Shorter rasputitsa in spring 1941, ground in western USSR is dry by June 1, 1941

What nation has survived the loss of it's capital?

What kind of argument is it? Soviet propaganda started pumping up 1812 analogies (even if Moscow was not a formal capital in 1812) at no time. The government, most of the population, ministries and enterprises had been evacuated. Fall of Moscow would be unpleasant but not catastrophic thing.


I didn't say surrender was in the near future, but defeat was the only likely result after losing your capital and failing to take it back.

Very interesting observation but hardly applicable to the circumstances taking into an account that the Soviets did not plan to surrender after a possible loss of Moscow.

BTW, who said that the Germans would be able to take Moscow in the magic 3 weeks? But if they did, they are in a worst trouble than they were at Stalingrad: they need a very substantial force to be permanently positioned in the destroyed widely sprawled city over the winter (hopefully, you are not cancelling the winter of 1941). Not being able to leave it because it is an important token. The Soviets are actually in a better position for the winter offensive and the 1st major encirclement of the Germans: troops on the flanks are still in the mostly destroyed countryside in a severe cold and with a lousy logistics.

Once it is lost Leningrad is going to fall over winter without the Moscow-Leningrad rail line being open.

Wow! Judging by that "jewel" you did not hear about the Blockade of Leningrad. I thought that at least this is a rather common knowledge....

After that Murmansk can't survive without Leningrad sitting on the rail line the Axis needed to send supplies to take it.

Yawn. You really don't have a clue: a new railroad from Murmansk, bypassing the blockaded Leningrad, had been speedily built and the German-Finnish attempt to cut it off failed. How in your opinion the Soviets kept getting the LL supplies from Murmansk after Leningrad was under blockade?
 
What nation has survived the loss of it's capital?

Just off the top of my head. Athens during the Persian Wars. France during the 100YW (OK, this was complicated). Khanate of Siberia after the fall of Qashliq in 1582. Spain during the Napoleonic Wars. Austria in 1809. The PLC during the Deluge. Tsardom of Moscow during the Time of Troubles. Crimean Khanate in 1736.
 

Deleted member 1487

What kind of argument is it? Soviet propaganda started pumping up 1812 analogies (even if Moscow was not a formal capital in 1812) at no time. The government, most of the population, ministries and enterprises had been evacuated. Fall of Moscow would be unpleasant but not catastrophic thing.
The Nazis put out propaganda about the 7 years war, but it didn't help them. And no the majority of the population was not evacuated and the ministries could be relocated to Kuibyshev, but that doesn't mean they can effectively govern without the nation's central rail and telecommunications hub with all of it's industry (nearly 10% of the USSR's just within the city) and the mineral deposits in the Oblast. Plus of course the multiple air bases and the Kubinka secret testing base.
http://minchanin.esmasoft.com/maps/ussr1939/maps/02.jpg
http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9//Railways1941.png
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_Oblast#Minerals
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kubinka_Tank_Museum#World_War_II_History

Very interesting observation but hardly applicable to the circumstances taking into an account that the Soviets did not plan to surrender after a possible loss of Moscow.
Plan to surrender or not the ability to continue offering effective resistance is what matters.

BTW, who said that the Germans would be able to take Moscow in the magic 3 weeks? But if they did, they are in a worst trouble than they were at Stalingrad: they need a very substantial force to be permanently positioned in the destroyed widely sprawled city over the winter (hopefully, you are not cancelling the winter of 1941). Not being able to leave it because it is an important token. The Soviets are actually in a better position for the winter offensive and the 1st major encirclement of the Germans: troops on the flanks are still in the mostly destroyed countryside in a severe cold and with a lousy logistics.
I did. Given the front line held IOTL holding Moscow given the terrain is in their favor wouldn't be that hard, especially as the Soviets would have lost their central rail hub for mobilizing and moving troops around the front. Having lost the prime telecom hub (think land line telephones) the Soviets are going to have a nightmare trying to organize any sort of significant offensive.

Wow! Judging by that "jewel" you did not hear about the Blockade of Leningrad. I thought that at least this is a rather common knowledge....
Yes and the Road of Life was supplied by Moscow via the Moscow-Leningrad RR.


