25 October 1941. Singapore.
allanpcameron
Donor
25 October 1941. Singapore.
Lieutenant-General Percival finally had a chance to sit down and talk about the first couple of months of having tanks under his command with Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick (CO 11th Bn RTR). Hedderwick was happy to report that his men and machines were coping with the climate, and had begun exercising with both Australian and Indian troops.
During September, Hedderwick and his Squadron Commanders had gone on a lengthy tour of the area looking at the terrain. With Percival’s pre-war work on defending Malaya, the RTR officers concentrated on the most likely routes that a Japanese force might take to attack Singapore from the north. With some help from the Royal Engineers Survey Depot, the Battalion now had a fairly good set of maps of the whole area. These maps would allow the tanks to avoid bridges that would collapse under the weight of the Matilda II tanks, something the Royal Engineers were quite keen on. They also were fairly realistic about the kind of terrain that the tanks could use off-road. The expectation of the RTR officers was that Malaya would consist mostly of impassable jungle. The reality they’d found was quite different. Large areas of the countryside were set aside as rubber plantations. While a tank might knock down a few trees here and there, the plantations weren’t completely unsuitable ground for tanks.
Hedderwick noted that the conditions of the roads were always going to be a factor in the mobility of the tanks. He expressed his disappointment at how few tank transporters he had to move his tanks around. The tracks on a Matilda would always have a negative impact on road surfaces, but usually there was a verge on the side of the road that the tanks could use.
Having looked over the ground, Hedderwick had re-evaluated his request to keep the whole Battalion together in the event of an attack. Having a central depot where the tanks could be serviced was clearly important, and the RASC were happy to offer to expand one of their workshops for the RTR. The suggestion that Hedderwick now wanted to make was to offer to keep his HQ Squadron at Singapore itself. A, B and C squadrons could be parcelled out, one to each of the three Infantry Divisions (9th & 11th Indian, 8th Australian). Having 18 Infantry Tanks at the disposal of the Divisional General would allow sufficient flexibility.
Percival wanted to know Hedderwick’s evaluation of the plans for Operation Matador. Major Tom McBride, CO B Squadron, had been able to drive up to Bangkok and back in a civilian car with his driver ‘on leave’. They’d taken lots of photographs to let the intelligence officers get an idea of what might be possible.
Getting to it in a timely manner however was always going to be the problem. The speed of the Matilda II would be an issue for the infantry commander to have to take into account. The journey to Songkla, at about 140 miles, would put the tanks under a lot of strain. Pattani, which was half the distance, would be a more realistic prospect, if the tanks were to get there, fight and get back. The RTR officer was also concerned with Japanese forces outflanking that kind of move northwards in Thailand. His own assessment, which chimed with McBride’s, was that the RAF base in Kota Bharu would be a prime target for the Japanese. Any British force sent into Thailand could well find itself having to fight its way back.
Percival was pleased with Hedderwick’s assessment. It confirmed what he thought was the weakness of Operation Matador. He would be relying on two Brigades of 11th Indian Division to both hold Jitra in the west and move into Thailand in the east. Until the next wave of reinforcements arrived, and had time to acclimatise and train, Percival was concerned that his forces would be open to defeat in detail if they were spread out too much. The question about whether the Thai army and police would cooperate or resist an incursion was a matter of debate.
There were two routes leading from South Thailand into North Malaya—the main road from Singora via Haad’yai Junction into Kedah and a secondary road from Patani via Yala to Kroh in North Perak where it branched, the better road going west into Province Wellesley and the other, which reported to be fit only for light transport, turning south to join the main north-south road west of the Perak River.
McBride had noted that on his travels he had regularly bumped into Japanese men, obviously army, who seemed to be doing exactly the same kind of reconnaissance as he was. He particularly noted that on one of his stops a group of Japanese had stayed in the same rest house. The two parties then proceeded to meet again on the road to Kroh. There was a feature on the road, known as the Ledge, where the road was cut into the hillside, with a steep descent to a river below. If that road was destroyed, movement south would be severely hampered. If it were open, it would allow a force to move into the rear areas of the Indian Division around Jitra.
Percival took careful note of this. Reports of Japanese ‘tourists’ were rampant, and they were obviously planning something. To counter whatever the Japanese had in mind, a fleet was being assembled for Singapore. The Battlecruiser HMS Repulse was currently working out of Mombasa. It would set sail for Trincomalee in November. The aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable, after she had worked up in the West Indies, was going to Gibraltar to replace HMS Ark Royal. HMS Ark Royal, with HMS Nelson, would sail to Singapore, via Alexandria, after they’d escorted a convoy to Malta. Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, was being asked to send another battleship (most likely HMS Barham), with a Cruiser Squadron and two Destroyer flotillas. HMS Prince of Wales was currently escorting a convoy towards South Africa, and then onwards to Trincomalee to rendezvous with HMS Repulse, HMS Nelson, HMS Barham and HMS Ark Royal. With her experience of flying off Hurricanes, HMS Ark Royal would receive two Naval Air Squadrons, each with 12 Hurricane Ibs, in addition to one of her Fulmar squadrons, leaving half of her Swordfish squadrons on Malta, along with the other Fulmar squadron.
