Sino-Soviet split becomes Sino-Soviet War

Rex Mundi

Banned
Sino-Soviet relations aren't my strong suit so forgive me if I sound dense, but Henry Kissinger discussed this in his book "On China." Mao Zedong claimed that a nuclear holocaust in China would have been beneficial to communism insofar as the elderly population would be wiped out with their old ideas. Kissinger dismisses this a bluff, albeit a very effective bluff that terrified U.S. and Soviet policymakers. Kissinger and Mao both knew that if either of the superpowers nuked China without intervention from the other side, China was screwed.

On the other hand, however, both statesmen seemed to believe that a nuclear strike in the MAD world wasn't particularly likely; Mao accordingly told Kissinger that, in the event of a conventional war with the Soviets, he would've retreated to the countryside and engaged in guerilla warfare. His attitude would basically have been "You think OTL Vietnam was bad?"

Does anyone know if that would've worked? I don't really have the expertise on Chinese geography and Soviet logistics and such to comment intelligently.
 
The fact that America can retaliate in a way China can only dream of doing to the Soviets?

The US government's policy in this event was more likely than not going to be to sit back and let the two Red menaces beat each other silly.

Sino-Soviet relations aren't my strong suit so forgive me if I sound dense, but Henry Kissinger discussed this in his book "On China." Mao Zedong claimed that a nuclear holocaust in China would have been beneficial to communism insofar as the elderly population would be wiped out with their old ideas. Kissinger dismisses this a bluff, albeit a very effective bluff that terrified U.S. and Soviet policymakers. Kissinger and Mao both knew that if either of the superpowers nuked China without intervention from the other side, China was screwed.

On the other hand, however, both statesmen seemed to believe that a nuclear strike in the MAD world wasn't particularly likely; Mao accordingly told Kissinger that, in the event of a conventional war with the Soviets, he would've retreated to the countryside and engaged in guerilla warfare. His attitude would basically have been "You think OTL Vietnam was bad?"

Does anyone know if that would've worked? I don't really have the expertise on Chinese geography and Soviet logistics and such to comment intelligently.

This is a good source:

http://www.damanski-zhenbao.ru/files/zhenbaodao.pdf

To answer your question -

The Soviets would have the best success in Xianjing. It is closer to their supply lines and is the hardest part for the Chinese to defend, while being sparsely populated. Lop Nur would be a critical target. The Soviets did not want to add any internal territory but Xinajing could be broken off with a puppet installed, Saifuddin Azizi or the like.

Mongolia would be critical. It was highly fortified with Soviet forces and would certainly be critical to cutting off the supply chain to Xianjing and keeping a flank on Manchuria.

Manchuria is the hardest aspect for the Soviets. The terrain, the larger populations and ease of Chinese supply (and distance for the Soviets) make it a tough nut to crack. This theater will certainly see tactical nukes and chemical weapons, probably by the desperate Chinese first.

The wild card is North Korea, certainly more in the Soviet sphere at the moment. Some overzealous Chinese commanders may sweep them along.

The Chinese leadership was paranoid beyond belief, expecting Soviet invasion at any moment, even after Alexei Kosygin and Zhou Enlai met on Sept. 11, 1969.

The Chinese plan was exactly what you mentioned - to evacuate the cities in the face of nuclear weaponry, and a guerilla campaign. Beyond nukes the PLA had large chemical weapon reserves that would be used, probably at the beginning to stop the Soviet invasion and give time for the PLA to retreat and reorganize.

Mao wasn't blind; he didn't think he could wipe away the Soviets. He knew the Chinese would be effectively destroyed in the convential military sense. Their only hope was to make the Kremlin know that any action would be crippling to the Soviets.

The Kremlin didn't want all out war either. That being said, I can see a certain series of events leading to war rather easily.

1. Brezhnev is assassinated on Jan. 22, 1969. Shelepin/Suslov and the hardliners were in a strong position to seize power at this moment with Brezhnev gone.

2. On Sep. 10, 1969, Alexander Shelepin's plane is lost between Irkutsk and Beijing. The now hardline Kremlin takes punitive measures against Chinese border positions in Manchuria and Xinjiang. Lop Nur is targeted with a convetional strike.

3. The Chinese Central Committee, assuming the worst, goes into full mobalization, and enacts air defense plans evacuating cities.

From here, it is hard to stop. If I were Chinese leadership, knowing my nuclear arms to be limited and extremely weak in comparison with the Soviet arsenal, I'd take a first strike approach in an attempt to buy time for the guerilla mobilization. I'd assume Mongolia and North Korea were involved in the situation as well, since I'm paranoid, living in a state of siege mentality for over a year now.

I'd target Soviet formations with a couple tactical nukes but I would reserve my few larger wield weapons for high value targets. Soviet formations threatening Xianjing and Manchuria will get chemical weapon attacks primarily. Pyongyang and Ulanbaataar will be targeted to cripple the proxies at the top. Also, cities critical to the Soviet supply change would get the few hydrogen bombs I have such as Novosibirsk and Tashkent.

