Moscow of 1812 was a vastly different city and of vastly different important than the 1941 version. The relevance of all of the things I mentioned was because of how important Moscow as to all of the things I listed.
Yes, in 1812 Moscow had a different kind of importance but I was talking about propaganda. As for the impossibility, in 1917 - 20 importance of the telegraph and telephone had been even higher than in 1941 (wireless radio being used only to a limited degree) and yet the Bolsheviks moved capital from Petrograd to Moscow quite easily.
Building a replacement national telecommunications hub after losing your capital is something that is not simple at all and in fact took decades to build up IOTL.
Taking into an account that, as you correctly remarked, the
modern experience of fighting after losing a capital does not exist, what you are saying is just your opinion. Are you a specialist in telecommunications?
The Soviets were short of wireless in 1941 and were throughout the war until LL really kicked into high gear and made good their deficiencies.
You are confusing apples and oranges. The wireless in the context we are talking about are for communications between the high command and the top front commanders. While, AFAIK, the Soviets did not have them on the same scale as Wehrmacht, at least in 1941 - 42, they did have an equipment. In 1941 - 42 the shortages were on a low level communications between the units. But on that level wire had been used and it did not require any complicated infrastructure. LL provided a lot of equipment but by 1943 the locally-produced radios became available with the LL equipment being used in a niche of the powerful army-level stations (happen to know: my father was deputy commander of the army communications and a family friend served as a radio operator during the war).
And no rail roads were not built in the middle of nowhere in WW2, they either were rebuilt following existing rail beds or were small local lines built up with tremendous effort.
I'd start with recommending to read Rocossovsky's memoirs but, anyway, did I say that these railroads had been major permanent lines? It is a product of your imagination. They were built on ad hoc basis for the specific operations and did not end up on the map. As for the effort, they were routinely built by the GULAG prisoners and, unfortunately, nobody was counting the effort.
Spring mostly. By June the issue was rivers that were higher, faster, and wider than usual due to the later rains in May still being run off in the first week of June. At least that was the formal reasons for the delay I've seen cited in translated documents.
Of course, it is always a climate or something else but not one's fault. An idea that all rains in the Central Russia are ending in May on schedule is an interesting notion but let me assure you that they routinely happening all over the summer. The rivers are usually getting wider and faster not because of the rains (unless they are extraordinary strong) but because of the thawing snow, which is not a problem by the late May. However, even the ordinary rain would cause noticeable problems on the countryside roads especially in the areas where the earth is heavily clay. Actually, even in the sandy ground they are causing problems if the road is heavily used and has all these depressions from the wheels. And for a pedestrian getting off the road is not always a simple solution if the area is forested or boggy (plenty of those West of Moscow) or if there are plowed fields.
You keep repeating the same story about the rains but how about the serious losses of equipment due to the tear and wear? How about the inadequate logistics? The work on adopting to the Soviet railroads were far from being completed, the Germans did not have unlimited supply of the horses and their auto park was never adequate for a task. Season may be different but the distances would be the same and so will be the problems.
For operation on a scale needed to taking a major city like Moscow you need a lot of infantry and artillery but they were lagging behind simply because the tanks and motorized units had been moving faster. And, for example, Guderian in his push toward Tula suffered not only from the bad weather but also from fuel shortages and damaged roads and bridges. "On 31 October, the
German Army high command ordered a halt to all offensive operations until increasingly severe logistical problems were resolved and the
rasputitsa subsided."
"By late October, the German forces were worn out, with only a third of their motor vehicles still functioning, infantry divisions at third- to half-strength."
Not just "rasputitsa" as a single factor with other easily ignored.
Limited capacity? Did you look at the Soviet maps I linked? Moscow is the core of the national system and permits lateral movements in quantity due to the number of double track lines in the area.
Can't tell about you but I saw the circular railroad around Moscow something between hundreds and thousands times (used to live not too far from it) and traveled by the Soviet railroads quite extensively. So I'd rather believe my lying eyes than your assurances and the primitive schemes you keep providing.
Flat lands to the east means the high ground is in the city, as are the air bases in the area. [\QUOTE]
What is your personal experience as far as Moscow is involved? Did you live in it or visited it extensively? I lived in it for 40 years and walked extensively through a big part of what was Moscow in the 1940's. The only noticeable "high ground" in it are Vorobiew Hills on the South-West (Moscow circa 1941).
That and the rivers and lakes east of the city which could be used to defend.[\QUOTE]
Somehow the rivers, lakes and swamps ceased to be a problem for the advancing Germans.

Actually, they
were a problem, especially when the Soviets started using artificial flooding by blowing off the reservoirs.
What forces were left IOTL in mid-October within the city? [\QUOTE]
Why forces would be
within the city if it was not under a direct attack? The Germans never were closer than 30km from Moscow center (and this was just a reconnaissance battalion). They were defending far perimeter. In a meantime extensive defense line (anti tank and anti personnel obstacles) had been built around Moscow and within Moscow as well. By the early November (OTL) "a triple defensive ring surrounding the city and some remnants of the Mozhaisk line near Klin. Most of the Soviet field armies now had a multilayered defense, with at least two rifle divisions in second echelon positions."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow#The_Battles_of_Vyazma_and_Bryansk
The newly-raised troops kept arriving starting from August in OTL but in AH time table it would be starting from July so the general situation would not change too much.