Sickle Cut in 1941 (or even autumn 1940)?

[King Augeas]

It's often said that 1940 was the best time for Germany to attack France, as British/French rearmament and reorganisation would mean that waiting until 1941 would likely cause a German attack to fail. However, OTL France and Britain already had the forces to defeat a German offensive, just not the specific offensive that actually happened, as the forces ended up in the wrong place and the command structures were incapable of reacting quickly enough to the German thrust.

So if we delay the German attack until autumn 1940 or May 1941, do these factors of CCC and deployment still dominate? Would the German forces be able to punch through the Ardennes, storm the Meuse and then drive to the sea much like OTL, or would the stronger, more numerous Allied forces be able to blunt the attack and seal the breach? Would allied strategy of the Dyle Plan remain the same or evolve into something less one-dimensional?

Feel free to choose autumn 1940 or May 1941, and to specify whether war began in 1939 as OTL or whether the invasion of Poland was delayed a year to 1940, noting the potential implications for rearmament in each case.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

One difference that is certain is Gamelin would have been retired in May 1940, battle or no battle. Reynaud had never much liked him & had in March 1940 determined to remove Gamelin & shake up the army command. Political preparation and a mild illness during April had interfered, but by 9th May Reynaud was very close to acting. The German attack caused him to defer action a few more days, but on 19th May the order was issued.

Exactly who would replace Gamelin is less clear. Weygand may not have been the choice had there not been the pressure of a German attack. Or Weygand may have been simply a interim replacement while a younger man was prepared. It would take a real expert in the politics of the French army & the biographies of the general officers to judge with any credibility who would be replaced & who promoted.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Another near given is the May 1940 strength of the French air force would have been almost entirely new model aircraft by late autumn. Training in the new aircraft would have been far along. In May 1940 OTL the Fr AF was standing down it groups with the older model aircraft. A large number had been withdrawn from the battle ready status & many had actually deposited their elderly aircraft in depots. A surge of deliveries was just starting in April-May. 300 from the US had just been delivered, 300 more were embarked for delivery in may/June. 1,200 more were scheduled for delivery from the US in the remaining five months of 1940, 3,000+ had been contracted for production in 1941 & more contracts for that year were in negotiation. French industry had completed its retooling for the new aircraft & was ramping up production in April/May. The reorganization was having its results as well.

The B series divisions & related other B formations were finally scheduled to stand down from construction duties and start a extended training cycle to bring them up to combat rediness. So were a dozen new divisions formed after the mobilization of the reservists September-October 1939. I don't have a exact number but the goal seems to have been for some eighty divisions trained to the highest levels of combat reediness by autumn.

In artillery, AT guns, small arms, tanks, armored infantry carriers, & much else the new weapons were starting to come off the production floor in April-May-june. By autumn equipment shortage would be made good & in the spring of 1941 the new generation of equipment would have been increasingly available. i.e.: a High powered 47mm AT gun was entering production in May 1940, a 75mm tank gun being tested, and a 90mm gun starting development. Its difficult to predict what might have been given priority & come off the factory floors en mass. It is safe to say that a small number of rearmed units of may 1940 strongly suggest what the bulk of the army would have looked like in October.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Even if the Anglo-French forces qualitative disadvantages remain (and some of them probably will, although a number won't due to factors Schwarmberger mentioned), their superior combined industrial bases by '41 will have accrued to the point where Germany can't overcome them. They could probably still inflict a tactical-operational defeat and shove the Anglo-French back, but not the OTL strategic victory they desperately needed.

This is ignoring that the only way Germany could economically sustain its war industry into 1941 is by basically becoming a Soviet client state.

 

[King Augeas]

Becoming a Soviet client state for a few months should be acceptable if Germany is able then able to defeat France and kick the BEF out. I appreciate that the additional armaments will be very useful, but I wonder if they will be used in the right place at the right time. For example, if they go to equipping the armies charging into Belgium, or the French air force continues with its sluggish pace of operation, then is it still plausible for Germany to break through on a Meuse front that has changed relatively little from spring 1940?

 

[Archibald]

King Augeas: the flaws in the French aircraft industry were very apaling - they ran all the way from operational requirements to front-line service. Per lack of Hispano Suiza 12Y (860 hp) France bought licence of both Merlin and Allison V-1710 (and also, radial engines) and subvariant of in-service fighters were designed. The Armée de l'Air 1941 logistics would have been a nightmare.

 

[CrimsonKing]

A 1941 Fall of France isn't impossible, (it's happening in my timeline in fact, although the Germans aren't using the Sickle Cut plan in it) but it requires changes in German economic and trade management which go back to before the Danzig crisis.

