Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.
- Thread starter allanpcameron
- Start date
With the Thompson, it's not so much the calibre, it's the design of the gun that makes it climb more than the 9mm subguns. The stock on the Thompson is very low compared to guns like the Sten, MP40, PPSh, Grease Gun, etc. And that low stock means that the recoil force will essentially pivot the gun up around the shooter's shoulder, rather than pushing into the shoulder like the other guns. That's why the earlier Thompsons had the Cutts compensator, to try and counteract that pivoting motion.
Thing with the Thompson is it's older technology (designed 1918) while most of the others are essentially "lessons learned" weapons from the 30's or early war years. Hence being much lighter, lower calibre, better designed stock, and being a bit smaller than the Thompson.
I was just about to post the same thing
I was surprised at how good it was actually - for an SMG and a STEN at that
There was a War Office report (that I cannot find) that actually makes the claim that as a suppressive weapon it was actually deemed more effective than a BREN gun - taking into account the speed at which it could be brought into action and its lighter weight.
Also it seems that a large number of early STENs were modified with a fore grip
The higher rate of fire does not help. The one I fired was an early model complete with Cutt's compensator - which didn't, by the way! It may have had a higher rate of fire than later models. Still, the combination of high ROFand a more powerful round cannot but be a problem. I find 45 acp quite controllable in a pistol, and more accurate than 9mm but then I am not firing 5 rounds in half a second! I 9mm Thompsons were made experimentally but I have no idea of the quantities; Kahr Industries now produce one in 9mm, and clain this is the first time one has been series manufactured
Sorry, I meant PL7: it's a standard UIT 25m and 50m pistol target, much used in civilian shooting in the UK and Europe. I forget not everyone on these forums is an active shooter...... I am British, by the way , not American, but not uptight about it. The black is about 6" diameter.What is a, "PL3 target"? I am used to military terms for targets like Figure 11 or Figure 25. I assume "PL3 target" is an American civilian term? The Owen was quite able at 25metres to hit and even chop down a Figure 11 Target:
Last edited:
marathag
Banned
I agree, the Thompson is a beast on FA, really need to work at keeping it on target.
But the one STEN I had experience with, it was 'Minute of Barn' accuracy past 30 yards
The Thompson, OTOH, was where I could get rounds on the 200 yard target on Semi without much effort.
Best ones I ever done for FA controlability? M2 Carbine, followed by M16
marathag
Banned
I found the Grease Gun very easy to shoot, from the low cyclic rate, but not as nice as M2 from the worse sights and stock for putting rounds on target.
The one gun I never got, was the M1 carbine conversion to .45 Magnum.
6 January 1942. Muda River. Malaya.
allanpcameron
Donor
6 January 1942. Muda River. Malaya.
The 29th Indian Brigade and merged 6/15th Brigade were holding the line anchored on the Muda River. Increasing pressure was being felt all along the front, with the Japanese obviously probing for weak spots.
Just before dawn a lengthy Japanese artillery barrage had been focussed on the positions of the 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles around Kuala Ketil. This was followed almost immediately by a strong force of Japanese aircraft which bombed and strafed anything that looked like a defensive position. These two events made the Indian troops aware that something bad was about to happen, and so it unfolded.
The way the river snaked around had made it difficult to organise interconnected defensive positions. The presence of the Japanese aircraft made the mobile element of the defence more difficult. Likewise, the gunners of the Field Batteries supporting the Frontier Force men were mostly having to take cover and not give away their positions. The anti-aircraft firepower of the Indian Brigade was limited to light machine guns, and therefore largely ineffective.
As the morning developed, more and more infiltrations were being noted in various points. Sometimes these were counterattacked, but sometimes the Japanese just disappeared into the jungle. Brigadier Dennis Reid (CO 29th Indian Brigade) had been requesting RAF support to no avail. The 1st Bn Worcestershire Regiment and 6/13 FFR were both under heavy assault, all along their front, as were the 6/15th Brigade nearer the coast. Reid and Brigadier Oswald Lay (CO 6/15th Brigade) had conferred with Major-General Murray-Lyon about the way in which the Japanese attack was progressing. Each Brigade had one Battalion in reserve, but, with the skies filled with Japanese aircraft, moving the reserves would be problematical.
Murray-Lyon also requested fighter cover for his force, but AVM Pulford noted that his own airfields were themselves under attack and he didn’t have any spare fighters to assist. The two Brigades had some depth to their defensive positions, that once the river line had to be given up, there were prepared positions to fall back to. The Frontier Force were the first to move back to their secondary positions, and it looked as if the Japanese were building a bridge over the river in the vicinity of the one demolished previously. As the Frontier Force men withdrew, the 1st Worcs had to realign their position to keep in touch. The Japanese commander saw his opportunity and exploited this gap with a surge of a couple of Infantry Companies.
