Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

[Icedaemon]

Oh boy, did I fall behind.

Mines were a worry, and the chances of throwing a track on the roadblock was obviously not something he wanted to do. He outlined an idea to the infantry Captain who was a bit surprised, but happy to agree. Alden gathered his two tank commanders and gave them their orders. The CS tank was to approach the bend and begin laying a combination of smoke and HE rounds on the roadblock, a few VB teams from the carrier platoon and a platoon of C Company would join them to keep the Japanese’ heads down.

When they had stalked the Japanese tank, Alden had found that the ‘jungle’ while thick wasn’t really a hinderance to the Matilda II. He would take his tank off the road and towards the roadblock position from the left-hand side, the other gun tank would go off on the right. Each tank would have a platoon of C Company following the tank through the jungle and then attack the roadblock from the flank. Alden thought that about 100 yards off the road would be sufficient to give the Japanese a real problem.

When ten minutes had crawled by on his watch, Alden ordered the driver to go, and keeping to marching pace, led the counter-attack into the Japanese flank. His guess had been right, the Japanese had prepared another roadblock and had the strength of about a company of men to hold it, along with anti-tank guns and three Type 97 tanks. The route Alden and 14 Platoon took brought them out at the rear of the roadblock, where the gunner made short work of the tanks, and the infantry, with a couple of carriers in support put the Japanese troops to flight. One of the anti-tank guns managed to get a round off which left a groove in the armour on the side of the turret and a loud ringing noise in Alden’s turret. The co-axial MG made short work of the Japanese gun crew. With the roadblock neutralised, Alden brought his tank back into line with the rest of the troop and began to roll up the flank of the Japanese attacking force. ‘Like a hot knife through butter’ was the gunner’s opinion. While he was firing away, he and the loader got into an argument about just how many tin cans the gunner had killed so far.

I do really like this particular post. Using the Japs own techniques against them and outfoxing them, possibly tilting the balance in a hard-fought battle. Lieutenant Alden is going places. If he survives this war, he might be a general by the 60s or 70s. The action seems visceral and realistic.

Since the KNIL had six Mark VICs at Singhawang II, the Dutch Brigadier Timmer (a brigade was a 15 man group in the KNIL) had been ordered to support the two Punjab battalions with his two tanks. Moorehead greeted Timmer with great enthusiasm. Moorehead had placed his 3rd Bn 16th Punjab Regiment to defend the waterways into Kuching. 5th Bn 14th Punjab Regiment were defending the airfield and some of the crucial points on the route to Singhawang II. His plan was to oppose a landing as far forward as possible, then to pull back to the airfield. The airfield itself was scheduled for demolitions, but it would a position for the 5/14 Punjab Regiment to hold, to allow the men of the 3/16 to withdraw through and prepare to hold the river crossing at Batu Kitang, to allow the other Battalion to fall back, and then leapfrog one another, bleeding the Japanese as much as possible all the way back. With two light tanks in addition to his understrength carrier platoons, he now had a mobile force with a bit of teeth to it. Timmer agreed to Moorehead’s plan and started working with the Punjabis to rehearse how such support would be best used.

A brigade in the Dutch Far Eastern forces was only 15 men? This is real?

Admiral Phillips was waiting for more reinforcements including HMS Warspite coming from Alexandria to replace HMS Barham. Four R Class battleships, Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge and Royal Sovereign along with HMS Hermes, which was at Durban being refitted, were all expected in Ceylon around March, for all the good Admiral Phillips thought they would do. HMS Repulse was in the dry dock in Singapore having emergency repairs, she was expected to sail with the empty merchant ships when they left Singapore. The battlecruiser was likely to need a longer time for repairs, which would probably mean sailing to the United States.

Given how the South China Sea is a tighter naval theatre than the Pacific, might this timeline see one more great battle between gun-armed battleships than OTL? I know it's outside the scope of a tank-focused timeline, but this seems like too large a possible battle to not show in all it's glorous detail should it come to pass.

On the whole the Count expressed some satisfaction with how things were going. It was unfortunate that the Indian troops didn’t see the possibility of their liberation from the British and therefore stop fighting. On the other hand, the losses incurred at Kota Bahru and at Jitra were greater than feared, but within the casualty projections overall. As long as Yamashita kept up the pressure, and continued to try to upset the British plans, Count Terauchi was confident of victory.

It seems to me that the Japanese officers are largely telling their superior what they think he wants to know, with their own intelligence analysts largely acting the same way.

