Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
The idea of amphibious invading a defended Norway makes me break out in hives.
I am having visions of Japanese troops jumping into icy fjords in the name of the emperor, convinced that determination alone will carry the day. It's a worry.
Surely Churchill ITTL will know better than to attack into frigid impenetrable terrain and will recognise that the soft underbelly offers warm impenetrable terrain.
I remember reading Brooks own memoirs and how hard he had to fight to dissuade Churchill from doing it.
The problem with North Norway (Narvik area) is that not only is it a horrible place to invade against any sort of defence (even if you can manage complete air/naval superiority) but it's a road to nowhere, since marching an army south through Norway is an obvious non-starter.
The problem with South Norway (Bergen/Stavanger area) is that it's still a long, rough sea crossing from the UK and it's easier for air support and reinforcements to get there from Germany via Denmark than from Britain. And if you manage to get a beachhead, what then? There's still a lot of highly defensible terrain between you and anywhere that matters and even if you get to Oslo you need a fleet in the Baltic to get anywhere else.
The problem with the "soft underbelly" is that OTL even after the Italian surrender it produced the bloody grind of Anzio/Cassino, then stalemate on the Gothic Line and the disaster of the Dodecanese Campaign. There's an argument that if the Western Allies had focussed harder on the Med (no Dragoon) they could have broken out into the Po valley in 1944 or landed an army in the Balkans and maybe "liberated" Bulgaria or even Romania before the Soviets. There's also an argument that the whole thing was a sideshow and they'd have done better to go all-in on the primary objective, which was France.
TTL. I'd expect the British to do something with their army in 1942, whether it's Rhodes, Norway, a Dieppe-style "raid", Pantellaria or some other Churchillain wild idea. Given that the army is currently in North Africa, the Med looks a probability.
The position of the Vichy French may be key. With the British camped on their doorstep and no Axis help in sight, I'd expect the colonial authorities in Tunisia, Algeria and Syria to be a bit more strictly neutral than either Berlin or Vichy would like. The whole point of Vichy, from the German perspective, was to make the French colonies, especially North Africa, "neutral" rather than falling under the control of the British. If French North Africa comes under British (or Free French) control, there's no more point in the fiction of Vichy independence and I'd expect the Panzers to roll in shortly. The French authorities in Tunis and Algiers know this, but there's neutral and neutral and there's more than one way of persuading the British not to cross the Mareth Line.
The problem with South Norway (Bergen/Stavanger area) is that it's still a long, rough sea crossing from the UK and it's easier for air support and reinforcements to get there from Germany via Denmark than from Britain. And if you manage to get a beachhead, what then? There's still a lot of highly defensible terrain between you and anywhere that matters and even if you get to Oslo you need a fleet in the Baltic to get anywhere else.
The problem with the "soft underbelly" is that OTL even after the Italian surrender it produced the bloody grind of Anzio/Cassino, then stalemate on the Gothic Line and the disaster of the Dodecanese Campaign. There's an argument that if the Western Allies had focussed harder on the Med (no Dragoon) they could have broken out into the Po valley in 1944 or landed an army in the Balkans and maybe "liberated" Bulgaria or even Romania before the Soviets. There's also an argument that the whole thing was a sideshow and they'd have done better to go all-in on the primary objective, which was France.
TTL. I'd expect the British to do something with their army in 1942, whether it's Rhodes, Norway, a Dieppe-style "raid", Pantellaria or some other Churchillain wild idea. Given that the army is currently in North Africa, the Med looks a probability.
The position of the Vichy French may be key. With the British camped on their doorstep and no Axis help in sight, I'd expect the colonial authorities in Tunisia, Algeria and Syria to be a bit more strictly neutral than either Berlin or Vichy would like. The whole point of Vichy, from the German perspective, was to make the French colonies, especially North Africa, "neutral" rather than falling under the control of the British. If French North Africa comes under British (or Free French) control, there's no more point in the fiction of Vichy independence and I'd expect the Panzers to roll in shortly. The French authorities in Tunis and Algiers know this, but there's neutral and neutral and there's more than one way of persuading the British not to cross the Mareth Line.
