What would be the consequences for the wider Pacific War if Singapore does not fall to the Japanese? And how late a POD can you come up with to avoid the fall?
Singapore holds?
- Thread starter Basileus Giorgios
- Start date
There is actually very little that Singapore can do to NEVER fall. You can delay the inevitable, but not prevent it without eliminating the entire European War, or at the very least keep it on the Continent and not allow it to spread into the Med (having the French Fleet decide to come over to the RN en masse will help too).
Singapore was, despite the large numbers of troops in the region, vastly under-equipped. The RAF had almost no strength there, the RAAF had very little strength there, and most of the troops were something less than top drawer since the cream had been skimmed and sent to the Western Desert. Artillery was scare and was quite old and there is no practical way to prevent the IJN from cutting the garrison off and simply treating it like the U.S. did Truk (except Truk could, barely, sustain the iland's population through farming. gathering, and some fishing). At Singapore, eventually the food runs out, the ammo runs out and the hope runs out.
Better command decisions could have kept the garrison going for another four-six months, after that its Kobayashi Maru time.
Singapore was, despite the large numbers of troops in the region, vastly under-equipped. The RAF had almost no strength there, the RAAF had very little strength there, and most of the troops were something less than top drawer since the cream had been skimmed and sent to the Western Desert. Artillery was scare and was quite old and there is no practical way to prevent the IJN from cutting the garrison off and simply treating it like the U.S. did Truk (except Truk could, barely, sustain the iland's population through farming. gathering, and some fishing). At Singapore, eventually the food runs out, the ammo runs out and the hope runs out.
Better command decisions could have kept the garrison going for another four-six months, after that its Kobayashi Maru time.
For a better defence you need things to have been very different in the late 1930's. Namely the Singapore garrison is stronger and is more competently led, perhaps it's Slim instead of Percival? Also a stronger British Pacific Fleet with more and larger carriers embarking modern fighters and dive bombers that allows them to sink some of the Japanese invasion force. Best case scenario is the Japanese advance gets bogged down meaning no invasion of Burma so Britain continues to have access to it's oil.
This will mean fewer Japanese troops can be deployed in China easing pressure on the Nationalists. If Singapore does eventually fall it's a fighting defeat rather than a humiliating surrender that has big implications for British pride in the post war world. Japan loses thousands more troops and much supplies in the campaign which has implications eleswhere.
This will mean fewer Japanese troops can be deployed in China easing pressure on the Nationalists. If Singapore does eventually fall it's a fighting defeat rather than a humiliating surrender that has big implications for British pride in the post war world. Japan loses thousands more troops and much supplies in the campaign which has implications eleswhere.
In the best possible world, the RN retains control over carrier aviation and replaces their outdated battleships with properly equipped carriers in the 20s and 30s. More realistically, perhaps some better intelligence could have tipped the British off a few months earlier. Had the army forces at Singapore been better prepared and equipped, and had the RAF actually leant them some good fighters (at least Hurricanes) then they could hold out much longer easily. The Japanese victory was quite precarious, more so than people think. Also, even if Singapore did fall, had the British fought to the death, it would have been far more honorable, like a WWII version of the Alamo.
Riain
Banned
I think it's entirely possible for the Commonwealth forces to make the Japanese reach their culmination point short of Singapore itself on or about the same date. For me the big question is can this event allow them to thwart the invasion of Sumatra at the same time? Because if Singapore holds for a while but Sumatra falls then there's nothing for it. But if the Japanese have to have a second crack at both Singapore and Sumatra then all bets are off in my book.
Lombok was invaded on Feb 18 and Timor on Feb 20, I think inertia would see these operations still occur. Java was invaded on Mar 1, would this convoy be sent to Malaya or Sumatra, or would it still go to Java? Nagumo bombed the crap out of Darwin on Feb 19, would he instead bomb Singapore and perhaps hunt for the naval units which thwarted the Sumatra landing and how long would this take?