Slim was also introduced to the existence of the Oriental Mission, which had been founded in Singapore in May 1941 as the regional headquarters of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Force 136, as it was known, was designed to conduct espionage, sabotage and reconnaissance in British territories that might be occupied by an enemy. Slim was informed that they were supporting Lt Col Noel Stevenson who had begun to organise levies from amongst the Karen tribesmen in the Shan States. Stevenson had served with the Burma Frontier Service and had extensive experience of working with the Karens. There was little time, few resources and next to no equipment, but many Karens were being organised to keep watch on Japanese movements and to identify Burmese collaborators. These two pieces of information made Slim realise why General Alexander had asked for Brigadier Orde Wingate to be attached to Burma Command.

I am sorry and a little ashamed. I know that Karen is an ethnic group treated dismally in Myanmar to this day, but I could not escape the mental image of overly argumentative scouts with dyed pixie cuts.

Heath reported that he had been informed by Lt.Col. James Mackellar (CO 4th Battalion, Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces) that there were reports that a Japanese force had been working its way down the east coast. With 9th Indian Division pushed back off the coast, the idea that a Japanese force was making its way south along the coast was entirely believable. As far as Heath knew at least one Company of 1st Battalion Mysore Infantry had retreated from the Gong Kedak area down the east coast. They hadn’t been in contact and Heath didn’t know whether or not they were still effective. RAF reconnaissance hadn’t noted anything obvious, but that whole coastal area was undeveloped and could easily hide even a large force from aerial reconnaissance.

Although it was still over a hundred miles north of Kuantan, Mackellar reported that there was almost nothing to stop the Japanese north of his force, which was just one Battalion spread thin over the eastern coast of Pahang State. The possibility of another Japanese amphibious attack on the east coast couldn’t be ruled out either. Heath had ordered Barstow to use 2nd Malaya Brigade to replace one of his tired Brigades, probably 8th Indian Brigade, and for them to move back to the Kuantan area. Here they could rest and refit. Having a Brigade, tired and depleted as it was, holding the airfield and resources of Kuantan would be most valuable. The previous commitment of Australian 8 Division to provide a counter-attacking force in the event of another Japanese landing was still on the table.

Heath then moved onto the situation on the west coast where 11th Indian Division were committed. After the initial attacks by the Japanese Guards Division had been repulsed, the intensity of the fighting had died down a little. There were growing indications that more Japanese troops were heading in the direction northern Malaya to reinforce the attack there.

While the Japanese advance is stalling, I do wonder how the the people in in the currently occupied areas are treated. If the fighting drags on, I can only imagine the situation for civilians in areas occupied by Japan is going to only get worse.

Heath revealed that 1st Independent Company (OC Major Sheppard Fearon) and the Australian Rose Force (OC Captain Dan Lloyd) were working behind the Japanese lines. They were working in platoon sized forces, being supported by the Royal Navy who were using the river system for infiltration and extraction. The two forces were supported by volunteers from the Federated Malay States Volunteer Forces, local European men who were acting as guides and translators. Most of the efforts of these special forces were in guerrilla tactics, making the rear area of the Japanese thrust unpredictable and tying down and ambushing Japanese troops defending their lines of communications. They also had small teams on overwatch of the roads and railway. These sent occasional radio messages when circumstances permitted. The information they were giving was worth its weight in gold, as there few other sources of reconnaissance information. Murray-Lyon’s preparations for a new Japanese attack was based largely on the information they were getting from 1st Independent Company.

This seems like a very high risk operation. Those men probably know they can expect no quarter if they are ever caught.

 

[Mark1878]

A brigade in the Dutch Far Eastern forces was only 15 men? This is real?

Brigadier is equivalent to corporal in several armies - the main example being the French.

From the French it is also a NCO rank in Spain, Italy and Netherlands and Indonesia.

 

[wietze]

Since the KNIL had six Mark VICs at Singhawang II, the Dutch Brigadier Timmer (a brigade was a 15 man group in the KNIL)

you certain about this?
in dutch 'Brigadier' is not the same as brigadier (aka brigade-general) in english.
The dutch brigadier is a specific KNIL rank, and about same level as cpl-1
a brigade in the KNIL consisted of 4 battalions (in wartime), but most of the structure was divided in battalions

edit:ninja'd

 

[naraic]

you certain about this?
in dutch 'Brigadier' is not the same as brigadier (aka brigade-general) in english.
The dutch brigadier is a specific KNIL rank, and about same level as cpl-1
a brigade in the KNIL consisted of 4 battalions (in wartime), but most of the structure was divided in battalions

edit:ninja'd

Agreed. A dutch Brigadier doesn't lead a brigade. Just like a corporal doesn't lead a corps.