The lessons of the previous month had taught the British officers to do the modern equivalent of forming a square, going into a box formation. As Platoons and Companies were by-passed the troops had learned to stay in place. In a manoeuvre battle, the Japanese often gained the upper hand. Whereas blocking the main routes would slow the Japanese as their supplies and reinforcements weren’t as capable of going through the jungle. The presence of Matilda II tanks was the key to be able to make sure that the boxes were relieved in a timely fashion.
The Japanese were becoming more adept at finding ways to disable the Infantry Tanks, since their anti-tank guns were completely ineffective. Their preferred method was to try to break the tracks of the tank, leaving it immobile. Once that was achieved, they might be able to kill the crew with petrol bombs or firing at point-blank range through vision slits. This had led to a greater emphasis on having at least a platoon of Indian or British troops to protect each tank, basically one Infantry Company per troop of three tanks. This had evolved over the previous month from lessons learnt, but any Company with that job was almost guaranteed to take heavy casualties.
11th Bn RTR’s C Squadron had started off working with 8 Division AIF, until the arrival of the Australian’s own Stuart Light Tanks, then the whole Squadron had been reassigned to III Indian Corps. Major Rupert Booth (OC C Squadron) had assigned 3rd and 4th Troop (OC Lieutenant Martin Thwaites) to 29th Brigade, with 1st and 2nd Troops with 6/15th Brigade. Booth himself, with Squadron HQ, remained with Major-General Murray-Lyon’s 11th Indian Division’s HQ.
The three tanks in Lt Thwaites’ 4th troop were all named for birds. His own was Corncrake, Sergeant Mike Harris’ tank was Condor and Corporal Bill Clutson’s tank was Cormorant. There hadn’t been a lot of time to get used to 29th Indian Brigade, but at least Thwaites was working with the Worcestershire Regiment, which helped with communications. His friend Lieutenant Paul Gregson OC 3rd Troop was attached to 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles. Gregson had joked about the problems trying to understand the Australians, but the Indians were a whole different kettle of fish.
The general principle was for the troop of tanks to be stationed with the Battalion HQ, and therefore able to quickly respond to any particular danger to any of the Infantry Companies. The Battalion reserve Company, with the carrier platoon were usually the group that the three tanks would work with. For Lt Thwaites that meant he was linked with Major Donald Nott of D Company and Captain Anthony James (OC Carrier Platoon).
The first sign that the tanks would soon be called into action was when the Battalion HQ itself was attacked by a small force of Japanese infantry. They suddenly appeared out of the jungle and it was only the bravery of one of the AA Platoon Corporal’s who managed to bring the twin Bren gun to bear, that stopped what seemed like a suicidal attack. The fact that the Japanese had infiltrated as far as the Battalion HQ brought home the serious situation that the Battalion faced.
Most of the telephone wires between the HQ and Company HQs were cut, and the Subaltern commanding the Signal Platoon was organising parties to find the breaks and fix them. Knowing full well that such an effort would be hazardous to say the least, the Battalion Commander, Lt-Col Jock Knight wanted a larger force to go with the Signallers.
Major Nott was given the task, and looking at the situation he expressed his opinion that his Company and the troop of tanks would be needed to both support the signallers and re-establish the separated links of the Battalion. Lt Col Knight wasn’t keen on committing his reserves so early in the battle, but after consulting with Brigadier Reid, he agreed. The Brigade’s reserve, 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment, were ready to support the other two battalions.
In the time it had taken for the decision to have been made, things were getting decidedly hairy for the forward platoons of both the Worcestershire Regiment and 6/13th FFR. The Japanese attack was developing some momentum. With the British supporting artillery and mobile forces constrained by the Japanese bombers and fighters, and increasing numbers of Japanese troops and tanks across the river, the British and Indian troops were hard pressed. Two platoons of A Company (Worcs Regt) were completely cut off, and C Company was pinned down and unable to move. When D Company and the three tanks started off, they were immediately pounced upon by Japanese aircraft. As many Bren guns as possible were brought to bear on the aircraft, but with very limited success. Three of D Company’s trucks were destroyed and five men killed and another fifteen injured. A bomb had missed Cormorant by just a few yards, which had concussed the crew and knocked out the radio.
Once they got on the move again, they reached B Company’s HQ. The signallers got to work mending the broken wires and Major Nott was given an update on the problems of A and C Companies. Japanese infiltrations had been noted all through Battalions positions. Lt Thwaites, whose tanks were all armed with the 2-pdr gun, knew that his troop would be useful against the Japanese tanks, and wanted to move up immediately to C Company’s position to relieve them. Nott was inclined to agree but moving up the road just invited more attention from the Japanese aircraft.