The Royal Australian Navy’s Cruisers and destroyers were the obvious choices to send as the basis for the Cruiser Squadron and Destroyer flotillas. The Australian destroyers HMAS Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen, Napier, Nestor, Nizam, would be much missed by Cunningham, but sending them home was a reasonable request from Australia. HMAS Stuart had already been detached and was being converted to an Escort Destroyer at Williamstown, Victoria. The sloop HMAS Parramatta would also return to strengthen her sister ships. The new destroyer, HMAS Norman, would follow from Home Fleet.
As for Cruisers, HMAS Perth was already being refitted in Sydney. HMAS Hobart was undergoing a refit in Colombo and now wouldn’t be returning to the Red Sea. HMAS Australia and HMAS Canberra’s work in the Indian Ocean would likely end and two RN Cruisers (HMS Gloucester and Dido) would be deployed to replace them. Admiral Cunningham was also going to release HMS Carlisle, the AA Cruiser, and HMS Fiji to add to the Australian Cruisers. HMS Greyhound, Ilex, Imperial and Juno would be the British Destroyers to join their Royal Australian Navy comrades.
The new Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, had finally persuaded Winston Churchill to allow the Australian I Corps (6th and 9th Divisions AIF) to be shipped home from the Middle East. Since both Divisions had suffered in the fighting in Greece and North Africa, Curtin was keen on giving the men some home leave. Once they were up to full strength, he planned sending them to Malaya. This would mean that I (Australian) Corps (6th, 8th and 9th Divisions) would be available to Percival. There were questions about whether the 23rd Brigade, spread over Rabaul, Timor and Ambon, would be better off if a Brigade Group as in each of those locations, this might mean splitting up some of the Brigades returning from the Middle East.
The Australian First Armoured Division were still at a relatively early phase of their development. The good news was that they were beginning to receive the first of 365 Stuart M3 Light Tanks. These Lend-Lease tanks, originally for the British Army, had been transferred over to the Australians. They expected that the full order that would be complete by the end of December. The expectation was for them to be available in the spring of 1942. Lieutenant-General John Lavarack, GOC I Corps, had already flown to Canberra to be consult with Curtin. Lavarack, despite Blamey’s objections, would take command of 2nd Australian Imperial Forces in the Far East. Already some of his staff were making their way to Singapore to begin the process of setting up a Corps HQ.
Percival had been informed by the War Office that 18th Infantry Division were about to embark directly for Singapore, with the hope that they would arrive in time for Christmas. A large Canadian contingent would be shipped on American vessels to Liverpool, to allow the direct transport to the Far East of the 18th Division. Along with this British Division, the RAF had shipped 96 crated Tomahawk IIbs, with ground-crew and some pilots to reinforce the squadrons defending Malaya. This had been done despite a protest from the Prime Minister who wanted to send as much as possible to the Soviet Union. He was informed that this was in fact a planned reinforcement of Middle East Command, which Generals Wavell and Auchinleck had agreed ship onwards to Singapore personally. Ninety-six Hurricanes had gone to the Soviet Union instead. The first shipment of P40s directly from the United States to the Soviet Union had been shipped in September.
The Brewster Buffaloes that the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF were being equipped with were, to quote one Australian pilot, ‘pathetic’. What the British Purchasing Commission had ordered, and what Brewster had delivered wasn’t exactly the same. The engine, often a second-hand refurbished Cyclone was underpowered, while the British requirements meant it was much heavier, reducing its underwhelming performance even more. The Tomahawks, when they arrived, and were rebuilt, and the pilots trained on them would be big improvement. But Air-Vice Marshall Pulford still worried that it could well be January before the Tomahawks were ready for action.
General Auchinleck, as C-in-C India, had looked again at the Indian troops who had gone to Iraq and Iran. He was aware that General Slim’s men should have gone to Malaya, and that their deployment had left Percival short. General Wavell, with some reluctance, agreed to Auchinleck’s request for 5th Indian Division to be returned firstly to India to take on new drafts to replace casualties. Auchinleck was in two minds about sending the 5th Indian Division to Malaya, to augment III (India) Corps, or to beef up the defences in Burma. Percival argued, convincingly, that Burma’s best defence was holding Malaya and Singapore. Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Corps) was delighted that his old Division was coming under his control. If Operation Matador was still being considered, 5th Indian Division would be an invaluable asset to move into southern Thailand.
