Not completely relevant I know, due to the position that NA is in right now, but still something I thought was pretty cool.
A Centurion grade tank is unlikely IMO, but a Comet grade one seems to be on the cards, in the form of the Victor. Sure it won't have the superiority over the Panther that the Valiant has over the Panzer III/IVs, but it should be at least comparable in terms of firepower, armour protection and mobility.TBH reading back over the Soviet bit with the way Britian has been performing I can't help but wonder if they get something like the Centurions when they land in Normandy that the Western Allies won't get closer to Berlin than OTL.
Original timeline storm?18 November 1941. Misurata, Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 17.
The few days of resting and resupplying should have been a pleasant interlude for the men of XIII Corps, except a terrible storm raged, soaking everything and everyone. Despite this some pushing in the direction of Homs had been done, and the small town of Zliten had been captured a few days earlier.
The reconnaissance efforts had shown that the next main line of resistance ran from Homs on the coast to Tarhuna inland. This seemed to be yet another extensive position and from captured men and documents it consisted of three Italian Infantry Divisions, with the remaining German forces around Tarhuna to protect the inland flank.
Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austin and General O’Connor had planned XIII Corps’ attack on Homs to coincide with the arrival at Tarhuna of XXX Corps. The 4th Indian Division, with an extra large contingent of Royal Engineers, had the difficult task of preparing the route so that the New Zealanders and 2nd Armoured Division would be able to move at a reasonable pace up to Tarhuna. The New Zealanders had arrived at Beni Ulid, with 2nd Armoured close behind them at El Merdum. The planned combined attack was due on 20 November. It wasn’t clear yet how the rainfall would affect progress towards Tarhuna, many wadis were impassable due to the water runoff. There was some flexibility in the plan, allowing for an extra day or two, which would allow XIII Corps to continue to build up their stocks of supplies.
The RAF were doing their best to keep up with the advance, though many landing grounds were waterlogged, but they still hoping to have enough aircraft within range for the attack. The Royal Navy were doing wonders at getting supplies forward and still blockading Tripoli. Another Italian convoy had been intercepted and destroyed the previous week. Tripoli’s harbour had taken a beating from the escorting ships of a British convoy heading for Malta. HMS Ark Royal’s aircraft had scored some good hits of targets inland. HMS Nelson, along with three cruisers had bombarded the docks for a good ten minutes before withdrawing out of range.
In one of their other operations, a submarine had taken as small party of Free French delegates and dropped them off in the vicinity of Tunis. These men were tasked with feeling out the situation regarding what the Vichy Regime might make of Italian and German troops coming over the border from Libya. It was suspected that some resupply ships for the Italians and Germans had been offloading in Tunisian ports and being convoyed across the border. While it was unlikely that Tunisia would side with De Gaulle, just like Syria, but they too would be worried about the consequences of providing the British with a reason to declare war.
The British themselves had to re-learn that lesson as other theatres of war opened up. The RAF tactics during the Battle of France were grossly inadequate. Malta was a nightmare of poorly organised air defense for months. Part of the failures in Greece, Crete, Malaya & Burma was the entrenched peace-time mentality (& racism) of the staff officers, who frequently closed their offices and took long lunches and weekends off. See also MacArthur and his staff for the Philippine debacle.While the deaths in that fiasco were tragic I think you can argue that they were inevitable. There's a difference between pre war practice and taking off with live weapons and handling the consequences of that. Even if the USAAF had listened to their officers who had observed the Battle of Britain there would still be a learning process. The Japanese meanwhile had been fighting a live war in China for four years and had gone through that process already.
This is also highlighted by the British response to German jamming of the radar in Malta. When asked how they should deal with it, RV Jones said to ignore it because the Germans would stop after a while, thinking it wasn't working. Which is exactly what happened. Post war Kammhuber asked Jones what was the technical breakthrough that the British had devised to enable them to defeat the German jamming efforts.I feel like this was one of the major failings of the Germans in WW2: Their consistent failure to examine and recognise the power of soft factors.
