Shortened HYW, divided France. Can it be done?

Early in the Hundred years war, England was pretty much dominating the French forces. Especially leading up to the battle of Poiters. On the 19th of September 1356, King John II was captured along with several important nobles following the defeat of the French army. His son, a young Charles the fifth, was left in leading a fractured kingdom, while English soldiers and his own leaderless mercenaries destroyed the French countryside in an attempt to feed themselves, all this less than a decade after the bubonic plague had ravaged Paris.

The change I am proposing is this: instead of his failed attack on Reims, the Black Prince instead offers to abandon his claim on the crown, in exchange for ceding control of Normndy and Aquitaine completely to England. Black Monday is avoided completely and France is allowed to recover from the severe beatings it had endured in the small span of time.

The change is based on the fact that Englnd too had suffered greatly due to the war and plague, as well as huge spending by the treasury. Parliament would likely prefer to avoid having the King of England decide to take residence in Paris, as well as gaining more control and stability with regards to the port of Calais, and it gives them a sizable level of power on the continent.

Is this feasible? Getting Prince Edward to do this is not impossible, but would France say yes? Any help would be lovely, thank you.

Edit: Spell check changed especially to espresso.
 
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Early in the Hundred years war, England was pretty much dominating the French forces. Especially leading up to the battle of Poiters. On the 19th of September 1356, King John II was captured along with several important nobles following the defeat of the French army. His son, a young Charles the fifth, was left in leading a fractured kingdom, while English soldiers and his own leaderless mercenaries destroyed the French countryside in an attempt to feed themselves, all this less than a decade after the bubonic plague had ravaged Paris.

The change I am proposing is this: instead of his failed attack on Reims, the Black Prince instead offers to abandon his claim on the crown, in exchange for ceding control of Normndy and Aquitaine completely to England. Black Monday is avoided completely and France is allowed to recover from the severe beatings it had endured in the small span of time.

What you are talking about had been formulated in the Treaty of Brétigny:

"By virtue of this treaty, Edward III obtained, besides Guyenne and Gascony, Poitou, Saintonge and Aunis, Agenais, Périgord, Limousin, Quercy, Bigorre, the countship of Gauré, Angoumois, Rouergue, Montreuil-sur-Mer, Ponthieu, Calais, Sangatte, Hamand the countship of Guînes. The king of England was to hold these free and clear, without doing homage for them. Furthermore, the treaty established that title to 'all the islands that the King of England now holds' would no longer be under the suzerainty of the King of France. The title Duke of Aquitaine was abandoned in favor of Lord of Aquitaine.

On his side, the King of England gave up the duchy of Touraine, the countships of Anjou and Maine, the suzerainty of Brittany and of Flanders. He also renounced all claims to the French throne." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Brétigny#Terms

The treaty started falling apart soon after it was signed because none of the sides seriously intended to stick to its conditions. Well, it is possible that King John was talking it seriously but not the Dauphin. Ditto for Ed Senior and Junior (who, it seems, never gave serious consideration to the legalities and other such nonsense).
 
What you are talking about had been formulated in the Treaty of Brétigny:

"By virtue of this treaty, Edward III obtained, besides Guyenne and Gascony, Poitou, Saintonge and Aunis, Agenais, Périgord, Limousin, Quercy, Bigorre, the countship of Gauré, Angoumois, Rouergue, Montreuil-sur-Mer, Ponthieu, Calais, Sangatte, Hamand the countship of Guînes. The king of England was to hold these free and clear, without doing homage for them. Furthermore, the treaty established that title to 'all the islands that the King of England now holds' would no longer be under the suzerainty of the King of France. The title Duke of Aquitaine was abandoned in favor of Lord of Aquitaine.

On his side, the King of England gave up the duchy of Touraine, the countships of Anjou and Maine, the suzerainty of Brittany and of Flanders. He also renounced all claims to the French throne." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Brétigny#Terms

The treaty started falling apart soon after it was signed because none of the sides seriously intended to stick to its conditions. Well, it is possible that King John was talking it seriously but not the Dauphin. Ditto for Ed Senior and Junior (who, it seems, never gave serious consideration to the legalities and other such nonsense).

Is there any way to make the treaties stick? Perhaps a more determined Papal intervention, or a greater backlash from the borderline revolting French nobles?
 
Is there any way to make the treaties stick? Perhaps a more determined Papal intervention, or a greater backlash from the borderline revolting French nobles?

