Well, not suicidal per se - but they almost certainly wouldn't have got what they wanted...Basically,France would have been suicidal to start a war.
The French might see the British as bluffing, because while it is important, Siam is still on the other side of the planet. So they could trick themselves into thinking "The British don't want to fight if we bluster enough we can still get it." This would start as Siam V France then escalate very quickly.Well, not suicidal per se - but they almost certainly wouldn't have got what they wanted...
True - but, as I say, they almost certainly wouldn't get what they wanted.The French might see the British as bluffing, because while it is important, Siam is still on the other side of the planet. So they could trick themselves into thinking "The British don't want to fight if we bluster enough we can still get it." This would start as Siam V France then escalate very quickly.
Oh that is most certainly true, even if it was just the Siam v. France I doubt it would be as beneficial as they think it wouldTrue - but, as I say, they almost certainly wouldn't get what they wanted.
At the time I wrote this, I was thinking that the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty had not yet occurred. Nonetheless, there were surely colonial borders Germany could seek from both sides to keep it out of the war.Likely makes the Germans more secure, from direct attack or adventurism for the duration of the and a decent interval afterwards.
What would you recommend the Germans do on the diplomatic/strategic offensive to gain land, prestige, money without pressing their luck too far?
It's not as though World War I made sense either. It resulted from a diplomatic crisis that spun out of control.OK, I read the OP, and saw all that stuff about the 1887 Mediterranean Agreements, which the author says were a scheme to keep Germany out of any general war. Fine, the Germans are smart enough to want to sit it out, good for them.
But there was no clear description then or anywhere down thread of why it is that France fails to go to war against Germany.
If the French judged themselves too weak as yet in 1893 to avenge themselves on the Germans who just 20 years before seized Alsace and Lorraine territory, and who imposed a heavy war indemnity on France that either they were still finishing paying off or had done so only recently (an indemnity no smaller, relative to France's population and resources, than that imposed on Germany by Versailles Treaty later), then it must have been apparent to them that getting into a fight with a major power like Britain would only weaken them further and postpone the day when at last France could turn on Germany and settle the score, seizing back the lost lands at the very least.
If France sees Germany as a British ally, why should she leave the Germans alone when getting into a knockdown fight with everyone else in sight?
Now I suppose maybe the French might think that if they can defeat Britain, then Germany will be weaker somehow, at least because of having a weaker ally in Britain, and perhaps can impose by treaty some prohibition of Britain allying with Germany. Perhaps they think if Russia can beat Austria-Hungary while allied with France, than in gratitude a stronger Russia will bring more weight to bear against Germany when at last the two allies are ready to take on the Germans at last?
Finally I suppose a victorious France gains more colonies and thus more wealth and manpower and can plan on bringing it all up to levels where they can defeat the Boche handily at last, sooner than if they conserved their strength by avoiding war with Britain and worked with the already considerable Empire they already had?
It remains my perception that the French had their gaze fixed rather manically on one target only--Germany. It was all about what would enable France to bring down Germany the soonest. Vice versa any plan that might make it impossible to defeat Germany was to be avoided like plague. In Paris, it was all about maneuvering against Berlin, the thief of French soil and the bloodsuckers who had also so humiliated them.
I accept the author's point that allying with Britain was a strange idea in France--although perhaps the author does not fully realize how close Britain and France had been during the Second Empire, and forgets the alliance of the Crimean War, and that Britain was where Napoleon III fled to when defeated? The alliance is perhaps not so very strange after all! I accept that Britain too might have stronger historical memories of the French as the eternal enemy than recent cooperation. Certainly the French turning to Russian alliance was not an icebreaker in London!
But discomfort and strangeness are one thing. France going toe to toe with Britain, her only major and serious ally being distant, backward and weak (though of course gigantic) Russia, having limited power to project to actually pin down any British forces (maybe a lot of them in India, moving to protect Persia and Afghanistan and thus the gateways to the Persian Gulf and to the Raj itself) leaving the French to slug it out with Britain practically alone--that seems like a hell of a risk to take even if they think they have a window to knock out the RN for the time being. And so what if one can sink much of the RN, that does not put a single French soldier onto British soil!
What do the British do if they find themselves in rather hot water in some war? Why, seek new allies, do they not? With Austria-Hungary an enemy already (though it is hard to see how the Hapsburg Empire can do anything much to hurt the French) why and how would a clever scheme called the Mediterranean Agreement guarantee that the German Kaiser would not once again attack France, if the British came begging with really attractive incentives? The fear of Russia--the same Russia that probably means to have its hands full on the Austrian front? That hopefully is tying down British forces in Central Asia or France is really in for it?
The same Russia that the German general staff in the early 1910s was confident it could beat, but would perhaps not be able to in another five years or so? I think in 1893, the Germans would have very great confidence indeed that they could hold off any threat Russia might try to pose, and still have plenty force left over to quash the French. Again.
