Shiny Happy Zimbabwe; or, Garfield Todd Wins Big

Rhodesian WI, POD c. 1955: Make South Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd a political genius.

OTL Todd was a liberal visionary who dreamed of allowing Rhodesia's emerging black middle class to become junior partners in white rule. Understand that this was not a plan for black majority rule! The idea was to co-opt the wealthiest and most educated blacks into governance, giving them a big enough share of power to keep them engaged while leaving the white minority firmly in charge.
But he failed to sell his plan; as of the late 1950s, most white Rhodesians fondly believed that the white 5% could continue to run things forever. His own party turned against him, and he was cast into the political wilderness.

But [handwave] let's say that Todd gets a version of his OTL plan passed. So, by 1964 wealthy and educated blacks constitute15%-20% of the electorate and hold a number of seats in Parliament. Say further that there's still a Unilateral Declaration of Independence against British rule -- but that the blacks continue to hold representation. This may be a bigger stretch than Todd's plan passing in the first place, but I think it's just barely plausible. Heck, some whites would seize upon this as a fig leaf: Britain is trying to enforce a ridiculous scheme for majority rule, instead of the sensible Todd system!
Now, we still get Mugabe and Nkomo turning guerrilla, and we still get the beginnings of a Bush War. OTL, in 1977-8 the Rhodesian Government adopted a desperate last-minute plan: to have a black PM and a black majority in Parliament, but with protections in place for the white minority. Alas, it was rather like the Confederacy arming black soldiers -- too little, far too late. By 1977 Mugabe and Nkomo were winning the Bush War, and they knew it.

But if the whites had tried this ten or even five years earlier, it would have worked a treat. By ~1970 Rhodesia had a large black middle class who'd have been happy to join with the white minority. And in an ATL where there'd already been successful power-sharing for over a decade, I think it's just barely possible this might have happened.

In which case, whoo! Things go great. Joshua Nkomo -- the now-forgotten other rebel leader -- was no fool; once he saw a stable, more-or-less popularly elected government in power, he'd come in from the bush and cut a deal. Mugabe never would, but it wouldn't matter -- cut off and isolated, he'd gradually dwindle into something like Jonas Savimbi, a violent and corrupt guerrilla leader running an ever-smaller movement into fanatical irrelevance.

So: *Rhodesia sees a peaceful, gradual transition to more-or-less majority rule in the middle 1970s, with international legitimization, the reopening of trade and the effective end of the Bush War around 1980 or so.

Is this completely happy and shiny? Not quite. White plantations still take up 90% of the good agricultural land. So there's going to be massive pressure on a majority government to break up the plantations and do land distribution. OTL this was grotesquely botched, for a variety of reasons. But I don't think that's inevitable. The dismount from white economic dominance would be hard, but other colonies (Zambia, Kenya, South Africa) managed it without violence. So [handwave] let's say that they manage some compromise that gives enough land to the landless to prevent an explosion, without utterly trashing the country's agricultural system.

So by 1990, Rhodesia -- now Zimbabwe -- is not only majority ruled, but mostly at peace and pretty prosperous. Per capita income is about as high as South Africa's. Some of the whites have pulled up stakes, but the great majority have stayed behind. (A surprising number stayed behind OTL.)

Knock-on effects around Africa? on South Africa in particular? What think you?


Doug M.
 
A couple of questions.

First, how different is this from OTL? Your 1964 target for blacks constituting 15 to 20 percent of the electorate was actually met; the 1961 constitution effectively set aside 15 of 65 parliamentary seats for Africans, and relaxed the property qualifications for both the A and B rolls for people with a secondary education. The trouble is that they always got outvoted, both before and after UDI (which did in fact preserve a level of black representation).

A change in voter qualifications is necessary, mind, but it isn't sufficient. What also has to happen is a change in attitude on the whites' part: for them to see the black MPs as partners rather than a meaningless sop or, worse yet, a disguised means of social control. Maybe it would help if the process started in 1955 rather than 1961, and maybe Garfield Todd would move in that direction if he stayed in office (as he seemed to be doing during his OTL tenure) but he'd have to drag his party kicking and screaming, and an opposition movement like the Rhodesian Front would certainly arise.

Would enough blacks be enfranchised quickly enough to keep the RF or something similar from taking power? Todd would face something of a catch-22 in this regard - if he relaxed the voter qualifications quickly, he'd have more black support but greater and more radical white opposition, while if he went slow, the RF would have a chance to see what was coming and build support among the whites before they lose their electoral majority. Todd would have to finesse this almost perfectly in order to come through.

But let's say he does it. That leads to the second question: what happens to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland? Todd was a federalist, and he wouldn't just want to shepherd Southern Rhodesia to quasi-dyarchy - he'd also want to convince the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to stay on board. If Kaunda and Kamuzu Banda see some real electoral (and, just as importantly, social) progress being made in Southern Rhodesia during the 1950s, and if they see Nkomo buying in, would it be possible to convince them that there's a future for Africans within the Federation and that bigger domestic markets would help ensure their countries' prosperity? Of course, if Southern Rhodesia goes UDI as you say, then continued federalism is dead in the water, but my gut feeling is that SR as the dyarchic economic center of a mostly-majority-ruled federation would have more staying power.
 
