20 October 1941. Sirte. Libya.
allanpcameron
Donor
20 October 1941. Sirte. Libya.
The arrival of 50th (Northumberland) Infantry Division to join 7th Armoured Division and 6th Infantry Division in XIII Corps had allowed the Corps to begin rehearsing for the forthcoming attack towards Misrata and ultimately Tripoli.
The Royal Navy and RAF had reported many successes stopping shipping coming from Italy to reinforce the Italian and German forces. There was a lack of intelligence about just what axis forces were still in theatre, so Lieutenant-General O’Connor had to plan for the worst-case scenario.
The Royal Navy had been hard at work escorting a veritable fleet of coasters which were carrying the stores needed for the build up to the attack. The fact that they had been able to bring the vast majority of the Valiant I tanks for 7th Armoured Division by sea to Benghazi had saved the tanks from the long overland route.
There was a growing hope that the next convoy would be able to make it to Sirte itself. There was little in the way of port facilities, but there was more than enough expertise in off-loading stores over the beach. The reason for this hope was that the RAF, reinforced by the SAAF and RAAF, seemed to be making inroads towards air superiority.
The numbers of fighters available at the front had risen to eight squadrons of Hurricanes and four squadrons of Tomahawks. The Wellington bomber force, based between Malta and Benghazi had reached five squadrons, with another seven squadrons between Beaufighters, Blenheims and Marylands. The problems facing Air Marshall Tedder in achieving this had been extraordinary. The need for a fighter Squadron’s ground element to be mobile enough to move forward with the aircraft from one landing ground to another was only possible with the help of the RAOC and RASC. Knowing that control of the air was a vital component of any success, General Wavell had agreed to Tedder’s requests for help.
The lessened activity over the summer months had allowed Tedder to build up a small reserve of pilots. During the summer months a number of ‘club runs’ to Malta had delivered many more Hurricanes to Malta, a percentage of which carried on to the area around Benghazi. The logjam at Tokradi was clearing, though the expected arrival of the first Kittyhawks from America would probably put things back again.
Once again, the combined work of Navy, Army and Air Force was paying off. With more fighter cover around Benghazi, the Navy were able to ship more supplies, including petrol, bombs and spares for the RAF squadrons close to their landing grounds. The increased Naval and Air power of Malta, focused on interdicting the Italian convoys to Tripoli, meant that the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica were lacking fuel supplies. This meant their ability to fly enough sorties was hampered. The first Bf 109F fighters were beginning to arrive in Libya, and the Macchi C202 were appearing over Malta. These outclassed the Hurricanes and Tomahawks on an individual level, but numbers mattered. As more and more British, Australian and South African pilots became proficient, some of the older tactics, which were obsolete, gave way to a similar style as the Luftwaffe used. The advantage given to the fighters defending Benghazi and Malta by Radar was also a force multiplier.
The majority of sorties flown by the RAF light bombers focused on their opposite numbers. Airfields, fuel dumps and transport hubs were the primary target. Tedder had begun the campaign to soften up the ground for the army, giving his bombers a month to cause the enemy aircraft as much trouble as possible. The Wellingtons concentrated on making the use of Tripoli’s port very difficult for the Italians and Germans.
The integration of 50th Infantry Division with 7th Armoured Division involved learning the skills of ground-air cooperation. Two Hurricane and two Tomahawk squadrons were designated as ‘Army Cooperation’ squadrons for XII Corps. The aircraft’s weaponry wasn’t entirely satisfactory for the role of ‘flying artillery’. The machine guns and 40lb bombs carried by the Hurricanes had to have an element of luck in hitting and damaging their targets. The Tomahawks weren’t much better, but could carry a larger bomb.
Each Brigade HQ had an RAF liaison attached. This officer was in radio contact with the RAF liaison at Divisional HQ, who in turn was in contact with the liaison at Corps HQ. As each request for air support was passed up the chain to RAF Western Desert HQ. Air-Vice Marshall Coningham, as Air Officer Commanding, had his team organised to be able to sift the requests, and knowing what and where his aircraft were, his team would assign the missions with the overall picture in mind.