Thwaites knew that his colleagues had had come success taking their tanks through the jungle, if the infantry were able to support them. It would take longer, but add the element of surprise when they arrived at C Company’s positions. Notes from an earlier attempt to do this had been circulated around the RTR Battalion, so Thwaites talked Major Nott through the procedure to follow. Leaving the damaged Cormorant with B Company, Thwaites and Sergeant Harris set off with the men of D Company following the tanks, except for the men of 12 Platoon which took the lead trying to guide the tanks away from impassable routes.
The slow walking pace meant that when the tanks and D Company arrived at C Company’s position, things were at a critical level. The wounded outnumbered those still fighting, and at least one platoon had been completely wiped out. Ammunition was almost gone, and there was no way to get supplies forward. Likewise, water was very short, and the wounded especially were suffering. The arrival of the two Infantry tanks, with three platoons of infantry turned the situation around. The Japanese withdrew rapidly into the jungle, leaving the battlefield suddenly quiet. Both C Company’s OC (Captain Brian Jacomb) and 2IC (Lt Richard Boulter) were dead, Lt Charles Cross, (OC 10 Platoon) had taken command. Once communications had been restored with the Battalion HQ, Lt Col Knight ordered all of C Company to withdraw. He also ordered Major Nott to move up to find A Company and enable them to withdraw in the same way. B and D Companies then would also pull back establish a new line of resistance, giving the map reference.
Lt Cross pointed out where A Company had been, but noted that not only had communications between the Companies been cut, but there had been diminishing sounds of battle from that direction. Cross got his remaining men together, and organised them to help the wounded back through the jungle the way the tanks had come. Warned of the possibility of small Japanese units still operating between the Company positions, Cross had to make sure that each party of wounded would have men protecting them from possible ambushes.
As Thwaites tanks set off in the direction of A Company’s positions, once again the men of 12 Platoon led the way. The quietness noted by Lt Cross wasn’t the complete absence of sound. The crump of a grenade and the sound of rifle fire could still be heard, even over the noise of the tanks. Working their way through the jungle towards where A Company’s HQ had been, an occasional burst of fire from 12 Platoon’s Bren gunners noted that the British troops were not the only ones using the cover of the jungle. Twice Sergeant Harris’ tank had to open fire with its co-axial machine gun, then disaster struck. A Japanese unit, manhandling a 75mm field gun managed to get two close range shots into Harris’ tank before the men of D Company could react. Harris himself escaped with burns, as did the driver, but both the gunner and loader were killed outright.
With the loss of Condor, Lt Thwaites was on his own, and he was worried about getting bogged down or otherwise disabled. After a brief conversation with Major Nott, the needs of the men of A Company had to take priority, and 13 Platoon were ordered to expand the cordon around Corncrake, to prevent another ambush.
Arriving at A Company’s HQ they found the site of a massacre. It seemed that the Company’s wounded had been gathered at an impromptu aid station, but the Japanese had obviously overran the position and put all the wounded to death. The corpse of the Battalion’s Chaplain, Rev Richard Welchman, was found tied to a tree with a multitude of deep wounds as if he had been used for bayonet practice. Nott used Thwaites’ radio to Battalion HQ to report the situation. The sound of firing coming from a couple of hundred yards away was investigated by 13 Platoon, who discovered the remains of 4 Platoon fighting almost to the last bullet. Clearing the Japanese off and evacuating the survivors took a matter of minutes, the blood of the men of D Company was up seeing what had happened to their comrades.
The senior NCO of 4 Platoon thought that some of 5 Platoon were still holding out in the next position, and Lt Thwaites’ tank led the men of D Company in that direction. As they did so they came upon a large force of Japanese troops with three light tanks. The men didn’t need orders from Major Nott to pour fire into the Japanese troops, caught moving along the road. Thwaites’ gunner took on the Japanese tanks, knocking out two of them in short order. The last withdrew at high speed down the road it had been advancing up. D Company’s officers worked hard to get their men to maintain discipline, and to withdraw leaving the Japanese survivors before they could react and get round the back of the British Company. As D Company retraced its route, a couple of men from 5 Platoon, who had been hiding in the jungle rejoined them. 5 Platoon had fought until their ammunition was almost exhausted, and then the Platoon Sergeant had ordered the men who were still able, to make a run for it. He, and the other wounded stayed in the position to given the others the best chance to get away. It had to be considered that they had paid for that with their lives.
