Siamese Crisis of 1893 leads to war

Well, not suicidal per se - but they almost certainly wouldn't have got what they wanted...
The French might see the British as bluffing, because while it is important, Siam is still on the other side of the planet. So they could trick themselves into thinking "The British don't want to fight if we bluster enough we can still get it." This would start as Siam V France then escalate very quickly.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The French might see the British as bluffing, because while it is important, Siam is still on the other side of the planet. So they could trick themselves into thinking "The British don't want to fight if we bluster enough we can still get it." This would start as Siam V France then escalate very quickly.
True - but, as I say, they almost certainly wouldn't get what they wanted.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I think they were too beaten down and would be uninterested in doing the white man favors but it would be interesting if China went in against the French (probably seeing the British as the winner) or if Japan did the same.
 
OK, I read the OP, and saw all that stuff about the 1887 Mediterranean Agreements, which the author says were a scheme to keep Germany out of any general war. Fine, the Germans are smart enough to want to sit it out, good for them.

But there was no clear description then or anywhere down thread of why it is that France fails to go to war against Germany.

If the French judged themselves too weak as yet in 1893 to avenge themselves on the Germans who just 20 years before seized Alsace and Lorraine territory, and who imposed a heavy war indemnity on France that either they were still finishing paying off or had done so only recently (an indemnity no smaller, relative to France's population and resources, than that imposed on Germany by Versailles Treaty later), then it must have been apparent to them that getting into a fight with a major power like Britain would only weaken them further and postpone the day when at last France could turn on Germany and settle the score, seizing back the lost lands at the very least.

If France sees Germany as a British ally, why should she leave the Germans alone when getting into a knockdown fight with everyone else in sight?

Now I suppose maybe the French might think that if they can defeat Britain, then Germany will be weaker somehow, at least because of having a weaker ally in Britain, and perhaps can impose by treaty some prohibition of Britain allying with Germany. Perhaps they think if Russia can beat Austria-Hungary while allied with France, than in gratitude a stronger Russia will bring more weight to bear against Germany when at last the two allies are ready to take on the Germans at last?

Finally I suppose a victorious France gains more colonies and thus more wealth and manpower and can plan on bringing it all up to levels where they can defeat the Boche handily at last, sooner than if they conserved their strength by avoiding war with Britain and worked with the already considerable Empire they already had?

It remains my perception that the French had their gaze fixed rather manically on one target only--Germany. It was all about what would enable France to bring down Germany the soonest. Vice versa any plan that might make it impossible to defeat Germany was to be avoided like plague. In Paris, it was all about maneuvering against Berlin, the thief of French soil and the bloodsuckers who had also so humiliated them.

I accept the author's point that allying with Britain was a strange idea in France--although perhaps the author does not fully realize how close Britain and France had been during the Second Empire, and forgets the alliance of the Crimean War, and that Britain was where Napoleon III fled to when defeated? The alliance is perhaps not so very strange after all! I accept that Britain too might have stronger historical memories of the French as the eternal enemy than recent cooperation. Certainly the French turning to Russian alliance was not an icebreaker in London!

But discomfort and strangeness are one thing. France going toe to toe with Britain, her only major and serious ally being distant, backward and weak (though of course gigantic) Russia, having limited power to project to actually pin down any British forces (maybe a lot of them in India, moving to protect Persia and Afghanistan and thus the gateways to the Persian Gulf and to the Raj itself) leaving the French to slug it out with Britain practically alone--that seems like a hell of a risk to take even if they think they have a window to knock out the RN for the time being. And so what if one can sink much of the RN, that does not put a single French soldier onto British soil!

What do the British do if they find themselves in rather hot water in some war? Why, seek new allies, do they not? With Austria-Hungary an enemy already (though it is hard to see how the Hapsburg Empire can do anything much to hurt the French) why and how would a clever scheme called the Mediterranean Agreement guarantee that the German Kaiser would not once again attack France, if the British came begging with really attractive incentives? The fear of Russia--the same Russia that probably means to have its hands full on the Austrian front? That hopefully is tying down British forces in Central Asia or France is really in for it?

The same Russia that the German general staff in the early 1910s was confident it could beat, but would perhaps not be able to in another five years or so? I think in 1893, the Germans would have very great confidence indeed that they could hold off any threat Russia might try to pose, and still have plenty force left over to quash the French. Again.

