Senatus Populusque Romanus-How Pompey, Cato, and Cicero Saved The Republic

For the Senate and People of Rome-How Pompey, Cato, and Cicero Saved The Republic

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Pompey's Triumph In The Civil War​
The god of war hates those who hesitate.
-Marcus Tullius Cicero​

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Bust of Pompey​

In the summer of 48 BC, the fate of the res publica hung in the balance. In an enormous gamble, Caesar had crossed the Rubicon, and invaded Italy, after being ordered by the senate to surrender his command and return home. Pompey, who had pledged to defend Italy, fled along with many prominent senators, to the heel of the peninsula. Caesar desperately pursued him, knowing if Pompey escaped Italy with his army, he would be in a terrible position. Showing his logistical and military brilliance, Pompey managed to just make it out of Italy with his army, before Caesar could snap the jaws shut in Brundisium. Now in Epirus, Pompeius Magnus had all the riches and manpower of the east at his disposal. The east was where he had made his name. Now it was where he would defend it, along with the republic.

Caesar had moved rapidly down through Italy. Showing clemency to the Italians and to the soldiers facing off against him, he would offer them the opportunity to join him, or just let them go their own way. For the commanders, he would also dismiss them and let them go free. This was clearly a calculated move by Caesar, in an attempt to win over the populace in Rome and Italy, and to prove that he was not another Sulla. Deprived of his chance to end the civil war quickly upon Pompey's escape, he turned his attention to solidifying his control of the western Mediterranean.

In an astonishingly fast 27 day march, Caesar defeated Domitius Ahenobarbus (whom he had released after the latter's surrender at Corfinum) at Massilia, and then crushed the politically leaderless Pompeian army at Illerdia in Hispania. His force of six legions and 3,000 cavalry, along with his 900 man bodyguard proceeded with their pacification of Hispania, suffering 70 men killed, while the Pompeian forces suffered 800 casualties, 200 dead and 600 wounded.

Returning to Rome in December of 49 BC, he was appointed dictator by the senators who had remained in Rome, with Mark Antony as his Master of Horse. He only kept this position for 11 days, enough to win the consulship along with Servilius Vatia Isauricus. He then renewed his pursuit of Pompey, who himself was gathering and training men, and feeling extremely confident in his chances.
Caesar's Last Stand

The gods favour the bold.
-Ovid​

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Caesar leading his men at Dyrrachium​

Bibulus was charged with the task of preventing the Caesarion forces from reaching Greece, and Pompey had every reason to believe Caesar could not successfully cross. Lacking a fleet, Caesar skimmed for ships, and attempted a winter crossing of 15,000 soldiers from Brundisium to Palaesa in Epirus. Bibulus was caught off guard, and the crossing was successful, with Caesar establishing a beachhead.

Bibulus was now prepared though, and prevented Caesar's ships from returning to Brundisium to retrieve the other half of his army. Many of Caesar's ships were burnt, and he was left in a precarious state. Bibulus fell ill and died shortly thereafter.

Now Caesar was in the worst possible state an army could possibly be in. Having been cut off from supply from Italy, he could not count on the locals to supply him, as Pompey's eastern glories had won over their hearts, making the Greeks staunchly pro-Pompey. He was in such a desperate state, that he tried multiple times to make peace with his adversary, but was refused at every attempt. Coming to the realization he would have to fight his way out of this precarious position, he attempted another winter blockade run, but rough seas and high winds forced the ships back.

Mark Antony rallied his men in Italy, and successfully broke through the blockade, landing much needed troops on the Epeirote coast. Now it was a race between Pompey and Caesar to reach Mark Antony first. Pompey got to Antony first, with Caesar hot on his heels. Pompey broke off and moved his forces to Dyrrachium, wisely avoided being caught between Caesar and Antony.