When D Company linked up with B Company and the Battalion HQ the loss of two almost two complete Companies left Lt Col Knight devastated. The whole Muda River position was in danger, as the Japanese infiltration tactics disrupted the British and Indian troops’ dispositions. As had happened with the Worcestershire Regiment, so too 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles had been badly handled and were being forced to pull back, once again meaning the Knight had to relocate his much-reduced force to not lose contact with the Indian troops. Brigadier Dennis Reid had already committed elements of 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment, his reserve, to maintain the link with 6/15th Brigade. Making contact with Major-General Murray-Lyon, Reid informed him of his Brigade’s troubles, a conversation very similar with the one he’d already had with Brigadier Oswald Lay. This was where the plan to keep lines of resistance with two Brigades was weak. A full Division defence would have a third Brigade to shore up problems or commit to a counter attack. Murray-Lyon informed his Corps Commander, Lt-General Heath, that the Muda River line couldn’t be held any longer and requested permission to withdraw the two Brigades before they were overwhelmed.
Heath and Percival agreed that withdrawing from Kedah and Penang was the wise thing to do, but were concerned that it could be done in an orderly fashion. Most of the assets on Penang Island had already been withdrawn or destroyed, the RAF’s Butterworth airfield had also been put beyond use. The fresh 12th Indian Brigade, with the survivors of 10th and 28th Brigades (reformed as 10/28th Brigade) had been digging in at Kuala Kingsar.
Murray-Lyon had prepared a plan for the withdrawal of his two Brigades in stages. With Heath and Percival’s permission, he communicated to Lay and Reid to begin the planned withdrawal at sunset. Getting that information to the Battalions, Companies and Platoons was haphazard due to the Japanese troops in the rear areas. There was a real danger that the withdrawal would become a rout.
Major Rupert Booth (OC C Squadron 11th Bn RTR) was up to date with the situation of his twelve tanks in the forward areas. Six had been knocked out, though some could be fixed up if recovered. The other six were in various places doing their best to support the Battalions they were supporting. Booth had three tanks under his direct command and he knew that these might be crucial to supporting the withdrawal. The other mobile force available to Major-General Murray-Lyon were the armoured cars and carriers of 3rd Cavalry and some light tanks of the 100th Light Tank Squadron. Booth had been working with Major Jack Alford of the tank squadron to work out some way to have the light and Infantry Tanks cooperate together. Booth and Alford offered to put together three troops (each made up of one I tank and 2 Light tanks) to reinforce the battalions holding the line, if the 3rd Calvary could keep the main road open for the Battalions to fall back along. Lt-Col De Winton agreed that his men would do their best to achieve this, and Murray-Lyon ordered Booth to take command and get his men out.
The last few hours of daylight were a nightmare for the officers and NCOs of the British and Indian Battalions attempting organise a fighting withdrawal while in close contact with the enemy. This was particularly difficult with the Japanese units that seemed to be ranging far and wide behind the front line. At least the Japanese aircraft had mostly disappeared, allowing the British artillery to properly support the infantry.
Major Booth had managed to contact all of his remain tanks and make sure that they were where they needed to be to help with the pull out. Whether or not it was through intelligence gained from prisoners, or just plain cunning, the commander of the Japanese force had prepared for the eventuality that the troops in front of him would begin to pull out under the cover of darkness. The last Japanese reserves were thrown into the battle, with a force of carefully husbanded tanks, to upset the British plan. In this they largely succeeded.
Two Battalion HQs were attacked as they were packing up, this ended in the death of both Lt-Col Ronald Bates the CO of the Punjab Battalion in 6/15th Brigade and Lt-Col Ian Bain (CO 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles). Bates would be awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for leading the HQ troops in a desperate action to protect the ambulances carrying away the wounded from the Aid Post. With the loss of leadership at the critical moment, both Battalions struggled to disengage and get away. The other two Battalions in the line, the British Battalion and the Worcestershires managed to get away in better order, with the reserve Battalions, 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment and the Jat/Punjab Regiment playing a crucial role in allowing this to happen.
The Japanese usually only carried one day’s supply on hand, relying on being resupplied each night. This saved the situation to some extent. The Japanese losses in men and material had gutted the two Regiments which had attacked. Their supplies were delayed by the activities of 1st Independent Company working behind their lines. As the last of the two Indian Brigades loaded onto lorries to head south, Booth had only five working I tanks to cover them and four light tanks. Lt Thwaites’ Corncrake was the only survivor of his troop, and he was devastated to discover that his friend, Lt Paul Gregson had been killed along with his crew. Gregson would be one of the many whose bravery awards would be given posthumously. The survivors of 6/13th FFR spoke of a tank, already covered with burning petrol, breaking through a roadblock and allowing whatever transport they had managed to salvage, to escape. The last to see it as they retreated said that it was no longer firing its guns, but seemed to be attempting to crush any groups of Japanese infantry who were firing on the lorries and carriers with the sepoys clinging to them.
