Singapore Feb 1942 with house-to-house fighting

Given that it's just been the 65th anniversary of the fall of Singapore, WI somehow Gen A.E. Percival had regained his nerve & decided to follow Churchill's exhortations to fight to the last man against Yamashita's (much smaller) attacking forces by 13th Feb 1942 ? Could the numerically superior British, Indian & AIF troops have viably tried to force the IJA to fight house-to-house a la Stalingrad, & mounted counter-attacks to recapture the reservoirs in Jap hands ? Would the fall of Singapore have still been inevitable, but with higher civilian casualties, & with what effects on Japanese capabilities & strengths ?
 
I assume that even if the British tried to fight to the last man they would fail. The Japanese had both extremely high motivation, and astonishing discipline. The British, who were mostly Indian (i think) had very little motivation and were not tenacious at all.
 
Dude, that was probaly true by the end of the Singapore battle, when most of the British, Indian & Australian troops had been severely demoralised by the great reverses suffered at Japanese hands ever since Dec 1941, & most were on the end of their tether (though by the same token there also were fresh reinforcements to Singapore, esp 2 largely uncommitted bdes of the 18th East Anglian Div, plus some 2000 AIF reinforcements-largely untrained-who ended up not seeing much action at all before they were forced to surrender).
 
The Japanese had invulnerable morale, and great tenacity. I'm pretty sure most of the British troops in Singapoore were Indian, so that means the opposite for them.
They would have easily lost.
 
Erm.. The Japanese were outnumbered, have pushed through a jungle before invading the island (with all the stains on logistics that implies) and had minimal amounts of equipment.

Even then it depends when Percival regains his nerve. Singapore really should (and in hindsight certainly could) have been defended better. However by the time the actual call to surrender was made, it seems unlikely the British can hold. Probably alot more people die but its still a defeat. You need alot more people than just Percival (start with the entire officer corps and then preferably every soldier) to suddenly want to fight to the death for them to hold.

Now if they did suddenly find that degree of courage (fanaticism?) under fire they would probably push the Japanese from the island, but its pretty much ASB for them to do so.

Realistically the British (of any description) are never going to fight for Singapore to the same degree as the Soviets would fight for Stalingrad.
 
The Japanese had invulnerable morale, and great tenacity. I'm pretty sure most of the British troops in Singapore were Indian, so that means the opposite for them.
They would have easily lost.

I am continually getting annoyed with peoples sweeping generalisations about the courage and steadiness of various nationalities servicemen in these threads. The Japanese whilst being fine soldiers were not supermen and had their failings and defeats. Conversely the Indian Army has always had a reputation for soldiers of the highest quality. Any army that has fought them had to perform to the highest standard to prevail. Even units that have not seen action before have been known to defeat experienced opponents. Unfortunately soldiers are often the victims of poor leadership and even worse planning. Battles and campaigns have been known to tip in the least likely direction because of seemingly insignificant events but at the end of the day you cannot blame the loss of any battle solely on the soldier on the ground.
 
Erm.. The Japanese were outnumbered, have pushed through a jungle before invading the island (with all the stains on logistics that implies) and had minimal amounts of equipment.

Even then it depends when Percival regains his nerve. Singapore really should (and in hindsight certainly could) have been defended better. However by the time the actual call to surrender was made, it seems unlikely the British can hold. Probably alot more people die but its still a defeat. You need alot more people than just Percival (start with the entire officer corps and then preferably every soldier) to suddenly want to fight to the death for them to hold.

Now if they did suddenly find that degree of courage (fanaticism?) under fire they would probably push the Japanese from the island, but its pretty much ASB for them to do so.

Realistically the British (of any description) are never going to fight for Singapore to the same degree as the Soviets would fight for Stalingrad.

Exactly. The loss of morale appears to have had a slow inexorable build up from the time of the sinking of the POW and Repulse. If the leadership and planning had been of even a competent standard, the Japanese advance could have been delayed at least.

