Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

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27 December 1941. Butterworth. Malaya.
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    • allanpcameron

    Donor
    27 December 1941. Butterworth. Malaya.

    Sergeant John Runcie, the commander of the Matilda II ‘Allahkaffik’, was no longer attached to the Bahawalpur Battalion, much to their disgust. The tank had been an omen of victory and indeed had proven crucial to their defence of Alor Star. Now Runcie, along with two other Matilda IIs from A Company 11th Bn RTR, ‘Abdullah’ and ‘Ahmed’ (recently renamed from Ajax and Achilles), were at Kampar.

    The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade had arrived as part of 5th Indian Division after their efforts in East Africa. Up until now they had been Lieutenant-General Heath’s III Indian Corps reserve. They had been working around Ipoh building up defensive positions, but now were Headquartered in RAF Butterworth, preparing positions behind the Muda River.

    The surviving troops of 6th and 15th Brigades were being rested and reorganised at Ipoh after their efforts around Jitra. Moving by train down to Ipoh on 20 December put them far enough away so that they could truly rest. The reorganisation was to merge the two Brigades into one effective. The British Battalion (1st Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment and 2nd Bn, East Surrey Regiment); The Punjab Battalion (1/8th and 1/14th Punjab Regiment); The Jat/Punjab Battalion (2/9th Jat and 2/16th Punjab Regiment. Amongst these three Brigades were added men of the Bahawalpur Battalion which had been broken up as replacements.

    The 6/15th Brigade was due to arrive back at Butterworth the next day to join 29th Brigade holding the positions at the Muda River. The position at Gurun was still holding, but the men of 10th Indian and 28th Gurkha Brigades were tiring, as Japanese pressure continued on them.

    Sergeant Runcie’s troop of tanks in the meantime had been assigned to 6th Bn 13th Frontier Force Rifles. The good news for Runcie was that the names of the tanks had found favour with the men of 6th/13th FFR, made even better by the fact they had worked with Matilda IIs in East Africa. Where the Bahawalpur’s had been keen to the point of enthusiasm, the men of the Frontier Force were somewhat more sanguine. They knew what battles were like and that tanks weren’t some sort of magic wand or divine intervention. The tank was another tool to accomplish objectives, like the rifle, the mortar and the life blood of a man.

    Runcie and his three tank commanders went through the various exercises they had employed previously to make sure that all the troops in the Infantry Battalion were clear on how best to work with tanks. Runcie had been informed that another battalion of Matilda IIs were arriving with the latest convoy. With any luck they might have brought some spare tanks as replacements for the losses of 11th Bn RTR. Maybe when they arrived Runcie thought that he and his crew might get a bit of R & R. They’d had a couple of days of relative quiet while the tank was being worked on, but then they’d been exercising with the infantry for hours every day, when not taking cover from air raids.
     
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    • kelgar04

    They more than likely are given they haven't captured the same vast amounts of supplies they did OTL.

    Right now they are probably confiscating the food and other stuff in the areas they are holding to maintain their forces to a degree.
     

    pjmidd

    justinmil22 said:
    I just realised the Japanese have 6 months before the monsoon season starts then front will stall and they get fucked harder
    Click to expand...
    Technically Malaysia has 2 monsoon seasons, a very mild one May-Oct and the major one Oct/Nov-March. The mild is from the SW and major from the East.
    However, rainfall distribution does vary a lot depending on location, Kota Bhatu for example has heavy rainfall, 600mm, Nov/Dec with under 100mm Jan-Jul, Kuala Lumpur, rainfall is only under 200mm Jun-Jul with the heaviest fall in November at just over 300mm. So, its Northeast Malaysia that gets hit hardest with less rain in the West. Singapore itself has 2 wetter "seasons" (Mar-May, Oct-Dec) with rainfall 200-240mm, Feb and Jun are the driest with 140-150mm.
     
    Ramp-Rat

    Ramp-Rat

    Monthly Donor
    Oh dear, once again a classic example of unthinking secrecy, where those at the top in an effort to protect what they believe is a great secret, go over the top. They at great expense have developed this fantastic doohickey that is going to win the war, in this case an automatic gun levelling system, and we have to keep it super top secret. No consideration is made of the fact that the men who are going to operate it need significant training, in how to use it, maintain it, and why it needs to be set up in a particular way. And it would help you if you received major feedback from the men at the pointy end, as to how it’s working out in the real world. The classic example from the Americans is the Norden bomb sight, elaborated precautions were established to protect this vital war winning device, including sworn oaths by the bombardiers, armed guards, etc, etc, which given that a German spy had already pre war told the Germans all about it, were a complete waste of time. Nor did the Americans take into account the fact that the British and Germans were not stupid, had engineers and scientists of their own, who were able to develop their own similar bomb aiming system.

