Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

If we are discussing D-Day in 1943 it is probably worth linking these earlier, often spirited discussions:




Among the extreme detail arguments presented in these threads there are a couple of general facts that can be assumed. Bear in mind these threads assume OTL until at least early 1942.

1. Any invasion of France in 1943 would be majority Commonwealth. The US could not bring enough formations up to strength and get them to Britain in 1943 to be the majority partner. At most they may achieve parity.

2. In spite of this an American Supreme Commander is still likely. Marshal is suggested as Eisenhower probably doesn’t yet have the prestige to be appointed when the bulk of the forces under him are not American and won’t be for some time.

3. For the invasion to go ahead the decision must be made in mid to late 1942. Otherwise the necessary material is not available.

4. This will cause a reduction of effort in the Pacific to a degree. Though @Eric C Johnson who was heavily involved in the first thread and mostly wrote the next two as OP, beleivws that this would lead to a much larger effort in 1944-45 as larger forces are moved from Europe to the Pacific in light of German defeat in 1944.

Certainly not everyone is convinced it was possible. Personally I was, but others had their own, valid, reasons for being sceptical.
 
But the crucial point is that the balance of power between the two Allies is going to shift later than OTL and will be less lopsided than OTL and even more importantly the US isn't the only country with domestic political constraints. In OTL the British Army weakened it's position by it's poor performance so that the British government from Churchill on down were not willing or able to fight for it's operational independence in the way that they did fight to ensure that the Royal Navy was always in charge of operations in the Med and Atlantic with only very, very nominal adherence to Eisenhower and Harris was able to operate Bomber Command with even less lip service to Allied unity. A British Army that has won a string of victories is a British Army that will have MP's fighting it's corner in Parliament and around the Cabinet table rather than criticising it. Now that isn't going to make the US any more willing to put their troops under British command but it is probably going to result in a much weaker Supreme Command, less unity of purpose and overall a less efficient campaign.
i had a horrible thought
butterflies cause mcarthur to be stationed in the ETO, now imagine him instead of eisenhower....
 
i had a horrible thought
butterflies cause mcarthur to be stationed in the ETO, now imagine him instead of eisenhower....

He was an "Asia hand" so it's unlikely he'll get sent to the ETO, much more likely is the comparison between the British performance in Malaya and his performance in the Philippines, as unfair as that comparison would be, sees him remain in the US for the duration. However if he did get sent the one bright spot is he'd be unlikely to have work with Montgomery as Monty appears to have had his OTL ascent blocked. Overall however he would be a disaster both because he was a pretty mediocre commander and unlike Eisenhower a terrible diplomat.
 
He was an "Asia hand" so it's unlikely he'll get sent to the ETO, much more likely is the comparison between the British performance in Malaya and his performance in the Philippines, as unfair as that comparison would be, sees him remain in the US for the duration. However if he did get sent the one bright spot is he'd be unlikely to have work with Montgomery as Monty appears to have had his OTL ascent blocked. Overall however he would be a disaster both because he was a pretty mediocre commander and unlike Eisenhower a terrible diplomat.
his and monty's ego put together in the same room would be dangerous, add de gaulle and something epic will happen lol (nothing good though)
send him to china instead him and chiang kai-shek will get along quite nicely (corruption overload for poor china though)
 
There’s also the fact that air superiority is an absolute must have prior to the invasion; difficult to see how that will be achieved in 43, with the lack of long ranged escorts to properly attrite the German fighter strength.
As with all the other 1943 landings in Europe threads, the Pacific would be stalled, as you would need Marines and Navy Carriers to make up the difference.
The hardest thing about that, is FDR having a long talk with Marshall to get over his bias, its not technology or logistics, and then with Nimitz and Dugout Doug on that 'Germany First' means exactly that.
 
He was an "Asia hand" so it's unlikely he'll get sent to the ETO, much more likely is the comparison between the British performance in Malaya and his performance in the Philippines, as unfair as that comparison would be, sees him remain in the US for the duration. However if he did get sent the one bright spot is he'd be unlikely to have work with Montgomery as Monty appears to have had his OTL ascent blocked. Overall however he would be a disaster both because he was a pretty mediocre commander and unlike Eisenhower a terrible diplomat.
Also remember Marshal had no use for Mac and would keep him as far away from the main front (Europe) as possible.
 
Better moral too as well since less dead sons, fathers, brothers and friends. As well as time to both learn get better trained formations and more and better kit into their hands.
In some ways, I see 1944 British ground performance as hesitant, or in wargaming term, hit their preservation limit. They were short of replacements and loss adverse. 7th Armoured did not perform as expected.
 
With the British standing on their own much better and Pearl Harbor & Philippines having been an abject failure for the Americans, is it not likely that domestic politics would have necessitated a shift of resources from Europe to Pacific Theaters versus OTL? So with fewer forces available in Europe I wonder if that doesn't push for a smaller "blooding" on a Mediterranean Island (one that allows the new production of US Heavy Bombers to more easily strike Ploesti and/or the Industrial Areas in Southern Germany and Austria).
 