Pompey now commanded a near perfect position. With his back to the sea and naval superiority, he could supply his men with impunity. The immediate area was surrounded by hills, making direct assault virtually impossible. Caesar pulled a play from the siege of Alesia, and ordered fortifications to be built to pin the Pompeian forces against the sea. Pompey's response was a system of walls and fortifications of his own to prevent any further Caesarion advancement. Constant indecisive skirmishes took place in no-man's land in between the two fortified positions. While Caesar had control of the surrounding farmland, Pompey had made sure it was picked clean of food, and through the sea, could be supplied constantly. As the harvest approached however, Pompey knew Caesar's men would have the necessary food to continue the blockade, and Pompey was not sure if he could maintain a sufficient amount of fresh water needed.

Then, in what would be known as the defining moment in the civil war, two gallic auxillaries, having escaped punishment for stealing pay from Caesar's legionaries, arrived in Pompey's camp. They informed Pompey that a section of Caesar's wall was still uncompleted and was the only plausible option for attack.

Pompey mounted an attack of six legions against Caesar's line where it joined the sea and where Caesar's IX legion was stationed. Vastly outnumbering Caesar's men, Pompey's forces broke through, forcing Caesar's men to pull back. Caesar swiftly counterattacked with 12 cohorts and drove the Pompeian forces back. Pompey's forces were too large however, and what was initially a successful counterattack, became outflanked on the right, and was beginning to buckle. His wings began to collapse, and Caesar's army began to panick and rout. Caesar realized the potentially disasterous situation his army was in and attempted to coordinate an organized withdrawal.

Pompey ordered his men to push on [1] feeling this was his chance to crush Caesar and end the civil war once and for all. The organized retreat turned into a full on rout, and Caesar's forces were crushed. What remained of the Caesarion forces limped back and set up a last ditch defense, where Caesar himself was slain along with many of his men. In an act of clemency, Pompey offered the Roman legions to rejoin him and the republic instead of face annihilation, which was readily accepted. In one master stroke, Pompey The Great had crushed Caesar and preserved the republic, cementing his legacy as the saviour of the republic in Roman history.

[1] In real life, Pompey feared a trap and thought Caesar was finished, and halted his men. This allowed Caesar's men to regroup, eventually winning at Pharsalus.
 
Some of you may know I am currently doing an alternate timeline on the diadochi. I am going to do this one side by side with "Let Slip The Dogs of War". I have always wanted to do a preservation of the republic timeline, and could wait no longer. :p

Constructive criticism is not only welcome but encouraged. I am far from a professional, and am aware I make mistakes. Feel free to point them out.
 
That is very interesting. But I have à problem with the title of this alternate timeline.

It is very interesting to have Caesar decisively defeated at Dyracchium. In real History, Caesar was actually almost killed by one of his soldiers which Caesar atelpted to stop fleeing. Caesar's bodyguards killed the soldier who, refusing to obey, was about to pierce Caesar.

But what must be taken into account, and which explains why Pompey made some bad choices bringing his final defeat, is that Pompey had to deal with the hidden hostility of his optimate allies. They wanted to discard him as soon as Caesar would be defeated.

One can guess that, as soon as Caesar defeated, they would have quickly resumed their harrassing of Pompey. It is this policy of harrassing Pompey from 61 BCE on which pushed Pompey into Caesar's arms for a whole decade.

To have Pompey remaining on acceptable terms with Cato, Domitius Ahenobarbus and other optimates, you need to have Pompey accept exactly the opposite of what he joined the optimates in an alliance for. Pompey allied with the optimates to put pressure on Caesar in order to prevent Caesar becoming his équateur on the roman political scene after his return from Gaul. But his political strategy misfired because Caesar did not bow down but instead to take up the gauntlet against all odds given the disproportion of forces on paper.

This is not impossible, but is going to demand a lot of work. To my opinion, the most probable is internal strife, opposition and even plots to have Republic freed from the "King of eastern kings". Remembre how it was efficient againt Anthony.
 
