Sent to Malaya December 1940.

[perfectgeneral]

Do we seriously have to have a debate over mobile 2 pounders vs Towed?

I think the key word is mobility. I'll leave it at that.

The best use of any Italian tank of the period was to take off the turret and install 75mm artillery. Again mobility. Although L3/35 tankettes would be the most likely surplus from North Africa. The L3 Lf flamethrower tank could do well. Plenty of fuel. At 3.2 tons, maybe a smaller mortar/AT gun would be required? Twice the speed of a Matilda II and only 4 foot eight inches wide (cf 8'6").

Light tanks could negotiate the small winding jungle tracks. Something the Japanese made good use of in this campaign. A Matilda makes a pretty good road block, but it can be by-passed. Pinch points in the terrain would have to be carefully selected. The sooner ground forces stop thinking about Op Matador and start looking for defensive ground the better. If Malaya Force hasn't got the tank engineers to adapt a few emergency SP guns/mortars then they will be in trouble when tanks start to break down or need damage repairing. Singapore is a major naval base and has bending, cutting, welding and riveting equipment along with lathes and other machine tools.

The (94mm) 3.7_inch_Mountain_Howitzer was standard issue in the Indian Army at this time and I'd expect quite a few to be called upon for those hillside strongpoints.

 

[Rickshaw]

Do we seriously have to have a debate over mobile 2 pounders vs Towed?

If someone has made it a key point in their scenario and keeps banging on about the need for them, then yes, I believe we do. There seems to be an assumption that Malaya was a place where massive tank battles took place. It wasn't. First up, the terrain precluded it. It wasn't all the dense jungle of myth - a hundred years of intense, European clearing and cultivation had put paid to that in many parts of the country but there simply weren't that many tanks involved and for the most part they were road bound. Towed AT guns were adequate to the task. It wasn't the lack of weapons, nor their quality, the problem was the the crews manning them. Something which I've failed thus far to see being adequately addressed in the usual preference for concentrating on the material over the moral.

 

[Rickshaw]

I think the key word is mobility. I'll leave it at that.

The mobility of the 2 Pdr was more than adequate for the task of defeating Japanese tanks. Even in North Africa it showed it was able to function quite well in a theatre where mobility was a much greater requirement than in Malaya.

You appear to think that Malaya was going to be a campaign of mobility. It wasn't. If done properly, it was going to be a war of position. Don't think North Africa. Think later Korea.

The (94mm) 3.7_inch_Mountain_Howitzer was standard issue in the Indian Army at this time and I'd expect quite a few to be called upon for those hillside strongpoints.

Mmm, I have some figures on total production somewhere around here. It was in the hundreds, not the thousands you appear to envisage and most of them were used on the North-West frontier. You going to strip that theatre or restart production of a gun which was long out of date?

 

[perfectgeneral]

Strip that theatre.

Pilots, experienced tank fighters, mountain guns, etc.
Malaya is just as much a gateway to India as the NW frontier and there is a more serious enemy on the doorstep.

 

[Some Bloke]

Interesting, how does Malaya holding affect the War as a whole and the post war world?

Immediately it's a sinkhole for Japanese manpower, so fewer resources for Burma, meaning more support for the Nationalists.

Other effects?

 

[Markus]

the japanese are screwed. with malaya and burma in allied hands attacks on the dutch east indies by air, naval and eventually ground forces are possible. that makes it as good as impossible to exploit the dei's resurces and that means japan run out of oil in a year or two.

 

[jackalope]

Nothing New

Send nothing new except a two dozen hand picked military men who think differently. Divide up 20% of the existing troops to a new corps, saying they will be in the reserves for
Singapore. Never put them there, except for show (quietly
return them back towards the front). Half of the
30% of force Dominion troops, especially Australian.
All are mixed, forcing them to learn together quickly.

Hack out mosquito net tent camps in deep swamps, mostly
in the front 1/4 of the country but some peppered here and
there for harrassment the whole the way through and let
the invasion pass them by. Most of the best thinkers,
opposed to functionaries, are there, and many if not nearly
all, of the regular troop chain of command are happy to let
them go. Very few of the top are, and some of those are
obvious incompentents (like drunkards), to salt the mines
and front up dummy groups so the ever present spies are
led to believe the tale.

Just about when the supply lines are stretched to the limit,
around the time the Japanese are approaching Singapore,
they go on the attack from their hidden locations. Supplies are the main treat, and the rare holding Japanese forces
ordinarily are avoided when regular unit. Live out of
enemy's pockets, happily so since only 30 days rations
are in the swamp enclaves at any one time before invasion.