There were two particular lessons that the latest serious of exercises had shown up. The first was recognition of friendly forces. Up until now British tanks had a white circle painted around the top of their turret. The dust and sand blowing up from tanks and other vehicles on the move meant that the circles weren’t always visible. The 50th Division’s experience in France and Flanders had noted that the German vehicles often had their swastika flag on the roof. The flag’s red background with a white circle, in which the black symbol was contained, was probably colourful enough to be seen from the air. The idea of having a Union Flag on every vehicle was considered, but discounted. After a search through Quartermasters stores and the souks of the Delta, enough orange-coloured cloth was sourced to add a panel on every British vehicle. Strict instructions had been issued to each and every unit to make sure that the panels were checked regularly to make sure they were clearly visible.
The other result of the debriefings was that some of the light bomber squadrons complained that they were held in readiness for a support mission, and then might only fly one sortie per day. On average the length of time it took from request to carrying out a mission was two and a half hours. The centralised way of collating requests was one reason, another was the distance of strike forces from the battlefield.
Once a mission was issued, the crews would need to be briefed, the aircraft then would have to take off, form up in the air, wait to rendezvous with the escorting fighters. They would then have to find a target, a landscape that didn’t lend itself to easy identification of landmarks. Visually identifying the correct target, was difficult enough, and when all was finally achieved, the weapons available were less than ideal.
No 21 Squadron, a Maryland equipped and South African manned squadron, had been particularly scathing in their debrief. Instead of waiting at readiness on their airstrip, they suggested that each light bomber squadron, with an accompanying fighter squadron should be circling in the vicinity of the battle. That way, if a mission came through, they would be on station much quicker. If no missions were allocated to them, then they would be free to engage targets of opportunity before returning to base. If each paired squadron in turn did this, then the total sortie rate would be much higher. One of the South Africans mentioned that it should be like a taxi-rank. The taxis are lined up and ready to go as soon as a call came in or a passenger hired them.
AVM Coningham agreed to try this in the next set of exercises. The need for clear map coordinates and some kind of smoke marking the target would also have to be practiced. The senior Royal Artillery commander present, noted that efforts to have an Observer in the air, giving corrections to batteries by R/T had proven useful previously. He said this hoping that the RAF would offer to provide aircraft again for his observers. This way they might also help coordinate air attacks with artillery bombardments. Coningham had a lot on his plate and wasn’t entirely sure he could help with that.
The Fleet Air Arm liaison mentioned that there were trained officers on the Fleet’s Battleships that were familiar with correcting gunnery from the air. He would happily ask Admiral Cunningham if someone could be spared from HMS Barham or Queen Elizabeth for the next exercise. Normally the job would be done flying on of the Battleship’s amphibians, though perhaps a Fulmar would be the better choice to use in a possibly hostile airspace. If a Royal Artillery Observer wanted to ride along and see what was involved, the Fleet Air Arm would happily help. The fact that most RAF raids needed to be guided by Albacores to find their target was something that the FAA didn’t want to rub in too much, and at least Conington acknowledged that the role of the FAA was important.
With 7th Armoured Division's 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades at full strength, efforts were being made to sort out the way which the Support Group was formed and used. Major-General Michael Creagh had been reassigned to General Auchinleck’s staff to become the Adviser Armoured Fighting Vehicles in India. Acting Major-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott was now GOC 7th Armoured Division. Having commanded the Support Group, and seen various ideas come and go, he had asked Lieutenant Generals O’Connor and Godwin-Austen for permission to adapt the Support Group to something more useful.
Acting Brigadier Jock Campbell, having been appointed as the CO of 7th Support group, had seen how the Indian 3rd Motorised Brigade had done with 22nd Armoured Brigade. Therefore, he had started calling the Support Group, “7th Motor Brigade”. This name quickly became popular. With three motorised Infantry Battalions, (2nd and 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps and 2nd Rifle Brigade), it was now a more rounded organisation. Some people had argued that, like the Support Group, that it should be arranged as a Brigade Group. This would mean having some integrated artillery (including anti-tank and anti-aircraft) and engineers. Major-General Gott however wanted, as with the Royal Engineers, all Royal Artillery units under Divisional control, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft units.
The problem Gott had seen previously was by parcelling out the artillery to various units, it meant that neither the Division, nor the Support Group, had enough combined strength. The problem of being defeated in detail was part of the learning taken from the fighting in France and Flanders. The Division had to be key organisation in battle. In Gott’s mind, putting Brigade Groups out separately was a recipe for disaster. Campbell, as an artillery man, could see the logic of Gott’s desire for consolidation of fighting power, though still thought there was a place for adaptation.