Lieutenant-General Percival finally had a chance to sit down and talk about the first couple of months of having tanks under his command with Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick (CO 11th Bn RTR). Hedderwick was happy to report that his men and machines were coping with the climate, and had begun exercising with both Australian and Indian troops.
During September, Hedderwick and his Squadron Commanders had gone on a lengthy tour of the area looking at the terrain. With Percival’s pre-war work on defending Malaya, the RTR officers concentrated on the most likely routes that a Japanese force might take to attack Singapore from the north. With some help from the Royal Engineers Survey Depot, the Battalion now had a fairly good set of maps of the whole area. These maps would allow the tanks to avoid bridges that would collapse under the weight of the Matilda II tanks, something the Royal Engineers were quite keen on. They also were fairly realistic about the kind of terrain that the tanks could use off-road. The expectation of the RTR officers was that Malaya would consist mostly of impassable jungle. The reality they’d found was quite different. Large areas of the countryside were set aside as rubber plantations. While a tank might knock down a few trees here and there, the plantations weren’t completely unsuitable ground for tanks.
Hedderwick noted that the conditions of the roads were always going to be a factor in the mobility of the tanks. He expressed his disappointment at how few tank transporters he had to move his tanks around. The tracks on a Matilda would always have a negative impact on road surfaces, but usually there was a verge on the side of the road that the tanks could use.
Having looked over the ground, Hedderwick had re-evaluated his request to keep the whole Battalion together in the event of an attack. Having a central depot where the tanks could be serviced was clearly important, and the RASC were happy to offer to expand one of their workshops for the RTR. The suggestion that Hedderwick now wanted to make was to offer to keep his HQ Squadron at Singapore itself. A, B and C squadrons could be parcelled out, one to each of the three Infantry Divisions (9th & 11th Indian, 8th Australian). Having 18 Infantry Tanks at the disposal of the Divisional General would allow sufficient flexibility.
Percival wanted to know Hedderwick’s evaluation of the plans for Operation Matador. Major Tom McBride, CO B Squadron, had been able to drive up to Bangkok and back in a civilian car with his driver ‘on leave’. They’d taken lots of photographs to let the intelligence officers get an idea of what might be possible.
Getting to it in a timely manner however was always going to be the problem. The speed of the Matilda II would be an issue for the infantry commander to have to take into account. The journey to Songkla, at about 140 miles, would put the tanks under a lot of strain. Pattani, which was half the distance, would be a more realistic prospect, if the tanks were to get there, fight and get back. The RTR officer was also concerned with Japanese forces outflanking that kind of move northwards in Thailand. His own assessment, which chimed with McBride’s, was that the RAF base in Kota Bharu would be a prime target for the Japanese. Any British force sent into Thailand could well find itself having to fight its way back.
Percival was pleased with Hedderwick’s assessment. It confirmed what he thought was the weakness of Operation Matador. He would be relying on two Brigades of 11th Indian Division to both hold Jitra in the west and move into Thailand in the east. Until the next wave of reinforcements arrived, and had time to acclimatise and train, Percival was concerned that his forces would be open to defeat in detail if they were spread out too much. The question about whether the Thai army and police would cooperate or resist an incursion was a matter of debate.
There were two routes leading from South Thailand into North Malaya—the main road from Singora via Haad’yai Junction into Kedah and a secondary road from Patani via Yala to Kroh in North Perak where it branched, the better road going west into Province Wellesley and the other, which reported to be fit only for light transport, turning south to join the main north-south road west of the Perak River.
McBride had noted that on his travels he had regularly bumped into Japanese men, obviously army, who seemed to be doing exactly the same kind of reconnaissance as he was. He particularly noted that on one of his stops a group of Japanese had stayed in the same rest house. The two parties then proceeded to meet again on the road to Kroh. There was a feature on the road, known as the Ledge, where the road was cut into the hillside, with a steep descent to a river below. If that road was destroyed, movement south would be severely hampered. If it were open, it would allow a force to move into the rear areas of the Indian Division around Jitra.
Percival took careful note of this. Reports of Japanese ‘tourists’ were rampant, and they were obviously planning something. To counter whatever the Japanese had in mind, a fleet was being assembled for Singapore. The Battlecruiser HMS Repulse was currently working out of Mombasa. It would set sail for Trincomalee in November. The aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable, after she had worked up in the West Indies, was going to Gibraltar to replace HMS Ark Royal. HMS Ark Royal, with HMS Nelson, would sail to Singapore, via Alexandria, after they’d escorted a convoy to Malta. Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, was being asked to send another battleship (most likely HMS Barham), with a Cruiser Squadron and two Destroyer flotillas. HMS Prince of Wales was currently escorting a convoy towards South Africa, and then onwards to Trincomalee to rendezvous with HMS Repulse, HMS Nelson, HMS Barham and HMS Ark Royal. With her experience of flying off Hurricanes, HMS Ark Royal would receive two Naval Air Squadrons, each with 12 Hurricane Ibs, in addition to one of her Fulmar squadrons, leaving half of her Swordfish squadrons on Malta, along with the other Fulmar squadron.