    In the case of the British there are three classic cases that I can think of, though I am sure that others can give more examples. During the inter war years the British had a system Asdic for detecting submarines, which was Most Secret, but required a hole in the bottom of the ship. Because it was Most Secret, the Admiralty wouldn’t allow the ship designers to be told what the hole was for, or anything about Asdic. Had they been brought into the lope, and told just the basics, they could have contributed much to the development. But a secret is a secret, and no one gave any consideration to the fact that maybe the Germans, French, Italians, Americans and Japanese, were not stupid and working on similar devices themselves. RDF, or Radar as it’s now better known was a big secret, and everyone was sworn to secrecy including the WAAF’s operating it. The fact that a German had in 1912 after the sinking of the Titanic developed the first very primitive system, was forgotten, as was the working set up on the French Ship Normandy, and other systems known about, especially once war was declared. But it’s a secret, which we have to defend, and we can not allow anyone to talk about it, dumb. In the Far East, code breakers working on the Japanese codes, were not allowed to see the secret maps of Japanese positions, which would have been of enormous help in their understanding of what they were reading, because it’s a secret.
    There are very few secrets that are so vital that you have to restrict them to only a tiny number of people, and most of these are operational, time and place of attacks, etc.

    Yes the British were right to keep the secret of the fact that they were able to read the German machine codes secret during the war, but even then they sometimes went too far, and didn’t explain to the commanders on the ground where the secret information was coming from, and thus just how reliable it was. Post war, the reasons to keep up the security, was very different, the Soviets weren’t dumb and had a very good idea of just how good the Anglo Americans were at code braking, plus some of their own spies on the inside. But the various minor nations that the British sold the reconditioned Enigma systems too were dumb, and thus Britain was able to read their secret messages for years. The American fixation with the Atomic secret was foolish, once they had used an atomic bomb, the secret was out, and any competent physicist would know how it basically worked. And while some of the methods of construction were and are to this day still secret, the basic principals of how to make even a H-Bomb are freely available. The Americans could have in 1946 told the world how to make a Bomb, as the problem isn’t how to make it, it’s assembling the materials needed, that’s the hard and very expensive part. And as happened during the efforts to construct the first Atomic Bomb, the military commander was determined to keep all the various ‘long hair’ scientists in their individual boxes, with no interaction between them. While the scientists wanted to be able to interact, and thus benefit from the intellectual fusion, that such interaction provides. Secrecy and its application is always a very delicate matter, that has to be applied with a great deal of forethought, if it’s not to become more of a hindrance than a benefit.

    RR.
     

    Peg Leg Pom

    Ramp-Rat said:
    Yes the British were right to keep the secret of the fact that they were able to read the German machine codes secret during the war, but even then they sometimes went too far, and didn’t explain to the commanders on the ground where the secret information was coming from, and thus just how reliable it was. Post war, the reasons to keep up the security, was very different, the Soviets weren’t dumb and had a very good idea of just how good the Anglo Americans were at code braking, plus some of their own spies on the inside. But the various minor nations that the British sold the reconditioned Enigma systems too were dumb, and thus Britain was able to read their secret messages for years. The American fixation with the Atomic secret was foolish, once they had used an atomic bomb, the secret was out, and any competent physicist would know how it basically worked. And while some of the methods of construction were and are to this day still secret, the basic principals of how to make even a H-Bomb are freely available. The Americans could have in 1946 told the world how to make a Bomb, as the problem isn’t how to make it, it’s assembling the materials needed, that’s the hard and very expensive part. And as happened during the efforts to construct the first Atomic Bomb, the military commander was determined to keep all the various ‘long hair’ scientists in their individual boxes, with no interaction between them. While the scientists wanted to be able to interact, and thus benefit from the intellectual fusion, that such interaction provides. Secrecy and its application is always a very delicate matter, that has to be applied with a great deal of forethought, if it’s not to become more of a hindrance than a benefit.
    Click to expand...
    There's another example that while not relevant to the war is an example of crass stupidity.