With the two Armoured Brigades and one Motor Brigade making up the Division, it was still very tank heavy, six armoured Regiments and only three infantry battalions. As all the tanks were Valiant I Infantry tanks, Gott had been working with Major-General John Evetts (GOC 6th Infantry Division) to attempt to use 4th Armoured Brigade, as a Tank Brigade. In this case, each Armoured Regiment would work with either one of the three infantry Brigades, or with the three battalions of one Brigade for a solid punch. This would let Gott keep 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Motor Brigade as the ‘breakthrough’ force. This ‘Mixed Division’, tried by the short lived 22nd Armoured Division, was much easier to handle and while the speed of the Valiant I wasn’t terribly fast, it wasn’t too different from the German panzers.
For Acting Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen, the forthcoming operation was quite different to his experience in East Africa. Richard O’Connor had taken him under his wing and had tried to bring him up to speed on what the battles in North Africa had taught the British Army.
The force Godwin-Austen now commanded, an Armoured and two Infantry Divisions, with all the Corps troops, was a powerful force. He’d studied everything that had happened up till then in North Africa and with Gott and John Evetts’ experience, he was relying heavily on them. Major-General William Ramsden (GOC 50th Division) was a late arrival, but had led 25th Brigade with distinction in the fighting in Flanders. Ramsden had taken over command of 50th Division when Giffard Martel had been promoted to GOC Royal Armoured Corps.
50th Division was made up of 69th, 150th and 151st Brigades, all of which were well seasoned. The Durham Light Infantry of 151st Brigade had taken part in the Battle of Arras which had put a dent in General Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division. It was believed by British Intelligence that Rommel was in Berlin looking to redeem himself after his failure in North Africa. Godwin-Austen felt he had three crack Divisions under his command. While it was possible that Vyvyan Pope’s XXX Corps might have to take over from him, Godwin-Austen believed that he had a force strong enough to march into Tripoli, as he had into Addis Ababa, if all the planets aligned correctly.
The arrival of 50th (Northumberland) Infantry Division to join 7th Armoured Division and 6th Infantry Division in XIII Corps had allowed the Corps to begin rehearsing for the forthcoming attack towards Misrata and ultimately Tripoli.
The Royal Navy and RAF had reported many successes stopping shipping coming from Italy to reinforce the Italian and German forces. There was a lack of intelligence about just what axis forces were still in theatre, so Lieutenant-General O’Connor had to plan for the worst-case scenario.
The Royal Navy had been hard at work escorting a veritable fleet of coasters which were carrying the stores needed for the build up to the attack. The fact that they had been able to bring the vast majority of the Valiant I tanks for 7th Armoured Division by sea to Benghazi had saved the tanks from the long overland route.
There was a growing hope that the next convoy would be able to make it to Sirte itself. There was little in the way of port facilities, but there was more than enough expertise in off-loading stores over the beach. The reason for this hope was that the RAF, reinforced by the SAAF and RAAF, seemed to be making inroads towards air superiority.
The numbers of fighters available at the front had risen to eight squadrons of Hurricanes and four squadrons of Tomahawks. The Wellington bomber force, based between Malta and Benghazi had reached five squadrons, with another seven squadrons between Beaufighters, Blenheims and Marylands. The problems facing Air Marshall Tedder in achieving this had been extraordinary. The need for a fighter Squadron’s ground element to be mobile enough to move forward with the aircraft from one landing ground to another was only possible with the help of the RAOC and RASC. Knowing that control of the air was a vital component of any success, General Wavell had agreed to Tedder’s requests for help.
The lessened activity over the summer months had allowed Tedder to build up a small reserve of pilots. During the summer months a number of ‘club runs’ to Malta had delivered many more Hurricanes to Malta, a percentage of which carried on to the area around Benghazi. The logjam at Tokradi was clearing, though the expected arrival of the first Kittyhawks from America would probably put things back again.
