Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

[MattII]

An alternative, if they think the British in Malaya are now too strong for the forces available, is to scrub the Western arm of the operation completely - hit the Philippines fast and hard, neutralise the garrison there, then make Davao your forward base (as OTL) and push South through the Makassar Straight and the Banda Sea, aiming to take Ambon and Timor and the oilfields in Eastern Borneo, then roll up the East Indies from the East. If the British shift forces from Malaya to oppose you, they have to move away from their air/naval bases at Singapore and (probably) leave their heavy equipment behind.

Once you've taken Java and Sumatra and closed the Sunda and Malacca Straights, Malaya can no longer be supplied and (like Bataan/Corregidor) is effectively a self-supporting PoW camp. The trapped Commonwealth forces there can be eliminated with a combination of landings in the south and a land offensive down the Kra Isthmus, using troops freed up by the end of operations in the Philippines and the East Indies.

But I suspect it's more likely that the IJA will decide that a single additional brigade in Malaya doesn't change the situation enough for a major revision to the plans.

Thing is, the reason they went for Malaya first was to neutralise the ability of Singapore to operate as a base. Malaya was attacked on the 8th, and the only other places even touched in December (apart from the Philippines) were Brunei and Kuching.

Also, good to hear about North Africa. Having to resupply over the beach will get them thinking about how to do that in future.

 

[pjmidd]

Absolutely. I can see an argument which says you strip forces from the Philippines invasion as that island is less of a threat after the USN has been taken out by the Pearl Harbor attack. Assuming the US cannot resupply or reinforce the islands means Japan can take it's time there and prioritise the important things (like the oilfields). It adds a bit more risk to the plan as it now requires total success at Pearl Harbor, but that sort of extra risk and complexity is entirely how OTL Japanese plans were made.

With hindsight it's not even that bad a plan, as long as the initial air attack on the PI goes as well as OTL then the Far Eastern Air Force gets effectively wiped out and there is no real offensive threat left on the islands. At that point the Phillipiness is less a knife on the throat, but an entirely blunt knife that's just been dropped.

Logistics mean the Japanese cannot actually increase the troops in Malaya by a meaningful amount , they could not OTL supply what they had ( one railway and small ports ). So any tweaks would be swopping units rather than adding. Add in more intense combat and even rolling 5's vs 2's rather than the 6's v 1's of OTL stalls them North of Kuala Lumpur.
'

 

[kelgar04]

Also keep in mind what passed for the Japanese logistic system is a mess as well the Japanese army when it comes down to it you hold a significant number of their forces in place they are screwed beyond all belief because they don’t have effective methods of resupply.

Heck the Imperial Japanese army idea of resupply is a lot like the of one of the Great Clans Armies in the Sengoku Period of japan.

 

[dave_r_gilbert]

Maybe though you would get arguments over, "we must secure the oilfields first as well" I think.

Japanese decisions seem to have been based more on internal politics than rationality.
As has been said, Yamamoto (and most of the IJN) saw the US as the biggest threat, and planned accordingly.
For most of the army Malaya and the DEI were priorities, creating a certain amount of tension, as the navy was needed to cover the transport.
Army/Navy relations were not good, to the extent that each saw the other as only slightly less of an enemy that the Americans and British.

Plausible end result:
Navy says to Army: Our plan is to hit Hawaii on 7th december. Plan is fixed, deal with it, unless you cant handle your end?
Army reply: 7th december is fine with us (even if it isnt). Just make sure you can handle your end. Ps. Can we have some transport?
Navy reply: Our plan says this much transport, if you want some more go and find it yourselves (knowing there isnt any).

In OTL one result of this sort of pissing contest was the decision to hit Philippines and Malaya at the same time rather than consecutively, because nobody wanted to admit it might be a bit of a stretch, relying on absolutely everything going absolutely right.

