I have no issue with the main discussions about tanks . Only with this threads tendency to end up in some very strange places where tanks and other pieces of kit are concerned !
Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
Did anyone yet mention that timeline The Fireflies of Port Stanley?I have no issue with the main discussions about tanks . Only with this threads tendency to end up in some very strange places where tanks and other pieces of kit are concerned !
i think here it would be some Valiants or Victors of Port Stanley.
30 January 1942. Balikpapan, Borneo.
allanpcameron
Donor
30 January 1942. Balikpapan, Borneo.
The Ito Detachment (1st Kure Special Landing Force, 228th Infantry Regiment with various support units ~5300 men) had been due to invade the island of Ambon. There were two problems. The first was that intelligence that Ambon was as well protected as Rabaul had been, meant that the Japanese force probably wasn’t strong enough to capture the island, at least not without severe problems. The losses taken by the South Seas Detachment at Rabaul had already put on hold that part of the operation.
The fact that Balikpapan on Borneo was still in the hands of the Dutch and British was a very sore point between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army. The loss of so many ships in the Makassar Strait, with the resultant losses for the invasion force, had the Army throwing accusations at the Navy for not protecting their men satisfactorily. The Navy, still reeling from the losses, burned with shame at an obvious failure of theirs being pointed out so brazenly. Vice-Admiral Kondo, commanding the Distant Cover Group (Battleships Kongo & Haruna, aircraft carriers Hiryu & Soryu, three cruisers, eight destroyers) had been too distant to intervene when the battle had broken out. The British and Dutch ships had hit the transports and their close escort hard, then withdrawn before Kondo’s fleet could react in a timely manner.
The loss of much of the Sakaguchi Detachment in that failure had meant that to regain the initiative and take Balikpapan, the Ito Detachment was off the coast of Borneo ready to try again. Along with the close escort of one Cruiser, fifteen destroyers, a variety of patrol boats and sub-chasers, protecting the eleven transports, the Distant Cover Force had sailed south from the Celebes Sea into the Makassar Strait, much closer to the invasion fleet than they had been previously.
With the increased air reconnaissance being done by the Dutch and Australians, the Japanese fleet had been spotted and tailed while the Dutch, British and Americans scrambled to get as many submarines into position to attrite the Japanese navy as possible.
In the event six submarines managed to get into shooting positions before the invasion took place. The four Dutch boats claimed five ships sunk between them, the two T Class RN submarines claimed another three, and damage to another two. The USN submarines reported two ships sunk, but again problems with torpedoes. The USAAF put together a B17 strike but was unable to claim any hits on the ships, two bombers were lost to Japanese naval fighters from the carriers. Attempts by the Dutch Naval Aviation, Air Force and the RAAF to interfere was slightly more successful, a few ships were damaged, but at a high cost to the attacking crews and aircraft.
After the fairly simple task of mopping up the Japanese who managed to get ashore, the Dutch and Indian troops were heartened by their success. An effort to reinforce the garrison was made on 26 and 27 January. The decision to withdraw the two Indian Battalions from Pontianak had led to the conclusion that the chances of holding the remaining parts of north Borneo was impossible. A couple of Dutch ships had picked up the remaining European civilians from Pontianak and the majority of the Dutch troops (a few stayed behind with radios to attempt to keep an eye of what the Japanese were doing). The civilians were taken to Java, and the troops dropped off at Balikpapan along with a several tons of supplies.
The main difference between the first and second invasion attempt was the presence of both land and carrier based Japanese bombers and fighters, and much better weather for them to operate. The inability of the Australian Brigade Group at Rabaul to beat off the Japanese attack had been put down to the incessant presence of Japanese aircraft. Although the AA groups had taken a heavy toll of the Japanese aircraft initially, they soon were overwhelmed. After that, the Australian ability to move during daylight was severely hampered, and their fixed positions were targeted from both sea and air. The same now happened to the garrison at Balikpapan.
The main surviving Dutch fighters and the newly arrived American squadrons based on Java were incapable of providing aircover for the garrison. With complete control of the air the Japanese were able to form a beachhead and then move out towards the town and airfield. Much of burning oil infrastructure which had hampered the Japanese previously was now burnt out and the Dutch and Indian troops put up a stiff resistance for as long as they could. Their orders were to fight but maintain their strength as far as possible. Each night, when the aircraft weren’t overhead, the Dutch and Indian troops withdrew to previously prepared positions. As the Japanese logistical system used the night to resupply the forward positions, they were unable to pursue the garrison closely, and found themselves the next day embroiled in another holding action.
The basic plan for the garrison was to hold the Japanese as long as possible, then to withdraw into the interior and make their way south towards Banjarmasin where it was hoped that the troops would be able to be evacuated. By the middle of February, the whole island of Borneo was in the hands of the Japanese, but at a terrible cost. It took a great deal of courage and skill to bring about half of the garrison off the island in the face of Japanese opposition. Over the next few months every now and then a few more troops would make it to Java, with fishing boats, and occasionally submarines, being used to bring them to safety.
The ABDA submarine fleet were still very active and shipping losses were becoming an increasing worry for the Imperial Japanese Navy. What surprised them most of all was that there seemed to be concentration on sinking the transport ships rather than the warships, something that was the opposite way of thinking to the Japanese submarine Captains that were active in the area.