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That is very interesting. But I have à problem with the title of this alternate timeline.

It is very interesting to have Caesar decisively defeated at Dyracchium. In real History, Caesar was actually almost killed by one of his soldiers which Caesar atelpted to stop fleeing. Caesar's bodyguards killed the soldier who, refusing to obey, was about to pierce Caesar.

But what must be taken into account, and which explains why Pompey made some bad choices bringing his final defeat, is that Pompey had to deal with the hidden hostility of his optimate allies. They wanted to discard him as soon as Caesar would be defeated.

One can guess that, as soon as Caesar defeated, they would have quickly resumed their harrassing of Pompey. It is this policy of harrassing Pompey from 61 BCE on which pushed Pompey into Caesar's arms for a whole decade.

To have Pompey remaining on acceptable terms with Cato, Domitius Ahenobarbus and other optimates, you need to have Pompey accept exactly the opposite of what he joined the optimates in an alliance for. Pompey allied with the optimates to put pressure on Caesar in order to prevent Caesar becoming his équateur on the roman political scene after his return from Gaul. But his political strategy misfired because Caesar did not bow down but instead to take up the gauntlet against all odds given the disproportion of forces on paper.

This is not impossible, but is going to demand a lot of work. To my opinion, the most probable is internal strife, opposition and even plots to have Republic freed from the "King of eastern kings". Remembre how it was efficient againt Anthony.

Hmm. What do you mean in the last paragraph btw?

As for Pompey, IIRC, he had always wanted the approval of Cato, which he never gained. Could Cicero maybe see this and convince Cato to at least initially, show approval of Pompey, just to keep the man with the army on their side until they can reform the republic?
 
Hmm. What do you mean in the last paragraph btw?

As for Pompey, IIRC, he had always wanted the approval of Cato, which he never gained. Could Cicero maybe see this and convince Cato to at least initially, show approval of Pompey, just to keep the man with the army on their side until they can reform the republic?

I mean that, in fact, Cato was the most stuborn opponent Pompey had ever faced. He was the leader of the Pompey bashing which was the favorite game of the optimates. All of them were denouncing the tyrant : tyrant meaning in reality "this son of a ... who has more power and popularity than all of us".

But since Cato was in fact not so smart, he threw Pompey into Caesar's arms. It is true that Pompey had been looking for an alliance with Cato. But it was because Pompey had identified Cato, who had very powerful family connections, as his potential worst opponent.

And Cato refused the alliance in 61.

It was their temporary common opposition to Caesar which was the base of their fledgling alliance.

But remember that Pompey had killed Cato's brother in law (the father of Brutus) and that he had killed the elder brother of Domitius Ahenobarbus (who was also a brother in law of Cato).
 
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I mean that, in fact, Cato was the most stuborn opponent Pompey had ever faced. He was the leader of the Pompey bashing which was the favorite game of the optimates. All of them were denouncing the tyrant : tyrant meaning in reality "this son of a ... who has more power and popularity than all of us".

But since Cato was in fact not so smart, he threw Pompey into Caesar's arms. It is true that Pompey had been loi king for an alliance with Cato. But it was because Pompey had identified Cato, who had very powerful family connections, as his potential worst opponent.

And Cato refused the alliance in 61.

It was their temporary common opposition to Caesar which was the base of their fledgling alliance.

Ah yes, I remember Cato being the cause for Pompey and Caesar's temporary alliance, and then being the cause of Caesar crossing the Rubicon in the first place.

So you don't think reality hitting Cato after the civil war and Cicero managing to use his oratory skills to let him see the light is possible? A pity then. Oh well. I guess Pompey in the title then can be interpreted as Pompey saving the republic just by defeating Caesar in the civil war then.
 