 

[allanpcameron]

you certain about this?
in dutch 'Brigadier' is not the same as brigadier (aka brigade-general) in english.
The dutch brigadier is a specific KNIL rank, and about same level as cpl-1
a brigade in the KNIL consisted of 4 battalions (in wartime), but most of the structure was divided in battalions

edit:ninja'd

Agreed. A dutch Brigadier doesn't lead a brigade. Just like a corporal doesn't lead a corps.

A brigade in the Dutch Far Eastern forces was only 15 men? This is real?

The tanks were under the command of Brigadier-Vechtwagencommandant (corporal tank commander) B. Timmer. The other tankmen were : Fusiliers-Vechtwagenbestuurder (private tank driver) K. Been, W. Piek, J.A. Palit, J. Verkaik and Zeltman (or Seltman). Fusiliers-Vechtwagenbestuurder Van Noort and Zwart came later in replacement of Zeltman who was evacuated by plane to Java for medical reasons. The tanks were at once sent to Singakawang II airfield where they were used for airfield defence. They used their MG against low flying Japanese planes. During one of the air raids, the amphibious tank seems to have been damaged beyond repair. Apart from the tanks, there were also 2 overvalwagens at the airfield. They were either used by one of the 13 brigades of the Garnizoensbataljon of the Westerafdeling van Borneo (garrison battalion of the western district of Borneo) or by the Stadswacht detachment of 50 men. All these units were assigned to the defence of the airfield. Each brigade had 19 to 20 men. From here.

This is my source for Timmer as commander of two tanks. And here is my source for the fifteen man group:

The Amphibious Tank was not used in the fighting because it became unserviceable shortly after the arrival due to its age. The two remaining tanks were under the command of Brigadier Timmer (a brigade was a 15 man group in the KNIL). After their landing at Kuching, two battalions of the Japanese 124th Infantry Regiment advanced toward the border with Dutch Borneo and crossed it on January 24th 1942. From here

Finally from Royal Netherlands East Indies Army 1936-42 (Men-at-Arms Book 251 Marc Lohnstein Osprey publishing 2018)

The territorial or 'garrison' infantry, which was Indonesian apart from Dutch officers and most NCOs, was widely dispersed in the outer regions to maintain law and order. Garrison battalions and companies were purely administrative entities, and personnel formed local detachments of only one or two sections. A section (brigade) numbered 15 rankers led by a Dutch or Indonesian sergeant. only a few of these detachments had any automatic weapons.

If anyone has a better source for the KNIL I would love to see it.
Allan

 

[allanpcameron]

2 January 1942. Singapore.

Sergeant Tommy Docherty’s shoulder wound had been properly treated and he was now on light duties. He had been brought back to Singapore Island to work with recently arrived 7th Bn RTR. Many of the men who’d fought at Arras were now leavening RAC units throughout the Corps, but there was still a number of veterans of the attack on 7th Panzer Division that had been so crucial to the delay to the German advance to the English Channel coast.

Their Commander was the recently promoted Lt-Col Jock Holden, who’d been Adjutant Captain during the Arras battle, and RSM Fowler still had his role. Lt Col Hedderwick had already visited his old comrades and welcomed them to Singapore. Tommy Docherty had been a trooper 7th Bn RTR in 1940, a driver of an A11. He’d been promoted and transferred to 11 Bn RTR when it had been raised in January 1941.

Docherty had spent a couple days catching up with old friends, and a couple of nights in Singapore drinking heavily with old and new friends. Suffering somewhat from a sore head, Docherty was spending the morning with the tank commanders of A Squadron, sharing his experience of fighting the Japanese in the Malayan terrain. He was able to share with them some of the lessons that had been learned, and it kept coming back to the problem of the 2-pdr gun. Most of the fights 11th Bn RTR had been in, the tanks were just mobile pillboxes, with one machine gun. Docherty couldn’t help but compare that to Arras and the effectiveness of the pompom gun that could deal with soft as well as some hard targets.