    The Colossus computer. The world's first programable electronic computer was a true ground breaking piece of technology, yet rather than exploit it after the war was over other than one kept at what became GCHQ all examples and the plans were destroyed to preserve the secret, so the Americans were able to corner the market.
     
    28 December 1941. Bangkok. Thailand.
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    • allanpcameron

    Donor
    28 December 1941. Bangkok. Thailand.

    The meeting between Lieutenant General Iida Shōjirō and Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki (GOC 15th and 25th Armies) had been called by General Count Terauchi Hisaichi, C-in-C Southern Expeditionary Army Group who had come from Saigon to get a report on the current situation.

    15th Army was only slightly engaged in Burma so far. 143rd Regiment of 55th Division, having landed on the Kra Peninsula had advanced into Burma and captured the airfield at Victoria Point. They had then detached a unit to Bokpyin which had also been captured. Otherwise, the rest of 55th Division and 33rd Division were occupying Thailand. Three infantry regiments were assigned to 33rd Division (213, 214, and 215 Regiments) and would arrive from China in due course. Once the efforts in Malaya were successful, and his skeleton force would be expanded as it had recently with the arrival of 56th Division (113 and 148 Regiments) then he would be ready to enter Burma.

    The situation for Yamashita’s 25th Army couldn’t be more different. The elements of 23rd Infantry Brigade, 18th Division, that attempted to land at Kota Bahru failed in their attempt and had been wiped out. The 5th Infantry Division’s 42nd Regiment, which had landed at Patani had failed to cross the middle of the country to break into the British rear at Kroh. They had then moved to attack Kota Bahru from the north and had been held up by the British and Indian forces there.

    The other element of 5th Division which had landed at Singora (41st Regiment and 3rd Tank Group) had made good progress through Thailand and had pushed the British out of Jitra and Alor Star. In doing so they had been weakened beyond the ability to carry on. Since reinforced by 11th Regiment, which had arrived on 16 December, they were preparing to get back into the fight. The Imperial Guards Division was now engaged at Gurun, but were finding that the British resistance was strong.

    Yamashita believed that the intelligence about the strength of the British and Indian troops in Malaya had underestimated them. The 3rd Tank Group had not been expecting the British heavy infantry tanks and had suffered as a result. While it was known that some of these tanks had arrived, their use by the British had been more effective that believed possible. Intelligence before the campaign also suggested that the Indian troops would give up easily rather than fighting for their Imperial masters. This hadn’t happened, they Indian troops hadn’t shown any sign of wanting to throw off their English oppressors and were fighting very hard. While all this was disappointing, it wasn’t completely unexpected in the wargames.

    General Yamashita was conscious that the extra efforts of his men was leading to shortages of ammunition (especially for the artillery) and other supplies. The Thais were being leaned on to support the efforts of the Japanese Army with food, fuel and some other essentials. Yamashita was confident that once the crust of resistance in the north of Malaya was broken, the movement towards Singapore would be an easier task. However, his staff had been repeatedly warning him that the plan had featured capturing British supplies, which hadn’t been happening. Responsibility for such things weren’t the concern of the Count, who suggested Yamashita’s staff spoke to someone on the Count’s staff about such matters.

    Yamashita, aware of talking down the situation, felt he also had to express his concern from aerial reconnaissance that more troops and supplies were arriving in Singapore, which the navy didn’t seem capable of doing anything about. The Air Regiments had their hands full with trying to eliminate the British air strength and supporting the ground troops. It would take greater efforts to close Singapore’s port to prevent more reinforcements to arrive.

    As well as 11th Regiment, Yamashita requested the early arrival 21st Regiment, the other element of 5th Division. Between the Guards Division and the fresh 11th and 21st Regiments, 25th Army would be ready to continue their advance down the west coast. With the loss of the part of 18th Division, Yamashita wondered if the rest of that Division, 55th and 114th Regiments, might also be assigned earlier than planned to Malaya.