The 29th Indian Brigade and merged 6/15th Brigade were holding the line anchored on the Muda River. Increasing pressure was being felt all along the front, with the Japanese obviously probing for weak spots.
Just before dawn a lengthy Japanese artillery barrage had been focussed on the positions of the 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles around Kuala Ketil. This was followed almost immediately by a strong force of Japanese aircraft which bombed and strafed anything that looked like a defensive position. These two events made the Indian troops aware that something bad was about to happen, and so it unfolded.
The way the river snaked around had made it difficult to organise interconnected defensive positions. The presence of the Japanese aircraft made the mobile element of the defence more difficult. Likewise, the gunners of the Field Batteries supporting the Frontier Force men were mostly having to take cover and not give away their positions. The anti-aircraft firepower of the Indian Brigade was limited to light machine guns, and therefore largely ineffective.
As the morning developed, more and more infiltrations were being noted in various points. Sometimes these were counterattacked, but sometimes the Japanese just disappeared into the jungle. Brigadier Dennis Reid (CO 29th Indian Brigade) had been requesting RAF support to no avail. The 1st Bn Worcestershire Regiment and 6/13 FFR were both under heavy assault, all along their front, as were the 6/15th Brigade nearer the coast. Reid and Brigadier Oswald Lay (CO 6/15th Brigade) had conferred with Major-General Murray-Lyon about the way in which the Japanese attack was progressing. Each Brigade had one Battalion in reserve, but, with the skies filled with Japanese aircraft, moving the reserves would be problematical.
Murray-Lyon also requested fighter cover for his force, but AVM Pulford noted that his own airfields were themselves under attack and he didn’t have any spare fighters to assist. The two Brigades had some depth to their defensive positions, that once the river line had to be given up, there were prepared positions to fall back to. The Frontier Force were the first to move back to their secondary positions, and it looked as if the Japanese were building a bridge over the river in the vicinity of the one demolished previously. As the Frontier Force men withdrew, the 1st Worcs had to realign their position to keep in touch. The Japanese commander saw his opportunity and exploited this gap with a surge of a couple of Infantry Companies.
The lessons of the previous month had taught the British officers to do the modern equivalent of forming a square, going into a box formation. As Platoons and Companies were by-passed the troops had learned to stay in place. In a manoeuvre battle, the Japanese often gained the upper hand. Whereas blocking the main routes would slow the Japanese as their supplies and reinforcements weren’t as capable of going through the jungle. The presence of Matilda II tanks was the key to be able to make sure that the boxes were relieved in a timely fashion.
The Japanese were becoming more adept at finding ways to disable the Infantry Tanks, since their anti-tank guns were completely ineffective. Their preferred method was to try to break the tracks of the tank, leaving it immobile. Once that was achieved, they might be able to kill the crew with petrol bombs or firing at point-blank range through vision slits. This had led to a greater emphasis on having at least a platoon of Indian or British troops to protect each tank, basically one Infantry Company per troop of three tanks. This had evolved over the previous month from lessons learnt, but any Company with that job was almost guaranteed to take heavy casualties.
11th Bn RTR’s C Squadron had started off working with 8 Division AIF, until the arrival of the Australian’s own Stuart Light Tanks, then the whole Squadron had been reassigned to III Indian Corps. Major Rupert Booth (OC C Squadron) had assigned 3rd and 4th Troop (OC Lieutenant Martin Thwaites) to 29th Brigade, with 1st and 2nd Troops with 6/15th Brigade. Booth himself, with Squadron HQ, remained with Major-General Murray-Lyon’s 11th Indian Division’s HQ.
The three tanks in Lt Thwaites’ 4th troop were all named for birds. His own was Corncrake, Sergeant Mike Harris’ tank was Condor and Corporal Bill Clutson’s tank was Cormorant. There hadn’t been a lot of time to get used to 29th Indian Brigade, but at least Thwaites was working with the Worcestershire Regiment, which helped with communications. His friend Lieutenant Paul Gregson OC 3rd Troop was attached to 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles. Gregson had joked about the problems trying to understand the Australians, but the Indians were a whole different kettle of fish.
The general principle was for the troop of tanks to be stationed with the Battalion HQ, and therefore able to quickly respond to any particular danger to any of the Infantry Companies. The Battalion reserve Company, with the carrier platoon were usually the group that the three tanks would work with. For Lt Thwaites that meant he was linked with Major Donald Nott of D Company and Captain Anthony James (OC Carrier Platoon).
