Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Rule of Conservation of Detail For the Preservation of Authorial Sanity in a nutshell. Always useful for a timeline.
Unfortunately, the further you go, the less you can leave out. Mind you, depending on your PoD(s) you can sometimes avoid time-consuming sections entirely, such as North Africa '42.
 
NA is pretty much done at this point aside from sweeping up what's left in Libya and unless the Vichy French decide to join in a really stupid act then it's a done deal.

They really don't want to draw the ire of British Armoured formations on their borders
 
He might be willing to intern the Axis forces, and eventually hand them back to Berlin.
For a price!
I'd be expecting at least 1 for 1 French POW plus expenses, and "more French troops and equipment to hold off these unreliable neighbours". Which of course will be training up as future Free French forces.
I've previously noted that the safest shipping route is via Spanish Morocco (Italy can't and Mers El Kebir says the British won't lest the French try). You can be sure that Franco would be clipping the ticket very generously.
My bet for North Africa would be secession from Vichy at the first legitimate opportunity, having taken care to be seen to be scrupulously neutral in the awkward intervening period.
And it certaily would be awkward, since the armistice was with Italy and Germany, and the Italian Armistice commission is a bit short of credibility right now.
Edit. This is a bit of a sideline really, but it's likely to involve (yet another) raw deal for the axis, so worth a bit of rubbing it in.
 
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Of course, the other option is, the British don't want to run that risk, and so use their newly acquired amphibious capability to drop a blocking force near or on the border, directly in the path of the German retreat, so that only a handful of troops get through, and those are ready to drop.
 
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Caught up. This is very interesting although I do wish your version of the A11 had been kept in large scale production for secondary theatres and colonial policing as it would have been brilliant at it and much more cost-effective than the other options. I'm thinking of a UK equivalent of the H35/R35 or the remaining FT-17s (similar size, similar cost, similar role, etc) as the French made over 3000 H and R35s with many of them being sent to colonial forces like in Indochina or Syria etc. A cheap reasonably capable tank like the A11 you created would be great for colonial policing and would significantly bolster the capabilities of forces in secondary theatres while allowing for first-rate tanks like this timeline Valiants to be concentrated in key areas especially if built in similar numbers to what the French did with the H and R35s. If the UK had adopted a policy of using mass-produced A11s which are designed to be cheap in the colonies to keep the natives in line then places like Malaya would probably have a few hundred and the A11, while not great and by 1941 they are no longer seen as capable in the front lines in North Africa they would still be very deadly in the East and would have been a really good base to build on, to be honest, your version of the A11 is a lot more suitable for the war in the far east than the A12. If built-in large numbers the simplicity of the design would also make it a great choice for sending up the Burma road as Lend-Lease to the Chinese.
 
31 October 1941. Libya.
31 October 1941. Libya.

The RAF’s efforts over the last few weeks had been intensified, so, it was clear to the Italians and Germans that the British were coming. With almost the whole of the Wehrmacht committed to Operation Barbarossa, almost no German reinforcements had arrived. With the position of the Royal Navy and RAF strengthened on Malta, very few ships had arrived to resupply or reinforce the Italians either. Those that had, didn’t carry enough of what was needed. The morale in Tripoli was very low. In Rome, despite the bombast of Mussolini, the loss of both the East African and North African colonies imminently was causing a degree of unrest in the civilian population.

Hitler’s attempts to support his Italian ally had been successful in Greece, but had failed on Crete, and in North Africa. He wasn’t prepared to keep sending troops and tanks to support, to his mind, a lost cause. Once the Soviets were defeated, a thrust down to the Persian Gulf to take the oil off the British would be enough to knock them out of the war.

During the summer months, knowing that the British were strengthening their forces, and stockpiling supplies for their next thrust, the Italian leadership in Tripoli tried to think of ways they could spoil the attack, or at least defend against it effectively. The losses of men and equipment since the ill-fated invasion of Egypt the previous year were irreplaceable. The constant failure to better the British in any fight had left the Italian troops angry and afraid. What remained on the German expeditionary force had retired to the vicinity of Tripoli to attempt to rebuild with what they had left.