If there is an active land combat front against Japan thanks to an earlier tie up in Africa, that's not hellish jungle in Burma, and only semi hellish jungle in a still held Malaya that would reshuffle priorities as it moves the question from "defend India" we saw in OTL.
To "maintain control of Malay Barrier, maintain exports from Malaya, attack Thailand, liberate Indochina" etc. Lots more to do there of interest for Winston to get stuck into.
Rhoades is a dead cert for Med ops though.
To "maintain control of Malay Barrier, maintain exports from Malaya, attack Thailand, liberate Indochina" etc. Lots more to do there of interest for Winston to get stuck into.
Rhoades is a dead cert for Med ops though.
I would argue that the Italian Amristice was a top notch opportunity that was lost first and foremost due to how the coupists handled it. With minot butterflies we would see the OTL plan of securing Rome during the first days of Italy switching sides. In that case, the Germans would have to establish themselves from the start at the Gothic Line. The Allies would have had months to slowly break through the line. If they breakthrough in April-May 1944, then the food and industry of the Po Valley will be lost to the german war effort.
At the same time, a different handling of the Armistice could result to a Balkan Bridgehead, that would draw additional german resources. I have again in mind Fester's timeline.
That's my take as well
Rhodes is a dead cert but might end up being ttls Dieppe?
Other than that yes defend India and Australia from Thailand who might lean more towards the British
The far advanced position that the British find themselves in allows an easier resupply of Malta taking a great deal of pressure off the RN
Far Less need for club runs and the like
There should be stronger allied forces available to invade and with a much stronger military reputation than OTL. I'm pretty sure the French will still fight but they should be more likely to seek armistice sooner ITTL - partly because they will be outmatched and partly because they can more easily justify their decision (what else could we do against the army that beat the Germans and the Italians in Africa?).
Narvik's strategic value changes dramatically depending on the decision to be made by Churchill as to whether to support the USSR following the German invasion.
However, it will be exceedingly interesting to see how this all plays out as the author's primary butterfly has resulted in a UK Command that has many more choices than they did in OTL.....
However, it will be exceedingly interesting to see how this all plays out as the author's primary butterfly has resulted in a UK Command that has many more choices than they did in OTL.....
Churchill hated Nazism even more than communism. He also knows he has to keep the Soviets fighting. There's no way he'd risk a german win. Even in OTL when things were far worse overall he suported the Soviets right from the start of Barbarossa, so he'll surely do it now and from a stronger position (not that he knows it's a stronger position).
Agreed. The issue comes in 1943/4, when Germany is clearly on the back foot, what does Churchill do then?
Garrison
Donor
He will support the USSR for the reasons @CaptainCalvert mentioned and this Churchill quote about his response right after the start of Barbarossa gives a flavour of his attitude:
Ramp-Rat
Monthly Donor
Reason to invade not to invade northern Norway.
If 1942 is a slack year for the British despite any Japanese actions, which will in the end mostly be covered by forces from India, as they were IOTL. Winston will be chomping at the bit to do something, anything to assist the Soviets, and take the war to the Germans. Yes he will want to strike at the so called soft underbelly in Greece and Italy, and for the Germans to be bombed back in to the Stone Age, while supporting an ever increasing resistance movement in Europe, to set it ablaze. Winston was a man with very little patience, and hated the attitude of when the time is right we will do something, just not now. He wanted to do it not now but last week, and was highly frustrated by those who took a measured approach to the problems before them. So Norway, are there any good reasons to invade northern Norway, and do they outweigh those reasons not to.