Once again, the combined work of Navy, Army and Air Force was paying off. With more fighter cover around Benghazi, the Navy were able to ship more supplies, including petrol, bombs and spares for the RAF squadrons close to their landing grounds. The increased Naval and Air power of Malta, focused on interdicting the Italian convoys to Tripoli, meant that the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica were lacking fuel supplies. This meant their ability to fly enough sorties was hampered. The first Bf 109F fighters were beginning to arrive in Libya, and the Macchi C202 were appearing over Malta. These outclassed the Hurricanes and Tomahawks on an individual level, but numbers mattered. As more and more British, Australian and South African pilots became proficient, some of the older tactics, which were obsolete, gave way to a similar style as the Luftwaffe used. The advantage given to the fighters defending Benghazi and Malta by Radar was also a force multiplier.
The majority of sorties flown by the RAF light bombers focused on their opposite numbers. Airfields, fuel dumps and transport hubs were the primary target. Tedder had begun the campaign to soften up the ground for the army, giving his bombers a month to cause the enemy aircraft as much trouble as possible. The Wellingtons concentrated on making the use of Tripoli’s port very difficult for the Italians and Germans.
The integration of 50th Infantry Division with 7th Armoured Division involved learning the skills of ground-air cooperation. Two Hurricane and two Tomahawk squadrons were designated as ‘Army Cooperation’ squadrons for XII Corps. The aircraft’s weaponry wasn’t entirely satisfactory for the role of ‘flying artillery’. The machine guns and 40lb bombs carried by the Hurricanes had to have an element of luck in hitting and damaging their targets. The Tomahawks weren’t much better, but could carry a larger bomb.
Each Brigade HQ had an RAF liaison attached. This officer was in radio contact with the RAF liaison at Divisional HQ, who in turn was in contact with the liaison at Corps HQ. As each request for air support was passed up the chain to RAF Western Desert HQ. Air-Vice Marshall Coningham, as Air Officer Commanding, had his team organised to be able to sift the requests, and knowing what and where his aircraft were, his team would assign the missions with the overall picture in mind.
There were two particular lessons that the latest serious of exercises had shown up. The first was recognition of friendly forces. Up until now British tanks had a white circle painted around the top of their turret. The dust and sand blowing up from tanks and other vehicles on the move meant that the circles weren’t always visible. The 50th Division’s experience in France and Flanders had noted that the German vehicles often had their swastika flag on the roof. The flag’s red background with a white circle, in which the black symbol was contained, was probably colourful enough to be seen from the air. The idea of having a Union Flag on every vehicle was considered, but discounted. After a search through Quartermasters stores and the souks of the Delta, enough orange-coloured cloth was sourced to add a panel on every British vehicle. Strict instructions had been issued to each and every unit to make sure that the panels were checked regularly to make sure they were clearly visible.
The other result of the debriefings was that some of the light bomber squadrons complained that they were held in readiness for a support mission, and then might only fly one sortie per day. On average the length of time it took from request to carrying out a mission was two and a half hours. The centralised way of collating requests was one reason, another was the distance of strike forces from the battlefield.
Once a mission was issued, the crews would need to be briefed, the aircraft then would have to take off, form up in the air, wait to rendezvous with the escorting fighters. They would then have to find a target, a landscape that didn’t lend itself to easy identification of landmarks. Visually identifying the correct target, was difficult enough, and when all was finally achieved, the weapons available were less than ideal.
No 21 Squadron, a Maryland equipped and South African manned squadron, had been particularly scathing in their debrief. Instead of waiting at readiness on their airstrip, they suggested that each light bomber squadron, with an accompanying fighter squadron should be circling in the vicinity of the battle. That way, if a mission came through, they would be on station much quicker. If no missions were allocated to them, then they would be free to engage targets of opportunity before returning to base. If each paired squadron in turn did this, then the total sortie rate would be much higher. One of the South Africans mentioned that it should be like a taxi-rank. The taxis are lined up and ready to go as soon as a call came in or a passenger hired them.
AVM Coningham agreed to try this in the next set of exercises. The need for clear map coordinates and some kind of smoke marking the target would also have to be practiced. The senior Royal Artillery commander present, noted that efforts to have an Observer in the air, giving corrections to batteries by R/T had proven useful previously. He said this hoping that the RAF would offer to provide aircraft again for his observers. This way they might also help coordinate air attacks with artillery bombardments. Coningham had a lot on his plate and wasn’t entirely sure he could help with that.
