Sent to Malaya December 1940.

Immaterial. The Henley was underpowered in any role. It was made a target tug 'cause the RAF couldn't think of any other use for it where it could be even marginally safely used.
You can't turn a sow's ear into a silk purse.

Underpowered !!? How? Source?

According to Gouling & Moyes - RAF Bomber Command and its aircraft 1936-1940, p.27
"With a wing span of 47ft 10.25in and an overall length of 36ft, the prototype Hawker P.4/34 was not much larger than the Hurricane and had a top speed of 292 mph at 17,100ft. It had a range of 1,000 miles at aa cruising speed of 215mph at 15,000ft."
Of the two designs put forward the Air Ministry decided the the Hawker was the best, and ordered (as I said before) 350, curious that the ground breaking aircraft the Spitfire only got an order for 310!
According to Owen Thetford - Aircraft of the Royal Air Force since 1918, the Hurricane I with the same engine as the Henley, had a max speed of 316 mph, not a lot of difference, considering the Henley's empty weight was nearer the Hurricane's max.
Or, John Terraine in - The Right of the Line, p.144:
"Hindsight tells us also - though the Hornum raid had provided a strong enough hint - that this belief in the so-called "big bombers" was pathetically misplaced.The hard fact is that the Whitleys, the Hampdens and even the wellingtons were unsuitable both for the direct support role that the war required, and the strategic role that the Air Staff yearned for. Indeed, it could be said that what May 1940 showed was that the RAF itself itself was unsuited to the war that Britain was fighting: what was needed was not Whitleys and Hampdens, but twice as many Hurricanes and Spitfires and a good close-support bomber ( the Hawker Henley, first flight 1937 - might well have been the one). But the RAF had set its face too resolutely against the idea of all forms of cooperation;..."
Moreover according to Peter C Smith - Dive Bomber p.61:
"But it was all too late. The RAF, by rejecting a purpose-built dive bomber with the Henley, had committed itself to the rejection of true dive bombing and all else was compromise. The overwhelming power in the upper echelons of the heavy bomber lobby carried all other considerations before it, and by the eve of the war the equally negleted fighter arm was crying out for what space design and building capacity there was to make good its own deficiencies. There was no room, even if the Air Ministry had been willing, which was far from the case, to add a dive-bomber programme as well at this late stage. And so the ill conceived Battles went to their doom in low flying suicide en masse in those desparate hours during the Battle of France in May and June 1940. Years later Sholto Douglas admitted that the pre-war policy of the RAF had been wrong: '... it would have been so much better, if, some years earlier, we had developed a dive bomber along the lines of Ernst Udet's Stuka, instead of devoting so much of our resources to the design, development and the production of those wretched Battles.' "

So it wasn't the aircraft that was the 'sow's ear' it was RAF policy!
 
Dowding was ready for retirement by this time. I hope his health holds up under the pressure.

He was due to be replaced by Courtney, before the Battle of Britain but was asked to stay on, because Courtney was too ill, fortunately IMHO - don't think he would have said no to more Squadrons to France.
What you befieve about his leaving Fighter Command in Nov., 1940 possibly depends on what you read! But I doubt ill-health was a reason.

Rather than going to the US as per OTL, I think this would enthuse him. I seem his first priority, as estabishing a local Observer Corp, and setting up 'control rooms' to identify raids and be able to direct Fighter interception.
 
He was due to be replaced by Courtney, before the Battle of Britain but was asked to stay on, because Courtney was too ill, fortunately IMHO - don't think he would have said no to more Squadrons to France.
What you befieve about his leaving Fighter Command in Nov., 1940 possibly depends on what you read! But I doubt ill-health was a reason.

Rather than going to the US as per OTL, I think this would enthuse him. I seem his first priority, as estabishing a local Observer Corp, and setting up 'control rooms' to identify raids and be able to direct Fighter interception.

Don't forget Dowding started his military career as a Gunner.

By this time a new tank was coming off the production lines that the army had decided it no longer had a use for. The MkVII Light Tank, considered a white elephant they might be able to get some shiped out. This could be played up in the Australian, Malayan and New Zealand press as the latest equipment to boost confidence.