So reasons for the British to invade northern Norway in 1942, despite the problems and in the face of all the advice from the Chiefs of Staff. Once the Germans invade the Soviet Union, and Britain starts the run supply convoys to Murmansk and Archangel, in 1941, it became obvious that the majority of the opposition forces were based in northern Norway. If Britain was to invade and capture northern Norway from Bodo, on up past Narvik, incorporating all the land up to the Soviet border. You have eliminated the majority of the submarine bases, and airfields from which the attacks on your convoys start. You now have airfields to base anti submarine patrol aircraft from, fighters to defend against Germany air attacks. And you can use Narvik as a base for both anti submarine patrols to prevent them from coming north, and as a midway point for some of the close escort. In addition I am assuming that as Narvik is the port at the end of the rail line from Sweden, through which Swedish iron ore is exported during the winter when the Baltic freezes over, it can be kept open all year round. So during the winter months buy all the iron ore you can from Sweden, the Germans can not complain, as with the Baltic frozen over, they can not buy it and ship it themselves. At the same time increase your purchases of Swedish ball bearings, which you can now ship out without the risk of running blockade runners past Denmark. And use the railway to ship in oil and grain to Sweden, plus letters and parcels for you POW’S in Germany. The convoys to the Soviet Union which had to be suspended during the summer months as the near perpetual daylight made them too costly to run, will be possible all year round. And while you are not going to be able to push south and liberate southern Norway easily, the same applies to the Germans, who are not going to be able to push you out of the north, without making a major commitment.
Is it such a good idea to invade northern Norway, and what are the potential consequences of such an invasion. Without doubt such an invasion is going to be difficult, while the landings will not be too hard, the Germans just don’t have a big enough garrison to prevent you from landing. You are going to have to deploy vertically all of your aircraft carriers, until you can develop airfields on land to provide air coverage. You are committing yourself to a long campaign in some of the most inhospitable land in Europe, and it lacks resources, so everything will have to be brought in. It is doubtful that you will be able to replace the British ground and airforces needed to secure a defend this area with Norwegian forces, there are not enough Free Norwegians in Britain. And while you will be able to attract a lot of young Norwegian men and women, to make their own way north, ether directly or via Sweden. I do not think that you will get enough to take over the defence, or have the ability to train those who do answer the call, in Norway. The Germans are going to put the Swedish under increasing pressure, to not sell their iron ore, ball bearings, and anything else they have that the British want, to the British. They will demand that any Norwegians that cross into Sweden and detained and placed in detention facilities, to prevent them from travelling north to join their Free Norwegian countrymen. The maintenance of the forces are going to be a continuous cost and drain on British resources, which might be better spent elsewhere. And the commitment once made, can not be abandoned without significant loss of face, and political consequences. So you are left with the question, do the benefits out weight the costs, and by what standard do you make the decision. Me I will remain neutral, I can see both sides of the argument, yes it is given the present conditions a good idea, but whether the cost is low enough and the benefits high enough, needs to my mind more thinking time.
Side note, in the Mediterranean an invasion of Rhodes and other Greek islands is a given, once the conflict in North Africa has ended. The cost to the Germans/Italians of trying to defend them with the British on Crete, is high, and the cost to the British of once Rhodes has been taken, of biting off the others one by one low.
RR.
If 1942 is a slack year for the British despite any Japanese actions, which will in the end mostly be covered by forces from India, as they were IOTL. Winston will be chomping at the bit to do something, anything to assist the Soviets, and take the war to the Germans. Yes he will want to strike at the so called soft underbelly in Greece and Italy, and for the Germans to be bombed back in to the Stone Age, while supporting an ever increasing resistance movement in Europe, to set it ablaze. Winston was a man with very little patience, and hated the attitude of when the time is right we will do something, just not now. He wanted to do it not now but last week, and was highly frustrated by those who took a measured approach to the problems before them. So Norway, are there any good reasons to invade northern Norway, and do they outweigh those reasons not to.