Jonathan, you're right -- the 15%-20% figure is too low. Your "meaningless sop / means of social control" point is also well taken. OTL, there was never any prospect of black MPs having a share in real power. And I agree that Todd has to thread a fairly narrow needle. Possibly making him a Lyndon Johnson level political genius may not be enough -- but it seems worth a try; certainly he could have been a lot more cunning than he was OTL.

As to federation, I think it's end is almost overdetermined. There were not one but two issues killing it. One was the obvious racial one -- white Rhodesians saw no point to staying federated with what would inevitably become black-ruled states. Whites were only about 2-3% of the population in Zambia, and well under 1% in Nyasaland / Malawi -- just not enough to maintain white dominance.

The other issue was money. Throughout Federation, Rhodesia consistently saw its northern neighbors as cows to be milked. At one point late in federation, when copper prices spiked for a while, Northern Rhodesia / Zambia was producing 60% of Federation revenues, but getting only 20% back. That was extreme, but the ratio was always grossly unbalanced in favor of Rhodesia. This aroused deep resentment among both white and black Zambians, and was a major reason nobody in Zambia lifted a finger to try to save the Federation.

Also, I think the timing doesn't work. The pressure for independence in Zambia and Malawi had become very strong by the early 1960s. Meanwhile, we're assuming a Rhodesia that gives blacks meaningful input into government, but doesn't go fully and truly dyarchic until sometime in the 1970s (and that under pressure from international disapproval and the Bush War). Even if that's followed by a fairly swift transition to no-kidding majority rule, it's coming too late to bring the northern states into the fold.

And finally: why would Kaunda or Hastings/Kamuzu Banda want to be part of a federation, anyway? They're masters in their own houses. What's the benefit to them?


Doug M.
 
Now that I think of it, 20 percent might be enough as a starting point if (a) the black MPs are associated with the ruling party; and (b) the party needs them to keep its majority.

Consider three scenarios relating to the 1962 general election, which was the first to be held under the 1961 constitution. First, there's the one that the United Federal Party expected to happen: that they would sweep the 15 districts (which were dominated by B-roll electors) and, as the establishment party, also win a majority of the 50 constituency seats. This would enable them to outvote the Rhodesian Front regardless of what the black MPs did, and would allow them to look all liberal and multiculti while actually treating the black members much like Mapai treated its Arab affiliates during the 1950s and 1960s - an occasional bone, but no more.

The second scenario is what actually did happen. The UFP did nearly sweep the B-roll seats, but won only 15 of the constituencies dominated by A-roll electors, and as a result, the RF won an absolute majority of the parliament. Nearly half the UFP caucus was black, but because they were in opposition, the RF could safely ignore them.

But consider a third scenario. Let's say the UFP had won four more seats, for a total of 33. It would have a bare majority in parliament - or maybe a bit more than that, since Ahrn Palley (a liberal independent who took the fifteenth B-roll seat) would probably support the government - but it would need the black MPs to stay in power. Whitehead wouldn't be able to get by with throwing them a bone - he'd have to appoint a couple of black ministers, and give the black members a real say in government.

So let's backdate the third scenario a bit. Garfield Todd institutes a dual-roll, overlapping-constituency system equivalent to the 1961 constitution in 1955 (not entirely impossible, as the first experiment with dual rolls occurred in 1957) and calls a general election in 1956. Ian Smith and Winston Field would scream bloody murder, but they'd be less organized in 1956 than in 1962, so despite widespread white outrage, the UFP squeaks through a narrow victory and Todd gets a second term. The UFP caucus totals 35 members, of which 15 are black; the opposition party holds 30 seats, with all members being white.

At this point, the white UFP members realize that they've got a tiger by the tail. They need the black MPs now to stay in power, but the more they give the blacks, the more white voters will go over to the opposition in the next election. In other words, unless they liberalize the voting qualifications fast, to the point where blacks are at least 35 or 40 percent of the electorate, they'll be out in 1960.

The question is whether even this will be enough impetus - after all, endangered UFP members have the much simpler option of crossing the floor and turning the Rhodesian Front's minority into a majority. But if Garfield Todd is a Johnson-level political genius, maybe he'd convince the caucus that partnership with the blacks is the way of the future and that a more equitable voting system (with safe seats reserved for all current white members, of course, or maybe a list system with spaces set aside for whites) could keep the party in power for the foreseeable future. Stay the course and it's gravy forever, while who knows what a loose cannon like Smith might do?

Note, though, that even if he can thread the needle, this would be a quick transition to effective dyarchy - it would have to happen between one election and the next, or else it wouldn't happen at all. I don't see any realistic way to drag it out into the 1970s, because unless Garfield Todd brings in enough black voters to win in 1960, Field or Smith will take charge and any further reforms will be sidelined. Which, in turn, means that your UDI condition is unlikely to be fulfilled, because an establishment party with a mostly-black supporting electorate wouldn't do something that rash.

