Singapore holds?

[Hyperion]

I do very well understand cause & effect. In this case I would suggest that the butterflies would be the size of bluebirds and not 747s. I can't really go into any sort of depth as to the reasons (which, BTW are legion) "as quite a bit of my statements are either fake, or known inaccuracies".

Remember this?

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=191723

You consistently used inaccurate information as to who the British commander even was, and your statements as to what equipment the British even had where inaccurate.

I know from your two big projects that you are capable of writing and research, so I'm surprised how someone of your level can make such baseless or inaccurate assertions with nothing to back them up.

BTW: which job are you referring to?

I was under the impression that you where in the service at one point.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Singapore#Fall_of_Singapore

"My attack on Singapore was a bluff – a bluff that worked. I had 30,000 men and was outnumbered more than three to one. I knew that if I had to fight for long for Singapore, I would be beaten. That is why the surrender had to be at once. I was very frightened all the time that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supplies and force me into disastrous street fighting.

– Tomoyuki Yamashita Shores 1992, p. 383."

I'll let the Japanese general in charge make my point. The Japanese where cutting it close when they forced Percival to surrender.

Any major disruption to Japanese operations, either at or around Singapore directly, or really any noteable disruption or delay beyond OTL could prove significant. It isn't after all like the British/Commonwealth lost every battle in the region.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gemas.

If you want to hold Singapore and Malaya in general for a while longer, give the British either a more reliable telephone line, or a radio. It isn't going to stop the invasion or fall, but the longer it holds, to bigger the butterflies in favor of the Allies.

 

[Astrodragon]

I think the issue with knock-on effects is the fragile nature of Japanese logistics (yep, its the L-word again..) in the campaign.

CalBear is correct that the effect of Singapore holding after february isnt huge in a strategic sense, as unless the cause for it holding also allows the British to hold much more of Malaya (so supplies can be run there without Japanese air power being so disruptive), or the western part of the DEI holds (again, denying Japan air interdiction over convoys), it can be left to be starved out.

Howver I think the point CalBear is missing is that Japanese logistics were on such a knife edge that ANY disruption has an effect (quite possibly a serious effect) on them. Even in the case of Yamashita falling short of the island and having to regroup, the effects on Burma will be strong, Without the supplies the Japanese got from Singapore, and the ability to free up some of the troops from Burma, the Burma invasion is als likely to fai (it was yet another shoe-strnig campaign).
Now lets assume Yamashita gets resupplied and reinforced. This is going to take time, and then he can either invest the island or attack it. Given that additional time, the British are not going to be sitting around watching, they are going to have built the best field fortifications they can, and given their available manpower these are likely to be quite formidable.
IF the Japanese air power in the area is such the British cant resupply (and its not going to be quite as easy to interdict a fast, one-way convoy as some people think - for example, the British can hold the convoy for bad weather which severly limits 1942-ers planes), then Yamashitas best option is to leave a holding force. The problem with that is that unless he gets a lot of reinforcements the defenders outnumber him. If he gets reinforcements, who ISNT getting them??

The main advantage the British get from Singapore holding is time. They were close to getting the necessary reinforcments into Burma. They had additional forces in Singapore, not time to get them ready to fight Some extra time alows these. We also need to remember that defeat or the prospect of defeat tends to concentrate the mind wonderfully. The British had gotten sloppy in the Far East, not helpled by the fact that the best people were in Europe and the Med. Victory diseased isnt unique to the Japanese (they were just the best exponents of it), and both the Empire and the U have just got a big dose of reality shoved in their faces. The US showed that they learned these lessons fast. The Empire did to, but after losing Malaya and Singapore they simply didnt have a usable way of coming back at the Japanese and showing it. When they did, in 44, the Japanese army got a very nasty shock.

Burma holding would allow Empire forces to at the least pin down a Japanese army in Siam/Malaya, and have the possibility of invading. In any decent terrain, the Japanese are going to run into the same issues re tanks and heavy weapons they did against the Russians. It would most likely mean an offensive into Siam in 43, which would be interesting (do the Japanese attack at Guadacanal and ignore Siam, or reinforce Siam and leave Guadacanal...they probably dont have the sealift to do both)

The whole point is, Singapore doesnt create huge butterflies. But you only need a little teeny butterfly to disrupt tha Japanese successes in early 42.

 

[Some Bloke]

It's interesting how often Singapore holding gets discussed but no timelines are ever made (hint, hint)

 

[HJ Tulp]

It's interesting how often Singapore holding gets discussed but no timelines are ever made (hint, hint)

Markus did a great one.

 

[Some Bloke]

got a link?

