Would the Japanese even dare invade British Malaysia, or French Indochina for the matter, in such a scenario?
Singapore holds?
- Thread starter Basileus Giorgios
- Start date
If Singapore can hold out through the time of Midway, doesn't that make the relative lack of Commonwealth resources in the Straits area much less of a problem, since the IJN at that point would have to make some MUCH harder decisions about how to deploys its forces on a strategic level? I realize that Singapore's defenders can't have known that before June of 1942 the cream of the IJN's carrier force will be at the bottom of the Pacific, so you have to endow them with probably superhuman endurance to last that long, but ... just wondering ....
Hyperion
Banned
Hm.
Four months would be in mid June, just after the Battle of Midway. If Singapore is still holding on then, even bairly, that would take a lot of pressure off of them.
Six months would be in mid August, right around the time of Guadalcanal starting. How many forces, navy units, or aircraft would be either stuck clearing Singapore and unable to go to the south Pacific, or vise versa, how many Japanese units cleaning up Singapore would have to be move to the south Pacific.
You act like Singapore holding even a month longer isn't going to have effects elsewhere. You act like Singapore holding exists in a bubble where nothing else will change.
I agree that Singapore can't exist in a bubble.
IOTL Singapore fell on Feb 15th.
Subsequent significant IJN carrier operations after that were:
a) Raid on Darwin - Feb 19th
b) DEI conquest support - end Feb thru early Mar
c) Indian Ocean Raid - Mar 31st thru April 10th
d) Coral Sea - early May
e) Midway - early June
Even with Singapore holding, A and B still happen.
The Indian Ocean raid doesn't happen as IOTL, and quite possibly not at all.
Does Coral Sea get butterflied away entirely or only delayed? I don't think the land invasion forces came from the Malaysia/Singapore campaign, but would they get routed over to a longer, more grinding fight at Singapore?
The Burma campaign gets slowed. At least one division used there came from the Malaysia campaign. But was that Division assigned to the theater before Sittang River and the fall of Rangoon? The Brits hold on to more of Burma? The Burma road stays open?
Midway has to get entirely butterflied away. Though something somewhere is bound to pop up and cause a really big US vs IJN carrier fight during the summer of 42.
I think that a better POD is France fighting on and the Japanese being forced to invade Indochina at the same time as campaigns take place in Malaya, the Philippines and the East Indies.
Indochina is untenable for more than three to four months, but it would suck enough Japanese troops to give some time to the British in Malaya. Once Indochina is just about to fall whatever troops and assets are left in Saigon should be evacuated to Singapore, further bolstering the defences there.
Provided that the British defence is well organised, it should be possible to stalemate the Japense into some kind of trench warfare in the Peninsula.
Indochina is untenable for more than three to four months, but it would suck enough Japanese troops to give some time to the British in Malaya. Once Indochina is just about to fall whatever troops and assets are left in Saigon should be evacuated to Singapore, further bolstering the defences there.
Provided that the British defence is well organised, it should be possible to stalemate the Japense into some kind of trench warfare in the Peninsula.
Actually, being in a bubble is an excellent analogy. Singapore WAS in a bubble, as was Bataan & Corrigdor. They were besieged and there was absolutely no way that they could be relieved. Any attempt to relieve them would have resulted in overwhelming defeat for the Allied naval forces. The garrisons had limited water and in both the PI and Singapore had substantial civilian populations trapped with them that were consuming much of their ration stores.
It was not like the RN could sally into the immediate region, even if it pulled all possible resources out of the Atlantic and Med, without running a gauntlet. The Japanese had overrun most of the DEI before Singapore fell (the initial landing in the regions were on January 8th), with the rest of the region falling in short order (the last significant force in the region surrendered on Java 3/8/42). This is noteworthy mainly in that it illustrates that none of Yamashita's force was needed to take the East Indies. As quickly as the Japanese gained control of a region they established air bases, giving them considerable reach and remarkable amounts of recon assets.
The Japanese could summon several HUNDRED G3M & G4M land based torpedo bombers, covered by well over 100 A6M fighters, just out of resources available in French Indochina and on Formosa (this doen't include the 150 or so IJA bombers and around 100 IJA fighters that were also in theater). No 1942 Allied task force could have pushed through the wall that Japanese air power could put up.