Yawn. You really don't have a clue: a new railroad from Murmansk, bypassing the blockaded Leningrad, had been speedily built and the German-Finnish attempt to cut it off failed. How in your opinion the Soviets kept getting the LL supplies from Murmansk after Leningrad was under blockade?
Because they lacked a rail line the Leningrad sat on top of. They couldn't move up enough supplies given the Finnish infrastructure alone to cut that line. Taking Leningrad opens up a high capacity rail link to the front that would allow for the necessary supplies. That would be the rail line from the Volkov to the Svir rivers.
http://www.kotikone.fi/~d628809/sa-int/karttajatkosota.html

The issue isn't the the LL supplies to Murmansk, it is the access to the double track rail line from Leningrad to the Svir river that would allow the Axis to move enough supplies to the front to cut the Murmansk RR and move in on the city to take it.

Also the rail line east from Murmansk toward Archangelesk existed pre-war.
http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9//Railways1941.png
 

Deleted member 1487

Just off the top of my head. Athens during the Persian Wars. France during the 100YW (OK, this was complicated). Khanate of Siberia after the fall of Qashliq in 1582. Spain during the Napoleonic Wars. Austria in 1809. The PLC during the Deluge. Tsardom of Moscow during the Time of Troubles. Crimean Khanate in 1736.
So none after the rail road was invented. Or the automobile. Or the telegraph. Or the air plane.
 
OP said more normal weather conditions for the East, not desert like dryness. As it was things got about as dry as they could be in the East June-July 1941, it was just that the rivers were flooded longer than IOTL, which was about June 10th IIRC.

That dust is normal conditions, just like in the US Midwest.

Have the same basic seasons, even

Snow
Mud
Dust
and then back to Mud before everything froze again

It's just not as noticed anymore with all the roadbuilding the US has been doing since the '20s, and that Oil was cheap enough for Farmers to spread Drums worth around the roads near their houses so they wouldn't get all that dust in the house

Iowa road before the Road to Market Road program, with areas planked to get over the worst muddy sections
a_000345_large.jpg


That's why most US Construction, Truck and Ag machinery typically had basic cyclonic separators, oilbath and oiled mesh filters, so they could live happily in the summer months and even Dust Bowl conditions tha were ongoing in the '30s.

A lot of the trucks the Germans gathered for Barbarossa, wasn't designed for that, but what they had in Western Europe. Typically just the oiled mesh.
 

Deleted member 1487

That dust is normal conditions, just like in the US Midwest.

Have the same basic seasons, even

Snow
Mud
Dust
and then back to Mud before everything froze again

It's just not as noticed anymore with all the roadbuilding the US has been doing since the '20s, and that Oil was cheap enough for Farmers to spread Drums worth around the roads near their houses so they wouldn't get all that dust in the house

Iowa road before the Road to Market Road program, with areas planked to get over the worst muddy sections


That's why most US Construction, Truck and Ag machinery typically had basic cyclonic separators, oilbath and oiled mesh filters, so they could live happily in the summer months and even Dust Bowl conditions tha were ongoing in the '30s.

A lot of the trucks the Germans gathered for Barbarossa, wasn't designed for that, but what they had in Western Europe. Typically just the oiled mesh.
Ok? The Germans dealt with it IOTL and overcame it. Are you saying it would be even worse than IOTL? By June the only 'wet' thing was swollen rivers, not anything that made the June-July roads less dusty.
 
Are you saying it would be even worse than IOTL

No, different problem. When you don't have mud, you typically had the dust. So they get more dust. It's won't slow progress, other than more worn out engines than OTL, they would travel farther.
Logistics will suffer a bit later on as truck transport is being repaired/replaced, sooner than OTL
 
The Nazis put out propaganda about the 7 years war, but it didn't help them.

It did not help because they were overwhelmed by a combined military and economic power of the Allies (all of them). German economic power was not overwhelming and their army not powerful enough to achieve the collapse of the SU: it simply could not occupy enough territory to achieve such a goal.