 

[King Augeas]

I'm aware of the flaws in the French air force, at least in general terms. Which is why it strikes me as possible that Germany could still achieve OTL-like surprise in a later thrust through the Ardennes, because of inadequate French recon despite their greater paper strength. Similarly, it seems credible that these flaws would prevent the French air force seriously interdicting the German thrust after it was discovered, again despite a material superiority.

But that's just the French. British forces are also present, and it assumes the Dyle plan as OTL and the absence of an effective strategic reserve.

What would a British Advanced Air Striking Force look like in six or twelve months' time, and would it fair any better against the Meuse bridges? Or would its recon discover the Ardennes thrust sooner?
Would the British have deployed an air defence system to increase interception rates and detect the concentration of German fighters over the Ardennes?
Carl mentions the uncertainty in the French command, but if the need to charge into France is dominated by political considerations, then isn't it still likely to happen regardless of who is in command?
How much stronger would the Meuse defences be in the autumn? How much time would they have needed to buy OTL to enable the French command to get a grip on the situation and deploy reserves to block the German thrust?

I remember reading a post by Carl a few months back... ah here it is...

There was that. The decisions of the senior French commanders were running at best between 36 & 48 hours behind events.

& there is that. Huntzinger judged, correctly, it would require the Germans 9 days to move a infantry/artillery assault force through the Ardennes. He was nonplussed to find a concentration of 400+ bombers and three armored divisions sufficient to break his defense of the Meuse River after just four days. Corap found his own 2d Army contending with three river crossings six days earlier than expected.

The previous autum Rundsteadt & his chief of staff Manstein calculated it would take about ten days to move a conventional infantry/artillery assualt force through the Ardennes, If the region were lightly defended. Hence the growing interest in using the new armored corps to disrupt the enmemy defense of the Meuse River ahead of the main force.

By forming seven armored and two motor rifle divisions into a single unit under Kliest & substituting air strikes for artillery Halder rendered every calculation by the experts useless, including his own German experts.

This suggests, crudely, that buying five days or so would be necessary. But a smaller delay would be sufficient, if supported by greater ground strength on the Meuse and more effective recon and bombing. How much delay would be sufficient to enable the French to recover?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Becoming a Soviet client state for a few months should be acceptable if Germany is able then able to defeat France and kick the BEF out. I appreciate that the additional armaments will be very useful, but I wonder if they will be used in the right place at the right time. For example, if they go to equipping the armies charging into Belgium,

Arms projection look sufficient to bring all the original reserve formations up to standard, including all the Series A & B forrmations. A fair number of the post B new divisions would be armed and trained as well. This as opposed to the 30-40 divisions ready in May 1940.

...or the French air force continues with its sluggish pace of operation,[ then is it still plausible for Germany to break through on a Meuse front that has changed relatively little from spring 1940?

Something is going to change here. That Gamelin is removed in May is a given. OTL the decision was made before the may disaster. The variable is we don't have a clear idea who replaces him, and how hard Reynaud will push for substantial changes. Daladier is a factor in that as well.

Understand that the doctrine in place 1939 & 1940 owed as much to lack of funds for training. The French politicians were wedded to fiscal responsibility and were loathe to spend a cent more than tax revenue provided. That meant training had to be curtailed which led to doctrines that half trained reservists could manage. This was not set in stone and in fact the training programs set up were designed to make the ground and air forces much more capable. Something closer to the US Army of 1943. The German had the same problem with training the mass of conscripts they inducted 1934-39, & got around it by large scale deficit spending. That 'paid' for a training program double in ambition to the French. i.e.: 24 full time training for conscripts vs 18 for the French and training for conscripts selected for NCO & technical specialists extended to 36 months or beyond. Siegfried Knappe was technically a reservist when conscripted in 1936, but he never left active service since he was selected for officer training.

... then is it still plausible for Germany to break through on a Meuse front that has changed relatively little from spring 1940?

Although we can't predict what change there will be it is safe to say the front of the 2d & 9th Armies will be changed. There had been many changes since September. The Strength across that region had been doubled, the 9th Army activated in order to rationalize the command & control, contingency plans readied. The build up of the French army and its plans had been a dynamic process & there is no reason it would freeze in place absent a German attack. The same applies to the German side. The offensive plans had bee war-gamed every month at halters level & often within Army Groups A & B. Multiple plans had been considered, tested, discarded, or kept alive. Changes were routine. It is certain this creative process would have continued resulting in German adaptation to the French improvements.

Note that Huntzingers name is often raised as a possible replacement for either Gamelin, or Georges as commander of the NW front. As 2d Army commander Huntzinger had disagreed with the weak attention to the Ardennes, and with the assumption the Belgians could stall a German advance long enough. Had he been promoted to either post, or perhaps only Army Group commander Huntzingers views on the Ardennes defense would have taken precedence.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

....