Perhaps not the perfect anecdote. But whenever the U-Boats started getting a worse plastering, the Germans decided that the innovation on the part of the Allies was a Technical one, and thus demanded a technical solution.
That is an amazing anecdote. Thank you for sharing it!This is also highlighted by the British response to German jamming of the radar in Malta. When asked how they should deal with it, RV Jones said to ignore it because the Germans would stop after a while, thinking it wasn't working. Which is exactly what happened. Post war Kammhuber asked Jones what was the technical breakthrough that the British had devised to enable them to defeat the German jamming efforts.
What amuses me about that mission is that the GZ was regularly radioing its position back to base and it was consistently wrong. Supposedly the RAF controllers in the plotting rooms tracking it were really tempted to radio the GZ its correct position.In 1939 when the Germans used the Graf Zeppelins as an ELINT platform to assess the UK Radar defence, they flew up the east coast of England tracked by Chain Home the whole way. Although the Germans were picking up the 12.5meter wave band transmitions from Chain Home they completely dismissed them as being evidence of a British Radar system as the wave length was much longer than any used by their own systems and their electronic experts deemed it technically inferior to any system they would contemplate building. Such is Military and Scientific Hubris !
i think that the wrong way round graf Zepplin reported position over the Yorkshire moors when in reality they where over hull i may be wrongthat story is actually true, whilst reporting a position of Hull the Graf Zeppelin was actually over the Yorkshire Moors. Fighter Command Headquarters who controlled the RDF system for once thought about operational security and did not reveal that the G.Z was being tracked by correcting her navigational errors.
Griffon itself would take more work than usual due to it having an integrated reductor unit for aircrafts, which needs to be deleted in tanks.Of course, when the Centurion-equivalent comes due, I'd expect it to be better than the OTL centurion, since I can't see Carden being happy with sticking with the Meteor, so I'd expect him to try putting a de-rated/Ricardo-modded Griffon in there, which should improve the top speed somewhat.
Given the way the war is progressing so far I have to wonder though if this argument will be stronger compared to OTL against use of American ammunition when it comes to tanks and anti-tank weaponry and such given the way British Armour and Anti Tank weaponry has been performing in North Africa so far as well as in other areas. I mean for one they could quite reasonably say that American amour and AT guns are untested against Frontline Germany equipment and when compares with British equipment of a similar type its not as effective.Therein lay his problem. Arguing for standardisation on towed anti-tank guns, led, inevitably, to standardisation of tank guns. The Americans were committed to the 75mm tank gun for obvious reasons. While their artillery regiments were due to replace the 75mm gun for a 105mm howitzer, their production facilities for 75mm were second to none (now that France was out of the picture). Once again, his nemesis, Sir John Carden, had proposed looking at adapting the 6-pdr to take the American 75x350 shells. It appeared from early analysis that this wouldn’t be a terribly difficult problem to resolve. At this point however, with America still neutral and with an army that was in many ways behind the British, it seemed to Clarke that there was a danger of the tail wagging the dog.
But how do you make a tank howl?I still think the follow on to the Valiant and Victor should be called Vulcan.
No North Sea or Humber Estuary in the Yorkshire moors!i think that the wrong way round graf Zepplin reported position over the Yorkshire moors when in reality they where over hull i may be wrong
Why can't the 75HV use 75x350 shells? As can a bored out 6 pdr. The Americans can build the 75HV under license instead of the 76mm M1Therein lay his problem. Arguing for standardisation on towed anti-tank guns, led, inevitably, to standardisation of tank guns. The Americans were committed to the 75mm tank gun for obvious reasons. While their artillery regiments were due to replace the 75mm gun for a 105mm howitzer, their production facilities for 75mm were second to none (now that France was out of the picture). Once again, his nemesis, Sir John Carden, had proposed looking at adapting the 6-pdr to take the American 75x350 shells. It appeared from early analysis that this wouldn’t be a terribly difficult problem to resolve. At this point however, with America still neutral and with an army that was in many ways behind the British, it seemed to Clarke that there was a danger of the tail wagging the dog.