What would be the reason for the French side to consider it as anything more than a way to get rid of an immediate danger? Especially taking into an account that Ed III was too sure in his strength that he did not insist on all necessary formalities of the transfer and did not pay necessary attention to the subtle changes in the text of the initial agreement.

An assumption that absence of the homage to the King of France during the transfers (each territory had to be transferred separately) automatically means sovereignty was a mistake with the roots in the different feudal structures in England and France: in France this simply meant that such a person is holding an "allod", territory over which he holds a full ownership, while not being a "sovereign": in the Southern France there were numerous allod holders who were not anybody's vassals while still being the subject of the King of France.

Legalities of that sort plus local unhappiness with the English administration produced, in a short time, good opening for the process of squeezing the English out of their territories.
 
What would be the reason for the French side to consider it as anything more than a way to get rid of an immediate danger? Especially taking into an account that Ed III was too sure in his strength that he did not insist on all necessary formalities of the transfer and did not pay necessary attention to the subtle changes in the text of the initial agreement.

In light of this, perhaps the POD would have to be a more significantly weakened France, either through greater war losses or a more severe plague. Either that or somehow make Ed more cautious, but that might be ASB. Perhaps a few more educated lawyers who understand French law?

An assumption that absence of the homage to the King of France during the transfers (each territory had to be transferred separately) automatically means sovereignty was a mistake with the roots in the different feudal structures in England and France: in France this simply meant that such a person is holding an "allod", territory over which he holds a full ownership, while not being a "sovereign": in the Southern France there were numerous allod holders who were not anybody's vassals while still being the subject of the King of France.

Yeah, more lawyers. Not usually something to try for, but in this case...

Legalities of that sort plus local unhappiness with the English administration produced, in a short time, good opening for the process of squeezing the English out of their territories.

What specifically caused the unhappiness? AFAIK a good sized portion of Normandy were pro-English, as well as Paris. But I might be confusing that with a timeline I read. Thank you for the help alexmilman.
 
In light of this, perhaps the POD would have to be a more significantly weakened France, either through greater war losses or a more severe plague. Either that or somehow make Ed more cautious, but that might be ASB. Perhaps a few more educated lawyers who understand French law?



Yeah, more lawyers. Not usually something to try for, but in this case...

Would not help in a long run. Charles V did not limit his actions to the legal trickery. Almost as soon as he became a king, he took energetic measures to improve fortifications of the French cities and castles, reformed his army and developed (with the help of du Guesclin) a new strategy of the step-by-step conquest of the English-held territories.

OTOH, on the English side nobody came with anything more intelligent that continuation of the big raids. They did not even think about strengthening defenses of Aquitaine. The raids had been costly for France but they were also required new money sanctioned by the Parliament of England. What is also important, they ceased to be productive with the better French fortifications and their refusal to get engaged in the major battles.

What specifically caused the unhappiness? AFAIK a good sized portion of Normandy were pro-English, as well as Paris. But I might be confusing that with a timeline I read. Thank you for the help alexmilman.

Paris eventually became pro-Burgundian and anti-Armagnac (and only by extension "pro-English") but this happened much later during the reign of Charles VI. As for Normandy, its Estates for 5 years in a row had been voting the sums to support the royal army that was besieging the English fortress on the Cotentin Peninsula and then paid 50,000 francs directly to the English for an agreement to leave the fortress voluntarily. Hardly an indication of the good feelings. Anyway, why would the people start having good feelings about the foreigners who are doing nothing but destroying their property?
 
One thing that could have weakened the French in this period is having Charles II of Navarre succeed in his bid for the throne, with a natural resistance from Charles V's siblings provoking a French Civil War while the English sit back munching popcorns.
 
Would not help in a long run. Charles V did not limit his actions to the legal trickery. Almost as soon as he became a king, he took energetic measures to improve fortifications of the French cities and castles, reformed his army and developed (with the help of du Guesclin) a new strategy of the step-by-step conquest of the English-held territories.

He did, I have been to see the wall he built in Paris, it was impressive. That said, it also cost a lot to build. Wouldn't increased costs for hiring new mercenaries and/or paying off unrulier nobles slow this process down somewhat? Perhaps fewer debtors willing to lend money to a king who seemingly couldn't stop the English armies from carving up his kingdom?

One thing that could have weakened the French in this period is having Charles II of Navarre succeed in his bid for the throne, with a natural resistance from Charles V's siblings provoking a French Civil War while the English sit back munching popcorns.