Pompey's Triumph and Retirement

Thus, Pompey achieved his lifelong goal, and retired as the most popular man in Rome
-Titus[1]​

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Pompey's Triumph In Rome

The senators were welcomed back into Rome with open arms and great praise. The civil war had ended, the republic had been preserved. The senate dutily awarded Pompey with a magnificent triumph, his fourth of his long and distinguished career. According to Titus[1],

"Pompey seemed delighted and full of the youthful vigour he had seemed to have lost prior to the civil war. The civil war had revitalized Pompey, and he felt content, as once again he was the most popular and revered figure by the people. Seing Pompey soak up all the praise and glory his triumph awarded him has lead me to conclude this was the first time in his life Pompey truly felt content and safe. His insecurity that the people may not love him seems to have vanished with the triumph."

Despite this, Pompey still yearned for the support and respect Cato had always denied him. The two had been briefly united for the civil war, but that was due to the circumstances that fell before them, and Cato still did not have a very high opinion of Pompey to say the least. To Cato, Pompey was a dictator himself, despite saving the Republic in its darkest hour. Cicero, always the great mediator, tried his best to use his skills to convince Cato to throw his support behind Pompey for the good of the republic, but Cato refused to back down from his principles. Cicero was fearing the worst, that Pompey, denied support from the optimates, could simply use his large poularity and his soldiers to make himself dictator.
To the relief of Cicero and the republic, Pompey went down a different path. After receiving his triump and now solidifying his position as Rome's most decorated and popular general in her history (at least in his mind), with no competitors that could claim to be his equal, Pompey decided it was time to retire from public life. He was now 58, and for the first time in his life, felt content with his position. Having been denied Cato's support once again, he felt now to be the right time to retire from the public life. Better to retire as the most revered man in Rome, then after being blackmailed by Cato and his camp. And so, Rome's most popular general retired to a large estate in Etruria.

[1]- An original historian from this timeline.
 
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Cato's Consulship and Cicero's Dictatorship
"For," said he, "though Cato have no need of Rome, yet Rome has need of Cato, and so likewise have all his friends."
-Marcus Tullius Cicero​
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-Bust of Cicero​
Cato had never felt any need or reason to run for consul. As he had shown when he became a tribune however (a position he had also didn't have much interest in running for), when he felt the Republic was in dire straits and needed his help, he stepped up to the occasion. Having once again won the hearts of the people due to his reputation of staying true to his principles and always looking out for the republic, Cato ran for consul for 47 BC for the first time. Being Cato, he refused to spend lavishly on a campaign, (although a few of his supporters did so) but still managed to be elected consul along with Lucius Marcius Philippus. Philippus had been a consul for 56 BC, and although it was only 9 years since his last consulship, he was permitted to run for the office for that year. During the civil war, Philippus had become a friend of Cicero, no doubt playing a role in Cato's choice to run together with him.

There was a very practical reason for why Cato decided to run for consul. He accepted the fact that a dictator would be required to reform the republic's constitution to try to prevent the conditions that lead to the civil wars which had occurred since the reforms of Marius. Recognizing that the senate declaring a dictator was needed was an inevitability, Cato wanted to make sure the wrong man, a very ambitious man who may try to put himself above the republic, was not appointed. Cato feared Pompey would return to public life, and when time came for the dictator to be appointed, Pompey would be chosen. Since dictators were appointed by the reigning consuls, it only made sense for Cato to run for the consulship if he wanted to make sure his man was appointed to that position.

Of course, his man was Cicero. Who better for Cato to look to, than the talented orator who had shown time and time again that he would put nothing above his dedication to the republic? His choice of running with Philippus reflected this, as Philippus had became a good friend of Cicero while waiting out the events of the civil war. Cicero was apprehensive at first when Cato revealed his thoughts to him, but quickly came around to the idea of being once again hailed as the protector and savior of the republic.