So reasons for the British to invade northern Norway in 1942, despite the problems and in the face of all the advice from the Chiefs of Staff. Once the Germans invade the Soviet Union, and Britain starts the run supply convoys to Murmansk and Archangel, in 1941, it became obvious that the majority of the opposition forces were based in northern Norway. If Britain was to invade and capture northern Norway from Bodo, on up past Narvik, incorporating all the land up to the Soviet border. You have eliminated the majority of the submarine bases, and airfields from which the attacks on your convoys start. You now have airfields to base anti submarine patrol aircraft from, fighters to defend against Germany air attacks. And you can use Narvik as a base for both anti submarine patrols to prevent them from coming north, and as a midway point for some of the close escort. In addition I am assuming that as Narvik is the port at the end of the rail line from Sweden, through which Swedish iron ore is exported during the winter when the Baltic freezes over, it can be kept open all year round. So during the winter months buy all the iron ore you can from Sweden, the Germans can not complain, as with the Baltic frozen over, they can not buy it and ship it themselves. At the same time increase your purchases of Swedish ball bearings, which you can now ship out without the risk of running blockade runners past Denmark. And use the railway to ship in oil and grain to Sweden, plus letters and parcels for you POW’S in Germany. The convoys to the Soviet Union which had to be suspended during the summer months as the near perpetual daylight made them too costly to run, will be possible all year round. And while you are not going to be able to push south and liberate southern Norway easily, the same applies to the Germans, who are not going to be able to push you out of the north, without making a major commitment.
Is it such a good idea to invade northern Norway, and what are the potential consequences of such an invasion. Without doubt such an invasion is going to be difficult, while the landings will not be too hard, the Germans just don’t have a big enough garrison to prevent you from landing. You are going to have to deploy vertically all of your aircraft carriers, until you can develop airfields on land to provide air coverage. You are committing yourself to a long campaign in some of the most inhospitable land in Europe, and it lacks resources, so everything will have to be brought in. It is doubtful that you will be able to replace the British ground and airforces needed to secure a defend this area with Norwegian forces, there are not enough Free Norwegians in Britain. And while you will be able to attract a lot of young Norwegian men and women, to make their own way north, ether directly or via Sweden. I do not think that you will get enough to take over the defence, or have the ability to train those who do answer the call, in Norway. The Germans are going to put the Swedish under increasing pressure, to not sell their iron ore, ball bearings, and anything else they have that the British want, to the British. They will demand that any Norwegians that cross into Sweden and detained and placed in detention facilities, to prevent them from travelling north to join their Free Norwegian countrymen. The maintenance of the forces are going to be a continuous cost and drain on British resources, which might be better spent elsewhere. And the commitment once made, can not be abandoned without significant loss of face, and political consequences. So you are left with the question, do the benefits out weight the costs, and by what standard do you make the decision. Me I will remain neutral, I can see both sides of the argument, yes it is given the present conditions a good idea, but whether the cost is low enough and the benefits high enough, needs to my mind more thinking time.
Side note, in the Mediterranean an invasion of Rhodes and other Greek islands is a given, once the conflict in North Africa has ended. The cost to the Germans/Italians of trying to defend them with the British on Crete, is high, and the cost to the British of once Rhodes has been taken, of biting off the others one by one low.
RR.
Northern Norway can also provide wood and herring. In WW1 they were shiping 15,000 tons of herring a month during the season. The wood would remove the number of Pit props being shipped over the atlantic. Plus the ships will be loaded each way instead of only 1 way during the longer cross altantic trip. The only question is would fighting the uboats in the north sea be easier or harder than the atlantic?
On the question of logistics, how far as the western desert railway come?
On the question of logistics, how far as the western desert railway come?
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
It depends on whether the objective is to sink U-boats (in which case the North Sea, by a long, long way) or to avoid U-boats sinking your ships (valuable cargo) (in which case the huge space in the Atlantic, by a long way. Finding convoys is tough if there's a lot of space to cover).