Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

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Because it would be still heavier and move the center of mass another half meter forward, and the nose bogey load already is *way* too much?
That depends on several different metrics, none of which are a factor if you don't actually have such a weapon to begin with, which the British didn't.

No. but they do have these:
QF 4-inch naval gun
Well yes, but that's a naval gun, one which, unlike the larger 4.5" calibre, never made the jump to land-based service.

This will also raise the attention of the Americans who will likely see the parallels between this new tank and their own heavy-tanks.
 
Well yes, but that's a naval gun, one which, unlike the larger 4.5" calibre, never made the jump to land-based service.
IOTL, yes, but there is absolutely nothing stopping it from doing so ITTL. It is Alternate History, after all. Besides, its weight and dimensions compare favourably with the L7, its a high-velocity AA gun that is also used in the dual purpose role & it already has a HE round, so they might as well bite the bullet and go straight for the slightly larger 38-pounder 100mm now.
This will also raise the attention of the Americans who will likely see the parallels between this new tank and their own heavy-tanks.
And?
 
IOTL, yes, but there is absolutely nothing stopping it from doing so ITTL. It is Alternate History, after all. Besides, its weight and dimensions compare favourably with the L7, its a high-velocity AA gun that is also used in the dual purpose role & it already has a HE round, so they might as well bite the bullet and go straight for the slightly larger 38-pounder 100mm now.
They could, but track the current progression of tank guns a moment 40mm - 57mm (+17mm) - 75mm (+18mm) - 94mm (+19mm). They could go 105mm for the follow-up tank, or they could follow that progression and go straight to the 114mm/4.5".

Might be a bit embarrassing for them to see Britain succeed where they failed.
 
That depends on several different metrics, none of which are a factor if you don't actually have such a weapon to begin with, which the British didn't.
The metrics that the designers would care about were:

1. Will the suspension and running gear break at the front in worst case conditions i.e. high speed traverse of worst acceptable rough terrain? Can it be made strong enough at acceptable cost?

That would be studied in depth analytically. Construction of models and testing would only be a reality-check process, relatively far down the road.

2. What track width is there room for between the necessary hull internal width and armor/mechanisms thicknesses, and the external width limit set by railroad and shipping limits, bridge widths, transporter widths and related limits, and does that track width yield a ground pressure consistent with the needed cross-country mobility on the intended terrain?

That, again, can be determined analytically, with no initial need to build test hardware.

Those are both very real world questions. Any discussion of hypotheticals begins with those questions. Certainly no designer would spend time considering a gun...naval or not yet in existence...for which favorable answers to those questions had not already been established to be likely.
 
Well I just figured the idea of American engineers tearing their hair out at little old Britain beating them to developing something like this a bit funny.
Hello,

That analysis is humorous to me. The train of thought the US Army developed for armored warfare apparently influenced the engineers on how tanks and other armored combat vehicles would be developed and having any potential input from the British experience largely ignored. Of course it does become a trainwreck once US Army tankers run into their opposite numbers in the German Army...
 
The metrics that the designers would care about were:

1. Will the suspension and running gear break at the front in worst case conditions i.e. high speed traverse of worst acceptable rough terrain? Can it be made strong enough at acceptable cost?

That would be studied in depth analytically. Construction of models and testing would only be a reality-check process, relatively far down the road.

2. What track width is there room for between the necessary hull internal width and armor/mechanisms thicknesses, and the external width limit set by railroad and shipping limits, bridge widths, transporter widths and related limits, and does that track width yield a ground pressure consistent with the needed cross-country mobility on the intended terrain?

That, again, can be determined analytically, with no initial need to build test hardware.

Those are both very real world questions. Any discussion of hypotheticals begins with those questions. Certainly no designer would spend time considering a gun...naval or not yet in existence...for which favorable answers to those questions had not already been established to be likely.
Those are hypotheticals, but the gun is often one of the initial specifications.