 

[MattII]

Japanese decisions seem to have been based more on internal politics than rationality.
As has been said, Yamamoto (and most of the IJN) saw the US as the biggest threat, and planned accordingly.
For most of the army Malaya and the DEI were priorities, creating a certain amount of tension, as the navy was needed to cover the transport.
Army/Navy relations were not good, to the extent that each saw the other as only slightly less of an enemy that the Americans and British.

Both were right, there was a need to take Malaya and the DEI, bu the USA were indeed the bigger threat.

Plausible end result:
Navy says to Army: Our plan is to hit Hawaii on 7th december. Plan is fixed, deal with it, unless you cant handle your end?
Army reply: 7th december is fine with us (even if it isnt). Just make sure you can handle your end. Ps. Can we have some transport?
Navy reply: Our plan says this much transport, if you want some more go and find it yourselves (knowing there isnt any).

In OTL one result of this sort of pissing contest was the decision to hit Philippines and Malaya at the same time rather than consecutively, because nobody wanted to admit it might be a bit of a stretch, relying on absolutely everything going absolutely right.

The Philippines has to be done immediately, and Malaya grows stronger by the day.

 

[kelgar04]

The Philippines will go exactly like OTL more than likely since MacArthur will make the same stupid mistakes and choices he did OTL .

 

[MattII]

The Philippines will go exactly like OTL more than likely since MacArthur will make the same stupid mistakes and choices he did OTL .

Yep. And if they pull troops from anywhere it will be Borneo, since it's the only place where troops can be freed up without potentially leaving the enemy a chance to do something rather nasty to you.

On other matters, I wonder what the state of infrastructure is in Libya right now? Have they bothered with a railway line?

 

[Rickshaw]

Japanese decisions seem to have been based more on internal politics than rationality.

The IJA and IJN suffered from that internally, with various factions often lying to each other and one another. The IJA's effort in New Guinea relied on native carriers for their effort over the Owen Stanleys. The staff officer who was charged with working out what was required basically lied to his superiors rather than accept that it was essentially an impossible task to rope in enough porters with the consequence when they began their offensive it was doomed from the start. Of course, their mistreatment of the native carriers didn't help and they didn't hang around. The end result was starving troops because they pushed ammunition forward, rather than food and so when they reached Imitar Ridge they basically had to turn around and run with their tail between their legs back to their bridgeheads on the north coast.

 

[Icedaemon]

It looks like that with the capture of the Italian top brass, their resistance at least east of Zliten became a disjointed mess, with every captain-and-above-ranked officer doing what they thought best. One set up an effective ambush position which caught the South African scout cars, but was overwhelmed with tanks, while others put up token resistance only to surrender at the first opportunity, seeing the war in North Africa as already lost.

Meanwhile, with already acclimatised and invulnerable to almost anything the Japanese have Matildas and perfect-for-the-theatre M3 light tanks supporting veteran infantry units, I don't see how the Japanese could overwhelm Malaya with what amounts to oodles of poorly supplied light infantry, however fanatical.

 

[vizzer]

The Philippines will go exactly like OTL more than likely since MacArthur will make the same stupid mistakes and choices he did OTL .

One problem I can see if the Philippines are actually held. What medal does the US give MacArthur if he got the MoH when losing them?
😋

 

[kelgar04]

One problem I can see if the Philippines are actually held. What medal does the US give MacArthur if he got the MoH when losing them?
😋

I have to wonder what the reaction would be if the British hold Malay and Singapore and the US looses the Philippines.

 

[Merrick]

Thing is, the reason they went for Malaya first was to neutralise the ability of Singapore to operate as a base. Malaya was attacked on the 8th, and the only other places even touched in December (apart from the Philippines) were Brunei and Kuching.

True. The Japanese plan OTL was to knock out the major US and British bases before they could be reinforced, followed by a pincer into Java to sweep up what was left. But if you don't have the resources to do both at once you have to go one at a time, and Luzon is the critical one because it sits on the sea lanes between Japan and the East Indies.