A delay may mean ultimate victory for the defenders since it would take longer for the enemy to reach the reservoirs and thereby mean their meagre supplies of food and ammunition would be depleted perhaps even exhausted.

Japanese defeat in Singapore would have enormous ramifictions of course.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
IIRC, when the British in Singapore surrendered, the Japanese were very nearly out of ammunition and other critical supplies. Having great morale is not of much use when you no longer have the means to fight.
 

Redbeard

Banned
After Plan Matador had failed to be initiated (by Brooke-Popham) the British knew they sooner or later would see the Japanese at the gates of Singapore but very little if anything was done to prepare the defence. In the more than two months passing before the IJA reached Singapore a lot could have been done.

The Engineer officer of Singapore repeatedly asked Precival for permission to build field fortifications etc. to prepare the defence of Singapore but was told not to as this would only unease the civilian population (!).

Most of the guns of the Singapore Fortress could very well cover the north, but hardly any HE ammo was available, only AP for use against heavily armoured ships. A good commander would have seen to this in time.

The main problem of Singapore was that her fresh water supply depended on reservoirs north of the strait, but very little was done to prepare the defence of these, building up stocks or evacuating civilians. Considering the extreme strategic importance of Singapore no cost really would have been to high.

Against a prepared defence the first Japanese assaults probably would have failed as they were rather a spent ball once they reached Singapore. A lengthy siege would probably be very costly for the defenders incl. the civilians - Leningrad under the burning sun. But the Japanese would need time to get siege artillery and supplies forward and by that time the British will also have gathered reinforcement. The Brigades and landing crafts used in the OTL Madagascar operation (early April 42) would have given an interesting option for an outflanking landing on the Malayan westcoast.

Most of the British and CW troops committed in Malaya and Singapore indeed were relatively raw, but the regular ones actually committed themselves quite well. In a lenghty siege it would be possible to improve the raw troops (or at least use as labour) but also better utilise the regulars that in OTL arrived just before the surrender (18th Division). When fairly trained and equipped Indian troops aquitted themselves very well. The 4th Indian Division (prewar professional), which fought in the Mediterranean area from 1940, probably was one of the best Divisions on allied side in WWII. The 11th Indian Division in Singapore was made up of recruits and not fully equipped, and simply fell apart. Many of the PoWs joined the Japanese afterwards.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
The Japanese were very low on ammo by the time of the meeting between them and Percival, and were planning on pulling back in the event of further Brit resistance. If the Brits had more success on the Malay peninsula itself, defensive ambushes etc I doubt the Japanese would have made it to Singapore. Sommerville's Far Eastern Fleet fleet was in the Bay of Bengal in the first week of May, if Singapore had held until then it may have been the focal point of a naval battle as envisaged before the war.
 
Well, suppose that there were more Japanese reinforcements, the battle could become long and bloody. That would basically make Singapore into a Pacific Stalingrad. And in the same year, to boot.
The effects of a British victory in that case cannot be underestimated.
 
Empror Mike- FFS just because they were Indian doesn't mean that they were going to roll over like beaten dogs. I'm Indian and I find your assumption exceedingly insulting. It's obvious that veteran soldiers of any nationality will perform better than raw recruits.

If Percival had had the nerve to make the Battle of Singapore into a meatgrinder, the Japanese would have lost. They were already at the end of their tether with regard to supplies of fuel and ammo.

Basically he just has to have the cold bloodedness to let the local population suffer and turn the island into a free-fire zone.

It would have been a nasty fight but the British could have overwhelmed the Japanese.
 
Morale is the problem and morle was bad because of deficient leadership. Most of the troops were raw recruits not battle hardened veterans. The Australians had been trained for desert warfare not jungle warfare.