So--bearing all this in mind, the prospects of victory seem too distant, too costly, their benefits far too uncertain, to justify the all-out effort needed to fight a Britain who might call on German help any old time and attack them on another front, one that might once again surge forth to take Paris.

This is almost certainly why the French did not choose to let this crisis blow their cool OTL.

Why should they here? What is different?
 
Likely makes the Germans more secure, from direct attack or adventurism for the duration of the and a decent interval afterwards.

What would you recommend the Germans do on the diplomatic/strategic offensive to gain land, prestige, money without pressing their luck too far?
At the time I wrote this, I was thinking that the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty had not yet occurred. Nonetheless, there were surely colonial borders Germany could seek from both sides to keep it out of the war.
OK, I read the OP, and saw all that stuff about the 1887 Mediterranean Agreements, which the author says were a scheme to keep Germany out of any general war. Fine, the Germans are smart enough to want to sit it out, good for them.

But there was no clear description then or anywhere down thread of why it is that France fails to go to war against Germany.

If the French judged themselves too weak as yet in 1893 to avenge themselves on the Germans who just 20 years before seized Alsace and Lorraine territory, and who imposed a heavy war indemnity on France that either they were still finishing paying off or had done so only recently (an indemnity no smaller, relative to France's population and resources, than that imposed on Germany by Versailles Treaty later), then it must have been apparent to them that getting into a fight with a major power like Britain would only weaken them further and postpone the day when at last France could turn on Germany and settle the score, seizing back the lost lands at the very least.

If France sees Germany as a British ally, why should she leave the Germans alone when getting into a knockdown fight with everyone else in sight?

Now I suppose maybe the French might think that if they can defeat Britain, then Germany will be weaker somehow, at least because of having a weaker ally in Britain, and perhaps can impose by treaty some prohibition of Britain allying with Germany. Perhaps they think if Russia can beat Austria-Hungary while allied with France, than in gratitude a stronger Russia will bring more weight to bear against Germany when at last the two allies are ready to take on the Germans at last?

Finally I suppose a victorious France gains more colonies and thus more wealth and manpower and can plan on bringing it all up to levels where they can defeat the Boche handily at last, sooner than if they conserved their strength by avoiding war with Britain and worked with the already considerable Empire they already had?

It remains my perception that the French had their gaze fixed rather manically on one target only--Germany. It was all about what would enable France to bring down Germany the soonest. Vice versa any plan that might make it impossible to defeat Germany was to be avoided like plague. In Paris, it was all about maneuvering against Berlin, the thief of French soil and the bloodsuckers who had also so humiliated them.

I accept the author's point that allying with Britain was a strange idea in France--although perhaps the author does not fully realize how close Britain and France had been during the Second Empire, and forgets the alliance of the Crimean War, and that Britain was where Napoleon III fled to when defeated? The alliance is perhaps not so very strange after all! I accept that Britain too might have stronger historical memories of the French as the eternal enemy than recent cooperation. Certainly the French turning to Russian alliance was not an icebreaker in London!

But discomfort and strangeness are one thing. France going toe to toe with Britain, her only major and serious ally being distant, backward and weak (though of course gigantic) Russia, having limited power to project to actually pin down any British forces (maybe a lot of them in India, moving to protect Persia and Afghanistan and thus the gateways to the Persian Gulf and to the Raj itself) leaving the French to slug it out with Britain practically alone--that seems like a hell of a risk to take even if they think they have a window to knock out the RN for the time being. And so what if one can sink much of the RN, that does not put a single French soldier onto British soil!

What do the British do if they find themselves in rather hot water in some war? Why, seek new allies, do they not? With Austria-Hungary an enemy already (though it is hard to see how the Hapsburg Empire can do anything much to hurt the French) why and how would a clever scheme called the Mediterranean Agreement guarantee that the German Kaiser would not once again attack France, if the British came begging with really attractive incentives? The fear of Russia--the same Russia that probably means to have its hands full on the Austrian front? That hopefully is tying down British forces in Central Asia or France is really in for it?

The same Russia that the German general staff in the early 1910s was confident it could beat, but would perhaps not be able to in another five years or so? I think in 1893, the Germans would have very great confidence indeed that they could hold off any threat Russia might try to pose, and still have plenty force left over to quash the French. Again.

