Siege of Nashville - feasible?

I have two scenarios here on a similar theme, both involving a siege of Nashville, though with the roles reversed. I thought it could be interesting to post them here and see if either could have been a feasible siege.

Scenario 1 - February 1862
Albert Sidney Johnston has been criticized (rightly in my opinion) for his actions before the fall of Fort Donelson. It has been stated that Johnston should have either reinforced the fort with the majority of his forces and gone to take command personally, or should have evacuated the forts to gather his strength later. Instead, Johnston reinforced the garrison with more men then he could afford to lose, but less than could save the fort.

Let's assume Johnston pulls the troops from Donelson, and prepares to defend Nashville. If Davis still gives him Bragg and the Gulf troops, he has about 52-56,000 men against Grant and Buell's combined strength of 60,000 and Foote's flotilla. Who would likely win out?

Scenario 2 - Throughout 1863, James Longstreet had supported moving the balance, if not the entirety, of his corps west to join the Army of Tennessee. Longstreet eventually got with his wish after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, but the victory at Chickamauga was wasted once the Army of the Cumberland was allowed to escape and the Knoxville campaign ended in failure.

Had Longstreet gone west after Chancellorsville, it seems they could have achieved more substantial results. Dealing Rosecrans a defeat before the Tullahoma campaign made capturing Nashville a possibility, as well as relieving pressure off Vicksburg.
 
I have two scenarios here on a similar theme, both involving a siege of Nashville, though with the roles reversed. I thought it could be interesting to post them here and see if either could have been a feasible siege.

Scenario 1 - February 1862
Albert Sidney Johnston has been criticized (rightly in my opinion) for his actions before the fall of Fort Donelson. It has been stated that Johnston should have either reinforced the fort with the majority of his forces and gone to take command personally, or should have evacuated the forts to gather his strength later. Instead, Johnston reinforced the garrison with more men then he could afford to lose, but less than could save the fort.

Let's assume Johnston pulls the troops from Donelson, and prepares to defend Nashville. If Davis still gives him Bragg and the Gulf troops, he has about 52-56,000 men against Grant and Buell's combined strength of 60,000 and Foote's flotilla. Who would likely win out?
This scenario is akin to having the Allied Axis Armies around the flanks of the German 6th Army in Stalingrad enter the Stalingrad pocket before the Red Army attack because their lines would be broken anyway. By giving up the Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, the Confederate defense of the west has been split in half.
The oft-forgotten results of Fort Henry and thus the Tennessee River were, ironically, the most important. After the fall of the fort, the railroad bridge across the Tennessee River just a few miles south of the fort was destroyed, severing the lines of communication between Bowling Green and Columbus. It was the fall of Fort Henry, not Fort Donelson, that prompted the Confederate evacuations of Columbus and Nashville and the concentration of troops from the Gulf to Tennessee.
If Fort Donelson was abandoned, the Federals could steam up the Cumberland River with impunity and attack Nashville in the rear or cut off communications. They couldn't do that if the naval batteries at Fort Donelson were manned to repel any such move.

The second problem is the number of troops on hand to defend Nashville. While the Army of Central Kentucky (Hardee's Army) would be a lot stronger, it would probably be late March or early April before reinforcements could arrive to form what would be the Army of Tennessee. Bragg had around 10,000 troops from the Gulf at Corinth with detachments at Bethel Station in early March while Polk's 7,000 men were at Humboldt and would march to Corinth days later. The New Orleans militia coming from the south would arrive by late March. IOTL Hardee's 13,000 men arrived on March 27th, the main reason for their slowness was the burden of carrying large quantities of ammunition, provisions and artillery. Given that the gathering Confederates would have to do the same, it's difficult to imagine that they could make a timely appearance.

Scenario 2 - Throughout 1863, James Longstreet had supported moving the balance, if not the entirety, of his corps west to join the Army of Tennessee. Longstreet eventually got with his wish after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, but the victory at Chickamauga was wasted once the Army of the Cumberland was allowed to escape and the Knoxville campaign ended in failure.

Had Longstreet gone west after Chancellorsville, it seems they could have achieved more substantial results. Dealing Rosecrans a defeat before the Tullahoma campaign made capturing Nashville a possibility, as well as relieving pressure off Vicksburg.
Longstreet's proposal included the units that made up the Army of Relief and suggested that Johnston take command of the whole force. If Longstreet brings only McLaws' and Hood's Divisions, he adds 14,512 officers and men into Bragg's army of around 50,000 troops to attack Rosecrans' 80,000 troops. The main problem with this scenario is logistics. Historian Thomas Connelly observed that "Bragg's own transportation system had been on the verge of collapse since early 1863." IOTL after Chickamauga Longstreet complained to Bragg that his staff officers had not been provided with the means of supplying his troops. Unless the army's wagon train could be greatly expanded then the Army of Tennessee could not venture more than a few miles away from a secure rail-head. A logistical build up that would take more than a month is needed before the Army of Tennessee+ is ready to strike a blow.

Still, the idea is militarily sound. If the units that made up the Army of Relief were sent to Bragg, Bragg could attain a numerical superiority in infantry and cavalry. I am, however, skeptical of relieving Vicksburg through an attack on Mufreesboro and later Nashville.
 
Not to mention that would leave Lee without any experienced crops commanders and roughly 50,000 troops. As it was the return of Longstreet barely made up the looses of Chancellorsville.
 
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