And no the majority of the population was not evacuated and the ministries could be relocated to Kuibyshev, but that doesn't mean they can effectively govern without the nation's central rail and telecommunications hub with all of it's industry (nearly 10% of the USSR's just within the city) and the mineral deposits in the Oblast. Plus of course the multiple air bases and the Kubinka secret testing base.

Of course, it could govern and a popular story about the nation's central rail hub is blown out of proportion: it's capacity simply was not enough for that task. The railroad ring going around Moscow and connecting the main railroads had limited capacity and so did these main roads.

What was never advertised and usually not shown on the schemes was a huge number of the secondary roads not passing through Moscow. So, yes, loss of Moscow would cause inconveniences but it would not be catastrophic and the 1st map you produced shows just the main roads. 2nd gives a much better idea and clearly shows that Moscow can be easily bypassed.

As for the minerals, you can't be serious: the SU lost much more valuable areas and survived.

Kubinka was not the only testing base.

Plan to surrender or not the ability to continue offering effective resistance is what matters.

Even loss of Moscow would not mean loss of ability to offer effective resistance.

I did. Given the front line held IOTL holding Moscow given the terrain is in their favor

I wonder how exactly terrain in that area would be in anybody's favor. Probably missed something fundamental during the 4 decades that I lived in Moscow. Defending it from the East would be rather difficult: flat area with a lot of forests on the outskirts and no noticeable natural obstacles. Taking it (stage that you keep ignoring) would be more interesting: it does not look like the Germans had the numbers (and many other things) for a complete efficient encirclement so this would be something Stalingrad-like: more or less frontal semi-circular attack from the Western direction and then house-to-house fighting.

wouldn't be that hard, especially as the Soviets would have lost their central rail hub for mobilizing and moving troops around the front.

Mobilization happened all over the country and even that 2nd schema you brought up shows that the Moscow was not indispensable in "moving" the troops. Most of the Soviet troops were not moving through Moscow: it simply did not make sense with the vast geographic area of mobilization and a very long front line.


Having lost the prime telecom hub (think land line telephones) the Soviets are going to have a nightmare trying to organize any sort of significant offensive.

Well, they had a lot of nightmares but this would not the biggest one. Not too difficult to solve.

Yes and the Road of Life was supplied by Moscow via the Moscow-Leningrad RR.

Leningrad had been cut off from Moscow and the Road of Life had been open only in November 1941 after Ladoga Lake was frozen and circulated only until April 1942. Then it started circulating again only in December 1942 and continued till January 1943 when blockade was lifted. Moscow-Leningrad railroad was not critical and your schema of cutting off Murmansk is excessively optimistic.
 
So none after the rail road was invented. Or the automobile. Or the telegraph. Or the air plane.

Or Internet. Or Facebook. Or Twitter. You can add more irrelevant objections.

Strange as it may sound, even prior to the invention of the railroads people had been building things called "roads" with an explicit purpose of traveling by them. And the armies had been routinely moving along these roads. How exactly did they travel is rather irrelevant.

Building the telegraph lines is not a difficult task and it does not require any fundamental construction. Invention of the wireless radio made things even easier. The railroads had been routinely built even in the middle of nowhere during the WWII (well, they were built even during the wars of the XIX century), see for example memoirs of Rokossovsky.
 
That dust is normal conditions, just like in the US Midwest.

Have the same basic seasons, even

Snow
Mud
Dust
and then back to Mud before everything froze again

It's just not as noticed anymore with all the roadbuilding the US has been doing since the '20s, and that Oil was cheap enough for Farmers to spread Drums worth around the roads near their houses so they wouldn't get all that dust in the house

Iowa road before the Road to Market Road program, with areas planked to get over the worst muddy sections
a_000345_large.jpg


That's why most US Construction, Truck and Ag machinery typically had basic cyclonic separators, oilbath and oiled mesh filters, so they could live happily in the summer months and even Dust Bowl conditions tha were ongoing in the '30s.

A lot of the trucks the Germans gathered for Barbarossa, wasn't designed for that, but what they had in Western Europe. Typically just the oiled mesh.