    Count Terauchi had listened to the two generals’ reports in silence. After a few moments' thought, he agreed that while Yamashita was correct in saying that some of the wargames had shown up a slower attack in Malaya, there was a timetable to be considered in the whole of the centrifugal offensive. Perhaps the two generals didn’t know that the other part of 18th Division, 124th Regiment, were encountering similar difficulties in Borneo. It was entirely possible that 114th Regiment would be needed there. General Imamura Hitosi’s 16th Army, responsible for conquering the Dutch East Indies had 2nd Division in Japan waiting for the Philippines and Malaya to fall. Then 16th Army would be reinforced by elements of Homma’s 14th and Yamashita’s 25th Armies. If the fighting in Malaya wasn’t concluded swiftly, then the whole timetable would be jeopardised.

    The earlier than planned release of 21st Regiment was a reasonable request, though getting from Shanghai to Malaya would need the help of the navy to escort the transports. More transports had been lost, even in the last few days at Miri, that it might not be a simple exercise to move a Regiment out of sequence. It made much more sense for 143rd Regiment from 55th Division to move down from Burma to reinforce 5th Division. Burma had to wait until Singapore had fallen anyway, so the minor achievements it had had could easily be left aside until later. Between 5th, Guards, 18th and 56th Divisions, Terauchi reasoned, would be more than enough to take Malaya, and then focus on Burma as planned.

    Lieutenant-General Iida was disappointed that he would be losing his only effective fighting force. However, it was always planned to conquer Singapore before Burma. His fear was that General Auchinleck would be using the time to gain reinforcements and strengthen his position in Burma. That would make the fight a bit harder, but Iida had every faith in his men. Lieutenant Yamashita was somewhat relieved that he hadn’t lost face with Count Terauchi. Yamashita’s forces had done well against a much better organised force than expected, and perhaps the British victories over the Italians had given them greater morale. The Infantry Tanks were a real fly in the ointment, Brigadier Naganuma (CO 3rd Tank Group) was sure that if the British tanks hadn’t been there, then the battle at Jitra would have gone very differently.

    Count Terauchi gave his two subordinates a brief update on the rest of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group’s activities. The invasion of the Philippines was going as planned, the Americans were withdrawing onto the Bataan Peninsula, and Lieutenant General Homma was confident that his 14th Army would soon be in control of all of the Philippine islands. The fall of Hong Kong to the 38th Division was also a great victory, and soon the 38th Division would be available for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. The bigger question was whether to attempt another landing in southern Malaya to get behind the British defensive lines. That would involve the cooperation of the Navy, who were unhappy at the losses of their cruiser force covering the initial landing. Count Terauchi would have to give that some consideration before approaching the Navy for another movement in the South China Sea. However, if locally sourced boats could be found to move the men, then he had no objection to the use of such tactics.

    On the whole the Count expressed some satisfaction with how things were going. It was unfortunate that the Indian troops didn’t see the possibility of their liberation from the British and therefore stop fighting. On the other hand, the losses incurred at Kota Bahru and at Jitra were greater than feared, but within the casualty projections overall. As long as Yamashita kept up the pressure, and continued to try to upset the British plans, Count Terauchi was confident of victory.
     
    Last edited:
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    • Logan2879

    Logan2879

    allanpcameron said:
    28 December 1941. Bangkok. Thailand.

    The meeting between Lieutenant General Iida Shōjirō and Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki (GOC 15th and 25th Armies) had been called by General Count Terauchi Hisaichi, C-in-C Southern Expeditionary Army Group who had come from Saigon to get a report on the current situation.

    14th Army was only slightly engaged in Burma so far. 143rd Regiment of 55th Division, having landed on the Kra Peninsula had advanced into Burma and captured the airfield at Victoria Point. They had then detached a unit to Bokpyin which had also been captured. Otherwise, the rest of 55th Division and 33rd Division were occupying Thailand. Three infantry regiments were assigned to 33rd Division (213, 214, and 215 Regiments) and would arrive from China in due course. Once the efforts in Malaya were successful, and his skeleton force would be expanded as it had recently with the arrival of 56th Division (113 and 148 Regiments) then he would be ready to enter Burma.

    The situation for Yamashita’s 25th Army couldn’t be more different. The elements of 23rd Infantry Brigade, 18th Division, that attempted to land at Kota Bahru failed in their attempt and had been wiped out. The 5th Infantry Division’s 42nd Regiment, which had landed at Patani had failed to cross the middle of the country to break into the British rear at Kroh. They had then moved to attack Kota Bahru from the north and had been held up by the British and Indian forces there.