Hello,

That analysis is humorous to me. The train of thought the US Army developed for armored warfare apparently influenced the engineers on how tanks and other armored combat vehicles would be developed and having any potential input from the British experience largely ignored. Of course it does become a trainwreck once US Army tankers run into their opposite numbers in the German Army...
Well even if they do get it right, there's no guarantee it will get overseas in any number, simply on the basis of logistics. In that, Britain has the advantage, as their tanks only have to cross the Channel to reach Europe, rather than crossing the entire Atlantic.

One way I could see the Americans taking inspiration from the British is in fitting the 76mm gun to the Sherman, based on the fact that the Victor's turret ring is only 66" (compared with 69" for the Sherman), yet they've still managed to squeeze a 75mm HV gun into said turret.
 
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Ramontxo

Donor
My wife has had a few trips to hospital over the past decade and with one at least more to come, she has one major piece of advice. Listen to the physiotherapist, do everything they say, don’t take short cuts.
Been there, survived that. She Is Right

(Knee operation)
 
Those are hypotheticals, but the gun is often one of the initial specifications.
In my ~50 year engineering career, every project required that every fundamental performance requirement had to be met. No fundamental performance requirements ever were relegated to a lesser importance because they were "hypothetical", or because the high level project definers hadn't included a bullet point for them in the high level project summary. The engineers were responsible for knowing what was required in the product, but not included in the project spec. If there were uncertainties in the spec, it was the engineers' job to ask the right questions until the performance requirements all were defined.

I didn't design tanks, but certain aspects of engineering are common.

Suspension / powertrain reliability (and in particular, front bogey ability to handle the weight forward) and cross-country mobility (for which front bogey ground pressure is a key determinant) are fundamental AFV performance requirements.

Woe be unto an engineer who decides that a fundamental performance requirement can be left until later to sort out because it's "hypothetical", and goes beyond the spec on another performance requirement because it'd be neat to do so.
 
In my ~50 year engineering career, every project required that every fundamental performance requirement had to be met. No fundamental performance requirements ever were relegated to a lesser importance because they were "hypothetical", or because the high level project definers hadn't included a bullet point for them in the high level project summary. The engineers were responsible for knowing what was required in the product, but not included in the project spec. If there were uncertainties in the spec, it was the engineers' job to ask the right questions until the performance requirements all were defined.

I didn't design tanks, but certain aspects of engineering are common.

Suspension / powertrain reliability (and in particular, front bogey ability to handle the weight forward) and cross-country mobility (for which front bogey ground pressure is a key determinant) are fundamental AFV performance requirements.

Woe be unto an engineer who decides that a fundamental performance requirement can be left until later to sort out because it's "hypothetical", and goes beyond the spec on another performance requirement because it'd be neat to do so.
Meanwhile, designing a gun with a new calibre is very expensive, and the cost of that is not something you want to add to the cost of a new vehicle. So the tank will get equipped with whatever gun is around that is felt to meet the minimum acceptable power at minimum expense (obviously the recoil mechanism would need to be redesigned, but hopefully not the breech or anything else). The engine is another big cost, so best to use one which is either already on hand, or at least in the works (the Meteor was the latter). After that, the drivetrain will, in many cases, have to de designed around the final size and weight of the vehicle, whenever that gets decided.
 
I'm back at work, and have started physiotherapy, so progress is being made. I had written most of the following before my accident, and have played around with it a few times. I hope it makes some kind of sense. Instead of Midway, the New Hebrides, or Vanuatu, as they are now, are the target of the Japanese, as a stepping stone to Fiji or New Caledonia. I believe there was such a plan. I am using the basic Midway operation's forces, plus the Aleutians force, and a bulked up invasion force for this. The Americans and British coordination is feasible considering where the ANZAC and South West Pacific areas are IOTL. I hope it doesn't come over as too ASB. I did consider losing Ark Royal to a Japanese submarine's torpedo, just to even up the score a bit...but then again...maybe not.
Allan
 
24 June 1942. Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.
24 June 1942. Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.