The first sign that the tanks would soon be called into action was when the Battalion HQ itself was attacked by a small force of Japanese infantry. They suddenly appeared out of the jungle and it was only the bravery of one of the AA Platoon Corporal’s who managed to bring the twin Bren gun to bear, that stopped what seemed like a suicidal attack. The fact that the Japanese had infiltrated as far as the Battalion HQ brought home the serious situation that the Battalion faced.
Most of the telephone wires between the HQ and Company HQs were cut, and the Subaltern commanding the Signal Platoon was organising parties to find the breaks and fix them. Knowing full well that such an effort would be hazardous to say the least, the Battalion Commander, Lt-Col Jock Knight wanted a larger force to go with the Signallers.
Major Nott was given the task, and looking at the situation he expressed his opinion that his Company and the troop of tanks would be needed to both support the signallers and re-establish the separated links of the Battalion. Lt Col Knight wasn’t keen on committing his reserves so early in the battle, but after consulting with Brigadier Reid, he agreed. The Brigade’s reserve, 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment, were ready to support the other two battalions.
In the time it had taken for the decision to have been made, things were getting decidedly hairy for the forward platoons of both the Worcestershire Regiment and 6/13th FFR. The Japanese attack was developing some momentum. With the British supporting artillery and mobile forces constrained by the Japanese bombers and fighters, and increasing numbers of Japanese troops and tanks across the river, the British and Indian troops were hard pressed. Two platoons of A Company (Worcs Regt) were completely cut off, and C Company was pinned down and unable to move. When D Company and the three tanks started off, they were immediately pounced upon by Japanese aircraft. As many Bren guns as possible were brought to bear on the aircraft, but with very limited success. Three of D Company’s trucks were destroyed and five men killed and another fifteen injured. A bomb had missed Cormorant by just a few yards, which had concussed the crew and knocked out the radio.
Once they got on the move again, they reached B Company’s HQ. The signallers got to work mending the broken wires and Major Nott was given an update on the problems of A and C Companies. Japanese infiltrations had been noted all through Battalions positions. Lt Thwaites, whose tanks were all armed with the 2-pdr gun, knew that his troop would be useful against the Japanese tanks, and wanted to move up immediately to C Company’s position to relieve them. Nott was inclined to agree but moving up the road just invited more attention from the Japanese aircraft.
Thwaites knew that his colleagues had had come success taking their tanks through the jungle, if the infantry were able to support them. It would take longer, but add the element of surprise when they arrived at C Company’s positions. Notes from an earlier attempt to do this had been circulated around the RTR Battalion, so Thwaites talked Major Nott through the procedure to follow. Leaving the damaged Cormorant with B Company, Thwaites and Sergeant Harris set off with the men of D Company following the tanks, except for the men of 12 Platoon which took the lead trying to guide the tanks away from impassable routes.
The slow walking pace meant that when the tanks and D Company arrived at C Company’s position, things were at a critical level. The wounded outnumbered those still fighting, and at least one platoon had been completely wiped out. Ammunition was almost gone, and there was no way to get supplies forward. Likewise, water was very short, and the wounded especially were suffering. The arrival of the two Infantry tanks, with three platoons of infantry turned the situation around. The Japanese withdrew rapidly into the jungle, leaving the battlefield suddenly quiet. Both C Company’s OC (Captain Brian Jacomb) and 2IC (Lt Richard Boulter) were dead, Lt Charles Cross, (OC 10 Platoon) had taken command. Once communications had been restored with the Battalion HQ, Lt Col Knight ordered all of C Company to withdraw. He also ordered Major Nott to move up to find A Company and enable them to withdraw in the same way. B and D Companies then would also pull back establish a new line of resistance, giving the map reference.
Lt Cross pointed out where A Company had been, but noted that not only had communications between the Companies been cut, but there had been diminishing sounds of battle from that direction. Cross got his remaining men together, and organised them to help the wounded back through the jungle the way the tanks had come. Warned of the possibility of small Japanese units still operating between the Company positions, Cross had to make sure that each party of wounded would have men protecting them from possible ambushes.
As Thwaites tanks set off in the direction of A Company’s positions, once again the men of 12 Platoon led the way. The quietness noted by Lt Cross wasn’t the complete absence of sound. The crump of a grenade and the sound of rifle fire could still be heard, even over the noise of the tanks. Working their way through the jungle towards where A Company’s HQ had been, an occasional burst of fire from 12 Platoon’s Bren gunners noted that the British troops were not the only ones using the cover of the jungle. Twice Sergeant Harris’ tank had to open fire with its co-axial machine gun, then disaster struck. A Japanese unit, manhandling a 75mm field gun managed to get two close range shots into Harris’ tank before the men of D Company could react. Harris himself escaped with burns, as did the driver, but both the gunner and loader were killed outright.