The seasons in the Central Russia are quite similar to what you described. Snow, then mud, then dust and mud, then mud, then snow.

Add to this that with the predominantly dirt roads in the European Russia even an ordinary rain can create serious problems all the way to a need of using the man-force to push a car out of the dirt. And if there is a heavy traffic, the things are getting from bad to worse. The photo you provided looks very familiar (typical countryside Road in the Moscow region circa 1970's) with one exception: nobody was bothering to put any planks across the muddy parts of the Soviet countryside roads. ;) And when it dry, yes, you do have a lot of dust if you are moving in a big column.

Infantry marching along the countryside after such a rain is another interesting story. Did anybody try to cross a mid-sized potato field after the rain?
 
Ok? The Germans dealt with it IOTL and overcame it. Are you saying it would be even worse than IOTL? By June the only 'wet' thing was swollen rivers, not anything that made the June-July roads less dusty.

Of course, I was not around in 1941 but as far as memory serves me, there were rains in a summer time and after the rain many of the countryside roads were getting a little bit tricky. Admittedly, there was no dust so you'd have one problem at a time. :)
 

Deleted member 1487

Or Internet. Or Facebook. Or Twitter. You can add more irrelevant objections.

Strange as it may sound, even prior to the invention of the railroads people had been building things called "roads" with an explicit purpose of traveling by them. And the armies had been routinely moving along these roads. How exactly did they travel is rather irrelevant.

Building the telegraph lines is not a difficult task and it does not require any fundamental construction. Invention of the wireless radio made things even easier. The railroads had been routinely built even in the middle of nowhere during the WWII (well, they were built even during the wars of the XIX century), see for example memoirs of Rokossovsky.
Moscow of 1812 was a vastly different city and of vastly different important than the 1941 version. The relevance of all of the things I mentioned was because of how important Moscow as to all of the things I listed. Building a replacement national telecommunications hub after losing your capital is something that is not simple at all and in fact took decades to build up IOTL. The Soviets were short of wireless in 1941 and were throughout the war until LL really kicked into high gear and made good their deficiencies. And no rail roads were not built in the middle of nowhere in WW2, they either were rebuilt following existing rail beds or were small local lines built up with tremendous effort.

Of course, I was not around in 1941 but as far as memory serves me, there were rains in a summer time and after the rain many of the countryside roads were getting a little bit tricky. Admittedly, there was no dust so you'd have one problem at a time. :)
Spring mostly. By June the issue was rivers that were higher, faster, and wider than usual due to the later rains in May still being run off in the first week of June. At least that was the formal reasons for the delay I've seen cited in translated documents.

It did not help because they were overwhelmed by a combined military and economic power of the Allies (all of them). German economic power was not overwhelming and their army not powerful enough to achieve the collapse of the SU: it simply could not occupy enough territory to achieve such a goal.
It was IOTL but for LL keeping the Soviets from starving. If they get luckier or make fewer poor choices in 1941 then the Soviets lose enough to reach a tipping point in their ability to resist, especially if a major port for LL is cut off or taken, like Murmansk. The combined military power of the Allies didn't start hitting a stride until late 1942/early 1943, so there were points in 1941-early 1942 when things were balanced enough in the main areas of operation to be potentially fatal to the USSR.


Of course, it could govern and a popular story about the nation's central rail hub is blown out of proportion: it's capacity simply was not enough for that task. The railroad ring going around Moscow and connecting the main railroads had limited capacity and so did these main roads.

What was never advertised and usually not shown on the schemes was a huge number of the secondary roads not passing through Moscow. So, yes, loss of Moscow would cause inconveniences but it would not be catastrophic and the 1st map you produced shows just the main roads. 2nd gives a much better idea and clearly shows that Moscow can be easily bypassed.
Mobilization happened all over the country and even that 2nd schema you brought up shows that the Moscow was not indispensable in "moving" the troops. Most of the Soviet troops were not moving through Moscow: it simply did not make sense with the vast geographic area of mobilization and a very long front line.
Moving supplies and replacements laterally along the front was pretty heavily dependent on Moscow

Limited capacity? Did you look at the Soviet maps I linked? Moscow is the core of the national system and permits lateral movements in quantity due to the number of double track lines in the area. It's loss rips the heart out of the system:
file.php



As for the minerals, you can't be serious: the SU lost much more valuable areas and survived.
There is a tipping point for losses, as they are cumulative.