So--bearing all this in mind, the prospects of victory seem too distant, too costly, their benefits far too uncertain, to justify the all-out effort needed to fight a Britain who might call on German help any old time and attack them on another front, one that might once again surge forth to take Paris.

This is almost certainly why the French did not choose to let this crisis blow their cool OTL.

Why should they here? What is different?
It's not as though World War I made sense either. It resulted from a diplomatic crisis that spun out of control.
 
#Shevek23

The last thing the French would want in a war with the world's premier naval power is also a war against the world's premier land power. That would be suicidal indeed, which is why France would want to keep Germany out at all costs.

I was looking for a naval war between France and Britain where the French are not totally outnumbered. The Siamese Crisis just seemed to me to come at about the best time vis a vis naval strength to make the French think it might just be worth a shot.Throw in some public outrage over French honour at being told what they can and can't do, couple with a British desire not to allow encroachment on their turf (India) and you never know. This is a war about colonialism and the French resentment, particularly over Egypt, of the British getting their own way too often. At this stage Germany doesn't have a single 1st class battleship and is not yet seen as a major threat on the colonial scene.
 
But why a naval war at all, when the real enemy is and is universally known to be Germany, not Britain?

Why not, as OTL, subordinating everything to building up to beat the Germans?
 
But why a naval war at all, when the real enemy is and is universally known to be Germany, not Britain?

Why not, as OTL, subordinating everything to building up to beat the Germans?
The UK were seen as a major potential enemy up until the 1960's (not a typo).

However it is to be noted that German involvement in Siam and the highlands of Vietnam were feared and recorded (although recorded by individuals of dubious credibility)
 
But why a naval war at all, when the real enemy is and is universally known to be Germany, not Britain?

Why not, as OTL, subordinating everything to building up to beat the Germans?

Because it is based on the Siamese crisis between Britain and France. This was a real event. The French fought a naval battle against the Siamese. They demanded territorial concessions from Siam. They threatened to bombard Bangkok. They initiated a naval blockade in the Gulf of Siam and ordered the British out of dodge. There were negotiations between the two countries and talk of war.

The Germans weren't really involved in it.
 
Anyone want me to put together the RN's battleship list as of this potential war? Could be fun to compare with the French and Russian battlelines of the same time.

Here are the Naval battles I designed for this situation. It has the following scenarios:

1) Main event - British Med Fleet and Channel Squadron v French Med Fleet, with option to substitute AH Fleet for Channel Squadron.

2) Russian Black Sea Fleet + Greeks v Italian fleet

3) Breakout attempt from Brest by the French Channel Squadron v British reserves.

4) Raid against Kronstadt defended by Russian Baltic Fleet by British Reserves.

5) Britain (part of China Station) v France (Division Navale de l’Extreme Orient) in Gulf of Siam.

6) Britain (part of China Station) v Russian Siberian Flotilla off Formosa.

7) British North Atlantic and West Indies Squadron + some Italians v Russian Colombian Exhibition Squadron + some French.

As to the likely-hood of these battles occurring, I say, who cares!

From my research, these were the active battleships in July/Aug 1893. *= Old wooden battleship. Coast defence battleships not provided.

French
Med Active Squadron - Formidable, Amiral Baudin, Hoche, Courbet, Devsatstion, Redoubtable, Amiral Duperre, Neptune, Marceau.
Med Reserve Squadron - Richelieu*, Colbert*, Caiman, Indomptable, Terrible.
Channel - Suffren*, Requin.

British
Med Fleet - Sanspareil, Hood, Nile, Trafalger, Collingwood, Colossus, Edinburgh, Inflexible, Dreadnought.
Channel Squadron - Royal Sovereign, Anson, Rodney.
Active Reserves - Alexandra, Benbow, Superb, Swiftsure, Thunderer, Audacious, Hero, Conqueror.

Russia
Black Sea Fleet -Ekaterina II, Tchesma, Sinope, Dvienadsat Apostolov.
Baltic Fleet - Imperator Alexander II
New York - Imperator Nikolai I

Greece - Hydra, Psara, Spetsai.

Italian Fleet
Lepanto, Italia, Andrea Doria, Ruggiero di Lauria, Re Umberto, Duilio, Dandolo.

Austro-Hungary - Kronprinz Rudolph, Kronprinzessin Stefani.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
French
Med Active Squadron - Formidable, Amiral Baudin, Hoche, Courbet, Devsatstion, Redoubtable, Amiral Duperre, Neptune, Marceau.
Med Reserve Squadron - Richelieu*, Colbert*, Caiman, Indomptable, Terrible.
Channel - Suffren*, Requin.

