Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

TBH reading back over the Soviet bit with the way Britian has been performing I can't help but wonder if they get something like the Centurions when they land in Normandy that the Western Allies won't get closer to Berlin than OTL.
 
TBH reading back over the Soviet bit with the way Britian has been performing I can't help but wonder if they get something like the Centurions when they land in Normandy that the Western Allies won't get closer to Berlin than OTL.
A Centurion grade tank is unlikely IMO, but a Comet grade one seems to be on the cards, in the form of the Victor. Sure it won't have the superiority over the Panther that the Valiant has over the Panzer III/IVs, but it should be at least comparable in terms of firepower, armour protection and mobility.

Of course, when the Centurion-equivalent comes due, I'd expect it to be better than the OTL centurion, since I can't see Carden being happy with sticking with the Meteor, so I'd expect him to try putting a de-rated/Ricardo-modded Griffon in there, which should improve the top speed somewhat.
 
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18 November 1941. Misurata, Libya. Operation Crusader, Day 17.

The few days of resting and resupplying should have been a pleasant interlude for the men of XIII Corps, except a terrible storm raged, soaking everything and everyone. Despite this some pushing in the direction of Homs had been done, and the small town of Zliten had been captured a few days earlier.

The reconnaissance efforts had shown that the next main line of resistance ran from Homs on the coast to Tarhuna inland. This seemed to be yet another extensive position and from captured men and documents it consisted of three Italian Infantry Divisions, with the remaining German forces around Tarhuna to protect the inland flank.

Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austin and General O’Connor had planned XIII Corps’ attack on Homs to coincide with the arrival at Tarhuna of XXX Corps. The 4th Indian Division, with an extra large contingent of Royal Engineers, had the difficult task of preparing the route so that the New Zealanders and 2nd Armoured Division would be able to move at a reasonable pace up to Tarhuna. The New Zealanders had arrived at Beni Ulid, with 2nd Armoured close behind them at El Merdum. The planned combined attack was due on 20 November. It wasn’t clear yet how the rainfall would affect progress towards Tarhuna, many wadis were impassable due to the water runoff. There was some flexibility in the plan, allowing for an extra day or two, which would allow XIII Corps to continue to build up their stocks of supplies.

The RAF were doing their best to keep up with the advance, though many landing grounds were waterlogged, but they still hoping to have enough aircraft within range for the attack. The Royal Navy were doing wonders at getting supplies forward and still blockading Tripoli. Another Italian convoy had been intercepted and destroyed the previous week. Tripoli’s harbour had taken a beating from the escorting ships of a British convoy heading for Malta. HMS Ark Royal’s aircraft had scored some good hits of targets inland. HMS Nelson, along with three cruisers had bombarded the docks for a good ten minutes before withdrawing out of range.


In one of their other operations, a submarine had taken as small party of Free French delegates and dropped them off in the vicinity of Tunis. These men were tasked with feeling out the situation regarding what the Vichy Regime might make of Italian and German troops coming over the border from Libya. It was suspected that some resupply ships for the Italians and Germans had been offloading in Tunisian ports and being convoyed across the border. While it was unlikely that Tunisia would side with De Gaulle, just like Syria, but they too would be worried about the consequences of providing the British with a reason to declare war.
Original timeline storm?
If so, my sincere regards on the depth of the research that you do for this timeline! :)
 
While the deaths in that fiasco were tragic I think you can argue that they were inevitable. There's a difference between pre war practice and taking off with live weapons and handling the consequences of that. Even if the USAAF had listened to their officers who had observed the Battle of Britain there would still be a learning process. The Japanese meanwhile had been fighting a live war in China for four years and had gone through that process already.
The British themselves had to re-learn that lesson as other theatres of war opened up. The RAF tactics during the Battle of France were grossly inadequate. Malta was a nightmare of poorly organised air defense for months. Part of the failures in Greece, Crete, Malaya & Burma was the entrenched peace-time mentality (& racism) of the staff officers, who frequently closed their offices and took long lunches and weekends off. See also MacArthur and his staff for the Philippine debacle.
 
I feel like this was one of the major failings of the Germans in WW2: Their consistent failure to examine and recognise the power of soft factors.

Perhaps not the perfect anecdote. But whenever the U-Boats started getting a worse plastering, the Germans decided that the innovation on the part of the Allies was a Technical one, and thus demanded a technical solution.
This is also highlighted by the British response to German jamming of the radar in Malta. When asked how they should deal with it, RV Jones said to ignore it because the Germans would stop after a while, thinking it wasn't working. Which is exactly what happened. Post war Kammhuber asked Jones what was the technical breakthrough that the British had devised to enable them to defeat the German jamming efforts.
 