Kubinka was not the only testing base.
Sure, but a lot of important technology and facilities, plus documents, would be lost.

Even loss of Moscow would not mean loss of ability to offer effective resistance.
That is the entire point of debate here.

I wonder how exactly terrain in that area would be in anybody's favor. Probably missed something fundamental during the 4 decades that I lived in Moscow. Defending it from the East would be rather difficult: flat area with a lot of forests on the outskirts and no noticeable natural obstacles. Taking it (stage that you keep ignoring) would be more interesting: it does not look like the Germans had the numbers (and many other things) for a complete efficient encirclement so this would be something Stalingrad-like: more or less frontal semi-circular attack from the Western direction and then house-to-house fighting.
Flat lands to the east means the high ground is in the city, as are the air bases in the area. That and the rivers and lakes east of the city which could be used to defend.
What forces were left IOTL in mid-October within the city? What was left was posted up on the highways to the west of it and if overrun leave nothing in the city to defend it. Rolling in frontally isn't going to be hard due to the lack of defenders.

Well, they had a lot of nightmares but this would not the biggest one. Not too difficult to solve.
It is if you lack enough wireless and were relying on that land-line network.

Leningrad had been cut off from Moscow and the Road of Life had been open only in November 1941 after Ladoga Lake was frozen and circulated only until April 1942. Then it started circulating again only in December 1942 and continued till January 1943 when blockade was lifted. Moscow-Leningrad railroad was not critical and your schema of cutting off Murmansk is excessively optimistic.
Where do you think the supplies and equipment to put the road of life into effect were coming from?
Road_of_life._1941_December.jpg
 
Moscow of 1812 was a vastly different city and of vastly different important than the 1941 version. The relevance of all of the things I mentioned was because of how important Moscow as to all of the things I listed.

Yes, in 1812 Moscow had a different kind of importance but I was talking about propaganda. As for the impossibility, in 1917 - 20 importance of the telegraph and telephone had been even higher than in 1941 (wireless radio being used only to a limited degree) and yet the Bolsheviks moved capital from Petrograd to Moscow quite easily.


Building a replacement national telecommunications hub after losing your capital is something that is not simple at all and in fact took decades to build up IOTL.

Taking into an account that, as you correctly remarked, the modern experience of fighting after losing a capital does not exist, what you are saying is just your opinion. Are you a specialist in telecommunications?

The Soviets were short of wireless in 1941 and were throughout the war until LL really kicked into high gear and made good their deficiencies.

You are confusing apples and oranges. The wireless in the context we are talking about are for communications between the high command and the top front commanders. While, AFAIK, the Soviets did not have them on the same scale as Wehrmacht, at least in 1941 - 42, they did have an equipment. In 1941 - 42 the shortages were on a low level communications between the units. But on that level wire had been used and it did not require any complicated infrastructure. LL provided a lot of equipment but by 1943 the locally-produced radios became available with the LL equipment being used in a niche of the powerful army-level stations (happen to know: my father was deputy commander of the army communications and a family friend served as a radio operator during the war).

And no rail roads were not built in the middle of nowhere in WW2, they either were rebuilt following existing rail beds or were small local lines built up with tremendous effort.

I'd start with recommending to read Rocossovsky's memoirs but, anyway, did I say that these railroads had been major permanent lines? It is a product of your imagination. They were built on ad hoc basis for the specific operations and did not end up on the map. As for the effort, they were routinely built by the GULAG prisoners and, unfortunately, nobody was counting the effort.


Spring mostly. By June the issue was rivers that were higher, faster, and wider than usual due to the later rains in May still being run off in the first week of June. At least that was the formal reasons for the delay I've seen cited in translated documents.