So when the senate declared that a dictator was needed in 47 BC, they turned to the two consuls for their man of choice. Cato and Philippus made their decision. Cicero was appointed dictator legibus faciendis et reipublicae constituendae causa ("dictator for the making of laws and for the settling of the constitution"). The Assembly of the People (Plebeian Council) ratified the appointment, with a limit of 1 year, longer than the usual 6 months for dictator, being placed on the position. Cicero could now set his sights on reforming the constitution for the good of the republic unimpeded.
 
I hope that the Senatorial aristocracy of Rome will act here as they realistically should do, and move towards an Augustan-style settlement, entrenching themselves as an hereditary ruling class, and excluding the rest of the citizenry from meaningful participation in the political process, given the disdain most of the aristocracy felt for their fellow citizens. Senators will then be free to advance their careers as they fit- remember that Roman politicians were always interested in personality and position for their own greater glory above any actual politicking.

All of this is likely to spark unrest amongst the recently enfranchised elites of Italy. Cato will certainly stay with Rome, but for Cicero, it could be agonising- side with his native Italians, or with the Republic? Or will Cicero end up being Emperor by default?
 
I hope that the Senatorial aristocracy of Rome will act here as they realistically should do, and move towards an Augustan-style settlement, entrenching themselves as an hereditary ruling class, and excluding the rest of the citizenry from meaningful participation in the political process, given the disdain most of the aristocracy felt for their fellow citizens. Senators will then be free to advance their careers as they fit- remember that Roman politicians were always interested in personality and position for their own greater glory above any actual politicking.

All of this is likely to spark unrest amongst the recently enfranchised elites of Italy. Cato will certainly stay with Rome, but for Cicero, it could be agonising- side with his native Italians, or with the Republic? Or will Cicero end up being Emperor by default?

I was thinking Cicero would take a more Sulla like path for reforms (not necessarily the same reforms as Sulla but reform the government in an attempt to keep a more stable, yet still traditional republic). I find Cicero to have too much faith in the republic and to feel too tied to Cato who put him in this position after all, to take an Augustan like path.
 
I was thinking Cicero would take a more Sulla like path for reforms (not necessarily the same reforms as Sulla but reform the government in an attempt to keep a more stable, yet still traditional republic). I find Cicero to have too much faith in the republic and to feel too tied to Cato who put him in this position after all, to take an Augustan like path.

Augustus was a deeply personally conservative figure, remember, who was clearly acting with the support of a critical mass of the aristocracy or else his reforms simply wouldn't have been able to work. Any measure that does anything but decrease the (already hugely limited) power of the people in favour of the aristocracy, and spares them from what they considered to be the demeaning behaviour of canvassing for votes will cause serious opposition to Cato and co, who will certainly be portrayed as Gracchi-style tyrants. Cicero is probably intelligent enough to realise this, but I'm not sure Cato is.
 
I have an idea. Ill post it tomorrow and if it doesn't sound realistic enough, ill cut it out and redo it, but I think it would work.
 
Cicero's Dilemma
“Rome is the last remaining truly free city. Unlike Athens before it, I will not be the one who puts an end to the ideals that made this city, and continue to make this city, free.”
-Marcus Tullius Cicero[1]​
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Cicero giving his speech before the senate​