British
Med Fleet - Sanspareil, Hood, Nile, Trafalger, Collingwood, Colossus, Edinburgh, Inflexible, Dreadnought.
Channel Squadron - Royal Sovereign, Anson, Rodney.
Active Reserves - Alexandra, Benbow, Superb, Swiftsure, Thunderer, Audacious, Hero, Conqueror.
Yeah, that battle is going to turn the French into drifting wreckage if pressed closely. The French periodic enthusiasm for small craft really weakened their navy's battle-line by making it inconsistently funded and developed.
 
And it just got worse for them. They had the Magenta running trials, but by the time they completed the Brennus in 1896, the Brits had added Empress of India, Ramillies, Repulse, Resolution, Revenge, Royal Oak, Barfleur, Centurion, Majestic, and Magnificent!
 
So, battleships of France, Russia and GB as of 1893 with their year laid down noted. Anything laid down pre-1875 not noted.


France
Coastal barbette

Devastation (1875)
Courbet (1875)

Barbette

Adm. Duperre (1876)
Adm. Baudin (1878)
Formidable (1879)
Hoche (1880)
Marceau (1882)
Magenta (1882)
Neptune (1882)

Stationnaire barbette
Bayard class, Vauban class (four total, earlier than Neptune)

Summary

6 coastal battleships, 7 full battleships, none laid down after 1882. One further ship completes in 1896.


Russian

Ekaterina II (1883)
Chesma (1883)
Sinop (1883)
Georgiy Pobedonosets (1881)
Imperator Aleksandr II (1885)
Imperator Nikolai I (1886)

Six battleships, can't find any others. None more modern than the Aleksandrs. Many additional ships complete in 1896.


Royal Navy
Orion (1875)
Agammenon (1876)
Ajax (1876)
Conqueror (1879)
Hero (1884)
Colossus (1879)
Edinburgh (1879)
Collingwood (1880)
Anson (1883)
Camperdown (1882) DAMAGED
Howe (1882) DAMAGED
Rodney (1882)
Benbow (1882)
Victoria (1885) SUNK
Sans Pareil (1885)
Trafalgar (1886)
Nile (1886)
Royal Sovereign (1889)
Empress of India (1889) FINISHED THIS YEAR
Ramilies (1890) FINISHED THIS YEAR
Resolution (1890) FINISHED THIS YEAR
Hood (1889) FINISHED THIS YEAR

In 1894 an additional four battleships join the fleet, and in 1895 a further two do. 1896 sees yet a further three join.

Summary: if this war starts in 1893, not only does the RN have fifteen battleships (generally more modern than their opponents) in hand and four joining the fleet, but two more are under repairs and another six join the fleet by the end of 1895 - before their opponents see any further ships to aid them. The Patent Royal Navy Giant Pre Dreadnought Pez Dispenser has been well and truly fired up.
And then you add the Italian and Austro-Hungarian battleships to the British side, my gods the Franco-Russian sides could be out numbered two to one.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The Formidables of France and the six Russian BBs are their only really useful types. The RN's ships of the Colossus type and later are probably useful (the old Inflexible is actually able to stand up to some non-RN Pre Dreadnoughts so long as the enemy has no heavy QF guns).
 
So I reread your OP, post 1. And I reread post 13, the only other place you talk specifically about the showdown in Thailand.

Everything you've said thus far has been OTL. OTL there were shots fired, what are called incidents, there was crisis. But there was no war!

You've recounted how Britain's diplomatic strategy to keep Siam from being swallowed up wholesale into French Indochina along with Laos and Cambodia was in fact to advise the Siamese king to roll over and accept humiliating demands.

That doesn't look much like the British spoiling for a fight to me!

Presumably at some point you are going to have some action go otherwise that it did OTL, where there was no war at all. I'd guess right now either you're going to have the British take a more proactive stance to uphold Siamese interests to maintain it as a buffer state, one where the French call the bluff and attack--though you've said shots were fired OTL and there was still no war. So the French would be on the offensive and vulnerable to a British response in the form of a DOW. However, it is usual, especially in this time frame, for DOWs to be conditional--that is it is preceded by an ultimatum, allowing the threatened party to back out of war.