Of course, it is always a climate or something else but not one's fault. An idea that all rains in the Central Russia are ending in May on schedule is an interesting notion but let me assure you that they routinely happening all over the summer. The rivers are usually getting wider and faster not because of the rains (unless they are extraordinary strong) but because of the thawing snow, which is not a problem by the late May. However, even the ordinary rain would cause noticeable problems on the countryside roads especially in the areas where the earth is heavily clay. Actually, even in the sandy ground they are causing problems if the road is heavily used and has all these depressions from the wheels. And for a pedestrian getting off the road is not always a simple solution if the area is forested or boggy (plenty of those West of Moscow) or if there are plowed fields.

You keep repeating the same story about the rains but how about the serious losses of equipment due to the tear and wear? How about the inadequate logistics? The work on adopting to the Soviet railroads were far from being completed, the Germans did not have unlimited supply of the horses and their auto park was never adequate for a task. Season may be different but the distances would be the same and so will be the problems.

For operation on a scale needed to taking a major city like Moscow you need a lot of infantry and artillery but they were lagging behind simply because the tanks and motorized units had been moving faster. And, for example, Guderian in his push toward Tula suffered not only from the bad weather but also from fuel shortages and damaged roads and bridges. "On 31 October, the German Army high command ordered a halt to all offensive operations until increasingly severe logistical problems were resolved and the rasputitsa subsided."

"By late October, the German forces were worn out, with only a third of their motor vehicles still functioning, infantry divisions at third- to half-strength."

Not just "rasputitsa" as a single factor with other easily ignored.

Limited capacity? Did you look at the Soviet maps I linked? Moscow is the core of the national system and permits lateral movements in quantity due to the number of double track lines in the area.

Can't tell about you but I saw the circular railroad around Moscow something between hundreds and thousands times (used to live not too far from it) and traveled by the Soviet railroads quite extensively. So I'd rather believe my lying eyes than your assurances and the primitive schemes you keep providing. :p


Flat lands to the east means the high ground is in the city, as are the air bases in the area. [\QUOTE]

What is your personal experience as far as Moscow is involved? Did you live in it or visited it extensively? I lived in it for 40 years and walked extensively through a big part of what was Moscow in the 1940's. The only noticeable "high ground" in it are Vorobiew Hills on the South-West (Moscow circa 1941).


That and the rivers and lakes east of the city which could be used to defend.[\QUOTE]

Somehow the rivers, lakes and swamps ceased to be a problem for the advancing Germans. :winkytongue: Actually, they were a problem, especially when the Soviets started using artificial flooding by blowing off the reservoirs.

What forces were left IOTL in mid-October within the city? [\QUOTE]

Why forces would be within the city if it was not under a direct attack? The Germans never were closer than 30km from Moscow center (and this was just a reconnaissance battalion). They were defending far perimeter. In a meantime extensive defense line (anti tank and anti personnel obstacles) had been built around Moscow and within Moscow as well. By the early November (OTL) "a triple defensive ring surrounding the city and some remnants of the Mozhaisk line near Klin. Most of the Soviet field armies now had a multilayered defense, with at least two rifle divisions in second echelon positions."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow#The_Battles_of_Vyazma_and_Bryansk

The newly-raised troops kept arriving starting from August in OTL but in AH time table it would be starting from July so the general situation would not change too much.
 
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raharris1973

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Let me clarify my question: do you expect that the difference would result in the German victory in war?

I tend to think not. I tend towards the view that the basic capabilities of each side and their action-reaction cycle once the invasion began, their "dialectic" if you will, is what determined the outcome.

However, I was interested in hearing the arguments, and would not call weather being a game-changer implausible or impossible. It's a totally legit PoD.
 
I tend to think not. I tend towards the view that the basic capabilities of each side and their action-reaction cycle once the invasion began, their "dialectic" if you will, is what determined the outcome.

Well, we are on the same page in that regard.

However, I was interested in hearing the arguments, and would not call weather being a game-changer implausible or impossible. It's a totally legit PoD.

Of course, it is legit but IMO to limit the whole issue to a single item is an extreme simplification which can't produce a meaningful answer. You already got scenarios which are completely ignoring German logistics, distances involved, growing Soviet resistance (and improved skills) and seemingly pretty much everything else.