In the longer term, how long would it take to resupply the Japanese forces in Malaya; 2 weeks, 6 weeks? Would shipping earmarked for the invasion of New Guinea on Apr 1 be used for this task instead, and if so what of that operation? And what about the FEF arriving in the Indian Ocean on Apr 2, the Dolittle Raid on April 18 and Coral Sea on 4 May, each of these would have to be countered by 2 or 3 IJN carriers but they are thousands of miles apart and only 2 weeks apart in time.
I don't have answers to these questions off the top of my head, but if the situation arose where the fall of Singapore and Sumatra were delayed the Japanese would ahve to find answers with the fixed resources they had.
Lombok was invaded on Feb 18 and Timor on Feb 20, I think inertia would see these operations still occur. Java was invaded on Mar 1, would this convoy be sent to Malaya or Sumatra, or would it still go to Java? Nagumo bombed the crap out of Darwin on Feb 19, would he instead bomb Singapore and perhaps hunt for the naval units which thwarted the Sumatra landing and how long would this take?
In the longer term, how long would it take to resupply the Japanese forces in Malaya; 2 weeks, 6 weeks? Would shipping earmarked for the invasion of New Guinea on Apr 1 be used for this task instead, and if so what of that operation? And what about the FEF arriving in the Indian Ocean on Apr 2, the Dolittle Raid on April 18 and Coral Sea on 4 May, each of these would have to be countered by 2 or 3 IJN carriers but they are thousands of miles apart and only 2 weeks apart in time.
I don't have answers to these questions off the top of my head, but if the situation arose where the fall of Singapore and Sumatra were delayed the Japanese would ahve to find answers with the fixed resources they had.
Flocculencio
Donor
Actually the latest POD is 15 Feb 1942. Yamashita was almost out of fuel, food and ammunition at this point- he spent all his effort on engaging British forces in a furious offensive to scare Gen Percival into surrendering- IOTL, this worked. If Percival manages to hold out for a couple of days longer, the Japanese will be forced to fall back.
It must be pointed out, however, that water supplies to the city had been cut and Percival had to factor in the prospect of civilian suffering. As CalBear points out, Singapore is not a tenable position unless you also hold Southern Malaysia since the city could not feed nor water itself.
If the Japanese are forced to fall back or at least give up offensive operations in Mid February what are the possibilities of an allied counter attack to retake part of the mainland and free the water supplies? Impossible?
I see. Can the city be supplied by the Dutch East Indies, or would these likely have fallen from Japanese launch bases in the Philippines?
Flocculencio
Donor
It's certainly possible if Percival takes the initiative. At the very least rallying and pushing the Japanese off the island gives the British forces control of the reservoirs in central Singapore which would provide some water for rationing.
South China Sea, off the Coast of Malaysia - 0500 hrs -Decembre 8th local.
Capitan John Symthe, and HMS Dogfish where not suppose to be here. instead He & the Sub were suppose to be docking in Singapore right about now.
However there had been that engine problem and here They were.
One last check from the Periscope, and the Dogfish fired it's 6 bow torpedoes, at 3 freighters.
A quick 180, and the 4 aft torps were away at a couple of Troopships.
As the Dogfish tried unsuccessfully to Escape they heard the explosions of 5 torpedoes Hitting.
What no one realized at the time was that the sunk Freighters carried the Invasions 200 tanks.
January 21th Kuala Lumpur, [otl 11th]
Without it's Tanks, the advance of the Japanese 25th Army had been a lot slower and more costly.
This had given the British more time to Organize,and Allowed the removal of Supplies from in Front of the advancing Japanese.
Now a desperate counterattack had broken the Japanese lines forcing them to pull back for the first time since the invasion began.
Febuary 20th
It had been a slow hard slog, but the British had Managed to hold the Kuala Lumpur Line. for a Month.
However it had finally Collapsed and the British were retreating to the newly prepared Line just a couple dozen miles south.
The Japanese had diverted reinforcements from the DEI which was still holding firm.
While the Japanese were not yet worried by the Delay, It would prove to be the Pivot on which their whole plan would crumple.