This suggests, crudely, that buying five days or so would be necessary. But a smaller delay would be sufficient, if supported by greater ground strength on the Meuse and more effective recon and bombing. How much delay would be sufficient to enable the French to recover?

The German take, based on their multiple map & field exercises was 48 hours.

They assumed that if the French start reinforcing the 2d & 9th Armies on the 11 May (D+1) instead of the 13th (D+3) the armored breakout would not occur. Mays discusses this in his analysis of the evolution of the German plans in his 'Strange Victory'. Doughty covers the same question in his analysis of the success of the XIX Pz Corps in 'The Breaking Point'. Both authors support Guderians judgement that it was a near run thing.

This is not to say the German offensive collapses. Rather the Sickle Cut maneuver fails. What 'MIGHT' save the Germans is the mass of infantry following, and the superiority of their air force in May. I've gamed this situation many times and found that often a substantial victory can be had without ANY German panzer force. Its less elegant & bloodier, but these games suggest the Allies can be bludgeoned into defeat. The German ground and air forces are broken as well, but the Allies are too. These are only table top games, so they may overstate German superiority, still the results lean towards a German victory of some sort.

 

[King Augeas]

Thanks, that really helps. So two days' quicker reaction, or two days' delay inflicted on the German forces (or a combination of course), should be enough to prevent the OTL breakout. The German infantry attack might still be successful, but the Allies should be able to avoid getting their armies encircled in Belgium. Also, the German forces in Belgium are going to get a bloody nose - AIUI the French divisions did pretty well against them OTL before being cut off, so with superior equipment a better performance should be expected.

In the event of this kind of German infantry victory, would the Allies retain a salient in Belgium? Presumably so - it threatens the Ruhr and their superior industrial strength should be sufficient to hold it.

 

[fasquardon]

Becoming a Soviet client state for a few months should be acceptable if Germany is able then able to defeat France and kick the BEF out. I appreciate that the additional armaments will be very useful, but I wonder if they will be used in the right place at the right time. For example, if they go to equipping the armies charging into Belgium, or the French air force continues with its sluggish pace of operation, then is it still plausible for Germany to break through on a Meuse front that has changed relatively little from spring 1940?

Germany getting stalled and having to basically sell it's crown jewels to the Soviets in order to keep their economic support for a drawn out battle in the West would be a very interesting TL.

Just imagine it: more German machine tools, skilled technicians, heck, even people at the cutting edge like von Braun or Heisenberg, moved to the SU for "safety" as Stalin tries to keep the Western slugfest going as long as possible and Hitler double his bets and doubles again to try and come out ahead strong enough to turn on Stalin and defeat him...

I imagine the Soviets would do quite well at first, though there is a risk that the allies might have more of a desire to pick a fight with the Soviets in such a scenario.

This is not to say the German offensive collapses. Rather the Sickle Cut maneuver fails. What 'MIGHT' save the Germans is the mass of infantry following, and the superiority of their air force in May. I've gamed this situation many times and found that often a substantial victory can be had without ANY German panzer force. Its less elegant & bloodier, but these games suggest the Allies can be bludgeoned into defeat. The German ground and air forces are broken as well, but the Allies are too. These are only table top games, so they may overstate German superiority, still the results lean towards a German victory of some sort.

You know, I don't think I've seen a TL that has focused on this sort of German victory. It could be quite interesting. Even if the Germans do bludgeon France down, I have a hard time seeing Britain accepting peace so long as there is hopes of bringing some allies in. But on the other hand, a longer fight in Europe might have utterly changed things in the Pacific, butterflying the familiar course to war between Japan and the US and an exhausted Germany might mean even Hitler says "we'll have to wait 20 years to face the Soviets".

I wonder what a Soviet-German cold war would look like, with the British and the Americans (each of whom is far more powerful than the continental powers) looking on from the sidelines would play out?

Probably the British and Americans don't stay on the sidelines for long...

fasquardon

 

[Blackfox5]

How many additional British divisions would be in place in France by Fall 1940 or May 1941? They would have to be more than the ten divisions in May 1940. This would give the Allies more reserves as British units displace French ones on the mainline.

The French Navy would also be improved. The battleship Richelieu would be in commission. The battleship Jean Bart was only 75% complete in May 1940. It would not be commisioned by Autumn 1940, but October 1940 was the date when she would be fitted out. By May 1941, she could be well be commissioned. They would have no impact on the land battle, but it would improve the French Navy's capability against the Italian fleet in anticipation of Italy's entrance into the war.

US manufacturing would begin filling the large orders sent to them by both Britain and France, particularly for aircraft.

