Don't think so - several of us suggested that a prescient British Army should send them out to Malaya but the last active service A11s ended up on Crete chewing up the German paras.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Can the Japanese by diverting men and resources from other planed operations, get their invasion of Malaya back on track, and succeed in capturing Malaya and Singapore?


The present difficulties that the Japanese are having in their invasion of Malaya, only go to show just how lucky they were IOTL. With minimal changes to the British command structure and slight improvements to the resources available, the British have succeeded in significantly changing the progress of the Japanese invasion. And while they the men of TTL have no knowledge of the events of OTL, and will still be operating fearful of a Japanese success in their invasion attempt, and have a long and difficult road to travel. We can see that the Japanese have effectively shot their bolt, and unless they can significantly reenforce their attack quickly, they are on the beginning of a downward spiral. The problem that the Japanese face, is which operation to cancel or delay, and how do they move the men and resources to the Malayan conflict. The Japanese logistics were throughout the war always strained, especially in comparison to the British and Americans. And in the Malayan region the British have the advantage of having Singapore, a major port and Naval base at their back. Yes the local infrastructure was underdeveloped by modern standards, with a poor road and railway system, airfields that are not all weather, and an inadequate Civil Defence system. But once the initial shock of the invasion is over, the British will be able to repair most of these deficiencies. And the British do have available a highly skilled, motivated and willing workforce to draw upon, who themselves have no love of the Japanese, the local Chinese population. They also have a large local shipping structure to draw upon, and the available local resources, such as fuel from Burma and the DEI, which is denied to the Japanese.

The Japanese are short of shipping, and thanks to the efforts of the RN and RDN, submarine forces in the South China Sea, shipping is going to be under serious pressure. They do not have a major port in the area that they can divert their forces to, and the roads and railways to move them and supply them at the front. The Japanese were like the Germans in the Soviet Union, expecting to very much live of the land. Fine if you are able to make a rapid advance, but totally inadequate if your forces are basically static. The Japanese are quickly going to consume all the available local resources, and in the process totally alienating the local population. And once they have stripped the local area of resources, they have the problem of what resources do they prioritise, food, fuel, ammunition or replacement men and equipment. So while the can divert men and resources from another front or planed operation, its doubtful that this will do them any good. Which operation are they potentially prepared to give up, as forces diverted to Malaya might not ever be available to complete their previous mission. Is diverting the forces, the best use of them, at this time, just how important was the mission to your grand plan, that they were initially slated for. Do you have the logistics available right now to allow you to divert these forces, or are you going to have to assemble them, and how long will it take. Even if they can scrape up the forces to divert to Malaya, by now it’s probably to late for them to be effective. And given that the British are due to receive significant reinforcements themselves, will not achieve the aim of getting their invasion back on track. While at one and the same time derail the future plans, that they had for those forces.

On the question of the affect that the various leaders of the warring nations had, and whether they were more use to their opposition than they were to their own side, the answer is it varies. Without doubt Hitler was a disaster for the Germans from the very start. He managed to totally mismanage the German economy and drive it into near bankruptcy, pre the outbreak of the war. While his interference in the military decisions, such as the halt order at Dunkirk, totally negated his any good his insistence that the French were in no position to fight. He wasn’t prepared to allow any opposition to his ideas, and surrounded himself with yes men and idiots. Mussolini wasn’t much better nor was Tojo, or any off the various dictators. Stalin could be a nightmare to his officials, but could be reasoned with by those with skill, he didn’t go full mad dictator until the post war period, as he had been pre war. FDR, was as have said before, very much a dilettante, and often failed to make his requests completely clear, was by the standards of the day lazy, and failed to put in the hard work required of a major leader. Winston had many faults, there is no doubt that he was a glutton and high functioning alcoholic, and in meany respects a bigot, though not a racist. He was however very hard working, even though he kept somewhat unusual working hours, and some very suspect personnel habits, such as dictation to his Secretary from the bath. He was frequently stubborn and obstinate, and a bit of a bully to those who were afraid to stand up to him. And as Alan Brooks said, the major problem was sorting out the one or two good ideas he had from the twenty ideas he had daily. His impatience with the majority of the members of the establishment, who found excuses why they couldn’t do what was required of them immediately, while at times useful, was mostly counterproductive. Of all the major leaders he along with Stalin, did have the foresight to see the post war consequences of their actions, unlike the majority of the others, who were blind sided by their own ideology.

RR.
 
Hm, Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, Mussolini... Is it just me, or are national leaders are more of a benefit to their enemies than their own side?
Churchill was not a dictator so was not in a position to 'benefit the enemy' in the same way that the other 3 could

He was the 'Prime' Minister, a first among equals certainly, but a minister who could be removed by the House of Commons, simply by the majority of the right honourable members choosing to do so.