While Cicero did not take up his position expecting to have an easy task ahead of him, he did not expect the dilemma he would come across that would have a profound impact on the direction of the republic. Shortly after assuming power, the senate approached Cicero with a grand bargain. Now was the chance for the senators to entrench themselves as the de facto hereditary ruling class of Rome. Excluding the rest of the citizenry from playing any meaningful role in the political process would prevent another Caesar or Sulla from rising to power on the backs of the people. By freeing the senators from the burden of the people, they would finally be able to further their careers whatever way they chose. The traditional republic was a broken system they argued, and was doomed to fail. Some sources say they even offered him emperor like powers!
Despite Cicero seeing the senators’ points, he was still a firm believer in the republic. He knew the Italians, who had only recently been enfranchised during the Social Wars, would be more than just simply displeased with the settlement, should Cicero accept it. To Cicero, the thought that the Italians could rise up again in revolt over this issue, was a realistic and worrying prospect.
Then there was Cato and the rest of the optimates, who as Cicero was debating himself, were speaking out against the plan at every chance. While Cicero and Phillipus made the loudest noise, Marcus Junius Brutus was not quiet himself. True to the republic as always, Brutus denounced even the thought of this grand bargain, and like Cato, claimed it would cause the death of the republic and the death of Rome itself. Cicero knew the optimates would be called out and defamed at every turn, labeled as Gracchi-esque traitors.
Completely torn, Cicero decided he was going to hear out anyone who wanted to give their humble opinion on the matter. Leaving his door open day and night for visitors,(similar to what a tribune of the plebs was obligated to do) Cicero was never short of guests at his residence. Whether it be the poorest of peasants in Rome, or a newly-enfranchised Italian, or a senator or other notable, Cicero listened to what everyone had to say on the subject. Titus tells us he even roamed the streets of Rome, asking the opinions of men he passed by. Clearly Cicero took this matter with the utmost importance and seriousness, knowing the fate of the republic rested on the decision he made. In a letter to Atticus, Cicero described his predicament:
On the one hand, a good case could be made for substantial changes to the republic that would completely alter it to something unrecognizable from what came before it. On the other, an argument could, and has been made that Rome would cease to be a republic if these measures were to be put in place. I am truly torn in two by both sides, but I know I must take a stance soon or the bickering going on in the senate house could escalate to something far worse. As of now, I cannot say with certainty I am leaning any one way. I feel as I should pay a visit to Pompey, and take his opinion on the matter at hand.

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Cicero’s desire to see Pompey was a sign of the respect for the man and his opinion that Cicero had always had. Soon after writing the letter, Cicero did in fact visit Pompey, which can be seen by some historians as the event that would shape Cicero’s ultimate decision.
While what was said between the two at Pompey’s villa is unclear, what we can conclude is Pompey expressed his distaste for the deal proposed to Cicero, and urged him to stay true to the traditional republican ideals. Shortly thereafter, he wrote a letter to the senate, stating his stance in support of Cato and the optimates, which was duly read by Cato himself in the senate house. Taken by surprise and recognizing the problems with going up against the most popular man in Rome-both amongst the populace and the soldiery, - the senators in support of the deal became less vocal.
Although Cicero was certainly now leaning towards rejecting the proposal and turning his attention back to reforming the republic, he was still far from taking a side. He was fearful of senators angry with his rejection of the compromise, using violent and extreme measures to get their way. Then, a single event made his decision for him.
Cicero still kept his doors open throughout the day and night, with only his 24 lictors standing between him and an opportunistic assassin. When a would be assassin was slain by his lictors one night, Cato and the other strong opponents of the proposal, sensed their chance. They quickly attributed the assassination attempt to the more outspoken supporters of the proposal, and with a few swift speeches, the senators were feeling the heat. Pinning it on their opponents was easy, as it was not unknown to the elites of Rome that Cicero now leaned towards rejecting the proposal. Completely losing any sense of legitimacy, and having little to nothing to counter, the senators in support of the proposal had been caught in check mate.
The event sealed Cicero’s decision, for if he was still undecided up until now, he certainly was not after a failed attempt at his life. Finally speaking out in rejection of the senate’s proposal with a brilliant speech in classic Cicero style, he famously uttered, “Rome is the last remaining truly free city. Unlike Athens before it, I will not be the one who puts an end to the ideals that made this city, and continue to make this city, free.”
Three months into his dictatorship, Cicero could not finally tackle reforming the republic, and making sure Rome remained free.

[1] An original quote from this timeline.
 

Deleted member 67076

Awesome timeline, glad to see a good surviving republic timeline. :D Though how are you going to deal with the problem of some ambitious general trying to march in and take over the place?
 
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