Admiral Chester Nimitz smiled as he read the after-action report from his Task Force Commanders after the Battle of the New Hebrides. There was a somewhat interesting difference between the styles of the two American Admirals, Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher, and the British Admiral Philips. In a sense there had been three battles, or at least three phases. The Japanese had gambled on trying to break the connection between American and Australia. Between the Code Breakers and pretty good reconnaissance, the Japanese fleet had been spotted sailing down through the Solomons, dropping off troops on a number of islands. They had then set their sights on the New Hebrides, with the possibility of moving on to Fiji or New Caledonia.

Despite Admiral King’s concerns, the British fleet of three carriers and three battleships, which were working in the ANZAC area, had managed some coordination with Fletcher’s Task Force 17 (USS Yorktown & Saratoga) and Task Force 16 (USS Enterprise & Hornet), under overall command of Admiral Frank Spruance. The British were in position to south-west of the New Hebrides between there and New Caledonia, while the Americans were to the north-east, between Fiji and the New Hebrides.

The first phase of the battle had been the arrival of the Japanese invasion fleet at the New Hebrides. The Army Air Force had reinforced the airfield at Efate with P40 fighters, and an Australian Beaufort squadron. There was also a squadron of B17 bombers acting as a long-range reconnaissance and strike force. The Japanese fleet was spotted by a picket line of USN and allied submarines, which then drew the attentions of the Army Air Force. The Japanese force seemed to be split into three sections, the aircraft carriers, the battleships and the invasion force. Nimitz had prioritized the Japanese aircraft carriers, then the invasion force and finally the battleships.

The initial air attacks on the invasion fleet had mixed results, while the Japanese air attacks on the airfield ground down the P40 squadrons. The British had lent the Americans some ASV equipped aircraft which made the first American strikes from both task forces on the Japanese aircraft carriers to arrive within 30 minutes of each other. The first reported results were confusing, with claims of damage done to four of the six Japanese aircraft carriers. The Japanese response seriously damaged USS Saratoga and caused minor damage to USS Yorktown. The air groups of both fleets had been depleted by their efforts and so the subsequent strikes were generally less effective.

By the end of the first day, the carriers Zuikaku and Soryu were sunk, Akagi and Kaga were both in serious trouble. USS Enterprise & Hornet were unscathed, while Saratoga succumbed to its damage, and Yorktown’s damage control were struggling to deal with the list that had developed. The American and Japanese aircraft carriers started to sort themselves out to continue the fight the next day. The Japanese battleships and transport columns had closed with the New Hebrides to begin the landings. The aircraft from the two light carriers Jun’yō and Ryūjō, sailing with the invasion fleet, had finally overcome the P40s protecting the island.

The next phase was described in Admiral Philips’ typically British understated way. He stated that during the night, the Fleet Air Arm had found a ‘target-rich’ environment among the invasion force. The transports and their escorts were on the receiving end of some 50 air dropped torpedoes, including, it was believed a battleship. The Fleet Air Arm were followed up by the three British battleships and the accompanying cruisers and destroyers. The radar equipped British ships, aided by the burning Japanese ships began a night engagement while the Japanese were still off guard. The element of surprise, the radar supported gunnery and weight of fire poured destruction on the Japanese ships. The British Battleships, Cruisers and Destroyers fired off many more torpedoes at the Japanese ships and raked anything within range with gunfire. Once the Japanese heavy support began to reply, the British ships withdrew at flank speed to rendezvous with the aircraft carriers in the direction of New Caledonia.

The Japanese plan was in tatters. The losses among the transports and their escorts had been critical. Many Japanese troops had made it ashore, but much of their heavy equipment and supplies had been sunk. Espiritu Sancto was lightly defended and fell quickly. The American ground forces on Efate put up a steadfast fight, but the sheer numbers of Japanese troops escaping from the carnage of the invasion fleet put them at too much of a disadvantage. Having forces on Espiritu Sancto and Efate was all very well, but the Japanese commanders knew that moving onto Fiji or New Caledonia was impossible. The surviving aircraft carriers and battleships were ordered to return to Rabaul.