OTL despite by your own evidence presented thus far, the French being on an aggressive roll and facing Britain with at least one, maybe more opportunities to settle matters with open warfare, still the British apparently took a soft line to deter it. If the French do something worse than OTL the British might feel national honor demands a war if the French won't apologize sufficiently.

OTL France never had to back down I guess, and I suppose you would be supposing that they would not and let the war start.

I'm using the word "suppose" a lot because while you've spent time and posts aplenty marshaling orders of battle on paper, you have yet to explain just how and why the sides go to war ITTL instead of avoiding it as OTL.

The more evidence you marshal to show that conflicts were not uncommon, that violence and thus presumably hatred between British and French forces was not unknown, the stronger my assertion that both sides clearly had good and deep reason to avoid allowing those crises to erupt into war. It is all well and good to show a flashpoint but OTL when the news of all this went to London and Paris, the outcome was--avoidance of war. It looks to me like the British were willing to see their position materially undermined considerably in order to avoid a worse undermining; if they were willing to go to war against France they'd be arming Siam and stationing protective ships and troops there in sufficient quantity to move against FIC. Or letting the whole Southeast Asian sideshow hang and going directly for war in Europe with France, hoping to drive her to the negotiating table at which she could be forced to disgorge all manner of what the British might regard as ill-gotten gains. Or both. It seems OTL they wanted neither and were willing to undermine their credibility as a protector of client nations in order to keep the peace. (They could probably afford this as by this time most nations in the world were formally folded into one empire or another; there weren't a whole lot of other client powers to be dismayed by Britain's uninspiring defense of the Thai kingdom).

So the French are going to have to do something drastic to force a British DOW when they are so reluctant to do it.

Anything drastic they do tips the balance of opinion in the capitals of Europe against them.

Germany can, of course, consulting strictly only its own interests, sit this one out. But at any rate I believe they will be at least moderately interested in supporting Austria-Hungary. They will be apprehensive about Russia. And if the British appeal to Germany to help them out with France by attacking and changing the balance of power the French apparently are reckoning on, Britain can offer to in turn keep Russia distracted and on the ropes. The British are at war with Russia if these alliances you've been leaving the Germans out of are a thing; Russia turns Austria-Hungary's arms-reach war with France into an up close and personal mauling by the Bear which the Germans are far less likely to sit back and watch patiently than a paper war with France.

Reading between the lines you've given out thus far, it seems your position is that in fact, OTL, the French were going a bit wild at this time, doing reckless things, and would not shrink from war.

There is nothing to guarantee Germany would enter the war on behalf of Austria and Britain. One thing about doing so though--the British can probably give a green light for them to move through Belgium, doing an end run around French heavy defenses. They may even be able to strong-arm Belgium into consenting and if not, nullify British support for Belgian neutrality. Now in addition to the war on France costing something, the war with Russia will also be brutal and costly for Germany. But the British can help there, coming in fleets to the Baltic to put pressure on St Petersburg itself; mobilizing Turkey against the Russians in the Black Sea; using some reserve force in the Raj to move north to Afghanistan and the Russian border there to distract and tie them down on that front and probably via Persia too, not to mention adventures against the Russian far east out of China and Japan. The point is not that these are favors to Germany, for the British are at war with Russia anyway if they go to war at all. But it means that there is never a better time to be at war with Russia. The Germans don't want or need anything from France in particular, but they do want the French and their allies to back off AH, and the British can offer the Germans many concessions to interest them. Such as say being awarded French colonial territory once France is defeated, in Africa, in Asia--even in America! (Goodby French Guiana, hello German Gujana! The USA might have some objections to that to be sure but in this age they aren't very potent to express them, though the war might change that; presumably if this a 20 year early Great War, the Americans will wind up holding everybody's war bonds probably with a strong preference for those they think are in the right. (Probably the English-Austrian side. Americans have sentiment for France, but Britain is the power it makes the most sense to stay on the good side of. Sentiments for France and a long tradition of cordial relations with Russia possibly keep them legally neutral and out of the war even if things get really drastic, but short of direct provocations by British or allied vessels or police agencies it seems likely they will sit it out).

Germany could be bribed by colonies overseas, and by a free hand to reshape Eastern Europe as she and Austria-Hungary see fit, and with the Germans knowing the French are always talking about revanche, it seems likely to me they'd take a nearly-free shot in return for British favors to be extorted from France thus weakening her further. Since the French will be perceived as the people who started it.

