I'm not convinced the QF 17pdr will be adopted/adapted for tanks. I think we're more likely to see some iteration of the Vickers 75mm HV, either in 75mm or 76.2mm/3". But we'll have to wait and see where Allan goes with this.
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
It all depends, British think the Germans are building a tank that needs a 17pdr to defeat, a 17pdr will be fitted. Stopping the 17pdr becoming the infantry's AT gun after the 6pdr is difficult ( the date start of work on design predates date 6pdr design finalised )
marathag
Banned
The big problem, as OTL, the towed 17 pdr is a huge monster for Infantry to move around.
Without the US in a Tunisian campaign, the (in)effectiveness of the US mobile AT Tank Destroyer arm will not be on display, while the British have the more limited experience of Portee efforts, and 17 Pdr also won't be deployed in time before Italian resistance ends in Libya.
In ATL North Africa, the 'Best Defence' against marauding Panzers, is a Vickers Tank.
So while Royal Ordnance is working on the 17 Pdr, there may be a call to match with whatever is in the current Vickers Tank, since that seems to be working.
So there might be a towed 3"HV of some sort, or mobile mounts like the Archer/Avenger/Challenger that don't need a Crusader Tractor to move the piece around.
Mark1878
Donor
Doesn`t the Vickers tank gun of 3" have the same anti tank power as the 6 pounder, the reason that the tank does not use the 6 pounder is that the tank needs better HE capability.
The 17 pounder is the next step up tank killer so the towed anti tank gun will go from 6 to 17 pounder.
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
As we approach the end of 1941, the British are in comparison to the the situation their were in IOTL, in a much better place. And this is primarily due to the existence of one man, John Carden, who has in combination with others managed to provide better tanks ITTL and develop other armoured equipment than were available IOTL. Yes the majority of ideas had been first thought up or tried during WWI, but a combination of lack of funding and in trenched thinking during the interwar years had been a significant break on development. It should be remembered that the British were and are a very inventive nation, and that during the interwar years, much thought and some very underfunded experiments, in future land warfare were debated and tried. However the vast majority of the monies and brains available, concentrated on maritime and aviation, as these two areas were where the gravest threat to the UK came from. So given that it’s now coming to end of 1941, what is the situation in regards to the British ITTL.
First and foremost the battle of the Atlantic is still going on, however it is often forgotten that it was a two sided battle. While the Germans were trying to blockade and isolated Britain from the world by sea and air, the British trying to do the same to the Germans. And that at the very worst stage of the battle, which is soon to come, once Germany declares war on America, at least 7 out of 10 convoys that sailed the Atlantic, did so without loss. And other than the very rare occasion when the Germans got lucky on the Biscay or Scandinavian route, British civil aircraft could fly wherever they wanted, and could with care even fly into Switzerland. For the Germans other than the occasional blockade runner from Japan, goods smuggled in via Spain, and goods from ether Turkey, Spain, Portugal or the French overseas colonies in Africa. Plus the few the few civil flights out of Spain to sympathetic South American nations, principally Argentina, Germany was isolated from the world. Why no blockade runners from South America, fat chance of assembling a cargo , placing it on a neutral ship or an interned German ship, without the British knowing, and a RN, or USN ship, pretending to be RN, waiting for you to sail being outside the port are close to zero.
Yes Britain has been expelled from mainland Europe and Scandinavia, but she has suffered less losses than she did IOTL. The attempted German aerial assault , and proposed invasion have been a total failure, and Germany is now totally committed to its campaign in the East against the Soviet Union. A campaign which in 1942, will go better thanks to the collapse of the the Italian/German campaign in North Africa, which will release much needed resources for the East, especially mechanical units, not that the Germans really have the oil to fuel them. However the British while expelled from Greece, have retained Crete, which will increasingly become a major thorn in the side of the Germans/Italians. The loss of Italian East Africa, will have two major improvements for the British situation, it releases trained experienced troops for development elsewhere, who can be replaced by second line indigenous and Indian forces for the colonial policing role. And it effectively turns the Indian Ocean into a British lake, with other than troop convoys, not needing convoys, thus freeing vital RN units for deployment elsewhere. And enabling a far more efficient use of available merchant shipping, plus limited intra colonial trade.