Prince of Wales and Repulse provide shore support. If they
are sunk, then refloating & tow to Ceylon is possible. They
leave soon afterwards, but several small, ancient destroyers
stay on as mobile moral support.

Eventually the Japanese do regroup, but critical initiative
is lost, even Thailand being briefly invaded. Japanese
pillage native Malayians/others, alienated an already
negative and hostile force. Malaya and hill Austronesian
peoples are especially valued for the knowledge of living
in the mountain regions, a dagger behind the Imperial
Japanese forces. Most Royal Kings of Malaya give
active support as much as is possible.

Singapore falls in May 1943, but large portions of Dutch Indonesia (non oil producing), Timor, and Burma never
do, including the road to China, not to mention an ever continuing Malayan guerrilla hill country roving force of
all sorts.

Some Australian outfits did go to guerrilla warfare, about
3,000 I recall, until the British commander ordered them
to quit and surrender (believing lies that all will be treated
well in the River Kwai Hiltons). And areas marked on
maps as 'impassable swamps' were easy to go through with
hand held bicyles. These troops simply selectively attacked the supplies and did quite well. Some kind of like minded bit would be grandfathered in the plan.

Faking the enemy is an old trick. The Mongols loved it,
feigning retreat and turning on a dime to crumble the
attacking force, especially the Poles. These passages
are a more ordinary type of the same, more of the
hole in the wall sense.

 

[Some Bloke]

I dunno about Singapore falling in 1943 with this scale of reinforcement or preparation, evacuation or relief maybe. If they've held out this long and have a general popular mobilisation (perhaps granting citizenship to ethnic Indians and Chinese), the Japanese will soon have numbers working against them, not mention a greater British commitment (bastion of empire malta of the east etc) I don't think British/Imperial public opinion will allow singapore to be simple abandoned. The big problem is Logistics, and I can see force Z being used to force periodic convoys for supplies etc, or maybe an evacuation of the surviving regular forces.

If parts of the Dutch East Indies never fall, I can see the development of a campaign leading to a retake the rest of the regions as a springboard for reliveing/retaking Singapore.

All of this depends on the level of preparation, of which I was initially somewhat sceptical (The figures are bigger even than France Fights On). If this is the only POD and Britain is still fighting alone, then I thing some of the equipment will be diverted to North Africa etc. However, With Dowding and Co leaning heavily on India for support this implies that the British Empire as a whole is mobilising and coordinating at a much larger scale than OTL. With this in mind how does this affect other regions and theatres. Either way, closer coordination withing the Commonwealth has interesting ramifications post war.

 

[Rickshaw]

Closer Imperial/Commonwealth cooperation will invariably fall foul of the very differing ideas of how the Empire/Commonwealth was going to operate. London very much saw it as supporting Britain and the colonies and Dominions would do as they are told in the process. The colonies to a lesser extent and the Dominions primarily, saw it as a joint effort, a case of Britain being primus inter pares. Canada, then Australia and finally South Africa had increasingly since the turn of the 20th century been becoming alarmed at being drawn into what were perceived as primarily European conflicts by the UK's involvement in them. Each Dominion definitely had its own views on how much it was willing to provide support to the Empire and how much it desired the Empire to support it, in its own regional concerns.

With an organisation as far flung and divergent as the early 20th century British Empire and then later Commonwealth was, there would obviously be conflicts in perceptions and needs. With people like Churchill unwilling to acknowledge until seriously pressed that the Dominions were indeed, separate, sovereign nations in their own right and not colonies ruled and controlled from London, the Dominions were obviously going to be seeking far more independence. They saw the Empire as potentially morphing into a federation style organisation. London resisted this centripetal "pull" of the "periphery" over its centrifugal "attraction" as the "centre".

 

[Some Bloke]

That is true but here you have British Commanders-in-Chief going
hat in hand asking India for help, which puts a very different spin on things.

Imagine being a civil servant ITTL and seeing the look on
Churchill's face when he sees hears news.

You are entirely correct about the fundamentally
different interpretations of commonwealth cooperation
at the time, and this adds an even more interesting
dimension to the whole scenario.

 

[Rickshaw]

India was essentially a self-governing Colony. While the Viceroy was appointed by London, once there he was essentially left to his own devices. They may have been British commanders in Singapore but their requests still had to go via London to New Delhi, not directly.