The Italian navy’s ‘Decima Flottiglia MAS’, after their successful attack on Suda Bay in March, had attempted to derail the British build-up with an attack on Malta in June which had been a disaster, and Tobruk harbour in September. This mission had been partly successful, two merchant ships had been sunk, but the loss of the adapted submarine Sciré in the aftermath of that attack had made more attacks problematic. The losses to the main fleet at Taranto and Cape Matapan had thrown up the weaknesses of the Italian fleet at night-fighting and cooperation between the Air Force and the Navy.

The idea of running a big convoy to Tripoli, with a strong escort had been tried and failed. Ubiquitous British aerial reconnaissance made the gathering of such a force impossible to hide, and the British Mediterranean Fleet was still considered too dangerous to take on in a fleet engagement. The loss of all the merchant ships, especially two tankers and an ammunition ship, in the most recent convoy on the night of 25/26 October had been a great blow. The Italian navy claimed to have sunk a British cruiser in the battle, but HMS Aurora, although damaged, had managed to return to Malta under her own steam.

The French were being pressed by the Germans to allow greater access to their territory, including ports and airfields in Tunisia. With a large British force sitting on the borders of Syria, and increasing propaganda from the Free French forces there, the Vichy government were caught between a rock and a hard place. If they acquiesced to the German demands, it was possible that the British would see that as an act of war, and the French possessions in the Middle East and North Africa would go the same way as the Italians. If they refused, there was real possibility that the Germans would occupy all of France. Marshall Petain was dithering; Admiral Darlan was pressing for the German demand to be met. The Americans were pressing Vichy to resist the German demands and were backing De Gaulle’s Free French movement.

In the meantime, the Italians had been doing their best to fix their defences for the expected attack. As well as covering the main coast road, the usual British attack included an inland hook. The Italians had been trying to make sure the obvious routes would also be defended. The problem with this was that the Italian forces were now more thinly spread than they would prefer. The German force had agreed to act as the mobile reserve with the surviving units from the Ariete Division.
 
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Sorry, this is a bit of filler. But there were two things I wanted to note. Firstly the Italian supplies. The Beta Convoy that was annihilated on 8 November by Force K from Malta has happened differently here. Force K sortied on 25/26 October but missed that convoy. Here they didn't miss. The Italian ‘Decima Flottiglia MAS’ attack on Gibraltar OTL here takes place against Tobruk, for reason mentioned, to try to halt build up of supplies. I thought a reasonable change. The loss of the submarine is just me having fun. Probably butterflies the attack on Alexandria.
The second is to highlight the very poor position of the Italians facing Crusader. The fact that they're trying to defend inland as well as the coast road leaves them stymied.
Partly this will make the description of Operation Crusader a wee bit easier to write. Still trying to put together just exactly what they have that is still in fighting shape, and so far. other than Ariete Division and the rump of Germans, they're down to infantry divisions only, and having to have created their own defences, which they wouldn't have had in place. The Mareth Line (?) faces the French!.
The wee bit about the French was just to mention them. Once the Italians are cleared out of NA, would that mean the French ME and NA colonies would more likely declare for De Gaulle? Not sure yet, but thought I'd mention it anyway.
Allan
 
Well NA is going worse for the Axis and given the Med is effectively a British lake you can see how much its hurting them. To say nothing of how shot Italian moral is and it’s probably worse for whats left of the Africa Korps since they just got abandoned in place.
 
And all the negotiating with France will be for naught if the British end up landing an blocking force behind the Axis, cutting them off from Tunisia.
 
He wasn’t prepared to keep sending troops and tanks to support, to his mind, a lost cause. Once the Soviets were defeated, a thrust down to the Persian Gulf to take the oil off the British would be enough to knock them out of the war.
Lost cause. Once the Soviets were defeated.
Hmmm.... I see more than just one lost cause there.... ;)
 
31 October 1941. Libya.

The RAF’s efforts over the last few weeks had been intensified, so, it was clear to the Italians and Germans that the British were coming. With almost the whole of the Wehrmacht committed to Operation Barbarossa, almost no German reinforcements had arrived. With the position of the Royal Navy and RAF strengthened on Malta, very few ships had arrived to resupply or reinforce the Italians either. Those that had, didn’t carry enough of what was needed. The morale in Tripoli was very low. In Rome, despite the bombast of Mussolini, the loss of both the East African and North African colonies imminently was causing a degree of unrest in the civilian population.