 

[The Oncoming Storm]

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=109108

 

[Astrodragon]

It's interesting how often Singapore holding gets discussed but no timelines are ever made (hint, hint)

I've thought about it, but its actually a horrendously complex one.
The reason is, you have to consider everything thats hapenning all over the Pacific (which is bad enough), plus SEA, plus the Med (to see what resources can be released)

 

[Riain]

I've thought about it too, but aren't prepared to go into the level of detail that people are comfortable with around here. It's difficult to cover a strategic event when people nitpick what individual battalions did or didn't do.

 

[Riain]

About Percival, it is often said that he was a good staff officer. What could a good staff officer do between April and December 1941 to make his command more effective without getting any more resources?

 

[ComradeTovarich]

I've thought about it, but its actually a horrendously complex one.
The reason is, you have to consider everything thats hapenning all over the Pacific (which is bad enough), plus SEA, plus the Med (to see what resources can be released)

And that means that you need to find a major POD that can butterfly away most, if not all, of the factors that caused the fall of Singapore. Even then, it would only be so that the fall of Singapore would be delayed. Having said that, I think it's pretty much a consensus when someone says that the Japanese situation in Malaya would be a precarious one if Singapore does indeed hold out.

Anyway, just a query. Given that Singapore does actually hold out for awhile, would it be possible for the British to establish a base of operations in Sumatra before attempting a relief operation to the island? This base would preferably somewhere around Banda Aceh. The British could mount airlift operations to the city using bombers and perhaps station a few on Singapore to conduct interdiction operations of Japanese convoys. This would buy time for the British to land troops to relieve Singapore. The plan, of course, is hinged on several assumptions, such as the British actually managing to push the Japanese out of Singapore and Johore post-15th February and that Churchill does not send Stalin badly needed military hardware and has the men to spare. Before anyone decides to flame me about posting a terrible plan, I'd like to make it clear that think that the chances of this plan succeeding is very slim because of Japanese air superiority, but I'd like to hear the opinions of others as to whether this would work. So, what do you think? Could such a plan save Singapore, or would it just delay the inevitable fall?

 

[jackalope]

Astrodragon wrote: I think the issue with knock-on effects is the fragile nature of Japanese logistics (yep, its the L-word again..) in the campaign.

We have already covered this in other threads. Time Life WWII book mentions of a couple modest sized Australian regiments which successfully lived out of the pockets of the Japanese for a couple of months, completely uncoordinated and ignored by the somewhat effete British command.

Or that the command pre 1941 grandly boasted of delusional "impenetrable jungles" which formed 'roadblocks'. Others testing that belief, found that a soldier could merely step from tree roots to tree roots and get through these supposed natural barriers. He could easily be carrying a bicycle while doing the same, and this is exactly the technique the Japanese used to so effectively shoot up the British rear (pun discriptive and accurate of historical accounts). In short, there were huge margins capable of massive improvement.

For some odd reason this is not accepted much in AH here. Facts being facts, Singapore could have easily lasted indefinitely with an _in_adequate Japanese General being sent to rectify the impasse, giving huge amounts of stores to the local forces and provoking the native groups (Malay, Chinese, and especially the mountain Australnesians) to support a long term fight with some logistics but more importantly inteligence reports.

Singapore is at a long end of the supply chain. Eventually the Japanese would have used naval landings, but these can technically be repulsed. Not easily, but it is within the realm of possibility. Personally, Singapore is effectively a figurehead irrelevant dead weight and not the goal in any longer guerrilla war where the value was mostly propaganda and civilian based.

As far as the Philippines being indefensible, MacArthur was a helpless baby for the first few days. Only Stalin seemed worse after the opening of the German/Russian hostilities. If he had made a preemptive strike (after, repeat, after Pearl had been bombed) on Taiwan bombers and caught the Japanese landing parties red handed on the beaches, considerable time would have been gained. And the Jungles, especially in the limestone karst areas near the coasts or inland, were perfect guerilla locations completely ignored by our beloved general (in the seperate southern command, a large force held out quite well till the end of WWII with much less favorable civilian help). He actually forbade units to go guerilla and shoot up the rear. After all, Japanese might treat us worse when we surrendered if that was done.

But most on this site will never see any of this.

 

[Hyperion]

So if the Japanese get delayed and decide to try for a naval landing, which Japanese ships would be pulled in to support the attack?

Would this result in a force ment for Sumatra or Java or Timor being pulled back to conduct the attack? Or might this have the Japanese pulling units from the Rabaul area?

Keep in mind also, around mid March, you have Wilson Brown and Fletcher giving the Japanese a big bloody nose off New Guinea, which OTL set the stage for Coral Sea. A major distruption here could butterfly away Coral Sea, or delay it long enough for Nimitz to assemble a much larger force.