In the Mediterranean, the retention of Crete, and the very effective blockade of Syria/Lebanon, causing food shortages and increasing indigenous revolts, mean that it cannot be long before the local administration has no option other than to switch sides. Failure to do so, will see ether a local uprising and a British Invasion, a straight British Invasion to remove the ongoing problem. Ether way their time is limited and better to jump before you are pushed, as that way they stand a chance of being able to retain their position. Much the same can be said of the position of the government in French North Africa, the time is very rapidly approaching when they too will have to decide which way to jump. Right now and for the next few weeks, they have three options, stick with Vichy, negotiate a separate deal with the British, or switch sides and join the free French. Option one is a non starter, once the British have captured Tripoli, and the conflict in the Far East against the Japanese has broken out, the British will be insisting that the question of FNA, is resolved quickly. They will want to reduce their commitments in the Mediterranean, and be able to run convoys through, with the minimum of risk, and because it will see a major reduction in shipping commitments. Yes there will still be a problem in the passage through the Sicilian narrows, but with the entire North African shore in British control, the risk will be manageable. Note unlike Dover Calais, which is 40 km, North Africa to Sicily is 150 km, and the Italians are going to have a very hard job closing that gap. Option two has the shortest shelf life, once the conflict in the Far East starts, the chance of negotiating a separate deal to one involving the Free French, and the much hated De Gaulle who the British have championed, is rapidly going to be off the table. Option three for all the substantial political problems, is other than trying to resist a British Invasion of FNA, is by early 1942, going to be the only one left.
Once the British have control of Tripoli, all their problems with supplying their forces over an overextended supply line, are effectively over. The British can both fully supply their troops, switch units that need extended rest and requirement, around with those who are fresh. The strain of supplying Malta is over, and it will quickly be built up as another base for operations against Italy and Sicily. FNA will find itself isolated from Metropolitan Vichy France, and facing the same problems that Syria/Lebanon does. Food shortages, and an increasing rebellious indigenous population, no fuel for its limited mechanical forces, or its civilian transport infrastructure, limited electricity grid, and commercial shipping needs. Mean that they are in an unstoppable downward spiral, and only by switching sides or the generous nature of the British, will it end. And ever week that goes by reduces the British inclination to be generous, and Britains resolve to end the impasse militarily. Which once they have captured Tripoli and refreshed, reorganised, resupplied, and prepared their forces, will be a task given the state that the French forces are now in, should be much easier than the resent campaign against the Italian/German forces. And one where large numbers of the French forces, will be inclined to only make a token effort at resistance before surrendering, and eventually changing sides.
In the Far East the British IMHO, have just about done enough by now to prevent the Japanese from capturing Malaya and Singapore. And without Malaya and Singapore, irrespective of how successful they are against the Americans in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbour, Burma, Java and Sumatra are safe. And without Java and Sumatra, the Japanese threat against Australia is significantly reduced, to a manageable level, one that doesn’t require American intervention. Nor will the British have to expend valuable resources to maintain vital communications with Australia, on things like the double sunset flight. Thanks to the retention of Burma, their will be no rubber shortage, or will the Bengal famine be as destructive as it was IOTL, as Britain will not be reliant on American for the ships to move the Burmese rice crop, or the ships to move alternative grains to Bengal. Nor will there be a need to invest so much resources into establishing an air bridge to China, yes there will be an air bridge between Burma and China, to move urgent supplies and personnel, but there will be no need to move everything else. Britain is predominately going to spend the majority of 1942, trying to stabilise the Atlantic, and Far East, while doing as much as it can to support the Soviet Union. While it will to the best of its ability conduct amphibious operations in the Mediterranean and Norway, both to learn what to do, and keep the Germans on edge.
RR.
First and foremost the battle of the Atlantic is still going on, however it is often forgotten that it was a two sided battle. While the Germans were trying to blockade and isolated Britain from the world by sea and air, the British trying to do the same to the Germans. And that at the very worst stage of the battle, which is soon to come, once Germany declares war on America, at least 7 out of 10 convoys that sailed the Atlantic, did so without loss. And other than the very rare occasion when the Germans got lucky on the Biscay or Scandinavian route, British civil aircraft could fly wherever they wanted, and could with care even fly into Switzerland. For the Germans other than the occasional blockade runner from Japan, goods smuggled in via Spain, and goods from ether Turkey, Spain, Portugal or the French overseas colonies in Africa. Plus the few the few civil flights out of Spain to sympathetic South American nations, principally Argentina, Germany was isolated from the world. Why no blockade runners from South America, fat chance of assembling a cargo , placing it on a neutral ship or an interned German ship, without the British knowing, and a RN, or USN ship, pretending to be RN, waiting for you to sail being outside the port are close to zero.