With the loss of Condor, Lt Thwaites was on his own, and he was worried about getting bogged down or otherwise disabled. After a brief conversation with Major Nott, the needs of the men of A Company had to take priority, and 13 Platoon were ordered to expand the cordon around Corncrake, to prevent another ambush.
Arriving at A Company’s HQ they found the site of a massacre. It seemed that the Company’s wounded had been gathered at an impromptu aid station, but the Japanese had obviously overran the position and put all the wounded to death. The corpse of the Battalion’s Chaplain, Rev Richard Welchman, was found tied to a tree with a multitude of deep wounds as if he had been used for bayonet practice. Nott used Thwaites’ radio to Battalion HQ to report the situation. The sound of firing coming from a couple of hundred yards away was investigated by 13 Platoon, who discovered the remains of 4 Platoon fighting almost to the last bullet. Clearing the Japanese off and evacuating the survivors took a matter of minutes, the blood of the men of D Company was up seeing what had happened to their comrades.
The senior NCO of 4 Platoon thought that some of 5 Platoon were still holding out in the next position, and Lt Thwaites’ tank led the men of D Company in that direction. As they did so they came upon a large force of Japanese troops with three light tanks. The men didn’t need orders from Major Nott to pour fire into the Japanese troops, caught moving along the road. Thwaites’ gunner took on the Japanese tanks, knocking out two of them in short order. The last withdrew at high speed down the road it had been advancing up. D Company’s officers worked hard to get their men to maintain discipline, and to withdraw leaving the Japanese survivors before they could react and get round the back of the British Company. As D Company retraced its route, a couple of men from 5 Platoon, who had been hiding in the jungle rejoined them. 5 Platoon had fought until their ammunition was almost exhausted, and then the Platoon Sergeant had ordered the men who were still able, to make a run for it. He, and the other wounded stayed in the position to given the others the best chance to get away. It had to be considered that they had paid for that with their lives.
When D Company linked up with B Company and the Battalion HQ the loss of two almost two complete Companies left Lt Col Knight devastated. The whole Muda River position was in danger, as the Japanese infiltration tactics disrupted the British and Indian troops’ dispositions. As had happened with the Worcestershire Regiment, so too 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles had been badly handled and were being forced to pull back, once again meaning the Knight had to relocate his much-reduced force to not lose contact with the Indian troops. Brigadier Dennis Reid had already committed elements of 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment, his reserve, to maintain the link with 6/15th Brigade. Making contact with Major-General Murray-Lyon, Reid informed him of his Brigade’s troubles, a conversation very similar with the one he’d already had with Brigadier Oswald Lay. This was where the plan to keep lines of resistance with two Brigades was weak. A full Division defence would have a third Brigade to shore up problems or commit to a counter attack. Murray-Lyon informed his Corps Commander, Lt-General Heath, that the Muda River line couldn’t be held any longer and requested permission to withdraw the two Brigades before they were overwhelmed.
Heath and Percival agreed that withdrawing from Kedah and Penang was the wise thing to do, but were concerned that it could be done in an orderly fashion. Most of the assets on Penang Island had already been withdrawn or destroyed, the RAF’s Butterworth airfield had also been put beyond use. The fresh 12th Indian Brigade, with the survivors of 10th and 28th Brigades (reformed as 10/28th Brigade) had been digging in at Kuala Kingsar.
Murray-Lyon had prepared a plan for the withdrawal of his two Brigades in stages. With Heath and Percival’s permission, he communicated to Lay and Reid to begin the planned withdrawal at sunset. Getting that information to the Battalions, Companies and Platoons was haphazard due to the Japanese troops in the rear areas. There was a real danger that the withdrawal would become a rout.
Major Rupert Booth (OC C Squadron 11th Bn RTR) was up to date with the situation of his twelve tanks in the forward areas. Six had been knocked out, though some could be fixed up if recovered. The other six were in various places doing their best to support the Battalions they were supporting. Booth had three tanks under his direct command and he knew that these might be crucial to supporting the withdrawal. The other mobile force available to Major-General Murray-Lyon were the armoured cars and carriers of 3rd Cavalry and some light tanks of the 100th Light Tank Squadron. Booth had been working with Major Jack Alford of the tank squadron to work out some way to have the light and Infantry Tanks cooperate together. Booth and Alford offered to put together three troops (each made up of one I tank and 2 Light tanks) to reinforce the battalions holding the line, if the 3rd Calvary could keep the main road open for the Battalions to fall back along. Lt-Col De Winton agreed that his men would do their best to achieve this, and Murray-Lyon ordered Booth to take command and get his men out.