Nonetheless, under competent leadership the Australians managed successful ambushes of superior Japanese forces in Malaya. If proper defences had been prepared then these forces would have positions to fall back on instead of being constantly subject to being surrounded and forced to fight their way through to their comrades. The anemy was in no position to fight a war of attrition on the peninsula.

Once the Japanese managed to occupy Singapore Island positions it was all over. The object must be to delay them so much that if they get there at all they are so exhausted and out of essential munitions that they fail.
 
On the 11th of Feb 1942, General Yamishita was informed that his supply lines had failed and they only had enough ammunition to last untill the 15th. In addition to this, it would take two weeks before any more supplies of any description could be had. With this knowledge Yamishita confided in his personal journal that he had to bluff the British into surrendering before he ran out of time or be destroyed. On the 14th of Feb General Percival wanted to order a general counter attack along the entire front line but his field commanders refused and the rest is history.
It's true that the troops defending Malaysia and Singapore were badly led but that doesn't make them bad soldiers or cowards. The biggest single cause of the retreat down the Malay peninsula was the decision by most British officers to fight on the map and they confined their troops to the sparce road network that then existed. The Japanese were then able to go around most obsticles forceing the defenders to retreat or surrender. By the 15th of Feb there were no more open flanks to turn and the only weapon the Japanese had left was bluff and bluster.
As for the Indians who did most of the surrendering, they fought bravely untill they were outflanked and their officers had to decide between surrender or fight through a jungle that appeared impasable on the map. The Australians were equipped for the desert but had been training for the jungle. When the first Australians were commited to battle the Japanese had been in Malaysia for over five weeks and were two thirds of the way to Singapore. Even so Australia's first battle against the Japanese was a victory and the next battle was looking like a victory until they discovered that they had been outflanked and had to retreat. Unlike the British, the Australians had realised that the impassable jungle was a myth and had asked another unit to cover their right but this wasn't done. This leads to the Australians weakness in Malaysia, their commander, General Bennett was the man that most Americans think Montgomery was. Bennett knew he was the best general in the free world and commanding a single division thousands of miles from the real war made him paranoid and impossible to work with. For Bennett cooperation with the other commanders was impossible and the opportunity to prevent the Japanes from getting to Singapore was lost. Then there's the Ghurkers who fought many rearguard actions down the peninsula and on the day they were ordered to surrender they were planning their own local counter attack. And in remembering the Ghurkers who surendered to the Japanes it should be noted that they refused to work on the Burma railway or any other activity that looked like war work, and for their loyalty the Japanese cut their toes off.
With all this I cannot imagine how the Japanes could have won if Percival had told his field commanders to obey orders. And for what it's worth, I think Yamishita wasn't expected to win. Yamishita had been persona non grata for several years for using the emperor's name to put down some troublesome officers. He had been sent to a backwater before the Malaysian campaign and was sent to a another backwater after it was over. Two of the divisional commanders under his command were the same rank as himself as was his chief of staff who was a former aid to the emperor and the perfect candidate to take over if Yamishita was forced to take his own life if he failed.
 
There is one problem... The British were running out of ammunition for various kinds of weapons when the Japs invaded. They had ran out of AA ammunition by 13th Febuary and cannot hope to capture already dwindling Japanese supplies. Even if they did, the Japs used weapons of differing calibres and a counter attack to retake the ammo and fuel depot at Bukit Timah seemed like a pipe dream.

Also, there is not a doubt that the British will not fight as hard as the Russians did for Stalingrad. Perhaps some news like Yamashita's current situation of being outnumbered and his mounting logistics problems in the form of propaganda may give the Brits enough motivation to push the Japs off Singapore and hold out until Somerville's Eastern Fleet arrives.

In any case, that leaves the only possible POD for a Eastern Stalingrad is to replace Percival with someone with a more brutal track record. I cannot imagine how the ruthless officer who earned himself a bounty on his head courtesy of the IRA became a wimpy staff mullah that caused Britain's greatest military defeat.
 
Top