The Royal Australian Navy’s Cruisers and destroyers were the obvious choices to send as the basis for the Cruiser Squadron and Destroyer flotillas. The Australian destroyers HMAS Vampire, Vendetta, Voyager, Waterhen, Napier, Nestor, Nizam, would be much missed by Cunningham, but sending them home was a reasonable request from Australia. HMAS Stuart had already been detached and was being converted to an Escort Destroyer at Williamstown, Victoria. The sloop HMAS Parramatta would also return to strengthen her sister ships. The new destroyer, HMAS Norman, would follow from Home Fleet.
As for Cruisers, HMAS Perth was already being refitted in Sydney. HMAS Hobart was undergoing a refit in Colombo and now wouldn’t be returning to the Red Sea. HMAS Australia and HMAS Canberra’s work in the Indian Ocean would likely end and two RN Cruisers (HMS Gloucester and Dido) would be deployed to replace them. Admiral Cunningham was also going to release HMS Carlisle, the AA Cruiser, and HMS Fiji to add to the Australian Cruisers. HMS Greyhound, Ilex, Imperial and Juno would be the British Destroyers to join their Royal Australian Navy comrades.
The new Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, had finally persuaded Winston Churchill to allow the Australian I Corps (6th and 9th Divisions AIF) to be shipped home from the Middle East. Since both Divisions had suffered in the fighting in Greece and North Africa, Curtin was keen on giving the men some home leave. Once they were up to full strength, he planned sending them to Malaya. This would mean that I (Australian) Corps (6th, 8th and 9th Divisions) would be available to Percival. There were questions about whether the 23rd Brigade, spread over Rabaul, Timor and Ambon, would be better off if a Brigade Group as in each of those locations, this might mean splitting up some of the Brigades returning from the Middle East.
The Australian First Armoured Division were still at a relatively early phase of their development. The good news was that they were beginning to receive the first of 365 Stuart M3 Light Tanks. These Lend-Lease tanks, originally for the British Army, had been transferred over to the Australians. They expected that the full order that would be complete by the end of December. The expectation was for them to be available in the spring of 1942. Lieutenant-General John Lavarack, GOC I Corps, had already flown to Canberra to be consult with Curtin. Lavarack, despite Blamey’s objections, would take command of 2nd Australian Imperial Forces in the Far East. Already some of his staff were making their way to Singapore to begin the process of setting up a Corps HQ.
Percival had been informed by the War Office that 18th Infantry Division were about to embark directly for Singapore, with the hope that they would arrive in time for Christmas. A large Canadian contingent would be shipped on American vessels to Liverpool, to allow the direct transport to the Far East of the 18th Division. Along with this British Division, the RAF had shipped 96 crated Tomahawk IIbs, with ground-crew and some pilots to reinforce the squadrons defending Malaya. This had been done despite a protest from the Prime Minister who wanted to send as much as possible to the Soviet Union. He was informed that this was in fact a planned reinforcement of Middle East Command, which Generals Wavell and Auchinleck had agreed ship onwards to Singapore personally. Ninety-six Hurricanes had gone to the Soviet Union instead. The first shipment of P40s directly from the United States to the Soviet Union had been shipped in September.
The Brewster Buffaloes that the RAF, RAAF and RNZAF were being equipped with were, to quote one Australian pilot, ‘pathetic’. What the British Purchasing Commission had ordered, and what Brewster had delivered wasn’t exactly the same. The engine, often a second-hand refurbished Cyclone was underpowered, while the British requirements meant it was much heavier, reducing its underwhelming performance even more. The Tomahawks, when they arrived, and were rebuilt, and the pilots trained on them would be big improvement. But Air-Vice Marshall Pulford still worried that it could well be January before the Tomahawks were ready for action.
General Auchinleck, as C-in-C India, had looked again at the Indian troops who had gone to Iraq and Iran. He was aware that General Slim’s men should have gone to Malaya, and that their deployment had left Percival short. General Wavell, with some reluctance, agreed to Auchinleck’s request for 5th Indian Division to be returned firstly to India to take on new drafts to replace casualties. Auchinleck was in two minds about sending the 5th Indian Division to Malaya, to augment III (India) Corps, or to beef up the defences in Burma. Percival argued, convincingly, that Burma’s best defence was holding Malaya and Singapore. Lieutenant-General Heath (GOC III Corps) was delighted that his old Division was coming under his control. If Operation Matador was still being considered, 5th Indian Division would be an invaluable asset to move into southern Thailand.