    The other element of 5th Division which had landed at Singora (41st Regiment and 3rd Tank Group) had made good progress through Thailand and had pushed the British out of Jitra and Alor Star. In doing so they had been weakened beyond the ability to carry on. Since reinforced by 11th Regiment, which had arrived on 16 December, they were preparing to get back into the fight. The Imperial Guards Division was now engaged at Gurun, but were finding that the British resistance was strong.

    Yamashita believed that the intelligence about the strength of the British and Indian troops in Malaya had underestimated them. The 3rd Tank Group had not been expecting the British heavy infantry tanks and had suffered as a result. While it was known that some of these tanks had arrived, their use by the British had been more effective that believed possible. Intelligence before the campaign also suggested that the Indian troops would give up easily rather than fighting for their Imperial masters. This hadn’t happened, they Indian troops hadn’t shown any sign of wanting to throw off their English oppressors and were fighting very hard. While all this was disappointing, it wasn’t completely unexpected in the wargames.

    General Yamashita was conscious that the extra efforts of his men was leading to shortages of ammunition (especially for the artillery) and other supplies. The Thais were being leaned on to support the efforts of the Japanese Army with food, fuel and some other essentials. Yamashita was confident that once the crust of resistance in the north of Malaya was broken, the movement towards Singapore would be an easier task. However, his staff had been repeatedly warning him that the plan had featured capturing British supplies, which hadn’t been happening. Responsibility for such things weren’t the concern of the Count, who suggested Yamashita’s staff spoke to someone on the Count’s staff about such matters.

    Yamashita, aware of talking down the situation, felt he also had to express his concern from aerial reconnaissance that more troops and supplies were arriving in Singapore, which the navy didn’t seem capable of doing anything about. The Air Regiments had their hands full with trying to eliminate the British air strength and supporting the ground troops. It would take greater efforts to close Singapore’s port to prevent more reinforcements to arrive.

    As well as 11th Regiment, Yamashita requested the early arrival 21st Regiment, the other element of 5th Division. Between the Guards Division and the fresh 11th and 21st Regiments, 25th Army would be ready to continue their advance down the west coast. With the loss of the part of 18th Division, Yamashita wondered if the rest of that Division, 55th and 114th Regiments, might also be assigned earlier than planned to Malaya.

    Count Terauchi had listened to the two generals’ reports in silence. After a few moments' thought, he agreed that while Yamashita was correct in saying that some of the wargames had shown up a slower attack in Malaya, there was a timetable to be considered in the whole of the centrifugal offensive. Perhaps the two generals didn’t know that the other part of 18th Division, 124th Regiment, were encountering similar difficulties in Borneo. It was entirely possible that 114th Regiment would be needed there. General Imamura Hitosi’s 16th Army, responsible for conquering the Dutch East Indies had 2nd Division in Japan waiting for the Philippines and Malaya to fall. Then 16th Army would be reinforced by elements of Homma’s 14th and Yamashita’s 25th Armies. If the fighting in Malaya wasn’t concluded swiftly, then the whole timetable would be jeopardised.

    The earlier than planned release of 21st Regiment was a reasonable request, though getting from Shanghai to Malaya would need the help of the navy to escort the transports. More transports had been lost, even in the last few days at Miri, that it might not be a simple exercise to move a Regiment out of sequence. It made much more sense for 143rd Regiment from 55th Division to move down from Burma to reinforce 5th Division. Burma had to wait until Singapore had fallen anyway, so the minor achievements it had had could easily be left aside until later. Between 5th, Guards, 18th and 56th Divisions, Terauchi reasoned, would be more than enough to take Malaya, and then focus on Burma as planned.

    Lieutenant-General Iida was disappointed that he would be losing his only effective fighting force. However, it was always planned to conquer Singapore before Burma. His fear was that General Auchinleck would be using the time to gain reinforcements and strengthen his position in Burma. That would make the fight a bit harder, but Iida had every faith in his men. Lieutenant Yamashita was somewhat relieved that he hadn’t lost face with Count Terauchi. Yamashita’s forces had done well against a much better organised force than expected, and perhaps the British victories over the Italians had given them greater morale. The Infantry Tanks were a real fly in the ointment, Brigadier Naganuma (CO 3rd Tank Group) was sure that if the British tanks hadn’t been there, then the battle at Jitra would have gone very differently.