Capitan John Symthe, and HMS Dogfish where not suppose to be here. instead He & the Sub were suppose to be docking in Singapore right about now.
However there had been that engine problem and here They were.
One last check from the Periscope, and the Dogfish fired it's 6 bow torpedoes, at 3 freighters.
A quick 180, and the 4 aft torps were away at a couple of Troopships.
As the Dogfish tried unsuccessfully to Escape they heard the explosions of 5 torpedoes Hitting.
What no one realized at the time was that the sunk Freighters carried the Invasions 200 tanks.
January 21th Kuala Lumpur, [otl 11th]
Without it's Tanks, the advance of the Japanese 25th Army had been a lot slower and more costly.
This had given the British more time to Organize,and Allowed the removal of Supplies from in Front of the advancing Japanese.
Now a desperate counterattack had broken the Japanese lines forcing them to pull back for the first time since the invasion began.
Febuary 20th
It had been a slow hard slog, but the British had Managed to hold the Kuala Lumpur Line. for a Month.
However it had finally Collapsed and the British were retreating to the newly prepared Line just a couple dozen miles south.
The Japanese had diverted reinforcements from the DEI which was still holding firm.
While the Japanese were not yet worried by the Delay, It would prove to be the Pivot on which their whole plan would crumple.
The British forces in Singapore clearly needed more tanks and airplanes. They could spare 200 tanks for the region and a few dozen of those spanking new modern aircraft. The problem was that all of these went to help the Soviets with their war effort through the Arctic Convoys. This was a massive waste of material as 200 British tanks and the few dozen planes that the British sent over to help the Soviets were but a dust speck in the hundreds and thousands of tanks and planes that the Soviets could produce with their gargantuan war economy. It was the immense quantity of Soviet tanks and planes that won the Great Patriotic War for them, not the puny force sent by the British to the Soviets.
Besides, these tanks and aircraft could have been better used elsewhere, particularly in Malaya. This would have made a somewhat major difference in the conduct of the battle for Malaya and Singapore. British armour and doctrine was of a generally higher quality than Japanese armour and the boost in aircraft numbers and quality would have made a difference in the air war over Malaya. To hell with all those theories about tanks not being able to fight in jungles (Yes, I'm looking back with 20/20 hindsight, but surely some wise guy in the British Army during that time could have come up with the thought that that theory was just an assumption that could be busted?)
Also, there have been reports that the Commonwealth forces in Singapore made use of captured Italian AT guns to deal with Japanese armour. Now, if they could bring over captured AT guns, why not captured tanks? Italian armour is notorious for having poor performance in the field but surely a few of them in Malaya would be better than nothing?
Nah... They could always steal more bikes from the hapless Malayan civilians. Besides, the advance down the peninsula would still happen with or without bikes. The only problem would be the speed of said advance.
I'd suggested Slim before. The only problem was that he was too junior for the post of GOC Malaya. By the time he was senior enough to take command of Malaya, there would be little that he could do to reverse the situation. For all his talents, he might have broken down under pressure like Percival did.
I'm not sure if the British would put strategic and tactical concerns over ensuring the safety of civillians in the field. That's considering that Singapore by February 15th was 'home' to over a million civilians. Any urban combat there would be highly disastrous for the civilians, since they were all crammed into whatever was left of the British hold on Singapore, which probably wasn't much by then.
Not to mention ten thousand lashes on the bum for the audacity to invade the realm of the Dear Lee-der... uhh... I mean... Gibraltar of the East.
Besides, these tanks and aircraft could have been better used elsewhere, particularly in Malaya. This would have made a somewhat major difference in the conduct of the battle for Malaya and Singapore. British armour and doctrine was of a generally higher quality than Japanese armour and the boost in aircraft numbers and quality would have made a difference in the air war over Malaya. To hell with all those theories about tanks not being able to fight in jungles (Yes, I'm looking back with 20/20 hindsight, but surely some wise guy in the British Army during that time could have come up with the thought that that theory was just an assumption that could be busted?)