Hitler’s attempts to support his Italian ally had been successful in Greece, but had failed on Crete, and in North Africa. He wasn’t prepared to keep sending troops and tanks to support, to his mind, a lost cause. Once the Soviets were defeated, a thrust down to the Persian Gulf to take the oil off the British would be enough to knock them out of the war.

During the summer months, knowing that the British were strengthening their forces, and stockpiling supplies for their next thrust, the Italian leadership in Tripoli tried to think of ways they could spoil the attack, or at least defend against it effectively. The losses of men and equipment since the ill-fated invasion of Egypt the previous year were irreplaceable. The constant failure to better the British in any fight had left the Italian troops angry and afraid. What remained on the German expeditionary force had retired to the vicinity of Tripoli to attempt to rebuild with what they had left.

The Italian navy’s ‘Decima Flottiglia MAS’, after their successful attack on Suda Bay in March, had attempted to derail the British build-up with an attack on Malta in June which had been a disaster, and Tobruk harbour in September. This mission had been partly successful, two merchant ships had been sunk, but the loss of the adapted submarine Sciré in the aftermath of that attack had made more attacks problematic. The losses to the main fleet at Taranto and Cape Matapan had thrown up the weaknesses of the Italian fleet at night-fighting and cooperation between the Air Force and the Navy.

The idea of running a big convoy to Tripoli, with a strong escort had been tried and failed. Ubiquitous British aerial reconnaissance made the gathering of such a force impossible to hide, and the British Mediterranean Fleet was still considered too dangerous to take on in a fleet engagement. The loss of all the merchant ships, especially two tankers and an ammunition ship, in the most recent convoy on the night of 25/26 October had been a great blow. The Italian navy claimed to have sunk a British cruiser in the battle, but HMS Aurora, although damaged, had managed to return to Malta under her own steam.

The French were being pressed by the Germans to allow greater access to their territory, including ports and airfields in Tunisia. With a large British force sitting on the borders of Syria, and increasing propaganda from the Free French forces there, the Vichy government were caught between a rock and a hard place. If they acquiesced to the German demands, it was possible that the British would see that as an act of war, and the French possessions in the Middle East and North Africa would go the same way as the Italians. If they refused, there was real possibility that the Germans would occupy all of France. Marshall Petain was dithering; Admiral Darlan was pressing for the German demand to be met. The Americans were pressing Vichy to resist the German demands and were backing De Gaulle’s Free French movement.

In the meantime, the Italians had been doing their best to fix their defences for the expected attack. As well as covering the main coast road, the usual British attack included an inland hook. The Italians had been trying to make sure the obvious routes would also be defended. The problem with this was that the Italian forces were now more thinly spread than they would prefer. The German force had agreed to act as the mobile reserve with the surviving units from the Ariete Division.
The Italian frogmen doing what they can but it's not enough to turn the tide starting to flow against the Axis armies in North Africa.
And the Americans... backing (covertly I would guess?)… de Gaulle in this timeline????? Oh wow. I thought (maybe wrongly???) that they didn't get on at all well with him in the original timeline?
 
Britian just beat the germans and the itialians in North Africe and them in Crete as well as braining the Italians in their other african territories. Right now the Americans are probably seeing Britains chances a lot more favourably than OTL, especially given that Greece was more of a fighting retreat and the Fall of France went somewhat better and it's more likely to be seen that the french failed there.

Though I have to wonder how the French African territories will jump and how the rest of the French empire will jump as well given how thoroughly the Axis got hurt.
 
Well, Benny the Moose still has Albania. That's enough colonial lands for the reborn Roman Empire, right?
Albanian soldiers were once a major part of the Egyptian army and the Ottoman army so they could be useful Italian recruits if the Italians went about it the right way.
 
As regards to Burma If I am not mistaken the logistics just don't exist for an overland offensive.
It required the capture of Rangoon and logistics from Singapore (with a large number of British trucks captured after the surrender of the Commonwealth forces).

The best part of 2 Divisions plus 2 tank regiments arrived after the Rangoon port was captured.

This was the only way that enough Japanese forces could be supported logistically for the subsequent Burma operations

They certainly could not have conducted such an operation using the non existent lines of communication from Thailand or even the small port of Moulmein (assuming that could be captured ittl) not that this would be viable with the British undefeated in Malaya.

Some of the reinforcing units used otl also cannot be in 2 places at once and had been used in both Malaya and the DEI.
 
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