The Fleet Air Arm liaison mentioned that there were trained officers on the Fleet’s Battleships that were familiar with correcting gunnery from the air. He would happily ask Admiral Cunningham if someone could be spared from HMS Barham or Queen Elizabeth for the next exercise. Normally the job would be done flying on of the Battleship’s amphibians, though perhaps a Fulmar would be the better choice to use in a possibly hostile airspace. If a Royal Artillery Observer wanted to ride along and see what was involved, the Fleet Air Arm would happily help. The fact that most RAF raids needed to be guided by Albacores to find their target was something that the FAA didn’t want to rub in too much, and at least Conington acknowledged that the role of the FAA was important.
With 7th Armoured Division's 4th and 7th Armoured Brigades at full strength, efforts were being made to sort out the way which the Support Group was formed and used. Major-General Michael Creagh had been reassigned to General Auchinleck’s staff to become the Adviser Armoured Fighting Vehicles in India. Acting Major-General William ‘Strafer’ Gott was now GOC 7th Armoured Division. Having commanded the Support Group, and seen various ideas come and go, he had asked Lieutenant Generals O’Connor and Godwin-Austen for permission to adapt the Support Group to something more useful.
Acting Brigadier Jock Campbell, having been appointed as the CO of 7th Support group, had seen how the Indian 3rd Motorised Brigade had done with 22nd Armoured Brigade. Therefore, he had started calling the Support Group, “7th Motor Brigade”. This name quickly became popular. With three motorised Infantry Battalions, (2nd and 9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps and 2nd Rifle Brigade), it was now a more rounded organisation. Some people had argued that, like the Support Group, that it should be arranged as a Brigade Group. This would mean having some integrated artillery (including anti-tank and anti-aircraft) and engineers. Major-General Gott however wanted, as with the Royal Engineers, all Royal Artillery units under Divisional control, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft units.
The problem Gott had seen previously was by parcelling out the artillery to various units, it meant that neither the Division, nor the Support Group, had enough combined strength. The problem of being defeated in detail was part of the learning taken from the fighting in France and Flanders. The Division had to be key organisation in battle. In Gott’s mind, putting Brigade Groups out separately was a recipe for disaster. Campbell, as an artillery man, could see the logic of Gott’s desire for consolidation of fighting power, though still thought there was a place for adaptation.
With the two Armoured Brigades and one Motor Brigade making up the Division, it was still very tank heavy, six armoured Regiments and only three infantry battalions. As all the tanks were Valiant I Infantry tanks, Gott had been working with Major-General John Evetts (GOC 6th Infantry Division) to attempt to use 4th Armoured Brigade, as a Tank Brigade. In this case, each Armoured Regiment would work with either one of the three infantry Brigades, or with the three battalions of one Brigade for a solid punch. This would let Gott keep 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Motor Brigade as the ‘breakthrough’ force. This ‘Mixed Division’, tried by the short lived 22nd Armoured Division, was much easier to handle and while the speed of the Valiant I wasn’t terribly fast, it wasn’t too different from the German panzers.
For Acting Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen, the forthcoming operation was quite different to his experience in East Africa. Richard O’Connor had taken him under his wing and had tried to bring him up to speed on what the battles in North Africa had taught the British Army.
The force Godwin-Austen now commanded, an Armoured and two Infantry Divisions, with all the Corps troops, was a powerful force. He’d studied everything that had happened up till then in North Africa and with Gott and John Evetts’ experience, he was relying heavily on them. Major-General William Ramsden (GOC 50th Division) was a late arrival, but had led 25th Brigade with distinction in the fighting in Flanders. Ramsden had taken over command of 50th Division when Giffard Martel had been promoted to GOC Royal Armoured Corps.
50th Division was made up of 69th, 150th and 151st Brigades, all of which were well seasoned. The Durham Light Infantry of 151st Brigade had taken part in the Battle of Arras which had put a dent in General Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division. It was believed by British Intelligence that Rommel was in Berlin looking to redeem himself after his failure in North Africa. Godwin-Austen felt he had three crack Divisions under his command. While it was possible that Vyvyan Pope’s XXX Corps might have to take over from him, Godwin-Austen believed that he had a force strong enough to march into Tripoli, as he had into Addis Ababa, if all the planets aligned correctly.