Now there's no telling just what detailed POD you might offer instead of this guess, which is vague anyway. But it still seems insane to me that the French would push gung ho forward for war with Britain--and everything you've said so far makes France look like the unilateral aggressor--without taking a bit more stringent and reliable action to tie the Germans securely down. Other than a swift invasion by Russia, what could guarantee that? Only Russia or the British are in a position to possibly bother Germany much, the Russians may do heavy but they don't do swift, the British are the enemy because of outrageous provocations in view of their refusal to be provoked OTL at this time. Germany is a loose cannon, and the French are insane not to secure it with more than a glance at them saying "they have no interest in this war." None until someone solicits them, and except for preempting and defusing the threat coming from both revanchist France and developing Russia, either of whom are easily handled today but may be more of a problem some years hence.

OTL there were other crises between Britain and France aside from this one and Fashoda. Again and again British and French troops and interests clashed between the Franco-Prussian War and the Great War, and yet none of these clashes led to war. Given that they were happening, and ships got sunk and people got killed. Yet no war.

It seems plain that while gung-ho regional colonial commanders may have been willing to go toe to toe, their national leadership kept slinking off to the conference rooms to fight with pens and ink instead of bullets and shells. In this case it it is the French who play Chicken, but was it every time? If it was a mix of both, that's my evidence that neither really wanted to fight the other given the general situation each perceived its country to be in. If it was always France who attacked and Britain that backed down, we'd understand that the British displayed great patience to avoid getting entangled in war with France.

So--you've got your armies lined up. But why do they fight?

What exactly is the point of divergence?
 
You are quite correct. The crisis never developed into a war. I am just proposing an alternative to the OTL in that it did develop into a war. If everyone acts just as they did historically then there is no war, but if someone acts differently then war is a possibility.

Maybe the British decide this is a good time to put a stop to French expansion towards India and give support to Siam which encourages them to refuse the French demands. Or maybe the Siamese just refuse the French demands anyway in the hope of receiving support from Britain and/or China if the French press their claim. The Chinese were still pissed with the French over Vietnam and Siam was another of their nominal vassals.

The crucial point here is that Siam refuses the French demands. The French would then feel duty bound to get more involved militarily which could lead to their occupation of the whole country, and this is where Britain would feel they would have to step in for the reasons given previously.

For this war to happen the parties involved need to make alternative decisions to the ones they did. But in this case there is a third party involved; the sovereign nation of Siam. If they choose to make a stand then it would drag Britain in regardless of their desire to avoid war.
 
You are quite correct. The crisis never developed into a war. I am just proposing an alternative to the OTL in that it did develop into a war. If everyone acts just as they did historically then there is no war, but if someone acts differently then war is a possibility.

Maybe the British decide this is a good time to put a stop to French expansion towards India and give support to Siam which encourages them to refuse the French demands. Or maybe the Siamese just refuse the French demands anyway in the hope of receiving support from Britain and/or China if the French press their claim. The Chinese were still pissed with the French over Vietnam and Siam was another of their nominal vassals.

The crucial point here is that Siam refuses the French demands. The French would then feel duty bound to get more involved militarily which could lead to their occupation of the whole country, and this is where Britain would feel they would have to step in for the reasons given previously.

For this war to happen the parties involved need to make alternative decisions to the ones they did. But in this case there is a third party involved; the sovereign nation of Siam. If they choose to make a stand then it would drag Britain in regardless of their desire to avoid war.
Really you'd get an alt-Fashoda.

Say the French come in, a few English battle ships come to intercept them and prevent them from going further.

Say they all go nuts and shots are fired.

You can be damn sure that the French officers who did that would be at best relegated to overseeing the a lovely village somewhere deep in Africa or Tonkin. Somewhere swampy, unruly with regular epidemies of cholera.
At worse, they're discharged and sent to prison.

French Indochina was clearly an antogonist to the UK holding, but it was a commercial war. The French would be stupid to try anything more as they have maybe 10.000 men there on a good day, compared to the hundreds of thousand of sepoys there.

As pointed out earlier, the whole crisis was a great occasion for the UK to get some territory of their own from Siam.

If they get to war with France, it is a very dangerous gamble in the end. If they pressure Siam into caving, Siam is weaker and the UK can extract territory of their own.
 
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