The end of the East African Campaign in mid 1941 would also free another Officer that the higher command might want to see sent to some far distant command. Ord Wingate.
 
How about Britian sending 70~80% of it's entire sub force to SE Asia in Summer 1941.
If it has continued Patrols of South/East China Sea, Maybe a couple of Subs will be in position to do something, evening Dec 8th.
 

Markus

Banned
"The end of the East African Campaign in mid 1941 would also free another Officer that the higher command might want to see sent to some far distant command. Ord Wingate."

*lol* but he would have been most useful for raising light infantry/guerillas from the local population.

@DuQuense: the subs were needed in the Med. how badly I cant say.
 
Underpowered !!? How? Source?

The Henley in service was also prone to overheating and fires - and you want them to serve in the tropics?

Smith BTW is a dive bomber enthusiast and prone to exaggerating their abilities.

So it wasn't the aircraft that was the 'sow's ear' it was RAF policy!

I beg to differ. The machine was unsuccessful because it was too specialised and underpowered. Yes, it didn't "fit" the air power doctrines of the RAF but then perhaps we should remember which air forces won the war and which one's lost - strategic air power was the doctrine that won out in the end. Tactical battlefield doctrine has therefore taken a back row seat.
 
@DuQuense: the subs were needed in the Med. how badly I cant say.
Which is why I didn't say -send them all. 70~80% may be a little high - ?maybe a 50-50 split?
With how stretched the Japs were logictically, The loss of a dozen Freighters and several Troop ships in the week following Dec. 8th would change the whole War.
 
The engines in the Henley were faulty early production engines and that is why they died. I'd much rather have Hercules-powered Hurricanes, but that's just me.
I wasn't implying that Dowding was in poor health, but he was pissed off and needed a holiday.
North Sea submarines didn't seem to have much effect patrolling during the period, so they could go. The subs in the Med can't be spared.
I'm surprised to hear that strategic air power won the war. I thought that idea was still being debated. Proper co-operative combined operations battlefield support, as established in the Western Desert campaign, using tactical fighter bombers and tank-busters, seemed to improve life for the Allies. Personally, I think it was more than one segment of military power that won the war. In fact, it was all segments, and more.
I'm also wondering if Churchill is still going to agree to close the Burma/Hong Kong conduit to Chinese aid as done OTL.
 

Markus

Banned
About the Henley:

The fact that the RAF considered dive-bombing indecent behavoiur does not mean the Henley could not have been a lemmon for this or that reason. Apparently it was the engines. What does that reminds me of? :D

About the subs:

IOTL even older and lager ones were patrolling in the Med which was not the right place for them. Sending North Sea subs to the Med and the larger subs to the Far East gets:

-2 Rivers
-2 Rainbows
-4 Parthians
-5 Odins

All long range boats designed for the Far East. Were there enough North Sea boats to relief them in 1941?
 
The Henley in service was also prone to overheating and fires - and you want them to serve in the tropics?

It encountered problems with engine wear, when target-towering such that the speed was limited to 220 mph - too slow for fighter training! But, what source do you have for 'overheating & fires' especially not towing?
No, it was perfectgeneral who wanted them, in post 3, I was commenting on your implied inaccurate portrayal as a 'target-tug'.

Smith BTW is a dive bomber enthusiast and prone to exaggerating their abilities.

Sure, he's an enthusiast - exaggerating, depends on your point of view.

I beg to differ. The machine was unsuccessful because it was too specialised and underpowered.

It was designed for the specification as layed down, but dive-bombing had little or no proponents in the RAF. And, still puzzled why you keep saying 'underpowered' - on what basis, speed - hardly, load carrying - hardly?
Yes, it didn't "fit" the air power doctrines of the RAF but then perhaps we should remember which air forces won the war and which one's lost - strategic air power was the doctrine that won out in the end. Tactical battlefield doctrine has therefore taken a back row seat.