Also, there have been reports that the Commonwealth forces in Singapore made use of captured Italian AT guns to deal with Japanese armour. Now, if they could bring over captured AT guns, why not captured tanks? Italian armour is notorious for having poor performance in the field but surely a few of them in Malaya would be better than nothing?
Nah... They could always steal more bikes from the hapless Malayan civilians. Besides, the advance down the peninsula would still happen with or without bikes. The only problem would be the speed of said advance.
I'd suggested Slim before. The only problem was that he was too junior for the post of GOC Malaya. By the time he was senior enough to take command of Malaya, there would be little that he could do to reverse the situation. For all his talents, he might have broken down under pressure like Percival did.
I'm not sure if the British would put strategic and tactical concerns over ensuring the safety of civillians in the field. That's considering that Singapore by February 15th was 'home' to over a million civilians. Any urban combat there would be highly disastrous for the civilians, since they were all crammed into whatever was left of the British hold on Singapore, which probably wasn't much by then.
Not to mention ten thousand lashes on the bum for the audacity to invade the realm of the Dear Lee-der... uhh... I mean... Gibraltar of the East.
As mentioned, the key to holding Singapore is defeating the Japanese in Malaya. Given the balance of forces, with better leadership and preparation on the UK side this is possible, but not easy.
The question then is, what happens. Will Churchill permit Malaya to be adequately reinforced to defend against the next attack, or will he continue with his overconfidence.
The question then is, what happens. Will Churchill permit Malaya to be adequately reinforced to defend against the next attack, or will he continue with his overconfidence.
Wait, now. What about Phillips getting lucky? Or smart, & sailing immediately he gets word of the Japanese task force? That would probably screw the landings pretty nicely & save Singapore... (IMO, that's the latest PoD you could get.)
Or do you mean they'd just try again?
Let's not forget, the bases were sited with damn all regard for the Army's ability to defend them... Wasn't there a 1936 report revealling the weaknesses? What are the chances for it being adopted & actual defensive measures taken?
No chance of having Allied subs run supplies in? Or too trickly to matter?
And does the arrival of additional troops just before surrender make a difference? My thought is, the Aussies (for whatever reason) don't get sent, & are instead either in the Mid East or New Guinea.
I also wonder if RN/RAN/RIN MTBs couldn't have interfered with IJA movements afloat. IIRC, there were numerous "leapfrogs" using barges.
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Cook
Banned
I will be blunt and say that this is a ridiculous remark to make and is ill informed.
There was nothing dishonourable about the fighting performance of the British, Australian and Indian soldiers and the Chinese irregulars defending Singapore. They lacked any air support, their equipment, including their uniforms, was not suitable for the tropics, and they were short on transportation and field artillery and completely lacking in anti-aircraft artillery and armour. The Japanese soldiers were veteran divisions from the fighting in China while the British Empire forces were experiencing fighting for the first time. Despite this the soldiers fought well, some outstandingly well, in circumstances that were wholly against them.
The failures of the Malaya and Singapore campaign were not in the performance of the men but that of their commanders who were entirely out-generalled by one of the outstanding generals of the war.
The British did not request a cease fire until most of the island of Singapore had been over-run by the Japanese including all of the high ground and, critically, the water reservoirs that the city of Singapore’s civilian population, as well as the defenders, required for fresh water. By that time British and Australians were holding lines that were inside the densely populated streets of Singapore City itself; further fighting would have resulted in an appalling massacre of civilians and this was the threat that Yamashita used when negotiating with Percival.
The defence of Singapore and Malaya could have been conducted better but there is no dishonour connected to the defending forces by the fall of Singapore and anyone suggesting that they should have fought to the death is entirely ignorant of the realities of war and what they are suggesting or is indifferent to the loss of human life.
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Look Cal, I don't believe in no-win situations so you figure out a damn way it holds for the whole war now!
Riain
Banned
All armies have problems, some have poor air and armour support while others don't have enough numbers. In the case of Malaya I think poor leadership lead to a poorly trained army using poor plans and which turned out to be wholly unable to use it's own strengths to any good effect.