The good news was that 7th Bn RTR had arrived with a larger number of 3-inch armed Close Support tanks than a tank battalion would normally have (18 instead of 6). They also had spares, some of which would be sent to 11th Bn RTR to help supplement the number in the remaining tanks in that Battalion. Each troop of three tanks would have one CS tank and two 2-pdr tanks, something that Docherty approved of. The other thing Docherty had learned, and spoke in favour of, was taking the Bren gun mount that could be attached to each tank. Originally this was designed as an anti-aircraft mount, but Docherty argued that the tank commander having one could use it while the main Besa MG was reloading or having the barrel replaced. He told his story of how he came to be wounded, he explained that while having the Sten gun in the tank was useful, a Bren had better range and power. Even better was having a Gunga Din who’d man that Bren gun while the tank commander was inside the hatch. The fact that being on the back of a tank was a particularly dangerous place wasn’t lost on the men of A Squadron, but Docherty’s description of how his mate, Sergeant Bill Morris, died was horrendous.

Because 7th Bn RTR would be working with 18th Infantry Division, part of the planning for exercises to prepare for combat, the men of 53rd, 54th and 55th Brigades were all scheduled to have time working with the tanks. Docherty, and a few others from 11th Bn RTR passed on the information about what signals to look for. As part of their training Western Command before sailing, the 18th Division had had some time training with tanks, so it wouldn’t be an entirely new situation for them. The primary difference at this stage was that in Division sized exercises in the UK an Army Tank Battalion would support one infantry Battalion. Each squadron of five troops would provide each of the three attacking platoons with a troop of three tanks, the other two troops being available either for a flanking move, or to thicken the firing line. Currently there was one tank Battalion spread out among III Indian Corps, and now one with II Australian Corps. It was clear that a new system would need to be worked out. For this the experience of men like Docherty was essential.

The advantage of the Matilda IIs that had arrived with 7th Bn RTR was they were equipped with a powered phone from the rear of the tank to inside the turret, allowing the infantry and tank commanders to converse without putting themselves in harms way. Docherty, when he saw this, couldn’t help but remember Gunga Din’s face every time he opened the hatch smiling down at him. Docherty had lost touch with where 3rd Bn 5th Mahratta Light Infantry were now, and hoped that the wee Indian was doing alright.

The tanks themselves were undergoing a bit of maintenance after their long sea voyage, and some ‘tropicalisation’ was being done to prepare them for work in Malaya. Another advantage that Docherty noticed was that with the tank battalion, they had brought a larger than normal ‘B echelon’. The plan, it seemed, in the War Office was that 11th and 7th Bn RTR would be the basis for a full Army Tank Brigade, 4th Bn RTR with 58 Matilda Mark II infantry tanks were sailing Wilson Special 14 convoy, along with battle replacements for 7th and 11th Bn RTR. Having sailed on 9 December 1941, the ships bound for Singapore were expected at the end of January.

The RAOC was responsible for the supply and repair for weapons, armoured vehicles and other military equipment and ammunition. Since a full tank Brigade was now being established in Singapore having the AFV element of the RAOC centred on the primary RAC Base Depot, co-existing at an RASC depot, made sense. By including a Base Supply Depot, an advanced Ordnance workshop, an extra Light Aid Detachment and RAOC Brigade level workshops along with 7th Bn RTR’s men and tanks, better care could be taken of the tanks. Lt-Col Hedderwick had already requested that some of his ‘Beyond Local Repair’ tanks might be brought back for some of the bigger jobs that his own B echelon couldn’t handle. The fact that a few tank transporters were included with the Advance Ordnance workshop meant that this could happen much more easily.

For the next few weeks, as Docherty recovered from his wound, his presence among the men of 7th Bn RTR, especially with those who hadn’t been in action before was helpful. Docherty couldn’t help wonder when the Medical Officer would class him as fully fit for duty and return to 11th Bn RTR, if there was much left of it by the end of the month.

 

[wietze]

This is my source for Timmer as commander of two tanks. And here is my source for the fifteen man group:

Finally from Royal Netherlands East Indies Army 1936-42 (Men-at-Arms Book 251 Marc Lohnstein Osprey publishing 2018)

If anyone has a better source for the KNIL I would love to see it.
Allan

in the 1907 the KNIL set up what was called a mixed brigade, consisting of 4 battalions infantry, half squadron cavalry, artillery unit, 1 MG company and 2 sections of engineers.
so a brigade def is not a 15 man group

 

[allanpcameron]

in the 1907 the KNIL set up what was called a mixed brigade, consisting of 4 battalions infantry, half squadron cavalry, artillery unit, 1 MG company and 2 sections of engineers.
so a brigade def is not a 15 man group

What is your source, and are you sure that things hadn't been changed by 1936?
Allan

 

[yulzari1]

Brigadier is equivalent to corporal in several armies - the main example being the French.