Singapore will have to be tackled eventually - letting the British base bombers/submarines there makes getting the oil home from Borneo considerably more interesting - but In 1942 British ability to project power East from Singapore is quite limited, at least beyond the range of land-based fighters from Malaya. The IJN will significantly out-muscle any plausible Force Z/Eastern Fleet and sending ships out of range of friendly air cover is unlikely to end well.

 

[Logan2879]

15 November 1941. Sirti, Libya.

Lieutenant General Vyvyan Pope, GOC XXX Corps, took the salute of 2nd Armoured Division as elements of it passed the reviewing stand. This was a fancy description for the Canadian Pattern Truck he was standing on, but it played its role. Three days ahead of schedule, Pope was pleased to inform General’s O’Connor (GOC 8th Army) and Wavell (C-in-C Middle East), standing alongside him on the truck, that XXX Corps was fully trained and ready for action.

XIII Corps had done extremely well having captured Misurata ahead of schedule, but, as expected they were now having to hold in place, as their stocks of supplies had been depleted and were in need of resupply. The Royal Navy had been running convoys directly from Benghazi to Beurat and over the beach at Misurata until its limited facilities could be improved.

Now it would be the turn of XXX Corps to take up the momentum that would lead the British and Empire forces to Tripoli. The 4th Indian Division were already at El Gheddahia, with the 2nd New Zealand Division at Tamet. Now that the 2nd Armoured Division had completed its final rehearsals satisfactorily, they would set off in the morning along the coast road via Tamet to El Gheddahia. A journey of over 80 miles just to the start line would take its toll on the Valiant I* tanks, but that would just be the beginning of days of seriously difficult driving.

threadmark missing @allanpcameron

 

[marathag]

One problem I can see if the Philippines are actually held. What medal does the US give MacArthur if he got the MoH when losing them?
😋

Demand to be made Dictator, like McClellan did to Lincoln.

 

[freelander]

14 November 1941. Singapore.

The men of 16th Brigade formed up on the docks of Singapore, the shouts of NCOs urging the men to get fell in. About half of the men had stood on similar docks in Egypt and Greece, unloaded from troopships wondering what on earth lay in store for them. The rest of the men were replacements, bringing the three Battalions back up to full strength. Some of the replacements were for the dead and wounded in North Africa and Greece. Other replacements for the men shipped off to training depots to pass on their experience to other recruits for the other Australian Infantry Battalions. The men all had had two weeks home leave, and then after a week in camp integrating the replacements, they’d sailed from Sydney Harbour.

The 16th Brigade had proved itself against the Italians at Tobruk, and the Germans in Greece as part of 6th Australian Division. Now they were part of 8th Division, bringing that Division up to full strength. 6th Division’s other two Brigades (17th and 18th) were being joined by 23rd Brigade (formerly of 8th Division) and each Brigade would act independently in Rabaul (17th), Timor (18th) and Ambon (23rd). General Ivan Mackay, having led 6th Division so successfully, had been considered for a more senior command in Australia. With his Division having been turned into three Independent Brigade Groups, Mackay had requested another command. General Auchinleck at the same time had been requesting that General Gordon Bennett, GOC 8th Division, might be recalled to Australia. There were problems between Bennet and Percival that were making cooperation difficult. Wavell and Blamey both gave Mackay the warmest of recommendations, and so it was decided to swap Mackay for Bennett as GOC 8th Division.

With the imminent arrival of 9th Australian Division and 1st Australian Armoured Division in Malaya, this would allow Mackay to become Corps Commander in due course. The men of the 16th Brigade were relieved that their ‘Mr Chips’ would continue to lead them. They were also happy to see that along with their Brigade, the 6th Calvary Regiment had been renamed as the 8th Division Cavalry Regiment. These had left behind their old Italian tanks and now boasted two squadrons of the new American M3 Light Tanks, as well as another of Humber Armoured Cars. The 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion had also been attached to 8th Division, something that Mackay had insisted on, along with 2/1st Field Regiment Royal Artillery.