The last few hours of daylight were a nightmare for the officers and NCOs of the British and Indian Battalions attempting organise a fighting withdrawal while in close contact with the enemy. This was particularly difficult with the Japanese units that seemed to be ranging far and wide behind the front line. At least the Japanese aircraft had mostly disappeared, allowing the British artillery to properly support the infantry.
Major Booth had managed to contact all of his remain tanks and make sure that they were where they needed to be to help with the pull out. Whether or not it was through intelligence gained from prisoners, or just plain cunning, the commander of the Japanese force had prepared for the eventuality that the troops in front of him would begin to pull out under the cover of darkness. The last Japanese reserves were thrown into the battle, with a force of carefully husbanded tanks, to upset the British plan. In this they largely succeeded.
Two Battalion HQs were attacked as they were packing up, this ended in the death of both Lt-Col Ronald Bates the CO of the Punjab Battalion in 6/15th Brigade and Lt-Col Ian Bain (CO 6/13th Frontier Force Rifles). Bates would be awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for leading the HQ troops in a desperate action to protect the ambulances carrying away the wounded from the Aid Post. With the loss of leadership at the critical moment, both Battalions struggled to disengage and get away. The other two Battalions in the line, the British Battalion and the Worcestershires managed to get away in better order, with the reserve Battalions, 3rd Bn 2nd Punjab Regiment and the Jat/Punjab Regiment playing a crucial role in allowing this to happen.
The Japanese usually only carried one day’s supply on hand, relying on being resupplied each night. This saved the situation to some extent. The Japanese losses in men and material had gutted the two Regiments which had attacked. Their supplies were delayed by the activities of 1st Independent Company working behind their lines. As the last of the two Indian Brigades loaded onto lorries to head south, Booth had only five working I tanks to cover them and four light tanks. Lt Thwaites’ Corncrake was the only survivor of his troop, and he was devastated to discover that his friend, Lt Paul Gregson had been killed along with his crew. Gregson would be one of the many whose bravery awards would be given posthumously. The survivors of 6/13th FFR spoke of a tank, already covered with burning petrol, breaking through a roadblock and allowing whatever transport they had managed to salvage, to escape. The last to see it as they retreated said that it was no longer firing its guns, but seemed to be attempting to crush any groups of Japanese infantry who were firing on the lorries and carriers with the sepoys clinging to them.
Donald Reaver
Donor
A brutal fight indeed for both sides, I'm curious to the percentage of losses of the Japanese forces committed at this point. They are paying a higher price so far, but fog of war at this point from the British side.
Great description of the sheer chaos that characterised much of the OLT fighting in the Far East, with units spread thinly through dense terrain and colliding in bloody fights at short range. The British are learning the OTL lesson that individual companies and even platoons need to be prepared to fight independently and in almost any direction when facing Japanese infiltration tactics.
Tactically, that was quite an achievement by the Japanese to crack a prepared river defence with armour and artillery support, and strategically they've retained the initiative and forced the British to evacuate a major base and port at Penang. The question is, how many such victories can the Japanese afford? They don't have much in the way of reserves, they're advancing very slowly and the the British and Australian forces to the south are only getting stronger.
Tactically, that was quite an achievement by the Japanese to crack a prepared river defence with armour and artillery support, and strategically they've retained the initiative and forced the British to evacuate a major base and port at Penang. The question is, how many such victories can the Japanese afford? They don't have much in the way of reserves, they're advancing very slowly and the the British and Australian forces to the south are only getting stronger.
One of the most moving things I've ever read from this period was from the retreat of BurCorps in Burma in 1942. Many of the soldiers were almost in rags, some marching without boots, but every time they saw Bill Slim approaching in his jeep, as he drove up and down the column, the men would straighten up and try and march in step.
Great update @allanpcameron
“The survivors of 6/13th FFR spoke of a tank, already covered with burning petrol, breaking through a roadblock and allowing whatever transport they had managed to salvage, to escape. The last to see it as they retreated said that it was no longer firing its guns, but seemed to be attempting to crush any groups of Japanese infantry who were firing on the lorries and carriers with the sepoys clinging to them.”
A brave last stand by the tankers.
“The survivors of 6/13th FFR spoke of a tank, already covered with burning petrol, breaking through a roadblock and allowing whatever transport they had managed to salvage, to escape. The last to see it as they retreated said that it was no longer firing its guns, but seemed to be attempting to crush any groups of Japanese infantry who were firing on the lorries and carriers with the sepoys clinging to them.”
A brave last stand by the tankers.