This is also highlighted by the British response to German jamming of the radar in Malta. When asked how they should deal with it, RV Jones said to ignore it because the Germans would stop after a while, thinking it wasn't working. Which is exactly what happened. Post war Kammhuber asked Jones what was the technical breakthrough that the British had devised to enable them to defeat the German jamming efforts.
That is an amazing anecdote. Thank you for sharing it!
 
In 1939 when the Germans used the Graf Zeppelins as an ELINT platform to assess the UK Radar defence, they flew up the east coast of England tracked by Chain Home the whole way. Although the Germans were picking up the 12.5meter wave band transmitions from Chain Home they completely dismissed them as being evidence of a British Radar system as the wave length was much longer than any used by their own systems and their electronic experts deemed it technically inferior to any system they would contemplate building. Such is Military and Scientific Hubris !
 
19 November 1941. London, England.
19 November 1941. London, England.

The trials of the M2 75mm gun in the American Medium M3, despite being in a side sponson, had been found to be quite positive. Its length at 31 Calibres gave it a muzzle velocity of 1,929 ft/s. A longer M3 75mm gun was soon to enter production, which would grow to 40 Calibres giving an improved 2,031 ft/s. There were two types of shell, the M48 HE 75x350 shells, which was judged excellent, and the M72 armour piercing round which was judged good. A new AP round was in development, the M61, which looked like it would be a great improvement. This gun and its ammunition had the capacity to both defeat German panzer armour at a good range, and answer the call from the front for an excellent HE shell. The next American tank, the M4 would be equipped with the M3 75mm, and the word from America was that it was looking like a good tank.

A report on the American Tank Destroyer Battalions that were being developed, noted the primary use of the 37mm towed anti-tank gun, which was already obsolescent. There were also reports of a 75mm gun being shoehorned into a G3 half-track. A request to examine this had been made, with the possibility of it being acquired under lend-lease.

Major-General Campbell Clarke, as Director of Artillery, continued to complain about accepting American weapons that relied on imported ammunition. The M3 Light Tank’s 37mm gun was a case in point, and now with this 75mm gun arriving in the M3 Medium, with another 37mm gun, to say nothing of the Browning machine guns that used .3-inch rounds, it would just make a quartermaster’s job so much harder.

Clarke continued to sponsor the 17-pdr gun that was being designed to eventually replace the 6-pdr in the towed anti-tank role. While Vickers 75mm HV had been approved for production for the Victor tank, Clarke was still unhappy with having two different types of gun, one in tanks and another for the anti-tank regiments. He considered the 6-pdr in the Valiant II, with the new HE shell, as being quite adequate for the next two years at least. This had the advantage of being the same gun and ammunition as used in the towed anti-tank regiments. While the up-armoured Panzer III and IVs encountered in North Africa were still vulnerable to the 2-pdr, though only just, the German armour, especially now it was known to be face-hardened, would be no match for the 6-pdr.

There was little of no information about German tank development, but the chances were that a ‘Panzer V’ would arrive at some point. It could be expected to have armour something like the French B1-Bis or the Matilda II and Valiant. The Germans Panzer III and IV also seemed to follow the British notion of an infantry and cruiser tank. If that continued then a Panzer VI could also be expected, likely to heavily armoured and armed. The 17-pdr was being designed for just such a development.

Clarke had to admit that the Vickers 75mm HV was further advanced, and that the prototypes had performed adequately. It might not be quite as effective as the 17-pdr, but he had to admit that the cries from North Africa for a proper dual purpose gun had become deafening. Even sending more Close Support versions of tanks, with the 3-inch howitzer, wasn’t satisfying the armoured regiments.

As Director of Artillery, Clarke approved of sending Valiant II, equipped for, but not with, the Soviet 76mm gun. It was hard to fathom why the Soviets hadn’t sent the guns or plans to enable that to happen, but, the way of the Russians had always been something of a mystery. At least it would mean that more of the 6-pdrs would be available to equip British forces sooner. He was also hoping that the Americans would react positively to the 6-pdr as a replacement for their own towed 37mm anti-tank gun. Having a standard 57mm anti-tank gun, if and when the Americans joined the war, would be beneficial.

Therein lay his problem. Arguing for standardisation on towed anti-tank guns, led, inevitably, to standardisation of tank guns. The Americans were committed to the 75mm tank gun for obvious reasons. While their artillery regiments were due to replace the 75mm gun for a 105mm howitzer, their production facilities for 75mm were second to none (now that France was out of the picture). Once again, his nemesis, Sir John Carden, had proposed looking at adapting the 6-pdr to take the American 75x350 shells. It appeared from early analysis that this wouldn’t be a terribly difficult problem to resolve. At this point however, with America still neutral and with an army that was in many ways behind the British, it seemed to Clarke that there was a danger of the tail wagging the dog.
 