Federation: I could imagine the race issue being overcome - if the pace of change in Southern Rhodesia is accelerated, then there might not be so much difference between SR and the other two majority-ruled states, and the whites might be persuaded that broad local autonomy is enough of a cushion against black rule at the federal level. Possibly SR could even cede some marginal areas to Northern Rhodesia, bantustan-style, in order to shore up the power of the white electorate. And while I take your point about Kaunda and Kamuzu being the masters of their own houses, I could also conceive them being attracted by (a) the possibility of being master of a bigger house, (b) a ready-made domestic market for their countries' products, and (c) an outlet for surplus Zambian and Malawian labor, especially if the above scenario plays out and dyarchy is a real deal by 1960. But yeah, the revenue issue's a killer, and with imbalances of the degree you're talking about, I can't quite see them finding middle ground.

Finally, land reform: is there any chance at all of encouraging collective farming or at least cooperatives? Nyerere tried and failed; would a somewhat less corrupt government in a country with an incrementally greater rule-of-law tradition be able to succeed?
 
Thinking about it a bit more, there might be a way to do this. It starts in 1962, though, and the hook is Whitehead being marginally smarter rather than Garfield Todd being a better politician.

The big sin of Whitehead and the UDF in 1962 was complacency: they were the establishment party, and except in 1946, establishment parties always won big in Rhodesia. Although the black electoral roll had been expanded considerably, they didn't do anything to get out the black vote or combat the boycott that was urged by African nationalist groups. They also didn't try to co-opt Garfield Todd's biracial Central African Party, which was contesting a few of the constituencies.

Looking at the seat-by-seat results, though, there are a few seats that could easily have flipped if the UFP had tried harder. In Matobo, the RF won by only 670-636, which could have been reversed if the B-roll turnout had been even 20 rather than 10 percent. In Eastern, the vote was 786 to 661, with 20.3 percent of the 508 B-roll voters showing up; again, the UFP could have won if the B-roll turnout were slightly more than doubled. In Bulawayo District, the RF got 702 to 575 for the UFP and 104 for Benjamin Baron of the CAP; we can assume most of Baron's votes would have gone to the UFP if he'd stood down, and there were also many B-list voters unaccounted-for.

Those three seats would be enough (the UFP would have 32 of 65, but Ahrn Palley would support them), but a vigorous campaign might also flip Bulawayo North and Salisbury Central, where there weren't many B-roll voters but where the RF's majority was 67 and 49 votes respectively.

So let's say they do it. Whitehead gets a panic attack and decides to go all-in. He wages a concerted (albeit under-the-table) campaign to get out the black vote, telling them that they may not like him much, but if they boycott, they'll get Winston Field. He offers Garfield Todd some post-election policy concessions if Baron stands down, and barnstorms the hell out of the marginal seats. It works, and the election result is a mirror image of OTL: 35 for the UFP plus Palley, and 30 for the RF.

Now the UFP is still in power and has a big IOU to pay to the black voters. But this is where the wheels come off, because Whitehead's much more timorous than Todd, and if he does too much, he'll lose the white MPs in his own party. He does push through some incremental reforms, decreasing the qualifications for both the A and B rolls to the point where ~15 percent of the A roll is black. Maybe he also appoints a black MP to a cosmetic government position and increases the profile of Africans in the civil service. But nobody's satisfied - the reforms are too much for most whites and not nearly enough for the blacks.

Come 1966, the white opposition is energized and the blacks are disillusioned. This time the black voters don't listen when Whitehead urges them not to boycott. The 15 B-roll seats go to the Central African Party or to independent nationalist candidates rather than the UFP, and the establishment party suffers a wipeout in the A-roll seats: the increased black presence on the A-roll pushes a few marginal seats Whitehead's way, but not enough to keep the RF from winning 40 seats and taking a firm majority.

The RF then tries to negotiate with Britain and, after the talks break down, goes UDI. As in OTL, the UDI government retains the existing electoral rules, which in TTL include Whitehead's amendments. This doesn't stop the RF from continuing as the ruling party, but it has to fight for more seats rather than being overwhelmingly dominant as in OTL, and, due to the black voters, the republic referendum is narrowly defeated. This means that the 1961 constitution, as amended, remains the default rather than switching to de jure racial segregation under the OTL 1969 charter.

Now it's the 1970s, with the bush war in progress, the republic at a dead end, Rhodesia isolated, and the RF increasingly facing right-wing opposition (Lardner-Burke?) due to its failure to go hard apartheid. Ian Smith was a lot of things, but he wasn't a total fool, so I'm guessing he'd respond to the right-wing opposition by tacking to the center, which would provide a window to bring in Nkomo. Talks begin in 1973 or so, and in 1975, Smith cuts a deal with Nkomo for a 50-50 parliament and a unity cabinet, with a graduated transition to majority rule over the next decade.

Where does it go from there?
 
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