    Count Terauchi gave his two subordinates a brief update on the rest of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group’s activities. The invasion of the Philippines was going as planned, the Americans were withdrawing onto the Bataan Peninsula, and Lieutenant General Homma was confident that his 14th Army would soon be in control of all of the Philippine islands. The fall of Hong Kong to the 38th Division was also a great victory, and soon the 38th Division would be available for the invasion of the Dutch East Indies. The bigger question was whether to attempt another landing in southern Malaya to get behind the British defensive lines. That would involve the cooperation of the Navy, who were unhappy at the losses of their cruiser force covering the initial landing. Count Terauchi would have to give that some consideration before approaching the Navy for another movement in the South China Sea. However, if locally sourced boats could be found to move the men, then he had no objection to the use of such tactics.

    On the whole the Count expressed some satisfaction with how things were going. It was unfortunate that the Indian troops didn’t see the possibility of their liberation from the British and therefore stop fighting. On the other hand, the losses incurred at Kota Bahru and at Jitra were greater than feared, but within the casualty projections overall. As long as Yamashita kept up the pressure, and continued to try to upset the British plans, Count Terauchi was confident of victory.
    Click to expand...
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    Ramp-Rat

    Ramp-Rat

    Monthly Donor
    And thus we see the numerous problems that the Japanese have, particularly in their conflict with the British, in their attempt to establish The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Starting with the first, the idea that they the Japanese were going to be welcomed by the downtrodden indigenous inhabitants of the various colonies. No consideration was made of what the locals wanted, or of the situation that applied in the various colonies. After all why would the Philippines want to replace American rule/guidance, which was due to end shortly, with Japanese. Given that there were significant differences and disagreement between the inhabitants of the various colonies, meany of which were long standing, which involved religious, racial and political reasons. Having the Japanese say let’s all be one happy family, under Japanese guidance, was never going to wash, and it was only a tiny number of greedy politicians who thought it a good idea. Take for example the idea that the Indian soldiers were going to rise up and overthrow their colonial masters, and join the Japanese. This ignores the fact that the Indian Army was not only professional but all volunteer, with its own long history, traditions and culture. With members frequently being the third or fourth generation to serve, alongside British officers who were themselves third or fourth generation members of the Regiment. And the Army had since the mutiny, which only involved a portion of the forces at the time, given loyal service in numerous campaigns inside and outside India. The only reason IOTL, that some deserted and broke their salt, was the feeling of absolute betrayal they felt. ITTL, the combination of slightly better equipment, and substantial better command, will ensure that the Indian Forces, remain loyal.

    In this meeting we see, the total absence of a representative of the Navy, who given that far more than in China, all campaigns are to an extent reliant on navel cooperation. In fact it is my opinion that this shows one of the major problems with the Japanese command structure, a total lack of professionalism. This meeting seams to be three old men chatting over brandy’s after a nice lunch/dinner, not three signor officers discussing vital events in the campaigns to capture Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies. They should have been sat around a conference table, with representatives of the Navy, Army Airforce, Intelligence, and Logistics, possibly even a representative of the Thai government, and the whole meeting should have been minuted. With copies of the minutes sent to everyone involved the next day, so that a record of what was decided was available. So what have we learned, the invasion of the Philippines is progressing nicely, no surprise there, the combination of dugout Doug, American unpreparedness, and the lack of training and resources of the Philippine Army, were always going to make this the result. A decision has been made to put on hold the invasion of Burma for now, and concentrate on the invasion of Malaya. This is very much to the British advantage, now they are at war actions that could not be taken pre war, can now be implemented, and the reinforcements that are soon to arrive will have some time to sort themselves out. The campaign’s outside Malaya are being scaled back for now to concentrate on Malaya, which is going to seriously piss of the Navy, who desperately need the oil in Borneo and the DEI. And will not appreciate having their plans seriously upset, and being asked to completely revise their transportation plans at the same time. The failure to address the problems with supplies for the Malaya conflict, right now at the top, is a big mistake, which is very shortly going to bite the Japanese big time. While there is no question that the Japanese were never going to win a war against Britain and America, they could have as they did IOTL, have enjoyed significant success in the opening stages. And while they are going to enjoy the same success that they enjoyed IOTL, against the Americans, their campaign against the British and thus the Dutch too is very much a busted flush now.

    RR.
     
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