Seven Pines/Fair Oaks POD - Longstreet doesn't get it wrong.

In OTL the situation in Virginia was thus: the 120,000 man Army of the Potomac sat astride the swollen Chickahominey river, effectively divided into two, while the near 60,000 man Army of Northern Virginia was camped just outside Richmond.

There were reports of Irvin McDowell approaching south with 40,000 more men and because of this Johnston decided to strike at the stronger Federal force on the north side of the river but news of McDowell being redeployed to the Valley changed this.

Johnston plan was simple.

Benjamin Huger's 5,000 man division would advance along the Charles City Road until it met up with Robert Rodes Brigade near the Federal left wing. Huger's division would wait there and succor the Confederate Right Flank.

Then Rodes Brigade would join up with D.H. Hill's reinforced 11,000 man division on the Williamsburg Road where Hill would then lead an attack on the Federal positions at Seven Pines.

While this was happening James Longstreet would lead the real main assualt with approximately eleven bridges of about 13,800 men along the Nine Mile Road to Old Tavern where the road intersected to New Bridge Road. There Longstreet would wait until Hill's division had engaged then he was to launch an attack into the Right Flank of Keyes dvision which would be weakened.

Huger understood the plan, Hill understood the plan, but Longstreet didn't. Johnston's written orders were not all that clear as he believed in allowing his subordinates freedom to take the initiative but his orders to Longstreet are unknown in its clearness. Johnston spen seven hours with Longstreet discribing his plan to him, as Longstreet had the most important job Johnston wanted to be sure he understood it.

E.P. Alexander, Johnston chief artillery officer, was present when Johnston discussed his plans with Longstreet and he said of it later that "it is hard to imagine how any serious misunderstanding of such a simple movement could have ever taken place in a conversation that prolonged for hours."

Becuase Longstreet missunderstood Johnston's plan his forces marched off on Huger's route and got in the way of Huger's division and neither of those forces got engaged in the fighting. D.H. Hill got tired of waiting for orders to attack and attacked anyway and Johnston went to where Longstreet should have been fighting and got wounded then didn't command a major army again until the late winter of 1863.

So POD is this:

What if James Longstreet didn't missunderstand Johnston's orders? What effect would Johnston's plan for Seven Pines/Fair Oaks actually being used have on the campaign?
 
'Tis a puzzler. The primary reason the movement got started wrong was that Longstreet used Huger's road, and the timing was dependant upon Huger opening the movement. With Longstreet safely to the north, Huger can move off in time.

I see no reason why he moves particularly fast - these are not yet seasoned troops. Furthermore, there will not be good co-ordination anyway. As it happened in OTL, and will not be changed in this ATL, there was a giant accoustic shadow across the battlefield, so extreme that Johnson didn't hear that his attack wasn't happening until 4 in the afternoon. Additionally, Keyes' men had a semi-decent defense.

Nevertheless, when D. H. Hill starts his attack (not before noon, certainly), it will succeed and break through Heintzleman's first line. The question is what happens later in the afternoon. Sumner was trying as hard as possible to bring the IInd corps across the Chickahominy, and managed it by late in the day. With the IInd, IIIrd, and IVth corps in place the Union army in fact outnumbers Johnson's attacking force. Then again, they will be more successful and with momentum.

I don't see a huge victory off the bat. But what happens tomorrow will be very fun indeed.
 
So what do we expect? Is this the likely scenario:

D.H. Hill's 11,000 man division to strikes at the Federal lines of Keyes Corps and catched them unaware which leads to hard fighting during which more men are deployed against Hill leaving the right flank exposed.

Longstreet (being where he's supposed to be) strikes with his 13,800 men on the Keyes right flank and smashed the whole Corps, sending them inot a rout that doesn't stop until they reach Hintzelman's lines near Savage's Station and White Oak Swamp.

Since Longstreet's attack has sent Keyes' Corps into a rout the reinforcement's possibly sent by Hintzelman dont join the battle in time and are driven back.

Edwin Vose Sumner, acting on his own initiative, sends John Sedgwicks division across the one usuable bridge which then collapses and stands Sedgwick and his Division the Southern side of the Chickahominey.

Johnston, from his HQ on the Nine Mile Road deploys three bridgades (Evander M. Law, James J. Pettigrew and John Bell Hood) to engage Sedgewick's Division at or near to Abercombie.

This leaves the situation as thus: the Confederates in almost complete control of the Southern side of the Chickhominey with only Hintzleman's two Corps and Sedgwick's division opposing them.

With the earlier deployment of Hill's forcess and the actual deployment of Longstreet forces against Keyes weakened right flank means that there casualties for the Confederates would be less than those for the Federals and most of the Casualties would be suffered by Hill's forces.

Still it is a clear Confederate victory for the first day and whether the Confederates can succor victory will all depend on how they deploy the next day.

Of coure there is still the option of George B McClellan pulling what forces he can back to the North Side of the Chickahominey over night...
 
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