However throughout British history PMs have generally jumped before they were pushed knowing their time was up

Churchill did survive a motion of no confidence during the worst moment of his time as Prime Minister - 'Vote of no confidence in central direction of war' - winning it with 475 votes to 25 on the 2nd July 1942 following the defeat of the Empire forces at teh Battle of Gazala and the subsequent loss of Trobruk as well as the defeats in the far east

None of the other 3 had to put up with anything like this
 
23 December 1941. Kuching, Borneo.
23 December 1941. Kuching, Borneo.

Lt Col Henry Moorehead (CO Sarawak Force 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment and 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment) had been in contact with the Dutch force at Singkawang II airfield. The Dutch had 750 men and a tank and armoured vehicle detachment protecting their airfield. It was just 70 miles from Kuching, but the road towards the Dutch East Indies border ended at Krokong, with a river ferry Batu Kitang before that that needed to be defended. Between Krokong and Singhawang II there was almost forty miles of virgin jungle.

The planning that A/Lt Col Lane had in place before the arrival of Moorehead’s force was to hold the airfield and then withdraw back towards Singhawang. Since Moorehead’s arrival he had working parties of his own troops and locals to try to widen a native trail into a path over the border, so that when the time came the men, and white civilians, would be able to make the journey a bit easier. The Dutch had agreed to allow the working parties to cross the border, and had some heavy machinery to push up from Siluas towards the border, adding to the British effort to make it possible. The result had been that two of the Dutch tanks, in fact Vickers Mark VIC Light Tanks armed with Besa 15mm and 7.92mm guns, had arrived to test the ability for tracked vehicles to get between the two airfields.

The Royal Dutch Indies Army, Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL), had ordered 73 Vickers-Carden-Loyd Light Tanks and had received 24 before the war had begun. In June 1940, the British War Office informed the Dutch exile government in England that the balance of the order of Light Tanks would be taken over by the British Government. At that time 16 vehicles were ready for delivery at Newcastle at the Vickers Armstrong factory. In the following months, the Dutch Foreign Office and the Colonial Office tried to recover all the missing 49 vehicles, and finally succeeded in early 1941. However, since all the tanks had been used for training purposes, and were therefore not brand new, the British had replaced half of them with new Vickers Mark VIC light tanks. These had been accepted by the Dutch government in exile and shipped to the East Indies, via the Panama Canal, in June 1941.

Since the KNIL had six Mark VICs at Singhawang II, the Dutch Brigadier Timmer (a brigade was a 15 man group in the KNIL) had been ordered to support the two Punjab battalions with his two tanks. Moorehead greeted Timmer with great enthusiasm. Moorehead had placed his 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment to defend the waterways into Kuching. 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment were defending the airfield and some of the crucial points on the route to Singhawang II. His plan was to oppose a landing as far forward as possible, then to pull back to the airfield. The airfield itself was scheduled for demolitions, but it would a position for the 5/14 Punjab Regiment to hold, to allow the men of the 3/16 to withdraw through and prepare to hold the river crossing at Batu Kitang, to allow the other Battalion to fall back, and then leapfrog one another, bleeding the Japanese as much as possible all the way back. With two light tanks in addition to his understrength carrier platoons, he now had a mobile force with a bit of teeth to it. Timmer agreed to Moorehead’s plan and started working with the Punjabis to rehearse how such support would be best used.

There were three vessels at Kuching: Margaret, Rejang, and Gladys that the Punjabis had taken over as floating strong points. The sepoys had brought on board sandbags to protect the crucial features and added a variety of weapons including Vickers HMGs to provide the firepower. In addition to the Punjabis, the Sarawak Coastal Marine Service provided the crews for the three vessels. Each ‘gunboat’ had a platoon of troops including at least one anti-tank rifle on each boat.

When Lt Col Lane had been SarForce CO, he had received reinforcements of two 6-inch guns Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery and commanded by Captain H.N.P.R. Halstead. One of the guns had been lost trying to cross a river, but Halstead had positioned the remaining gun so that ships approaching along the Santubong River would be covered by it. The Punjabis’ had also been issued with three old 18-pounder guns and Halstead’s men had trained detachments of Punjabis to operate them. These were placed to cover the Sarawak River approach to Kuching. Between the ‘gunboats’ and the artillery Moorehead was confident that any Japanese landing parties wouldn’t have an easy time of it.