If your question is turned upside down, would a rainy summer (happens quite often) mean that the Germans would not get anywhere close to Moscow even with the earlier start?

Or perhaps the whole "rasputitsa" thing can be considered as a convenient post-factum excuse for the Germans, just as the reported by von Bock -40C near Moscow in December (https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=182049 - contains temperature charts contradicting that claim but how accurate are they? How -40C would impact the Red Army? ). The Germans kept advancing through the fall of 1941 and it does not look like rasputitsa seasons were stopping operations on both sides during the following years. Now, back to "rasputitsa" and its impact on the roads. The problem is that most of the roads in the Central Russia were dirt and you don't really need a seriously bad weather to make them very bad, just an ordinary rain could produce that effect. Even if the summer is unusually dry you still have serious problems because most of the bridges were not strong enough for a heavy traffic (both as in "high intensity" and "heavy loads"). For example, Soviet KV was too heavy for the average countryside bridges. Now, how about the rivers. Well, they are swelling when the snow is thawing (which should be over by the late May or even earlier) but other than that, most of them are quite small and should not be a major problem. IIRC, the Germans had been stressing a "sea of mud" rather than the rivers but, again, up to which degree was it true? Their transportation was heavily horse-based so how come that the Soviets managed to move their equipment using ...well, the horses or the trucks less powerful than the German ones? With all that mud Guderian managed to go all the way to Tula advancing all the way to November (at which point he Hoepner and Kluge got engaged in a favorite military game of finger pointing instead of acknowledging a seemingly obvious fact that what they had available was not enough for either encirclement or a frontal attack on Moscow: it was too big and too strongly fortified).

So even in the best case scenario you'd have to rely heavily upon a limited number of the reasonably good major roads. What was historically the best transportation season in the Central Russia? Winter, because instead of the shitty roads and endless obstacles you have smooth frozen rivers. That's why the Mongols invaded during the winter. Was it anybody's fault that the Germans (a bunch of the military geniuses who were just 3 weeks short of defeating the SU) were not prepared for the winter cold or spring/fall dirt?

How about Barbarossa failing much earlier, say at the time of Smolensk, when it should became clear that an idea of the victory by blitz is not working? Perhaps, while it is rather difficult to overestimate Soviet ineptitude during 1941, the German military genius was more than a little bit overestimated and their strategic planning had been faulty, just as their military intelligence?
 
Was it anybody's fault that the Germans (a bunch of the military geniuses who were just 3 weeks short of defeating the SU) were not prepared for the winter cold or spring/fall dirt?
And it's not like they didn't know what the Ukraine and Russia was like, they were there in WWI,
europe_march_1-15_1918.jpg

with the exact same dirt paths masquerading as roads, and the exact same Winters
 
And it's not like they didn't know what the Ukraine and Russia was like, they were there in WWI,
with the exact same dirt paths masquerading as roads, and the exact same Winters

And some of them visited the SU after WWI as a part of the military cooperation between Wiemar Respblic and the SU. For example, Kama tank school (German: Panzerschule Kama) located near Kazan was operating from 1929 to 1933 and among the people training, instructing or visiting were Walter Model and Heinz Guderian.
 
Ignoring Moscow for the time being, would an earlier start possibly enable the Germans to capture Leningrad? If so does this dramatically improve their supply situation for their drive on Moscow or on other fronts? I'm not anywhere close to an expert on what Soviet defenses looked like in the Baltics and in the Leningrad sector three works before Barbarossa so I'm curious if that would make a difference.
 

Deleted member 1487

Ignoring Moscow for the time being, would an earlier start possibly enable the Germans to capture Leningrad? If so does this dramatically improve their supply situation for their drive on Moscow or on other fronts? I'm not anywhere close to an expert on what Soviet defenses looked like in the Baltics and in the Leningrad sector three works before Barbarossa so I'm curious if that would make a difference.
Butterflies and luck might let it happen, but there wasn't anything in particular with an earlier start date that would make Leningrad fall with OTL strategy.
 
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