I also believe that India's ability to contribute to this massive build up in Malaya has been vastly overstated.

In particular the issue of Indian fighter squadrons. The Indian Air Force only had were 3 SQNs - 1 (Lysander by DEC41) (formed1APR33), 2 (formed OCT41 with Wapities then Audax then Lysander by DEC41), 3 Audax (formed OCT41), 4 Lysander (formed 1FEB42) were the only available IAF SQNs before 15FEB43. None were fighter. So where were the fighter pilots to come from ? There were the 24 IAF pilots sent to OTUs in the UK in Summer 1940 but they ended up all over the shop (not all suited to be fighter pilots). There were some Anglo-Indians in the RAF but they would not have been sufficient to raise and to train a single SQN with its attrition for very long. (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forum...yal-Indian-Air-Force-in-WW2-Lots-of-Rare-Pics)

Then there is the matter of aircraft. The claim is that HP Herefords would be sent to Malaya as they were "unsuitable" for European theatre use. Only 150 built (used Napier Dagger engine - a huge failure) and survivors were converted to standard Hampdens. Therefore none to send.

A-28 Hudsons were in Malaya So were RAF Hudsons. What more does he want ? There were only so many available. The American production rate would have to be substantially increased.

Hawker Henley was only produced as a target tug (and not a very good one at that) - such that the survivors of the 200 built were withdrawn from service as unsafe in 1942. So he would condemn the aircrews to a totally unsuited aircraft ? It would appear so.

Then there is the matter of sending all this equipment to Malaya. I wonder what Middle East command would have thought of it? Particularly when they were hard pressed as they were?

 

[Markus]

Singapore falling in 1943 would require ASB intervention. IOTL the Allies went of the offensive just half a year after the Fall of Singapore and kept the initiative in the Solomons an in New Guinea. The only exception was Burma but there the setbacks were more embarrassing than painful. Speaking of Burma. At the end of 1943 the Brits had a dozen divisions on the Burma front, almost all Indian.

When the war began both sides fought with small forces. The Brits did have three divisions in Malaya, but two were 1/3 under strength. The Japanese initially deployed little more than one division and their reserves were meagre. No more than one and a half. The Allies had an armoured brigade and two infantry divisions on the way when Singapore fell. The East African Campaign was over too, so two African divisions could have been send too. Eventually they were.

And getting equipment particularly planes would have been more than easy. Fighter Command had over 70 squadrons in the UK when Germany attacked the USSR. Since they won the BoB with 50 and Germany could not have launched another attack on the UK before the summer of 1942(!!) planes, tanks and infantry were available, just not in the right place.


But were are supposed to make do with 2nd rate equipment:

There were plenty of captured italian 75mm guns still in storage in North Africa in mid-41.

200+ Curtiss Hawks with perfectly good engines were used as fighter trainers in India and South Africa.

Hundreds of Battles were used as trainers in Canada and South Africa.

 

[merlin]

Hawker Henley was only produced as a target tug (and not a very good one at that) - such that the survivors of the 200 built were withdrawn from service as unsafe in 1942. So he would condemn the aircrews to a totally unsuited aircraft ? It would appear so.

But it wasn't design as a 'target tug'! So all the more reason to use it as per the original design mandate.
The Hawker Henley was designed to spec. P.4/34 (a replacement for the Hart light bomber) - day boming, dive bombing and strategic reconnaissance. The normal bombload was to consist of 4 x 20lb, 4 x 112lb/12lb, or 2 x 250lb GP bombs. Two additional 250lb bombs were to be carried as an overload. Fairey was the other design - virtuallly a smaller Battle - which later became the basis for the Fulmar FAA fighter. The aircraft had a top speed of 292 mph at 17,100ft. It had a range of 1,000 miles at a cruising speed of 215 mph at 15,000ft.
The Ministry ordered 350, but later the official policy towards the Hart-type of light bomber changed before any of the P.4/34 prototypes had been completed. The Henley order was cut to 200 - all to be adapted for target towing - for which they were unsuited.
As Owen Thetford said "There will always be speculation as to why the high performance Henley (of which the RAF had 122 in service in Sept 1939) was never issued to first-line light bomber squadrons as it could carry 750 lbs of bombs and was much superior to the Fairey Battle."

 

[Just Leo]

Some minor points:
The Hawker Henley wasn't so bad per se, but a very early version of the Merlin engine was the standard fit. Early Merlins had an awful time passing a 60 hour type test as well as being lower powered, and the Henley engines struggled and failed regularly under the strain of pulling a target.