The second full day of the battle began with an airstrike from USS Enterprise and Hornet’s surviving air groups on the Japanese aircraft carrier force. Only Shokaku and Hiryu were undamaged. Akagi and Kaga were found not only with the help of the British radar equipped Swordfish, but by the plumes of smoke coming from them. After all the casualties of the day before the American punch wasn’t quite as strong as they’d hoped, but Akagi and Kaga were finished off, while Shokaku and Hiryu escaped unharmed, but with much reduced air groups.

The rest of the day was primarily a day for the submarine services. Many of the allied submarines on picket duty had been ordered towards the New Hebrides to try to pick off as many stragglers as possible. A Dutch submarine finished off the Japanese battleship Fuso, previously damaged by a Fleet Air Arm torpedo. While the rest of the main elements of the Japanese fleet turned back towards Rabaul at their best speed, the submarines concentrated on the remnants of the invasion fleet scattered around the New Hebrides. The allies however didn’t have things their own way. USS Yorktown was sunk by a Japanese submarine. Most of her crew had already been taken off as the damage control tried to save her, but she had lost power and the flooding had slowed her to the point where the submarine was able to get a clear shot on her.

The Royal Navy re-engaged during the second night of the battle. The withdrawal of the main Japanese Carrier and Battleship formations had been noted, and Philips attempted to intercept them between the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands. Unfortunately, the British ships missed the main body, but they did manage to strike at some of the support vessels and surviving elements of the invasion force. The attack followed the same pattern: a massed air strike from the three British Carriers’ torpedo bombers, followed by the surface fleet engaging at relatively close quarters. Among the ships sunk by the Swordfish of HMS Ark Royal were the light carrier Jun’yō and the seaplane carrier Chiyoda. The surviving Japanese escorts, a few Cruisers and about twelve destroyers managed to score a few hits on HMS Nelson, but the cruiser HMS Gloucester and the destroyer HMS Imperial were both fatally hit by long range torpedoes from the Japanese destroyers. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s attempt to protect what remained of the merchant ships was only partially successful. The British claimed to have sunk six fleet oilers, which Nimitz’s intelligence team hoped were part of the Japanese Carrier Strike Force’s Supply Unit.

Admiral Nimitz discussed with his staff the outcome of the battle. The loss of Saratoga and Yorktown were weighed against four Japanese fleet carriers and one light carrier. The British losses were very light compared to the destruction of the Japanese invasion fleet, including one battleship. The downside was that the Japanese now had forces on many of the Solomon Islands, on Espiritu Sancto and Efate. These last two were however considered to be little more than prisoner of war camps. The Japanese ability to resupply them was negligible, and without their heavy equipment and much of their supplies, they were no threat, more an inconvenience.

The US First Marine Division were coming close to operational readiness, and it had been presumed that they were likely to be bloodied in the Solomon Islands. The airfield in Efate however was worth recapturing, and that would therefore likely be their first port of call. The other American Division on New Caledonia, becoming known as the Americal Division was also nearing the ability to go on the offensive, these would be the tip of the American spear that would be driven into the heart of the Japanese Empire.
 
Damn, that blow to the Japanese will hurt brutally within both the IJN and IJA as well losing that much sea lift will affect all aspects.

It will lead to some interesting aspects post-war as well.
 

bobbins

Donor
I'm back at work, and have started physiotherapy, so progress is being made. I had written most of the following before my accident, and have played around with it a few times. I hope it makes some kind of sense. Instead of Midway, the New Hebrides, or Vanuatu, as they are now, are the target of the Japanese, as a stepping stone to Fiji or New Caledonia. I believe there was such a plan. I am using the basic Midway operation's forces, plus the Aleutians force, and a bulked up invasion force for this. The Americans and British coordination is feasible considering where the ANZAC and South West Pacific areas are IOTL. I hope it doesn't come over as too ASB. I did consider losing Ark Royal to a Japanese submarine's torpedo, just to even up the score a bit...but then again...maybe not.
Allan
Glad you’re on the mend and hope the improvement to your health continues.
 