When one considers the impact of Singapore on IJA & IJN availabilities in the summer of 1942 the impact on Allied naval asset availability due to any sort of relief effort must be balanced. The Japanese could afford fewer troops if the trade was a couple of Allied carriers.
Any attempt to relieve Singapore would have been a disaster of the first order of magnitude.
There would have been one noteworthy material and one morale impact of a longer resistance. The material would be a slight reduction of the IJA forces available to invade Burma, although the speed of the IJA conquest of the region was such that the presence of a couple addtional regiments may not have been critical either way. The morale impact of a longer struggle is, of course, difficult to measure. The rapid collapse of the fortress was a blow to British prestige, a longer resistance would have made the loss more paletable, but the loss was as certain as the Sun rising.
IF Singapore still holds during post-Midway..
Wouldn't Japan hold off any future offensives against Burma & China and any pushes toward India and pull some of their best combat troops from those Theater of Operations and make another determine thrust to break thur and thus make sure that Singapore gets conquered and then continue their advance down the Solomon Slot and towards India...?
Wouldn't Japan hold off any future offensives against Burma & China and any pushes toward India and pull some of their best combat troops from those Theater of Operations and make another determine thrust to break thur and thus make sure that Singapore gets conquered and then continue their advance down the Solomon Slot and towards India...?
As CalBear has correctly pointed out, Singapore becomes untenable except as a fortress once the DEI falls. However that doesnt mean it holding for longer causes butterflies...
The OTL surrende was so finely balanced that pretty much anything the British do better (and there was a LOT of room for improvement!) would neam Yamashits overrunning his supply lines and havingto pause for resupply (whuch isnt goingto happen instantly). How difficult it then becomes to take Singapore then depends on how far away from it the British held the Japanese. If, as it not unreasonable with a bit better organisation/supply.leadershipequipment then they should be able to grind the Japanese to a ahlt a little way up the peninsular, at least far enough away Singapore isnt under artillery fire.
With SIngapore holding, and resupply needed, I dont think Burma will fall. That was another case of Singaporeitus (and if we are assuming a better Singapore defence, its logical some of the same improvement will occur here). I cant see the Japanese ignoring Singapore to go and push everything into Burma, because the British still have a very considerable force on the island. Get too clever, and you could find them advancing up the peninsular, which is realy going to screw your Burma invasion something awful.
Now its going to take a while for resupply to arrive in Malaya - during which time the DEI will fall. Singapore is now fairly isolated. How long it hold is likely now a funtion of supply; the shipping cant get through the deployed Japanese air power. So the question is really can the Japanese reinforce and rsupply Yamashita before other things cause them to have to divert their very limited resources elsewhere? Probably, but now the fall of Singapore is far less of a fiasco, and Burma is safe (by this point enough reinforcements have arrived the Japanese cant get enough troops theer through the logistics bottleneck that is their only available supply route. If something falls apart, there will be a tendency to let Singapore wither on the vine - until the allies can get air power closer, they cant do anything with it
It will mean no Indian Ocean raid - thats just not going to happen if Singapore is still holding. After that, the IJN went east, so Singapore isnt really an issue.
The OTL surrende was so finely balanced that pretty much anything the British do better (and there was a LOT of room for improvement!) would neam Yamashits overrunning his supply lines and havingto pause for resupply (whuch isnt goingto happen instantly). How difficult it then becomes to take Singapore then depends on how far away from it the British held the Japanese. If, as it not unreasonable with a bit better organisation/supply.leadershipequipment then they should be able to grind the Japanese to a ahlt a little way up the peninsular, at least far enough away Singapore isnt under artillery fire.
With SIngapore holding, and resupply needed, I dont think Burma will fall. That was another case of Singaporeitus (and if we are assuming a better Singapore defence, its logical some of the same improvement will occur here). I cant see the Japanese ignoring Singapore to go and push everything into Burma, because the British still have a very considerable force on the island. Get too clever, and you could find them advancing up the peninsular, which is realy going to screw your Burma invasion something awful.
Now its going to take a while for resupply to arrive in Malaya - during which time the DEI will fall. Singapore is now fairly isolated. How long it hold is likely now a funtion of supply; the shipping cant get through the deployed Japanese air power. So the question is really can the Japanese reinforce and rsupply Yamashita before other things cause them to have to divert their very limited resources elsewhere? Probably, but now the fall of Singapore is far less of a fiasco, and Burma is safe (by this point enough reinforcements have arrived the Japanese cant get enough troops theer through the logistics bottleneck that is their only available supply route. If something falls apart, there will be a tendency to let Singapore wither on the vine - until the allies can get air power closer, they cant do anything with it
It will mean no Indian Ocean raid - thats just not going to happen if Singapore is still holding. After that, the IJN went east, so Singapore isnt really an issue.