From the French it is also a NCO rank in Spain, Italy and Netherlands and Indonesia.

The basis is the sub division of the rank of General. Thus there is in the British army the Brigadier (corporal) General, (sergeant) Major General, Lieutenant General and General.

 

[wietze]

What is your source, and are you sure that things hadn't been changed by 1936?
Allan

the dutch wiki on the history of the KNIL, that section itself comes from a book on the history of the KNIL

Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger - Wikipedia

nl.wikipedia.org

brigades in NL parlance have been the same size as elsewhere.

 

[MattII]

The Japanese aren't going to like when the new force goes in...

 

[allanpcameron]

the dutch wiki on the history of the KNIL, that section itself comes from a book on the history of the KNIL

Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger - Wikipedia

nl.wikipedia.org

brigades in NL parlance have been the same size as elsewhere.

From that website:

Please note the pay scales: Soldat 2e, Soldat 1e, Brigadier (Korp), Sergeant etc.
I have to say, I rest my case.
Allan

 

[naraic]

What is your source, and are you sure that things hadn't been changed by 1936?
Allan

A brigadier is definitely the equivalent of a corporal. I am however unsure that they command a brigade. A corporal does not command a corps.

I can easily find a dozen sources referring to a knil brigade being a unit with multiple battalions.

http://www.indonesia-dutchcolonialheritage.nl/KNIL%20ShortHist/KNIL,%20short%20history.pdf

In 1940 the mobilized KNIL counted 40.000 professional soldiers and 20.000 home reserves (landstorm) as well as conscripts. In the same year the army command tried to place orders for the delivery of 500 planes: bombers, dive bombers and fighters. The command already made a start with the motorization and mechanization of the troops on Java. The aim was to form five mobile brigades with 5.000 men and 90 tanks / armoured cars each.

A Marc Lowenstein blog post over on osprey publishing.

Blog - Royal Netherlands East Indies Army: preparing for war - Osprey Publishing

ospreypublishing.com

In 1941, on the eve of the Japanese southern offensive and inspired by the German use of mechanised warfare in Western Europe, it was decided the KNIL was to be drastically reorganised and expanded. This plan sought to motorise and mechanise its infantry. To this effect, five mixed brigades and one mobile brigade were to be formed under the direction of three division staffs. But on the eve of the Japanese landings on Indonesian soil these plans had not yet fully come into being. It meant that the mobile troops consisted of four infantry regiments with support troops. Only seven out of the 16 infantry battalions had been motorised. However, the cavalry had become almost fully motorised. The Japanese invasion hit the KNIL in the middle of an extensive reorganisation.

I've also found a couple of references suggesting that a section or a squad or a half platoon was called a brigade in the knil but not good sources.

Patrouille in de Buitengewesten door een KNIL-brigade à 16 man ca. 1930. De alarmhouding van de enkele man gewapend met karabijn-klew… | Tentara, Sejarah, Indonesia

2018 Jul 6 - Patrouille in de Buitengewesten door een KNIL-brigade à 16 man ca. 1930. De alarmhouding van de enkele man gewapend met karabijn-klewang. Atjeh, Noord-Sumatra, Nederlands-Indië

www.pinterest.ie

Could KNIL have used brigade in both forms? It would be like USA calling a section (ie a half platoon usually) a corps as its commanded by a corporal while still using corps for multidivisional units.

 

[HPM]

With the more familiar UNF, UNC etc.,

Only to benighted Yanks and certainly not for those of us who were brought upon Whitworth.

 

[HPM]

A

The UK and US use different thread standards. A US nut will not fit on a UK bolt.a

Actually there are a few congruences; certain sizes can be made to fit. Not well, but they will work. I do not recommend it oh highly stressed machinery or precise applications.

 

[wietze]

From that website:View attachment 783652
Please note the pay scales: Soldat 2e, Soldat 1e, Brigadier (Korp), Sergeant etc.
I have to say, I rest my case.
Allan

i wasn't questioning the brigadier thingy, i was questioning the 15 man brigade

Could KNIL have used brigade in both forms? It would be like USA calling a section (ie a half platoon usually) a corps as its commanded by a corporal.

very possible, could be 'flexible' use of expressions.
in dutch there is the expression 'vliegende brigade' (flying brigade) which means a very mobile unit/taskforce

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

A

Actually there are a few congruences; certain sizes can be made to fit. Not well, but they will work. I do not recommend it oh highly stressed machinery or precise applications.

A very temporary fix you keep a close eye on until you can get the proper spares.