There are so many butterflies flapping from an early end to North Africa that the author can take this is any direction he wants but I think the senior leadership both in the US, in the US Army ETO and in Britain will appreciate the need to "blood" at least some US forces in Europe under European conditions. The problem is where. Churchill is going to want to do Rhodes ASAP but solo US invasion of Sardinia while the British focus on Sicily?
 
Also remember Marshal had no use for Mac and would keep him as far away from the main front (Europe) as possible.
Mac has already retired once so I would guess gets retired again. He is 60 so older than any other Western general (I think the nearest is Dill a year or two younger who was at Chief of Staff level). I think all the fighting generals ie Eisenhower down are in their early 50s
 
A thought - with how much combined arms are working for the British in the North African theatre, and likely to be a lynchpin in the South-East-Asian theatre (especially if they can see the army-navy rivalry hurting Japan at the same time) - might the British be pushing for a more unified high command. That being the case, a compromise with the Americans might be including equally ranked British and American generals and admirals in said high command, but without any single officer named the supreme commander.

The British might even potentially manage to have more commonwealth top brass in such a command structure, as I would expect the Australians and Canadians at the least to also want one of their own at the highest levels of decision-making.
 
A thought - with how much combined arms are working for the British in the North African theatre, and likely to be a lynchpin in the South-East-Asian theatre (especially if they can see the army-navy rivalry hurting Japan at the same time) - might the British be pushing for a more unified high command. That being the case, a compromise with the Americans might be including equally ranked British and American generals and admirals in said high command, but without any single officer named the supreme commander.

The British might even potentially manage to have more commonwealth top brass in such a command structure, as I would expect the Australians and Canadians at the least to also want one of their own at the highest levels of decision-making.
Not needed. All the active commands were cross service commands they had control of the air land and sea. In fact having equal commanders is not a good idea as what happens to their subordinates if they get conflicting orders.

The exceptions were the strategic bombers and fighters but they were subordinated when needed most e.g. D-Day

Also in Europe the naval commands were all RN but the main battle was on land so has to be a general in charge.
In the Pacific and Atlantic the battle is mainly naval so need a navy person in charge.
The exceptions here are MacArthur was his campaign naval or land? and Mountbatten where the fight was on land.

As for Australian and Canadian they don't have as many men in the fight and their leaders are not as senior as the British and so would not get the top commands. Although depending on how Malaya, Indonesia and Philippines goes the fight in SE Asia might become Australian if the Japanese keep Indonesia.
 
With the British standing on their own much better and Pearl Harbor & Philippines having been an abject failure for the Americans, is it not likely that domestic politics would have necessitated a shift of resources from Europe to Pacific Theaters versus OTL? So with fewer forces available in Europe I wonder if that doesn't push for a smaller "blooding" on a Mediterranean Island (one that allows the new production of US Heavy Bombers to more easily strike Ploesti and/or the Industrial Areas in Southern Germany and Austria).
There is a hard physical limit on what you can do in Asia./the Pacific. The logistics can't handle it until they are built. Just pushing more troops in won't help. Japan is basically Italy in terms of economy, so it will get crushed in its own good time. OTOH Germany is playing around in Europe. In comparison it is running around the chocolate shop with a sack.
 
Hm, could Operation Husky become an alternate Operation Torch?
As far as I can make out from 'Proposed Plan and Sequence of the War' (The Second World War, volume III, W. Churchill), once the USA was in the war, following Pearl Harbour, Churchill really wanted the Americans to help clear French North Africa/bring it over to the Allied cause in 1942. (And to support the drive of the Italians and Germans out of the rest of North Africa, but that is already looking pretty much done in this timeline.)
The Americans could still be involved in some kind of 'mop up French North Africa' campaign, whilst the British (and their other allies) are busy elsewhere (assuming diplomatic pressure does not already cause French North Africa to crumble.)

(And as far as I can make out on a quick read through, Churchill's plan for the Pacific for 1942 was to reinforce and resist and to look to regain naval superiority versus Imperial Japan. Also to keep Imperial Japan as busy as possible as far forward as possible, to stretch and strain their logistics and wear down their air forces. Depending on Imperial Japanese reactions to events in the rest of the world, the shape of any fighting in the Far East may look substantially different from in the original timeline. The Imperial Japanese have still not yet reached the point of actually attacking Pearl Harbour or any 'ABDA' territories elsewhere, as of the latest updates, and may not attack on their original timeline schedules or plans.)
 
As for Australian and Canadian they don't have as many men in the fight and their leaders are not as senior as the British and so would not get the top commands. Although depending on how Malaya, Indonesia and Philippines goes the fight in SE Asia might become Australian if the Japanese keep Indonesia.
Until 1943, Australia had more forces "in the fight" than the US or the British did in the Pacific war. Indeed, the US and the UK owed a great deal to Australia for its contribution to "the fight".
 
As for Australian and Canadian they don't have as many men in the fight and their leaders are not as senior as the British and so would not get the top commands
I seem to recall that Harry Crerar was considered next in line behind Monty as Commander of 21st Army Group if Monty was incapacitated or promoted out.
 
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