The intermittent radio communications from Lane’s 2nd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment confirmed the Japanese landing, and the attempts they had been making to cause the Japanese as much trouble as they could. Lane had informed Moorehead that all four of his Companies were still actively engaged with the enemy but avoiding set-piece battles where the Japanese numerical superiority could be brought to bear. Lane had planned on resisting for a week, and then pulling his men back to reserve positions where they could rest and regroup. Once that happened, Lane suspected that the greater part of the Japanese force would likely head towards Kuching.

The Dutch Militaire Luchtvaart-KNIL (Military Aviation) and Marine Luchtvaartdienst-KNIL (Naval Air Force) had been attempting to bomb the Japanese ships at Miri with some success, the destroyer Shinonome had been sunk, and it was believed that at least one transport had been damaged. The Royal Dutch East Indies Navy (Nederlands-Indië Marine) had two submarines in the vicinity K-XIV (Lt.Cdr. C.A.J. van Well Groeneveld) and K-XVI (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Jarman) which were converging on Miri to attack the ships there. Lane reported that some of the ships were still off-loading what looked like engineering equipment. His best guess was that it was equipment to get the oil field running again. If those transports could be sunk, then it would give Moorehead longer to prepare to defend Kuching, and the Dutch to defend Singhawang II.
 
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I thought a good bit before having the Dutch with more tanks. The 'Dutchmen', the Vickers-Carden-Loyd Light tanks taken up in June 1940 by the British as training tanks is OTL, as are the efforts to get the 49 tanks back. Without the complete panic post Dunkirk, I think supplying the Free Dutch with 49 light tanks, including here some Mark VICs is probably pushing the envelope, but hey ho...
Allan
 
I thought a good bit before having the Dutch with more tanks. The 'Dutchmen', the Vickers-Carden-Loyd Light tanks taken up in June 1940 by the British as training tanks is OTL, as are the efforts to get the 49 tanks back. Without the complete panic post Dunkirk, I think supplying the Free Dutch with 49 light tanks, including here some Mark VICs is probably pushing the envelope, but hey ho...
Allan
Mayby not, the britsh army already decided in 1937/38 in this timeline (I think) that VC light tanks where not proper tanks, so having a steady supply of proper tanks, no great losses in North Africa and the weather preventing any ideas about german landings in the fall/winter of 1940. Mayby the are in fact pleased to get rid of those rubbish light jobs. ( before somebody in the finance ministry thinks he can save some money by using light tanks again..)
 
Gotta get the foreign currency somewhere, after all. I think it's perfectly reasonable for surplus light tanks of little real utility to be passed off to the Dutch overseas holdings.
 
Gotta get the foreign currency somewhere, after all. I think it's perfectly reasonable for surplus light tanks of little real utility to be passed off to the Dutch overseas holdings.
IOTL the contract was fulfilled by sending Marmon-Herrington armoured cars from South Africa: From here

Marmon-Herrington Mk.III armoured Car

The KNIL received 49 of these obsolescent armoured cars from South Africa shortly before the fall of Java. They were shipped to the NEI in place of the M1936 light tanks seized by the British Army following the outbreak of war in Europe. All were veterans of the Desert War and arrived badly worn and without armament. Due to constant front-line duty without proper maintenance, their engines badly needed overhaul and the four-wheel drive transmission on many of the vehicles was also out.

Although hampered by a critical shortage of trained mechanics and technical personnel, KNIL depot units were able to arm each vehicle with a Vickers heavy machine gun and make 27 of the Marmon-Herringtons operational before the Japanese landed on Java. From these, two independent squadrons were formed, while a reconnaissance platoon with three vehicles was attached to the KNIL's Mobile Column.

After the surrender of the NEI, a number of captured Marmon-Herringtons were used by the Japanese for occupation duties. They later turned the surviving vehicles over to Indonesian nationalists at the end of the Pacific War, who operated a number against British and Dutch forces on Java. In turn, returning Dutch troops recaptured and operated several of these vehicles as well.
 
IOTL the contract was fulfilled by sending Marmon-Herrington armoured cars from South Africa: From here
While they built less Vickers lights this time, those saved from France with the much reduced need for replacement with the success in NA should means there be a few free to be sold. Is there enough of them around in the UK for more to be upgraded to VIC for the dutch.

Interesting if the Straat Soenda does not run aground this time. Also the Dutch getting the rest of the order if Java and/or Sumtra hold.
 
Every little bit helps and I don't think the Japanese have any Armoured landing capability without taking a port so those tanks will be a godsend
 
Quite a grainy photo of Two officers from the Staffordshire Yeomary in front of their Marmon Herrington Scout Car - apparently cast off from a Hussar regiment that got re-equipped with Daimlers.
AB2022A2-4ABC-435A-BA09-38614952ECB2.jpeg
 
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