24 June 1942. Pearl Harbour, Hawaii.

Admiral Chester Nimitz smiled as he read the after-action report from his Task Force Commanders after the Battle of the New Hebrides. There was a somewhat interesting difference between the styles of the two American Admirals, Raymond Spruance and Frank Fletcher, and the British Admiral Philips. In a sense there had been three battles, or at least three phases. The Japanese had gambled on trying to break the connection between American and Australia. Between the Code Breakers and pretty good reconnaissance, the Japanese fleet had been spotted sailing down through the Solomons, dropping off troops on a number of islands. They had then set their sights on the New Hebrides, with the possibility of moving on to Fiji or New Caledonia.

Despite Admiral King’s concerns, the British fleet of three carriers and three battleships, which were working in the ANZAC area, had managed some coordination with Fletcher’s Task Force 17 (USS Yorktown & Saratoga) and Task Force 16 (USS Enterprise & Hornet), under overall command of Admiral Frank Spruance. The British were in position to south-west of the New Hebrides between there and New Caledonia, while the Americans were to the north-east, between Fiji and the New Hebrides.

The first phase of the battle had been the arrival of the Japanese invasion fleet at the New Hebrides. The Army Air Force had reinforced the airfield at Efate with P40 fighters, and an Australian Beaufort squadron. There was also a squadron of B17 bombers acting as a long-range reconnaissance and strike force. The Japanese fleet was spotted by a picket line of USN and allied submarines, which then drew the attentions of the Army Air Force. The Japanese force seemed to be split into three sections, the aircraft carriers, the battleships and the invasion force. Nimitz had prioritized the Japanese aircraft carriers, then the invasion force and finally the battleships.

The initial air attacks on the invasion fleet had mixed results, while the Japanese air attacks on the airfield ground down the P40 squadrons. The British had lent the Americans some ASV equipped aircraft which made the first American strikes from both task forces on the Japanese aircraft carriers to arrive within 30 minutes of each other. The first reported results were confusing, with claims of damage done to four of the six Japanese aircraft carriers. The Japanese response seriously damaged USS Saratoga and caused minor damage to USS Yorktown. The air groups of both fleets had been depleted by their efforts and so the subsequent strikes were generally less effective.

By the end of the first day, the carriers Zuikaku and Soryu were sunk, Akagi and Kaga were both in serious trouble. USS Enterprise & Hornet were unscathed, while Saratoga succumbed to its damage, and Yorktown’s damage control were struggling to deal with the list that had developed. The American and Japanese aircraft carriers started to sort themselves out to continue the fight the next day. The Japanese battleships and transport columns had closed with the New Hebrides to begin the landings. The aircraft from the two light carriers Jun’yō and Ryūjō, sailing with the invasion fleet, had finally overcome the P40s protecting the island.

The next phase was described in Admiral Philips’ typically British understated way. He stated that during the night, the Fleet Air Arm had found a ‘target-rich’ environment among the invasion force. The transports and their escorts were on the receiving end of some 50 air dropped torpedoes, including, it was believed a battleship. The Fleet Air Arm were followed up by the three British battleships and the accompanying cruisers and destroyers. The radar equipped British ships, aided by the burning Japanese ships began a night engagement while the Japanese were still off guard. The element of surprise, the radar supported gunnery and weight of fire poured destruction on the Japanese ships. The British Battleships, Cruisers and Destroyers fired off many more torpedoes at the Japanese ships and raked anything within range with gunfire. Once the Japanese heavy support began to reply, the British ships withdrew at flank speed to rendezvous with the aircraft carriers in the direction of New Caledonia.

The Japanese plan was in tatters. The losses among the transports and their escorts had been critical. Many Japanese troops had made it ashore, but much of their heavy equipment and supplies had been sunk. Espiritu Sancto was lightly defended and fell quickly. The American ground forces on Efate put up a steadfast fight, but the sheer numbers of Japanese troops escaping from the carnage of the invasion fleet put them at too much of a disadvantage. Having forces on Espiritu Sancto and Efate was all very well, but the Japanese commanders knew that moving onto Fiji or New Caledonia was impossible. The surviving aircraft carriers and battleships were ordered to return to Rabaul.