Yes Britain has been expelled from mainland Europe and Scandinavia, but she has suffered less losses than she did IOTL. The attempted German aerial assault , and proposed invasion have been a total failure, and Germany is now totally committed to its campaign in the East against the Soviet Union. A campaign which in 1942, will go better thanks to the collapse of the the Italian/German campaign in North Africa, which will release much needed resources for the East, especially mechanical units, not that the Germans really have the oil to fuel them. However the British while expelled from Greece, have retained Crete, which will increasingly become a major thorn in the side of the Germans/Italians. The loss of Italian East Africa, will have two major improvements for the British situation, it releases trained experienced troops for development elsewhere, who can be replaced by second line indigenous and Indian forces for the colonial policing role. And it effectively turns the Indian Ocean into a British lake, with other than troop convoys, not needing convoys, thus freeing vital RN units for deployment elsewhere. And enabling a far more efficient use of available merchant shipping, plus limited intra colonial trade.
In the Mediterranean, the retention of Crete, and the very effective blockade of Syria/Lebanon, causing food shortages and increasing indigenous revolts, mean that it cannot be long before the local administration has no option other than to switch sides. Failure to do so, will see ether a local uprising and a British Invasion, a straight British Invasion to remove the ongoing problem. Ether way their time is limited and better to jump before you are pushed, as that way they stand a chance of being able to retain their position. Much the same can be said of the position of the government in French North Africa, the time is very rapidly approaching when they too will have to decide which way to jump. Right now and for the next few weeks, they have three options, stick with Vichy, negotiate a separate deal with the British, or switch sides and join the free French. Option one is a non starter, once the British have captured Tripoli, and the conflict in the Far East against the Japanese has broken out, the British will be insisting that the question of FNA, is resolved quickly. They will want to reduce their commitments in the Mediterranean, and be able to run convoys through, with the minimum of risk, and because it will see a major reduction in shipping commitments. Yes there will still be a problem in the passage through the Sicilian narrows, but with the entire North African shore in British control, the risk will be manageable. Note unlike Dover Calais, which is 40 km, North Africa to Sicily is 150 km, and the Italians are going to have a very hard job closing that gap. Option two has the shortest shelf life, once the conflict in the Far East starts, the chance of negotiating a separate deal to one involving the Free French, and the much hated De Gaulle who the British have championed, is rapidly going to be off the table. Option three for all the substantial political problems, is other than trying to resist a British Invasion of FNA, is by early 1942, going to be the only one left.
Once the British have control of Tripoli, all their problems with supplying their forces over an overextended supply line, are effectively over. The British can both fully supply their troops, switch units that need extended rest and requirement, around with those who are fresh. The strain of supplying Malta is over, and it will quickly be built up as another base for operations against Italy and Sicily. FNA will find itself isolated from Metropolitan Vichy France, and facing the same problems that Syria/Lebanon does. Food shortages, and an increasing rebellious indigenous population, no fuel for its limited mechanical forces, or its civilian transport infrastructure, limited electricity grid, and commercial shipping needs. Mean that they are in an unstoppable downward spiral, and only by switching sides or the generous nature of the British, will it end. And ever week that goes by reduces the British inclination to be generous, and Britains resolve to end the impasse militarily. Which once they have captured Tripoli and refreshed, reorganised, resupplied, and prepared their forces, will be a task given the state that the French forces are now in, should be much easier than the resent campaign against the Italian/German forces. And one where large numbers of the French forces, will be inclined to only make a token effort at resistance before surrendering, and eventually changing sides.