Other things to consider. By February, let alone March, Singapore can probably only be supplied by Submarines or the odd aircraft that is willing to make a suicide trip. That being said, if even a handfull of submarines or the odd aircraft are able to get in and pull men and equipment out, might there be anyone or anything in Singapore that OTL was captured or lost that might be pulled out?

Any officers, equipment? Where there any gold reserves in Singapore?

Likewise, how would this effect the ABDA Command. I know in OTL they didn't accomplish much of anything, but here, if Singapore holds a month or two longer, how much pressure, if any, would be taken off of the ABDA Command.

 

[Some Bloke]

I remember reading Markus's timeline, it was very funny but the discussions here seems to be taking a very different direction,
I shall watch with interest.

 

[Hyperion]

What British submarines where in the region? I know there where very few, but I seem to recall that two or three might have been in the region.

 

[merlin]

Perhaps British forces in Malaya & Singapore, are given air support by the timely arrival of Squadrons of the Indian Air Force (which could have been expanded earlier than OTL - I did have a thread about it). Their support - flying initially from Burmese airfields - indidictive Japanese supplies and concentrations.
In recognition, of their valued contribution to delaying the Japanese advance - the decision was made to split the Hurricane shipment to Russia - with a substantial part going to the Far East.

 

[stevep]

What British submarines where in the region? I know there where very few, but I seem to recall that two or three might have been in the region.

Hyperion

Unfortunately, AFAIW, the British subs, which were actually designed for a Pacific war, had largely been transferred to the Med. This would be another advantage of winning the Libyan campaign earlier, as at least some would probably have been sent back east given the growing tension in the region.

Steve

 

[stevep]

Perhaps British forces in Malaya & Singapore, are given air support by the timely arrival of Squadrons of the Indian Air Force (which could have been expanded earlier than OTL - I did have a thread about it). Their support - flying initially from Burmese airfields - indidictive Japanese supplies and concentrations.
In recognition, of their valued contribution to delaying the Japanese advance - the decision was made to split the Hurricane shipment to Russia - with a substantial part going to the Far East.

merlin

It's a possibility but forces need to be in place prior to the Japanese attack to really make a difference. Alternatively we have less of the wasteful fighter sweeps earlier in the year, or we transfer some of the a/c sent to Russia OTL to replace the obsolete ones in place.

Steve

 

[merlin]

merlin
It's a possibility but forces need to be in place prior to the Japanese attack to really make a difference. Alternatively we have less of the wasteful fighter sweeps earlier in the year, or we transfer some of the a/c sent to Russia OTL to replace the obsolete ones in place.
Steve

I thought that's what I said - i.e. Indian Air Force expanded earlier, so can be re-located east, when tensions are running high.
Personally I wary of having too many aircraft in Malaya - al the more for the Japanese to destroy on the ground! And I did mention replacing lost aircraft with many of the ones destined for Russia!

 

[stevep]

I thought that's what I said - i.e. Indian Air Force expanded earlier, so can be re-located east, when tensions are running high.
Personally I wary of having too many aircraft in Malaya - al the more for the Japanese to destroy on the ground! And I did mention replacing lost aircraft with many of the ones destined for Russia!

merlin

Sorry. I thought you meant them being reinforced after the s**t hit the fan.

There was plenty of room, with all the modern airfields that had been built and Britain produced enough a/c and pilots to easily stock them. Given the distances the Japanese were operating at a massive pre-emptive attack would have been very difficult to organise, especially with the need to also hit Pearl at dawn there and the fact the army landed in Malaya and and Thailand before that. The British might lose a number of a/c due to complacency and grossly underestimating the Japanese, especially the range and performance of their a/c. However even replacing the small number of a/c in Malaya by modern ones would make a huge difference and building up to the planned force would have made any Japanese penetration into Malaya ASB.

Steve

 

[Alien and Sedition Bat]

If the British had possessed the foresight that the Japanese would eventually make a move (and the reason they didn't have the foresight is that they looked down on the Japanese), then in the 1920s and 30s they would have (a) encouraged local defense industries, including aircraft plants, in Australia and India--and been generous about licensing out British technology; (b) moved towards a form of home rule in India in cooperation with the princely states; (c) moved more rapidly in setting up a non-British component to the officers corp in India; (d) founded a military academy in Singapore and set up an RSA, RSAF and small RSN and Chinese-led reserve and volunteer units; (d) turned over much of the leadership responsibility for defending Singapore (and most of the responsibiity for training and equipping the people of Singapore) to the Indians and Australians. In other words, the British would have had to squelch a lot of their racism and start acting more like leaders of a Commonwealth than like imperial rulers. I guess the previous sentence is sufficiently utopian to make all this an ASB scenario.