Can the Japanese by diverting men and resources from other planed operations, get their invasion of Malaya back on track, and succeed in capturing Malaya and Singapore?
The present difficulties that the Japanese are having in their invasion of Malaya, only go to show just how lucky they were IOTL. With minimal changes to the British command structure and slight improvements to the resources available, the British have succeeded in significantly changing the progress of the Japanese invasion. And while they the men of TTL have no knowledge of the events of OTL, and will still be operating fearful of a Japanese success in their invasion attempt, and have a long and difficult road to travel. We can see that the Japanese have effectively shot their bolt, and unless they can significantly reenforce their attack quickly, they are on the beginning of a downward spiral. The problem that the Japanese face, is which operation to cancel or delay, and how do they move the men and resources to the Malayan conflict. The Japanese logistics were throughout the war always strained, especially in comparison to the British and Americans. And in the Malayan region the British have the advantage of having Singapore, a major port and Naval base at their back. Yes the local infrastructure was underdeveloped by modern standards, with a poor road and railway system, airfields that are not all weather, and an inadequate Civil Defence system. But once the initial shock of the invasion is over, the British will be able to repair most of these deficiencies. And the British do have available a highly skilled, motivated and willing workforce to draw upon, who themselves have no love of the Japanese, the local Chinese population. They also have a large local shipping structure to draw upon, and the available local resources, such as fuel from Burma and the DEI, which is denied to the Japanese.
The Japanese are short of shipping, and thanks to the efforts of the RN and RDN, submarine forces in the South China Sea, shipping is going to be under serious pressure. They do not have a major port in the area that they can divert their forces to, and the roads and railways to move them and supply them at the front. The Japanese were like the Germans in the Soviet Union, expecting to very much live of the land. Fine if you are able to make a rapid advance, but totally inadequate if your forces are basically static. The Japanese are quickly going to consume all the available local resources, and in the process totally alienating the local population. And once they have stripped the local area of resources, they have the problem of what resources do they prioritise, food, fuel, ammunition or replacement men and equipment. So while the can divert men and resources from another front or planed operation, its doubtful that this will do them any good. Which operation are they potentially prepared to give up, as forces diverted to Malaya might not ever be available to complete their previous mission. Is diverting the forces, the best use of them, at this time, just how important was the mission to your grand plan, that they were initially slated for. Do you have the logistics available right now to allow you to divert these forces, or are you going to have to assemble them, and how long will it take. Even if they can scrape up the forces to divert to Malaya, by now it’s probably to late for them to be effective. And given that the British are due to receive significant reinforcements themselves, will not achieve the aim of getting their invasion back on track. While at one and the same time derail the future plans, that they had for those forces.
On the question of the affect that the various leaders of the warring nations had, and whether they were more use to their opposition than they were to their own side, the answer is it varies. Without doubt Hitler was a disaster for the Germans from the very start. He managed to totally mismanage the German economy and drive it into near bankruptcy, pre the outbreak of the war. While his interference in the military decisions, such as the halt order at Dunkirk, totally negated his any good his insistence that the French were in no position to fight. He wasn’t prepared to allow any opposition to his ideas, and surrounded himself with yes men and idiots. Mussolini wasn’t much better nor was Tojo, or any off the various dictators. Stalin could be a nightmare to his officials, but could be reasoned with by those with skill, he didn’t go full mad dictator until the post war period, as he had been pre war. FDR, was as have said before, very much a dilettante, and often failed to make his requests completely clear, was by the standards of the day lazy, and failed to put in the hard work required of a major leader. Winston had many faults, there is no doubt that he was a glutton and high functioning alcoholic, and in meany respects a bigot, though not a racist. He was however very hard working, even though he kept somewhat unusual working hours, and some very suspect personnel habits, such as dictation to his Secretary from the bath. He was frequently stubborn and obstinate, and a bit of a bully to those who were afraid to stand up to him. And as Alan Brooks said, the major problem was sorting out the one or two good ideas he had from the twenty ideas he had daily. His impatience with the majority of the members of the establishment, who found excuses why they couldn’t do what was required of them immediately, while at times useful, was mostly counterproductive. Of all the major leaders he along with Stalin, did have the foresight to see the post war consequences of their actions, unlike the majority of the others, who were blind sided by their own ideology.
RR.