Guys
As Calbear says Singapore can't hold in any meaningful way if Malaya falls. Furthermore Malaya is more important, both militarily as it has a number of important air bases and economically as it supplies tin and rubber.
Holding Malaya is fairly simple with some changes, preferably earlier but can be quite late. For instances French Indo-China goes Free French, Britain clears N Africa earlier, some supplies sent to Stalin OTL go to Malaya instead.
One of the most frustrating things was that while Percival was a decent staff officer he was a poor commander and also unable to stand up to colonial officials before the war started. He was actually tasked with preparing plans for how the japanese might attack Malaya and predicted just about everything, including the vulnerability of western Malaya with it's plantations and excellent road system as the main avenue of a Japanese advance. Unfortunately he proved totally inadequate at actually doing anything about preventing it.
Another disaster was the last minute reinforcement of the base which basically delivered 2 divisions into captivity to no point. For once that doesn't seem to have been Churchill's fault as he wanted to send them to Burma, where they might have made a difference but apparently the Australian government insisted on reinforcing Singapore.
Steve
As Calbear says Singapore can't hold in any meaningful way if Malaya falls. Furthermore Malaya is more important, both militarily as it has a number of important air bases and economically as it supplies tin and rubber.
Holding Malaya is fairly simple with some changes, preferably earlier but can be quite late. For instances French Indo-China goes Free French, Britain clears N Africa earlier, some supplies sent to Stalin OTL go to Malaya instead.
One of the most frustrating things was that while Percival was a decent staff officer he was a poor commander and also unable to stand up to colonial officials before the war started. He was actually tasked with preparing plans for how the japanese might attack Malaya and predicted just about everything, including the vulnerability of western Malaya with it's plantations and excellent road system as the main avenue of a Japanese advance. Unfortunately he proved totally inadequate at actually doing anything about preventing it.
Another disaster was the last minute reinforcement of the base which basically delivered 2 divisions into captivity to no point. For once that doesn't seem to have been Churchill's fault as he wanted to send them to Burma, where they might have made a difference but apparently the Australian government insisted on reinforcing Singapore.
Steve
Lost the game
Banned
This kind changes the dynamic of the war altogether but... How about if Mussolini realizes in 1938 that Hitler is batfuck insane and stays out of the war- or joins the allies at the end for a little land grab. No war in North Africa could mean that the forces meant for that area are sent to Malaya.
I think the thing that says everything about Percival is his handling of Operation Matador. Despite arriving in theatre in April and predicting that he would have inadequate forces to do the job he continued to plan for Op Matador to use divisions that he didn't have. At the very last moment he changed these plans to use the forces at hand, battalions instead of divisions.
I'm not surprised that Malaya was overrun within weeks, the commander on the spot had little grip on the reality of his situation, and this had huge impacts. In my mind this last minute abortion of planning and execution of Matador led to the disasters of the first day or two which led to the scream for Force Z to go north to do something to redress the problems, and we all know what happened there. Realistic planning for Op Matador and a non invasion defensive plan using the forces at hand could have mitigated the disasters of the first day reduced the need for Force Z to sail north into the jaws of a 7 cruiser force, 2 subs and an air fleet, to give it the 3 days grace it needed to be reinforced by HMS Exeter, HMAS Hobart and their destroyers.
Hyperion
Banned
Amazing how you missed the freaking point Calbear. Simply amazing, and kind of scary given your job.
By bubble, I mean, and I'm mystified as to how the heck you didn't understand this, I mean if something happens that makes Singapore hold out even a month longer, it should have knock on effects elsewhere.
If Singapore holds even a month longer, let alone four-six months, a lot of troops and equipment are going to either be tied down there instead of fighting the allies elsewhere, and the Japanese might be forces to delay or cancel a couple of operations elsewhere to finish Singapore off.
I'm horrified that you don't understand that kind of effect.
I actually find it better to ignore a lot of your statements on Britain or WW2 in the Pacific, as quite a bit of your statements are either fake, or known inaccuracies.