And of course the general delay improves the strategic position of the Allies with lots of benefits to them. Even a replay of OTL's May 1940 attack won't threaten Britain as much as one in September 1940. By the time the Germans are ready for an air attack or sea invasion, the weather will be in Britain's favor. The additional time will also mean the British defenses elsewhere are a bit more advanced. And it increases the likelihood that France will fight on more than a month. Perhaps even for the entire course of the war. On the other side of the world, China will continue to make use of Haiphong port to bring in supplies for about 6-12 months more plus no temporary shutdown of the Burma Road. This is a big win for China as any additional supplies will have a big impact on their ability to fight. This pushes a possible Japanese threat to the Far East into 1942 or later. And the Battle of the Atlantic will be much more subdued without French coasts being in German hands.

Chances for a German victory decline the longer the war goes on. They have superior doctrine and leadership compared to the Allies, but the Allies have superior economies, support by the United States, and they will work out their problems with leadership and doctrine the more time they have.

I think at best Germans make substantial advances into northern France, but then their offensive dies down. They lose their shot at winning the war, and the Allies look forward to a few years of heavy fighting. Italy never joins the war, and Eastern Europe stays out. Allies launch their big offensive in 1942 to win the war, but may launch a smaller offensive in 1941 to recapture certain territory. War ends by 1943.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

There is the possibility the generals execute a coup in the hope of negotiating a peace with the Allies.

 

[zert]

Stopping Germany plus a later German attack, as said, helps China. Keeping Italy neutral frees up several troops for the Allies as well as allowing supplies to flow into Southern France away from German Uboats.

 

[Paulo the Limey]

There is the possibility the generals execute a coup in the hope of negotiating a peace with the Allies.

I can't see that happening before substantial Entente forces are on German soil, and I don't see the Entente going for it either, given the Dolchstoßlegende.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Internal circumstances may change that. On both sides.

 

[bphillip54]

Germany armed forces would have improved at the same rate as the British and French did if they waited til 1941. Germany would have had more panzer and mechanized divisions. Who says France doesn't fall for the fake German push through Belgium thinking that Germany was trying the same strategy used WWI in 1941?

 

[Paulo the Limey]

Germany armed forces would have improved at the same rate as the British and French did if they waited til 1941. Germany would have had more panzer and mechanized divisions. Who says France doesn't fall for the fake German push through Belgium thinking that Germany was trying the same strategy used WWI in 1941?

What makes you think that they were improving at the same rate? Much has already been said in this thread about the ongoing reorganisation of the French Air Force, together with the increase numbers of American aircraft that were being delivered. France would also have had longer to sort out their mobilisation issues that severely impacted on their industrial production.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The German take, based on their multiple map & field exercises was 48 hours.

Of course what Manstein knew was that the French's command structure meant they couldn't respond that fast (and indeed, they did not). He conceived the Sickle Cut Plan with a firm understanding of what the French command structure in mid-1940 was like, a classic case of Sun Tzu's "Know Thy Enemy". Much of the nervousness among the rest of the German command over the plan stemmed from worries that Manstein might be wrong and that the French would move faster then he thought they could.

It would be interesting to see how Manstein might have revised the plan (or his support for it) had it been post-poned until 1941 and the French command structure proceeded to evolve to something that could respond to German actions much more rapidly.

What 'MIGHT' save the Germans is the mass of infantry following, and the superiority of their air force in May. I've gamed this situation many times and found that often a substantial victory can be had without ANY German panzer force. Its less elegant & bloodier, but these games suggest the Allies can be bludgeoned into defeat. The German ground and air forces are broken as well, but the Allies are too. These are only table top games, so they may overstate German superiority, still the results lean towards a German victory of some sort.

The Germans would indeed likely still gain a victory, but it wouldn't be a victory which knocks the French out which is the kind of victory the Germans need to avoid getting ground down. It would basically be a repeat of World War 1 with the Anglo-French rudely shoved out of Belgium and a chunk of northern France before the German offensive runs out of steam. And the Anglo-French can rebuild their broken forces while the Germans can not.

Germany getting stalled and having to basically sell it's crown jewels to the Soviets in order to keep their economic support for a drawn out battle in the West would be a very interesting TL.

It would basically be PDF's "A Blunted Sickle" except strung out over a longer period of time.

Germany armed forces would have improved at the same rate as the British and French did if they waited til 1941.

Uh... this is completely false. The German mobilization program had already peaked in 1939 and their armaments industry productivity was declining by 1940. In the mean time, the Anglo-French's mobilization had caught up with Germany's by mid-1940 and was due to quickly overtake unless Germany managed to knock out and loot one of the two major powers (which indeed is what happened). As time goes on, the German armed forces would become relatively weaker compared to the Anglo-French. Hitler, pretty much alone among the German High Command at this point, was well aware of this fact and it was a key reason as to why he latched on too Manstein's Sickle Cut's Plan (which actually offered the prospect of a total victory) over the OKW plan (which only offered some brief gains followed by a grinding stalemate Germany could ill afford).