Experiments were done on the Curtiss Hawk 75 (P-36), designated XP-42, which, after discovering that 3 versions of ducted bullet-nose enclosures over-heated the engine, found that a carefully designed close cowl with propellor spinner resulted in a top speed of 340 mph.(std 311 mph.) This would have made it faster than several contemporary aircraft of the time, including the Zero. Of course, this stage of the experiment wasn,t completed until 1943.

Dowding was ready for retirement by this time. I hope his health holds up under the pressure.

All the extra equipment will have to be sailed in around the Cape of Good Hope, to avoid pilferage by Malta and North Africa.

Who is going to convince Churchill that the Japanese present a danger, and that that danger cannot be bested by a squadron of round-eyes flying Wildebeasts? Certainly, the Audaxes were needed in Iraq. There were some spare Gauntlets around.

 

[Rickshaw]

But it wasn't design as a 'target tug'! So all the more reason to use it as per the original design mandate.

Immaterial. The Henley was underpowered in any role. It was made a target tug 'cause the RAF couldn't think of any other use for it where it could be even marginally safely used.

You can't turn a sow's ear into a silk purse.

 

[Markus]

All the extra equipment will have to be sailed in around the Cape of Good Hope, to avoid pilferage by Malta and North Africa.

Who is going to convince Churchill that the Japanese present a danger, and that that danger cannot be bested by a squadron of round-eyes flying Wildebeasts? Certainly, the Audaxes were needed in Iraq. There were some spare Gauntlets around.

NA was supplied by convoys that went round the Cape of Good Hope and like I said combat worthy second-line a/c were used as trainers in large numbers, like ~120 A-17 light bombers.

Who convinces Churchill? He would not need much convincing. The Brits were building up their forces with a completion date in mid-42. All one needs is a faster build-up. Well, maybe not even that. Just a return to the original schedule. That one included sending one additional Indian division to Malaya but the Iraqi Uprising got in the way. The uprising had been put down by June. At the same time the Italian resistance in Ethiopia had collapsed anywhere but the area around Gondar.

 

[Rickshaw]

Some minor points:
All the extra equipment will have to be sailed in around the Cape of Good Hope, to avoid pilferage by Malta and North Africa.

You are aware that only one major convoy carrying armaments for North Africa/Middle East went directly through the Mediterranean before 1943? The Tiger Convoy, Convoy WS58 of May 1941. It wasn't known as "Bomb Alley" for nothing...

 

[jackalope]

1943 ASB? Hardly. Japanese would have poured in the troops to be sure, Singapore being considered vital to the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere. But with that increased fight, other more important objectives are lost, like the imparitive oil fields (mostly already taken before Singapore) and environs.

The date was arbitrary, yet judged in relation to a successful guerrilla campaign and the isolation of Singapore. It is deep within a mass of land, meaning air support. The allies had precious little of that in the early part of the war. Singapore would have had to have resupply by the interior of Malaya or would be lost beforehand. Holding out one year is possible then.

As usual in AH, there are many, too many variables to list well.

 

[Markus]

1943 ASB? Hardly. Japanese would have poured in the troops to be sure, Singapore being considered vital to the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere. But with that increased fight, other more important objectives are lost, like the imparitive oil fields (mostly already taken before Singapore) and environs.

The IJA was a light infantry force with an obsolete doctrine. Anytime they ran into well-trained and well-equipped opponents they got their asses handed to them. Even the Chinese beat them on some occasions. The Japanese were lucky almost all of the fighting was in stone age areas like NG or the Solomons where the Allies could not fully use the advantage of motor transport and armour.

If they had not taken the (entire) Malaya barrier the Allies would have send reinforcements the Japanese could neither have matched in quantity nor quality.

 

[Astrodragon]

1943 ASB? Hardly. Japanese would have poured in the troops to be sure, Singapore being considered vital to the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere. But with that increased fight, other more important objectives are lost, like the imparitive oil fields (mostly already taken before Singapore) and environs.

The date was arbitrary, yet judged in relation to a successful guerrilla campaign and the isolation of Singapore. It is deep within a mass of land, meaning air support. The allies had precious little of that in the early part of the war. Singapore would have had to have resupply by the interior of Malaya or would be lost beforehand. Holding out one year is possible then.

As usual in AH, there are many, too many variables to list well.

Poured in forces? using what non-existant logistics train??