With practised ease, the men of 16th Brigade followed the orders of their Officers and marched off the docks, heading for trains to take them to Kuala Lumpur. Joining the other two Brigades of 8th Australian Division, they would undergo a series of exercises designed by Mackay and his staff to take on board the lessons learned in North Africa and Greece, as well as learning how to fight in the new country they had been sent to defend.

Good riddance to Bennett

 

[Derek Pullem]

15 November 1941. Sirti, Libya.

Lieutenant General Vyvyan Pope, GOC XXX Corps, took the salute of 2nd Armoured Division as elements of it passed the reviewing stand. This was a fancy description for the Canadian Pattern Truck he was standing on, but it played its role. Three days ahead of schedule, Pope was pleased to inform General’s O’Connor (GOC 8th Army) and Wavell (C-in-C Middle East), standing alongside him on the truck, that XXX Corps was fully trained and ready for action.

XIII Corps had done extremely well having captured Misurata ahead of schedule, but, as expected they were now having to hold in place, as their stocks of supplies had been depleted and were in need of resupply. The Royal Navy had been running convoys directly from Benghazi to Beurat and over the beach at Misurata until its limited facilities could be improved.

Now it would be the turn of XXX Corps to take up the momentum that would lead the British and Empire forces to Tripoli. The 4th Indian Division were already at El Gheddahia, with the 2nd New Zealand Division at Tamet. Now that the 2nd Armoured Division had completed its final rehearsals satisfactorily, they would set off in the morning along the coast road via Tamet to El Gheddahia. A journey of over 80 miles just to the start line would take its toll on the Valiant I* tanks, but that would just be the beginning of days of seriously difficult driving.

This is where the butterflies keep on giving. Lower allied casualties and higher axis mean that a completely fresh corps can replace the one that just crushed the remaining axis mobile forces. It's like 1943 OTL only 12 months earlier

 

[freelander]

I have to wonder what the reaction would be if the British hold Malay and Singapore and the US looses the Philippines.

I fear that the Americans would be very embarrassed and Doug out Doug would most definitely not get his MOH however you never know with the Americans they are a strange bunch. I can never understand why Doug out Doug got away with it. One thing that baffles me is why he allowed all of their planes to be lined up ready for inspection and not dispersed. The man should have been Court-Marshalled oh and the money given to his incompetent staff should have been seized. At least Eisenhower had the good grace to turn his his offer down.

 

[GarethC]

Singapore will have to be tackled eventually - letting the British base bombers/submarines there makes getting the oil home from Borneo considerably more interesting - but In 1942 British ability to project power East from Singapore is quite limited, at least beyond the range of land-based fighters from Malaya. The IJN will significantly out-muscle any plausible Force Z/Eastern Fleet and sending ships out of range of friendly air cover is unlikely to end well.

Good point - but even an outgunned Eastern Fleet is a fleet-in-being that distracts the IJN.

If Holland is still swanning around with fast capital ships, can Kido Butai be off supporting the invasion of Rabaul, chasing Fletcher and Halsey from the Marshalls, raiding Darwin, and then covering the invasion of Java?

 

[HPM]

With what ammunition depots and fuel tank storage or machine workshops?
With what food processing and storage capabilities capable of ensuring a group of very hungry USN sailors and aviators about to put to sea will be kept supplied with ice-cream (and other essentials) until they next return to port?
With what airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, and counter-submarine measures in place to nominally protect ships actually in port? (Not that that does much good if Italian frogmen are coming after you, as the British found out to their cost several times, but Italian frogmen are less of a problem in the Pacific, I grant... )

An early end to the North African campaign a threat to Italy etc and we might get Italian frogmen on our side rather earlier than OTL.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

One thing that baffles me is why he allowed all of their planes to be lined up ready for inspection and not dispersed.

They were easier to guard against sabotage like that. For some reason he discounted the threat of an airstrike against his own air force (not that it was good for much anyway). The obsolete P26's and obsolescent P35's would have been wiped out in a few days anyway.