The fact that the Allies had the industrial capacity, to wage a strategic bombing campaign, doesn't invalidate the idea that having a more tactical air force capability in May/June 1940 wouldn't have helped. No, we can't know what would have happened if those 112 aircraft that Owen Thetford mentioned (I don't think he's a dive-bombing enthusiast), had been substituted for Battles; but then at AH that's what is all about.
 
Poured in forces? using what non-existant logistics train??


Scavenging materials from Thailand and elsewhere, mostly it is assumed. Instead they sent their supply train to Burma. Both were stretched to the limit, but in the case of Singapore, it fell quickly and there was no other border front nearby (Japan did try to invade India, but never quite made it. There were a few close calls with the border front nearly collapsing).
 
The fact that the Allies had the industrial capacity, to wage a strategic bombing campaign, doesn't invalidate the idea that having a more tactical air force capability in May/June 1940 wouldn't have helped. No, we can't know what would have happened if those 112 aircraft that Owen Thetford mentioned (I don't think he's a dive-bombing enthusiast), had been substituted for Battles; but then at AH that's what is all about.

You do realise that if an aircraft is prone to overheating and fires in the skies above the UK, it isn't going to cope very well with the skies above Malaya which are in the tropics? You're basing your comments on an aircraft that was flawed.
 
Scavenging materials from Thailand and elsewhere, mostly it is assumed. Instead they sent their supply train to Burma. Both were stretched to the limit, but in the case of Singapore, it fell quickly and there was no other border front nearby (Japan did try to invade India, but never quite made it. There were a few close calls with the border front nearly collapsing).

And just how do they get to Thailand in the first place?

And I'm sure the Thais will be just chuffed to be stripped to support the Japanese forces, it will make them love them so much more...:p
 
You do realise that if an aircraft is prone to overheating and fires in the skies above the UK, it isn't going to cope very well with the skies above Malaya which are in the tropics? You're basing your comments on an aircraft that was flawed.

Whilst you keep saying its prone to overheating and fires, yet provide no sources for this, or whether when this happens it was while target towing, as opposed to potential doing what it was designed for.
Try, doing the search function, on the Hawker Henley - I think your comments are, so far, the only derogatory ones there.
I'm not claiming it is a 'problem solving' aircraft, but it is a good 'what if' aircraft as many historians have agreed (who've previously quoted - not just Peter Smith).
I would imagine that if it was to go to the tropics, then it would have been up-engined with the Merlin xx, and equiped with the appropriate tropical filters etc -as per the Hurricanes.
"Flawed"? Is that just your opinion?
 
Whilst you keep saying its prone to overheating and fires, yet provide no sources for this, or whether when this happens it was while target towing, as opposed to potential doing what it was designed for.

It is mentioned on the Wikipedia page for the aircraft. It doesn't matter if its target towing or doing anything else, if the aircraft was prone to overheating and fires in the benign skies of the UK in the much hotter temperatures of the tropics over Malaya it would be much worse off.
 
It is mentioned on the Wikipedia page for the aircraft.
Ignoring the whole wiki reliability issue, no it isn't. The page has been revised since December last year and the current version doesn't mention anything about fires or overheating.
 
Ignoring the whole wiki reliability issue, no it isn't. The page has been revised since December last year and the current version doesn't mention anything about fires or overheating.

Dunno I just did a google search that was the page that came up. I note that when I repeated the search today it didn't come up. I am mystified. However, I note several other pages do also mention it, with details of particular crashes.

I also note from this page, about the death of FARWELL, F. Aircraftsman 2nd Class, RAF. Drogue Operator, 1 AACU RAF. Died 8 Nov 41. Aged 22 that:

The RAF accident report gives the cause of the accident as, "Unauthorised aerobatics - developed a spin off a stall turn at 2000ft - failed to recover. Orders already in force prohibiting aerobatics on type."

Hardly inspiring for a dive bomber, now is it? No aerobatics?

Overheating is also mentioned as a problem in Mason, F.K, Hawker Aircraft Since 1920, Putnam, London, 1961, on p.269, where it is claimed the problem beset Henley's "by the score".

Henley was an also run. I am unsure why people really like to spend so much time and effort resurrecting it.
 
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