I agree that Singapore, under almost any circumstances, will eventually fall. In my mind the question comes down to can the British hold the Japanese off far enough north to keep enough of the water supplies in action? If Singapore has water supplies, then they can hold out until supplies of food and ammo get low. Absent adequate water, they can't last.
I do very well understand cause & effect. In this case I would suggest that the butterflies would be the size of bluebirds and not 747s. I can't really go into any sort of depth as to the reasons (which, BTW are legion) "as quite a bit of my statements are either fake, or known inaccuracies".
I guess you need to ignore what I say then. No point in arguing with you if you figure everything I say is either wrong or fake.
BTW: which job are you referring to?
I guess you need to ignore what I say then. No point in arguing with you if you figure everything I say is either wrong or fake.
BTW: which job are you referring to?
Amazing how you missed the freaking point Calbear. Simply amazing, and kind of scary given your job.
By bubble, I mean, and I'm mystified as to how the heck you didn't understand this, I mean if something happens that makes Singapore hold out even a month longer, it should have knock on effects elsewhere.
If Singapore holds even a month longer, let alone four-six months, a lot of troops and equipment are going to either be tied down there instead of fighting the allies elsewhere, and the Japanese might be forces to delay or cancel a couple of operations elsewhere to finish Singapore off.
I'm horrified that you don't understand that kind of effect.
I actually find it better to ignore a lot of your statements on Britain or WW2 in the Pacific, as quite a bit of your statements are either fake, or known inaccuracies.
The problem is that they ALL need to hold on. only one of the holding isn't going to change anything. The DEI has to hold, something that is pretty unlikely, and Malaya has to hold (something that was less unlikely, but given the training levels of the troops and the general incompetence shown by the British/Commonwealth command, still pretty far out there) otherwise Singapore holding out is an irritation not a disaster. If anything it becomes a lovely flame to draw the RN moth to destruction in vain efforts to relieve the garrison as it starves to death.
Singapore isn't Stalingrad, it isn't even Tobruk; the IJA isn't going to beat itself to death trying to overrun the island. The IJN wants the harbor and the Singapore Roads anchorage, but they can wait and just let the defenders starve and die of thirst.
As far as Nagumo's IO raid, it was pretty much worthless in any sort of strategic sense. It didn't advance the Japanese cause one bit, although it helped increase the rampant Victory disease and the losses suffered by the RN were far from crippling (Hermes was at the end of her tether, although she could have been of some use in the CVE role) although the loss of Cornwall and Dorsetshire was serious it also didn't cripple the RN as a whole.
If the entire Southern Resource Area holds on, than it is absolutely a game changer. That being said, it take a lot more than just Singapore hanging on until April to make that happen. The U.S. managed to deny the IJN the use of Manilia Bay until May, it inconvenienced the Japanese fleet, but it didn't change the war.
Cook
Banned
The problem is the idea of trying to hold ‘fortress’ Singapore. Singapore had no strategic value once Malacca had fallen; its’ value had been as a base for the fleet, but the fleet did not exist. It should have been evacuated and, tragically, there had been time and the shipping available to get most of the troops out during the last stages of the Malaya campaign. Pumping raw untrained Indian and Australian troops and British troops who were totally out of condition having spent weeks on board ship, into Singapore after Jahore had already fallen was ridiculous and was a level of irresponsibility verging on the criminal.
Yes, but that isn't beyond the realms of practicality. I personally lay the blame with Percival, for his failure to properly train and exercise the troops in his 7 months of command prior to the outbreak of war, and for his failure to build realistic plans around the forces at his disposal. I personally think it is ludicrous to say that the minimum needed to defend Malaya is 50% more strength than the Japanese needed to conquer it.
In my view the best trained troops Percival had, launching a realistic and well planned attack upon the Japanese as soon as they landed and then conducting a force-on-force fighting withdrawal down the peninsula should be enough to stall them in southern Malaya on or about the 14th of Feb. That takes care of Malaya and Singapore.
Sumatra is even easier since it was taken by a parachute landing followed by a seaborne invasion. If the ABDA naval force was able to intercept the invasion convoy, even if it was defeated in battle by the escort, the convoy might have turned back, been scattered or lost cohesion. Whatever happened the air attack the next morning would have achieved something leading to a much weakened invasion. This would give the defenders a good chance to hold on if they don't quickly win.