That would be interesting. Perhaps stopping the pursuit of the feigned retreat at Cocherel? I don't know much past there, but that seems to be the pivotal battle on that front.
 
He did, I have been to see the wall he built in Paris, it was impressive. That said, it also cost a lot to build. Wouldn't increased costs for hiring new mercenaries and/or paying off unrulier nobles slow this process down somewhat? Perhaps fewer debtors willing to lend money to a king who seemingly couldn't stop the English armies from carving up his kingdom?

The English armies were aimlessly marching through France causing a lot of destruction but rarely achieving any strategic goal. As a king of France Charles V had considerable resources and it was not a matter of the voluntary lending but of the various forms of taxation. BTW, in many cases fortifications of the cities had been erected by the cities themselves at their own expense: they were not the royal folly but rather the only way to save the inhabitants from being looted and/or killed by the English. As far as "carving" was involved, it was rather other way around: during the reign of Charles V French royal forces had been squeezing the English out of their possessions, quite often with a full cooperation of the locals. There were only few areas where the local population saw some sense in being on the English side: Bordeaux region due to a wine trade and, from time to time, Brittany (or rather part of it) where the French advance was considered a danger to the local authonomy.
 
The English armies were aimlessly marching through France causing a lot of destruction but rarely achieving any strategic goal. As a king of France Charles V had considerable resources and it was not a matter of the voluntary lending but of the various forms of taxation. BTW, in many cases fortifications of the cities had been erected by the cities themselves at their own expense: they were not the royal folly but rather the only way to save the inhabitants from being looted and/or killed by the English. As far as "carving" was involved, it was rather other way around: during the reign of Charles V French royal forces had been squeezing the English out of their possessions, quite often with a full cooperation of the locals. There were only few areas where the local population saw some sense in being on the English side: Bordeaux region due to a wine trade and, from time to time, Brittany (or rather part of it) where the French advance was considered a danger to the local authonomy.

That does make sense, the cities paying to fortify. But it still doesn't explain where the money came from. France was rich, but not in gold and silver. French wealth came from trading farmed goods predominantly, and what taxes were collected were usually given in the form of grain. Hard currency was a tool for the rich, and this was true across much of Europe. They clearly had the cash to push England back, but I doubt they had much more. I can't help but note that at this time nearly every Frenchman had a serious thinness of the seat of their pants. England was poor, but still had access to their wool trade, though not for much longer.

To me it seems that France relied on luck quite a lot at this time, especially the events of Black Monday and Cocherel.
 
That does make sense, the cities paying to fortify. But it still doesn't explain where the money came from. France was rich, but not in gold and silver. French wealth came from trading farmed goods predominantly, and what taxes were collected were usually given in the form of grain. Hard currency was a tool for the rich, and this was true across much of Europe. They clearly had the cash to push England back, but I doubt they had much more. I can't help but note that at this time nearly every Frenchman had a serious thinness of the seat of their pants. England was poor, but still had access to their wool trade, though not for much longer.

To me it seems that France relied on luck quite a lot at this time, especially the events of Black Monday and Cocherel.

What you wrote above is strongly based upon the assumption that England had unlimited economic and human resources and could maintain uninterrupted fighting on any scale indefinitely. This was not the case at all. Not sure where did you get an idea about the French taxes being paid, at the time of Charles V, in grain. According to Jean Favier, these taxes had been providing enough money to provide (among other things) a regular pay to the companies on King's service (with more than 80% being paid before the end of campaign): France was already deep into "monetary economy" (and I'm not sure that "much" of Europe wasn't, especially if you are talking about the Western Europe).

Selling wool was OK but if this is your only major source of money, you are not in a good position for running a major endless war. Wat Tyler's Rebellion had been caused, among other issues, by the raising taxes resulting from the conflict with France and heavily influenced the course of the Hundred Years' War, by deterring later Parliaments from raising additional taxes to pay for military campaigns in France.

Attributing French final victory to the specific "subjective" events is (no offense) somewhat naive: they passed through a number of the terrible setbacks before they won the war and an assumption that the English side was going to be victorious just by not losing 1000 soldiers in 1360 or by Captal de Buch not being defeated and captured in 1364 can't be taken seriously. The only important part about Cocherel was that it demonstrated 2 things which the French were too slow to recognize: (a) the small numbers of archers were pretty much useless and (b) the fake retreat provoking English into a rush attack was one of the ways of dealing successfully with their tactics.
 
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