In 1939 when the Germans used the Graf Zeppelins as an ELINT platform to assess the UK Radar defence, they flew up the east coast of England tracked by Chain Home the whole way. Although the Germans were picking up the 12.5meter wave band transmitions from Chain Home they completely dismissed them as being evidence of a British Radar system as the wave length was much longer than any used by their own systems and their electronic experts deemed it technically inferior to any system they would contemplate building. Such is Military and Scientific Hubris !
What amuses me about that mission is that the GZ was regularly radioing its position back to base and it was consistently wrong. Supposedly the RAF controllers in the plotting rooms tracking it were really tempted to radio the GZ its correct position.
 
that story is actually true, whilst reporting a position of Hull the Graf Zeppelin was actually over the Yorkshire Moors. Fighter Command Headquarters who controlled the RDF system for once thought about operational security and did not reveal that the G.Z was being tracked by correcting her navigational errors.
 
that story is actually true, whilst reporting a position of Hull the Graf Zeppelin was actually over the Yorkshire Moors. Fighter Command Headquarters who controlled the RDF system for once thought about operational security and did not reveal that the G.Z was being tracked by correcting her navigational errors.
i think that the wrong way round graf Zepplin reported position over the Yorkshire moors when in reality they where over hull i may be wrong
 
Of course, when the Centurion-equivalent comes due, I'd expect it to be better than the OTL centurion, since I can't see Carden being happy with sticking with the Meteor, so I'd expect him to try putting a de-rated/Ricardo-modded Griffon in there, which should improve the top speed somewhat.
Griffon itself would take more work than usual due to it having an integrated reductor unit for aircrafts, which needs to be deleted in tanks.
Considering Vickers' excellent relations with Ricardo and their push with diesel, it would rather make sense to use the dedicated H16 diesels that Ricardo developped in 1940/41 as an offshoot of the TOG program. It is not much larger than a Meteor but can do 720-760hp supercharged and 560 when naturally aspirated. Ricardo may even tune that engine specifically for a smaller "Vickturion" since TOG may not be as important ITTL.

It's also worth noting that a Vickers-designed Centurion stemming from the Valiant/Victor line wouldn't be anything like the offshoot of the A27/34 family designed by Leyland and co.
To start with it was a Heavy Cruiser while here it's actually related to an Infantry/borderline Universal family, which changes some specs. Second Vickers is more interested in diesel and a relatively more compact and weight-efficient vehicle. One could even contemplate a Vanguard-like pike nosed hull front. Turret design under Vickers was somewhat different.

A lower weight means that Cent wouldn't necessarily be as underpowered as OTL.
 
Therein lay his problem. Arguing for standardisation on towed anti-tank guns, led, inevitably, to standardisation of tank guns. The Americans were committed to the 75mm tank gun for obvious reasons. While their artillery regiments were due to replace the 75mm gun for a 105mm howitzer, their production facilities for 75mm were second to none (now that France was out of the picture). Once again, his nemesis, Sir John Carden, had proposed looking at adapting the 6-pdr to take the American 75x350 shells. It appeared from early analysis that this wouldn’t be a terribly difficult problem to resolve. At this point however, with America still neutral and with an army that was in many ways behind the British, it seemed to Clarke that there was a danger of the tail wagging the dog.
Given the way the war is progressing so far I have to wonder though if this argument will be stronger compared to OTL against use of American ammunition when it comes to tanks and anti-tank weaponry and such given the way British Armour and Anti Tank weaponry has been performing in North Africa so far as well as in other areas. I mean for one they could quite reasonably say that American amour and AT guns are untested against Frontline Germany equipment and when compares with British equipment of a similar type its not as effective.

if that is the case could the equipment in question could less of it be purchased or at least sent to other areas.
 
Therein lay his problem. Arguing for standardisation on towed anti-tank guns, led, inevitably, to standardisation of tank guns. The Americans were committed to the 75mm tank gun for obvious reasons. While their artillery regiments were due to replace the 75mm gun for a 105mm howitzer, their production facilities for 75mm were second to none (now that France was out of the picture). Once again, his nemesis, Sir John Carden, had proposed looking at adapting the 6-pdr to take the American 75x350 shells. It appeared from early analysis that this wouldn’t be a terribly difficult problem to resolve. At this point however, with America still neutral and with an army that was in many ways behind the British, it seemed to Clarke that there was a danger of the tail wagging the dog.
Why can't the 75HV use 75x350 shells? As can a bored out 6 pdr. The Americans can build the 75HV under license instead of the 76mm M1

I'd hate to lose the 17 pdr but it seems like the sensible thing.

Move straight to 20 pdr?
 
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