Far eastern cities such as Omsk, Irkutsk and Vladivostok will get DF-2s but are smaller cities and even the low 20kt yield weapons will be crippling. Baikonur is a target as well.

The Chinese hope is a long range one. They know they cannot stop the Soviet advance, but they need to absorb it and just survive.

The Soviet's, even if hardline, will likely be in communication with the White House through the emergency teletype system, like in '67. No matter who is in the White House, if the Chinese nuked the Soviets, there is no way the WH will threaten the USSR if they launch a punitive response. They have the right to self-defense.

So, the US agrees to a limited Soviet response. The WH knows they cannot stop them, but they can get the Kremlin to agree to some stipulations. Yield levels are keep low in northeast China as to keep fallout in Korea and Japan low. Southern targets are limited to not effect Hong Kong. Xinxiang is glassed.

The Kremlin reports from where and to where the missile launches are happening, but actual ICBM launches are limited. The majority of nuclear weapons used are theater specific weapons, such as AS-3 and AS-4 cruise missiles. Naturally, Beijing is targeted, hard, for destruction to remove the dangerous leadership.

I do not think Chinese leadership would survive as an unified entity in a Sino-Soviet War. Between the Red Guards, Mao's clique and the Gang of Four and Lin Bao, China was extremely unstable at the time. Basically, it wouldn't be a Vietnam scenario, it would be like invading a Somalia with nearly a billion people with a good portion of the cities being radioactive craters.

If Lin Bao survives, he is the most likely candidate for a Soviet puppet.

Messy.

On a side note, to see how China may be carved up, Drew's Rumsfeldia is dealing with this issue currently. The circumstances are different but the results are likely similar.

Edit: Expected initial nuclear death toll - Soviet, Mongolian and North Korean ~ 5-8 million. Chinese ~ 100 million with the 'limited' Soviet response mentioned above, making September 11th, 1969 the deadliest day in history.
 
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Rex Mundi

Banned
Interesting. I think we might need a slightly earlier POD, though. Kissinger seemed to opine (and I largely agree) that the nuclear option was never really on the CPC's table OTL. The Soviets assisted the Chinese with their nuclear program until 1960; as late as 1959, they had plans to provide the PRC with their first atomic bomb (presumably in order to accelerate the Chinese nuclear program). As it happened, China's first nuclear test was conducted toward the end of 1964. By 1968-69, diplomatic feelers had already been put out and the process that culminated in Kissinger's 1971 visit to Beijing had already been started. Given that timespan there's no point in the OTL 60's in which China could have launched a nuclear strike (preemptory or otherwise) on Russian targets; China isn't a nuclear threat until the 1970's, really, at which point the Sino-American détente is secretly well under way. Even if we ignore the political situation, 1969 seems much too early for China to even provide a legitimate MAD deterrent.

The geopolitical problem in the late 60's and 70's is that China isn't going to put itself in a war with one of the superpowers without the other's support; neither are America or the Soviet Union, for that matter. If China feels threatened by Russia, it is almost assuredly as per OTL going to enter diplomatic negotiations with the U.S.A. Given the Cold War paradigm, it's in the best interests of both America and China to cooperate with each other; it is then in the bests interests of the Soviet Union to negotiate a détente with the United States. China's ascension onto the world stage offsets the bipolar scheme of the world - in game theory terms it plays a kingmaker. Whichever country is in an alliance of two will not feel sufficiently threatened to start a nuclear war. For whichever country is isolated, the logical option is to use diplomacy to end their isolation, rather than go to war with the other two and be outnumbered.

A hardline Soviet Union is probably more likely to push China towards the United States which will inevitably force the Soviets to soften their stance. What we would need is for all three powers to be hostile to the other two but none of the statesmen or politicians involved would find that an acceptable situation.
 
A hardline Soviet Union is probably more likely to push China towards the United States which will inevitably force the Soviets to soften their stance. What we would need is for all three powers to be hostile to the other two but none of the statesmen or politicians involved would find that an acceptable situation.

This might take No Nixon.

Nixon, Kissinger and Co. were really the only ones thinking about reaching out to the Chinese. The straightforward, non -realpolitik, anti-Communist stance was still the most prevelant position amongst the establishment politicians. Somebody like Reagan or Buckley wouldn't dream of it; a Democrat could never do the same without being branded a Red.

"Only Nixon could go to China" isn't exactly true. Probably only hardliners could go to China, only Nixon was a 'hardliner' but wanted to, at least in '69.

But by '72, people beyond the saavy Nixon and Kissinger (future conservative forpolicy minded peoples like Haig, Bush and Rumsfeld) had began to realize that the Sino-Soviet Split could actually be to their advantage.

I agree war is unlikely and would really only happen by accident. But accidents happen.

A true loser in this scenario is North Vietnam. With China in chaos and Soviet capabilites strapped, they're going to run out of war resources fast.

Soviet allies and proxies in South America, Africa and the Middle East are also likely to be less supplied than OTL as well.
 
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