In the Far East the British IMHO, have just about done enough by now to prevent the Japanese from capturing Malaya and Singapore. And without Malaya and Singapore, irrespective of how successful they are against the Americans in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbour, Burma, Java and Sumatra are safe. And without Java and Sumatra, the Japanese threat against Australia is significantly reduced, to a manageable level, one that doesn’t require American intervention. Nor will the British have to expend valuable resources to maintain vital communications with Australia, on things like the double sunset flight. Thanks to the retention of Burma, their will be no rubber shortage, or will the Bengal famine be as destructive as it was IOTL, as Britain will not be reliant on American for the ships to move the Burmese rice crop, or the ships to move alternative grains to Bengal. Nor will there be a need to invest so much resources into establishing an air bridge to China, yes there will be an air bridge between Burma and China, to move urgent supplies and personnel, but there will be no need to move everything else. Britain is predominately going to spend the majority of 1942, trying to stabilise the Atlantic, and Far East, while doing as much as it can to support the Soviet Union. While it will to the best of its ability conduct amphibious operations in the Mediterranean and Norway, both to learn what to do, and keep the Germans on edge.
RR.
Mussolini can still try to go neutral and say 'Okay: I stop fighting, Italy stops fighting, everyone leave us alone, please. We will only fight now if anyone invades us.'
Now it may or may not work, and there is the sticky question of - for example - the occupation zone in France (and probably equivalents in other places).
Now it may or may not work, and there is the sticky question of - for example - the occupation zone in France (and probably equivalents in other places).
Italy MIGHT be able to get that deal from Britain, but only after Mussolini was replaced.
The 77 mm HV on the Comet was pretty close to the US 76 mm Gun M1 and 7.5 cm Kwk 40 in terms of energy, and definitely more powerful than the 6 pdr, 75 mm M3, or the F-34. The 75 mm HV that Victor will use ITTL is similar in size. The 17-pdr, 7.5 cm Kwk 42, and 90 mm M3 were all pretty similar in energy and another step up in size and weight.
marathag
Banned
Getting exact details on the 75mm/L50 HV gun is difficult, I don't believe it to have been exactly like the 77mm, that was a new gun to fire a 76mm 17pdr Shot from the WWI era 3" 20cwt AA casing.
From my reading, the 75mm HV was to use an all new gun using the US 75mm projectiles in that 20cwt case, and give performance similar to what the US 76mm was.
The 75mm HV fired a 15 pound shell at around 2500ft/s so a downgrade on the 77mm firing a 17 pound shell at around 2600ft/s.
Mm, between HEAT (nabbing the idea from the Germans) and an APDS round that might actually be able to hit something, I'm not so sure the 75mm is lacking in penetrative capability.
The 77mm was a modified 17-pounder, because of all the flaws that cropped up when they tried to shoehorn the latter into a tank..
Last edited:
I'm fairly certain that is incorrect. The 77mm was, I am sure, a modification of the 75mm HV. The 75mm HV was designed to use American 75mm projectiles but in a larger case to extract greater performance. Of that I am now certain, the British 75mm was an attempt to improve on the US 75mm gun.
When the 77mm was adapted from the 75mm the only thing to really change was the projectile, both guns used the same 420mm long case from the 3" 20cwt AA gun of WW1. After moving away from the American projectiles the gun was given a bit more power and renamed the 77mm to avoid confusion. The only thing the 77mm and 17 pounder have in common are the projectiles.
The real question is why were the British using the American 75mm projectiles for a gun they designed. My best guess is that the British were trying to tempt the Americans into adopting a British gun for the Sherman and any future tanks. There was serious discussion in Britain in 1942 (when the 75mm HV development started) to stop all tank design and production and just use American tanks. My suspicion, which I admit I can not prove, is that the 75mm HV was a face saving measure of sorts. Get the Sherman to become more of a Universal tank. "It may be American but it uses a British Gun" as an example. Plus improving the AP performance of the US 75mm is not a goal without merit looking ahead in WW2. When the decision was made to not stop building tanks then the obvious gun to put in the next tank is the same gun you want in the Sherman. I suspect that it soon became apparent that the Americans were done listening to the British and were going to keep going their own way. At that point relying on US projectiles for the next tank gun became pointless and the switch was made to 17 pounder projectiles.
It is an interesting thought though, what if the US had adopted the 75mm HV for the Sherman in late 42 or early 43?
Formidable also wasn't put out of action. Maybe two battleships and one or two carriers for Force Z, with another couple of battleships sitting in Singapore itself in reserve?