So--bearing all this in mind, the prospects of victory seem too distant, too costly, their benefits far too uncertain, to justify the all-out effort needed to fight a Britain who might call on German help any old time and attack them on another front, one that might once again surge forth to take Paris.
This is almost certainly why the French did not choose to let this crisis blow their cool OTL.
Why should they here? What is different?
The UK were seen as a major potential enemy up until the 1960's (not a typo).But why a naval war at all, when the real enemy is and is universally known to be Germany, not Britain?
Why not, as OTL, subordinating everything to building up to beat the Germans?
But why a naval war at all, when the real enemy is and is universally known to be Germany, not Britain?
Why not, as OTL, subordinating everything to building up to beat the Germans?
Anyone want me to put together the RN's battleship list as of this potential war? Could be fun to compare with the French and Russian battlelines of the same time.
Yeah, that battle is going to turn the French into drifting wreckage if pressed closely. The French periodic enthusiasm for small craft really weakened their navy's battle-line by making it inconsistently funded and developed.French
Med Active Squadron - Formidable, Amiral Baudin, Hoche, Courbet, Devsatstion, Redoubtable, Amiral Duperre, Neptune, Marceau.
Med Reserve Squadron - Richelieu*, Colbert*, Caiman, Indomptable, Terrible.
Channel - Suffren*, Requin.
British
Med Fleet - Sanspareil, Hood, Nile, Trafalger, Collingwood, Colossus, Edinburgh, Inflexible, Dreadnought.
Channel Squadron - Royal Sovereign, Anson, Rodney.
Active Reserves - Alexandra, Benbow, Superb, Swiftsure, Thunderer, Audacious, Hero, Conqueror.
And then you add the Italian and Austro-Hungarian battleships to the British side, my gods the Franco-Russian sides could be out numbered two to one.So, battleships of France, Russia and GB as of 1893 with their year laid down noted. Anything laid down pre-1875 not noted.
France
Coastal barbette
Devastation (1875)
Courbet (1875)
Barbette
Adm. Duperre (1876)
Adm. Baudin (1878)
Formidable (1879)
Hoche (1880)
Marceau (1882)
Magenta (1882)
Neptune (1882)
Stationnaire barbette
Bayard class, Vauban class (four total, earlier than Neptune)
Summary
6 coastal battleships, 7 full battleships, none laid down after 1882. One further ship completes in 1896.
Russian
Ekaterina II (1883)
Chesma (1883)
Sinop (1883)
Georgiy Pobedonosets (1881)
Imperator Aleksandr II (1885)
Imperator Nikolai I (1886)
Six battleships, can't find any others. None more modern than the Aleksandrs. Many additional ships complete in 1896.
Royal Navy
Orion (1875)
Agammenon (1876)
Ajax (1876)
Conqueror (1879)
Hero (1884)
Colossus (1879)
Edinburgh (1879)
Collingwood (1880)
Anson (1883)
Camperdown (1882) DAMAGED
Howe (1882) DAMAGED
Rodney (1882)
Benbow (1882)
Victoria (1885) SUNK
Sans Pareil (1885)
Trafalgar (1886)
Nile (1886)
Royal Sovereign (1889)
Empress of India (1889) FINISHED THIS YEAR
Ramilies (1890) FINISHED THIS YEAR
Resolution (1890) FINISHED THIS YEAR
Hood (1889) FINISHED THIS YEAR
In 1894 an additional four battleships join the fleet, and in 1895 a further two do. 1896 sees yet a further three join.
Summary: if this war starts in 1893, not only does the RN have fifteen battleships (generally more modern than their opponents) in hand and four joining the fleet, but two more are under repairs and another six join the fleet by the end of 1895 - before their opponents see any further ships to aid them. The Patent Royal Navy Giant Pre Dreadnought Pez Dispenser has been well and truly fired up.
Really you'd get an alt-Fashoda.You are quite correct. The crisis never developed into a war. I am just proposing an alternative to the OTL in that it did develop into a war. If everyone acts just as they did historically then there is no war, but if someone acts differently then war is a possibility.
Maybe the British decide this is a good time to put a stop to French expansion towards India and give support to Siam which encourages them to refuse the French demands. Or maybe the Siamese just refuse the French demands anyway in the hope of receiving support from Britain and/or China if the French press their claim. The Chinese were still pissed with the French over Vietnam and Siam was another of their nominal vassals.
The crucial point here is that Siam refuses the French demands. The French would then feel duty bound to get more involved militarily which could lead to their occupation of the whole country, and this is where Britain would feel they would have to step in for the reasons given previously.
For this war to happen the parties involved need to make alternative decisions to the ones they did. But in this case there is a third party involved; the sovereign nation of Siam. If they choose to make a stand then it would drag Britain in regardless of their desire to avoid war.