The Ito Detachment (1st Kure Special Landing Force, 228th Infantry Regiment with various support units ~5300 men) had been due to invade the island of Ambon. There were two problems. The first was that intelligence that Ambon was as well protected as Rabaul had been, meant that the Japanese force probably wasn’t strong enough to capture the island, at least not without severe problems. The losses taken by the South Seas Detachment at Rabaul had already put on hold that part of the operation.
The fact that Balikpapan on Borneo was still in the hands of the Dutch and British was a very sore point between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army. The loss of so many ships in the Makassar Strait, with the resultant losses for the invasion force, had the Army throwing accusations at the Navy for not protecting their men satisfactorily. The Navy, still reeling from the losses, burned with shame at an obvious failure of theirs being pointed out so brazenly. Vice-Admiral Kondo, commanding the Distant Cover Group (Battleships Kongo & Haruna, aircraft carriers Hiryu & Soryu, three cruisers, eight destroyers) had been too distant to intervene when the battle had broken out. The British and Dutch ships had hit the transports and their close escort hard, then withdrawn before Kondo’s fleet could react in a timely manner.
The loss of much of the Sakaguchi Detachment in that failure had meant that to regain the initiative and take Balikpapan, the Ito Detachment was off the coast of Borneo ready to try again. Along with the close escort of one Cruiser, fifteen destroyers, a variety of patrol boats and sub-chasers, protecting the eleven transports, the Distant Cover Force had sailed south from the Celebes Sea into the Makassar Strait, much closer to the invasion fleet than they had been previously.
With the increased air reconnaissance being done by the Dutch and Australians, the Japanese fleet had been spotted and tailed while the Dutch, British and Americans scrambled to get as many submarines into position to attrite the Japanese navy as possible.
In the event six submarines managed to get into shooting positions before the invasion took place. The four Dutch boats claimed five ships sunk between them, the two T Class RN submarines claimed another three, and damage to another two. The USN submarines reported two ships sunk, but again problems with torpedoes. The USAAF put together a B17 strike but was unable to claim any hits on the ships, two bombers were lost to Japanese naval fighters from the carriers. Attempts by the Dutch Naval Aviation, Air Force and the RAAF to interfere was slightly more successful, a few ships were damaged, but at a high cost to the attacking crews and aircraft.
After the fairly simple task of mopping up the Japanese who managed to get ashore, the Dutch and Indian troops were heartened by their success. An effort to reinforce the garrison was made on 26 and 27 January. The decision to withdraw the two Indian Battalions from Pontianak had led to the conclusion that the chances of holding the remaining parts of north Borneo was impossible. A couple of Dutch ships had picked up the remaining European civilians from Pontianak and the majority of the Dutch troops (a few stayed behind with radios to attempt to keep an eye of what the Japanese were doing). The civilians were taken to Java, and the troops dropped off at Balikpapan along with a several tons of supplies.
The main difference between the first and second invasion attempt was the presence of both land and carrier based Japanese bombers and fighters, and much better weather for them to operate. The inability of the Australian Brigade Group at Rabaul to beat off the Japanese attack had been put down to the incessant presence of Japanese aircraft. Although the AA groups had taken a heavy toll of the Japanese aircraft initially, they soon were overwhelmed. After that, the Australian ability to move during daylight was severely hampered, and their fixed positions were targeted from both sea and air. The same now happened to the garrison at Balikpapan.
The main surviving Dutch fighters and the newly arrived American squadrons based on Java were incapable of providing aircover for the garrison. With complete control of the air the Japanese were able to form a beachhead and then move out towards the town and airfield. Much of burning oil infrastructure which had hampered the Japanese previously was now burnt out and the Dutch and Indian troops put up a stiff resistance for as long as they could. Their orders were to fight but maintain their strength as far as possible. Each night, when the aircraft weren’t overhead, the Dutch and Indian troops withdrew to previously prepared positions. As the Japanese logistical system used the night to resupply the forward positions, they were unable to pursue the garrison closely, and found themselves the next day embroiled in another holding action.
The basic plan for the garrison was to hold the Japanese as long as possible, then to withdraw into the interior and make their way south towards Banjarmasin where it was hoped that the troops would be able to be evacuated. By the middle of February, the whole island of Borneo was in the hands of the Japanese, but at a terrible cost. It took a great deal of courage and skill to bring about half of the garrison off the island in the face of Japanese opposition. Over the next few months every now and then a few more troops would make it to Java, with fishing boats, and occasionally submarines, being used to bring them to safety.
The ABDA submarine fleet were still very active and shipping losses were becoming an increasing worry for the Imperial Japanese Navy. What surprised them most of all was that there seemed to be concentration on sinking the transport ships rather than the warships, something that was the opposite way of thinking to the Japanese submarine Captains that were active in the area.
Whooosh!
Sound of attempt at a joke sailing over someone's head
Nothing goes over my head.
My reflexes are to fast.
Last edited:
Some high ranking Japanese officers will have to use the garden they will probably have to line up with their seconds.
Yes, cause the IJN can't seem to comprehend the fact that those transports are more important targets than the actual warships. Can't invade the islands without those troops after all and warships can be sunk later.
Can't resupply them as well which will hurt them even more.
6 subs.
4 Dutch
2RN
???USN
How many US subs, and why aren't they in the total of 6?