The second full day of the battle began with an airstrike from USS Enterprise and Hornet’s surviving air groups on the Japanese aircraft carrier force. Only Shokaku and Hiryu were undamaged. Akagi and Kaga were found not only with the help of the British radar equipped Swordfish, but by the plumes of smoke coming from them. After all the casualties of the day before the American punch wasn’t quite as strong as they’d hoped, but Akagi and Kaga were finished off, while Shokaku and Hiryu escaped unharmed, but with much reduced air groups.

The rest of the day was primarily a day for the submarine services. Many of the allied submarines on picket duty had been ordered towards the New Hebrides to try to pick off as many stragglers as possible. A Dutch submarine finished off the Japanese battleship Fuso, previously damaged by a Fleet Air Arm torpedo. While the rest of the main elements of the Japanese fleet turned back towards Rabaul at their best speed, the submarines concentrated on the remnants of the invasion fleet scattered around the New Hebrides. The allies however didn’t have things their own way. USS Yorktown was sunk by a Japanese submarine. Most of her crew had already been taken off as the damage control tried to save her, but she had lost power and the flooding had slowed her to the point where the submarine was able to get a clear shot on her.

The Royal Navy re-engaged during the second night of the battle. The withdrawal of the main Japanese Carrier and Battleship formations had been noted, and Philips attempted to intercept them between the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands. Unfortunately, the British ships missed the main body, but they did manage to strike at some of the support vessels and surviving elements of the invasion force. The attack followed the same pattern: a massed air strike from the three British Carriers’ torpedo bombers, followed by the surface fleet engaging at relatively close quarters. Among the ships sunk by the Swordfish of HMS Ark Royal were the light carrier Jun’yō and the seaplane carrier Chiyoda. The surviving Japanese escorts, a few Cruisers and about twelve destroyers managed to score a few hits on HMS Nelson, but the cruiser HMS Gloucester and the destroyer HMS Imperial were both fatally hit by long range torpedoes from the Japanese destroyers. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s attempt to protect what remained of the merchant ships was only partially successful. The British claimed to have sunk six fleet oilers, which Nimitz’s intelligence team hoped were part of the Japanese Carrier Strike Force’s Supply Unit.

Admiral Nimitz discussed with his staff the outcome of the battle. The loss of Saratoga and Yorktown were weighed against four Japanese fleet carriers and one light carrier. The British losses were very light compared to the destruction of the Japanese invasion fleet, including one battleship. The downside was that the Japanese now had forces on many of the Solomon Islands, on Espiritu Sancto and Efate. These last two were however considered to be little more than prisoner of war camps. The Japanese ability to resupply them was negligible, and without their heavy equipment and much of their supplies, they were no threat, more an inconvenience.

The US First Marine Division were coming close to operational readiness, and it had been presumed that they were likely to be bloodied in the Solomon Islands. The airfield in Efate however was worth recapturing, and that would therefore likely be their first port of call. The other American Division on New Caledonia, becoming known as the Americal Division was also nearing the ability to go on the offensive, these would be the tip of the American spear that would be driven into the heart of the Japanese Empire.
Imperial Japanese are presumably going to change their codes after an ambush like that, just to be on the safe side.
Nice to see a timeline though where they try something other than original timeline Midway, and glad that you are slowly recovering, Allan. :)
 
Great update! Naval battle seems quite realistic.

My only quibble is the land battle on Efate. In OTL the Allies were present on the island since March 1942 (advance elements of Americal division) with significant reinforcements arriving in May (Marines, Fighter Squadron, an African American Unit). http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/E/f/Efate.htm.
Given the codebreaking success, these forces are going to be ready and waiting for the IJN. See this chapter for ideas of what they would likely do https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Midway/USMC-M-Midway-3.html.

Since Japanese amphibious assault doctrine was still pretty terrible, without means to provide significant naval gunfire support, minimal provisions for landing heavy equipment, and relying heavily on surprise and "élan" to carry the day, I have a hard time seeing them overcome a prepared American garrison. Look at what the Marines at Wake were able to do under far worse conditions. Even the Second Landing attempt was a near run thing that would have failed if additional troops, small arms, and ammunition were present. If it was up to me, my only tweak would be to have the Japanese fail to take Efate.
 
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