 

[allanpcameron]

i wasn't questioning the brigadier thingy, i was questioning the 15 man brigade


very possible, could be 'flexible' use of expressions.
in dutch there is the expression 'vliegende brigade' (flying brigade) which means a very mobile unit/taskforce

I have quoted three sources. I'm not sure why you don't accept the evidence I have put before you. Again I ask you for your source. There is no question that a Brigade is a collection of battalions in most armies. However, the evidence in the KNIL is that a section, is under the command of a Brigadier in the KNIL, equivalent of a corporal in most armies. I find it difficult to understand why you doubt the three sources I have quoted, plus from the one source you quoted. I do research for this TL, which I am prepared to accept better sources if quoted. However I believe the sources I have used for this are solid and incontrovertible. If you don't accept these sources, please show me, preferrably from three other sources that I am wrong?
Allan

 

[mundi_mundi]

Noting Wally's post #3,800 about US sub tenders having escaped the Philippines, if they're made available in Singapore* would that plus whatever capacity the Singapore dockyards can spare be enough to keep at least some of the US submarines operational? Might some cannibalisation of spare parts from one surviving sub to another as well as whatever other bodges turn out to be possible also help?

I appreciate this could all lead to a diminishing asset, but maybe the political value of US subs operating out of Singapore might outweigh the costs? It'd be a nice example of US/UK cooperation under trying conditions, even if they'd perhaps be more capable operating on a different supply line.

*I.e. if they're sent to Singapore & not elsewhere and they actually make it there.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

And so we see the fundamental differences between OTL and TTL, along with the differences between the Japanese Army and the British Army. IOTL the Japanese managed to get inside the British forces C3, and inside the heads of the signor British commanders. ITTL, enough extra resources, and changes to the British command structure, has taken place, that the Japanese have failed to get inside both the British C3 and commanders head. IOTL, the British command would have been running around like headless chickens, throwing any forces available into the fray willy nilly, in an attempt to stem the Japanese advance. ITTL, the British forces on the ground have stopped/slowed down the Japanese attack sufficiently to allow the command structure to absorb the information presented and make mature considered decisions. And this has forced the Japanese to change their plans, in the Far East theatre of operations, allowing the British breathing space to react. This will eventually have major consequences on the conduct of the campaign in the region, and the conduct of the war overall, plus the situation post war. Think, if the British campaign in FIC, and liberate this area, before the end of the war against Japan, the chances of the post war French campaign to prevent the independence of this area happening in the same way as it did IOTL, are very much reduced. The retention of the land link to China, the Burma Road, will have a significant impact on the Chinese Civil War post WWII, and ether delay the Communists victory, or extended the war into the 1950’s. No airlift into China, means that there is no example of a ‘successful’ airlift to base any subsequent airlift on. IE no Berlin airlift, not that the situation in Europe will be identical to that it was IOTL.

Japanese logistics and medical services were IOTL notorious for being bad, and right now they are falling under ever increasing strain. There is no way that a Japanese equivalent of Sergeant Docherty, would as he has, been evacuated to a base hospital, successfully treated for his wounds, and then returned to light duties, training the newly arrived reinforcements. Who IOTL, would have been thrown into a desperate attempt to bolster the defences of Singapore, without time to acclimatise or receive instructions on fighting against the Japanese in local conditions. As is Sergeant Docherty, has been medically evaluated to a base hospital, successful treated for his wounds, and is now on light duties while he recuperating. He is passing on his hard won knowledge of armoured warfare, gained both in France and subsequently in Malaya, to the new arrivals. Who are being given the time to acclimatise, recover from their long sea transport, and train in local conditions and with the infantry they will be working with. When the High Command decide that the forces presently engaged against the Japanese, have given their all, and need relief and replacement. The force that is sent forward, will be as prepared as is possible, and much stronger than the one it’s replacing was at the start of the campaign. The British in the Far East, having blunted the initial Japanese attack, are only going to get stronger day by day. Like all wars the war in the Far East is mostly about resources and materials, however unlike in Europe a little goes a long way in the region. And the British have India and Africa to draw on for one of the most vital resources, manpower, IOTL the Burma campaign was predominately fought by the British Indian Army, with significant support from both East and West African troops. Britain can bring more to the table than the Japanese can, both materially and manpower, and once Britain gets it act together, the Japanese are only going to be going backwards. It’s just a question of time before the British have secured the majority of British colonial possession in the Far East, along with those of the Dutch and French, and are wondering what to do next.

RR.