Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
The M3 Stuart was not well liked in the Pacific theatre. Basically it was too light and not armoured enough for use. It often failed, bottoming out on tree trunks and it's gun's only advantage was a HE and a canister round. It failed in New Guinea and Guadacanal. After that it basically disappeared from the Pacific.
Deploying in defensive positions in terrain as it exists in Malaya or Burma is very different than deploying to rocky islands and atolls to root out dug-in defenders in an island hopping offensive.
The tank you need in the Far East is the Matilda with the 3" close support gun. Even an H.E. round will do for most of the Japanese tanks and H.E.A.T. rounds aren't exactly hard to do.
Hello,
Yes, the British and Anzac troops can face most Japanese tanks in service by 1941 with their own tanks. Even early versions of this tank will end up ripping apart Japanese AFVs...
tankmuseum.org
Yes, the British and Anzac troops can face most Japanese tanks in service by 1941 with their own tanks. Even early versions of this tank will end up ripping apart Japanese AFVs...
M4 Sherman - The Tank Museum
As an all-round, general purpose tank, the M4 Sherman was one of the best tanks of the Second World War. Used by the US, UK and USSR in WW2 and beyond.
tankmuseum.org
On a personal note, My father fought through North Africa/Italy 1941/44, driving and commanding just about every tank allies had.
He seldom talked about his war but when he dis he always called the M3 Stuart the "Honey" and was very clear that it was exactly that, a "Honey" of a tank compared to everything he had been fighting in up to that point of the war.
He seldom talked about his war but when he dis he always called the M3 Stuart the "Honey" and was very clear that it was exactly that, a "Honey" of a tank compared to everything he had been fighting in up to that point of the war.
The Stuarts also saved the remnants of the British forces in Burma. Covering the long retreat to the Indian border after the fall of Rangoon.
Get the battalion or ideally a brigade of them to Burma earlier, along the Division(s) sent to Singapore just to march into captivity would have been a potential game changer. The Japanese would probably have been stopped in their tracks.
Lots of subsequent butterflies, not least the Bengal famine should have benn avoided then.
Garrison
Donor
The British being more successful in SEA might also mean the Indian National Army never gets off the ground. Along with alleviating the famine that should significantly change the post war political landscape in India.
Well there's (or will be) fifty-some Matilda IIs in Malaya, so sending them to Singapore shouldn't be just handing them over to the Japanese.
They were at the end of the day well made, reliable light tanks (I say light they were about the same weight as a PzIII and Crusader) but were a then obsolete design but made a difference at Buna when they arrived but where vulnerable to 25mm AAA cannon fire which saw 4 of them knocked out.
The AA gun was eventually 'sniped' by a 25 pounder gun used in the direct role but the fact remained that they were available and were better than no tank
(I suspect the real reason they saw little use later in the SWP campaign was simply because better tanks were available and were used in relatively low numbers!)
Its a shame they were not able to be deployed earlier in that battle and in greater numbers
Had they been able to get a couple to the Triangle then again I am certain that US and Aussie losses would be far less given their ability to deal with the log bunkers the Japanese were so great at constructing.
Steel and HE saving blood.
CS gun tanks firing HE would have been better as would Lees with their 75mm guns!
But maybe Buna will not be necessary ITTL!
The Stuarts were also much more capable in Burma than what replaced them.
IIRC, when I had to do a study of the Arakan Campaign, I noted that the Stuarts with their dual ammo could bust Japanese bunkers by using the later standard tactic of an AP shell to bust a hole and then a HE to blast the bunker open. The later tanks with the 2 pr only had AP so no HE to bust the bunker.
IIRC, when I had to do a study of the Arakan Campaign, I noted that the Stuarts with their dual ammo could bust Japanese bunkers by using the later standard tactic of an AP shell to bust a hole and then a HE to blast the bunker open. The later tanks with the 2 pr only had AP so no HE to bust the bunker.
Frankly I am puzzled when I read suggestion that Burma should receive reinforcements before Malaya.
First and foremost it goes against OTL planning. The actual plans in our history stated that a 40 battalion garrison is needed with two tank regiments and additional machine gun battalions. The source I am using for these numbers is the "Disaster in the far East, 1940-1942". Singapore and Malaya are very valuable assets to be just abandoned. Britain spent millions in establishing a major naval base in Singapore. Malayan rubber and tin were much needed sources of USD. Moreover, any attempt to renforce first Burma (that was out of danger) would be a huge political mistake when it came to Australia and the Dutch East Indies. Both the Commonwealth and the Dutch had based their whole strategy that british Malaya is a bulwark against the japanese threat.
The British themselves had calculated that the Japanese could support at most two divisions to Burma through Thailand. More probably it would be a single divisions in their estimations. For the Japanese to support a major campaign in Burma they need first to control Malaya and the Malacca Straits in order to use coastal shipping for such a campaign.
First and foremost it goes against OTL planning. The actual plans in our history stated that a 40 battalion garrison is needed with two tank regiments and additional machine gun battalions. The source I am using for these numbers is the "Disaster in the far East, 1940-1942". Singapore and Malaya are very valuable assets to be just abandoned. Britain spent millions in establishing a major naval base in Singapore. Malayan rubber and tin were much needed sources of USD. Moreover, any attempt to renforce first Burma (that was out of danger) would be a huge political mistake when it came to Australia and the Dutch East Indies. Both the Commonwealth and the Dutch had based their whole strategy that british Malaya is a bulwark against the japanese threat.
The British themselves had calculated that the Japanese could support at most two divisions to Burma through Thailand. More probably it would be a single divisions in their estimations. For the Japanese to support a major campaign in Burma they need first to control Malaya and the Malacca Straits in order to use coastal shipping for such a campaign.
I agree - as it was there was at the time the 17th Indian Army 'Black Cats' infantry Division (Then very Green and poorly equipped) - the Burma Division (Militia/Police) and 9 Chinese Divisions guarding the Rangoon-China supply line.
Much of the IJA forces sent to Burma where the same units that had fought in Malaya and they cannot be in two places at once.
That being said had the Black cats been supported by the 7th Armoured Brigade a month earlier then the Japanese would have had a much harder time capturing the port of Moulmein, fighting at Bilin River and then the Sittang Bridge
Its highly unlikely that the IJA forces 33rd and 55th Divisions could have been supported without Moulmein being captured with their lines of supply stretching back into Thailand with no suitable MSR and as it was they were both stripped down formations with a single tank platoon in support.
I think moving armour to Burma would mean that the needs of Malaya are fully met. Malaya was a backwater. Burma was the backwater's backwater.
The easiest way to stiffen up the 17th Indian div would have been to send one of the 10th Indian's brigades to Burma and the 10th gets a green brigade from the 17th. These men took part in the Anglo-Iraqi War under Slim and even though the conflict was not hard it was still a valuable lesson. They would pass long their lessons to the remaining 17th div brigades.
By the way, I retract my previous comments regarding the needed forces in Malaya. As it turns out it was an estimate at April 1940 when the japanese threat was much much more nuanced. According the "Disaster in the Far East" :
Last edited: