Second Battle of Hawaii

The ground based aircraft in Hawaii is just too much for Japan to challenge unless the Pacific fleet has been eliminated.

What Japan should have done is Midway with 6 carriers, no Americans readings their messages and the submarine line that was planned in position before the attack not scrambling to get in position before the battle.

Japan wasn't far from the right moves at the time they just missed their target.
 

SsgtC

Banned
The IJN's losses might be severe. But my question is what about USN losses? Assuming a combined Japanese strike force, what would be US losses. If Yamamoto can sink two or three of our carriers, and do further damage to the Pacific Fleet he would consider that a win from the perspective that it would prolong the war for several months.

To anticipate a comment I realize that it is possible many if not most of the carriers in the IJN strike force would be sunk along with the skilled airmen in them. However, if our losses were large enough it would delay future plans at least for a few months. How the Japanese use that time remains to be discussed.

By the time of the OTL Battle of Midway, the US was pumping out ships at an astronomical rate. Consider this, the US started the War with 7 carriers. They ended the war with 160.

Now granted, 125 of those were escort carriers. But that still leaves you the Saratoga, the Enterprise, 24 Essex-class, 9 Independence-class and 3 Midway-class that commissioned in late 45, early 46.

So in short, the US could lose every carrier in PacFlt, and at worst the war lasts maybe a month or two longer. OTOH, if Japan loses all six of their fleet carriers in an attack on Hawaii, there is literally nothing they can do about it. Thought the entire war, the IJN operated only 25 carriers total. Only 15 of which were fleet carriers. And of those 25, 10 were built before the war.
 

nbcman

Donor
The IJN's losses might be severe. But my question is what about USN losses? Assuming a combined Japanese strike force, what would be US losses. If Yamamoto can sink two or three of our carriers, and do further damage to the Pacific Fleet he would consider that a win from the perspective that it would prolong the war for several months.

To anticipate a comment I realize that it is possible many if not most of the carriers in the IJN strike force would be sunk along with the skilled airmen in them. However, if our losses were large enough it would delay future plans at least for a few months. How the Japanese use that time remains to be discussed.

I'd argue otherwise that it would accelerate the Allies victory. Philosophically, if the IJN main BB line was gutted in the proposed Battle of Hawaii, what would IJ do if the US doesn't negotiate? Their prewar doctrine of the Decisive Battle would be destroyed along with their BBs. At least IOTL, the IJN had the majority of their Battle line available for the 'Decisive Battle' until it was shattered at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Now they'd only have whatever remnants that survived the 2nd Battle of Hawaii along with the limited number of other ships which were not involved in the IOTL Midway operation. The IJN wouldn't come out to engage the US and Allies in the Southwest Pacific or Central Pacific so there would be a shorter New Guinea, Solomans Islands and Central Pacific campaigns.

EDIT: In fact it could be much worse for the Japanese as the Allies may be able to invade Japan prior to nuclear weapons being available in 1945.
 
Alanith

Yamamoto "got it" early on with his 6 month comment. Once Japan declared war on the U.S. it was only a matter of time before U.S. industrial strength and U.S. resolve would make themselves known. If Japan had even the shadow of a chance it had to do as much damage to the U.S.N. as it possibly could. A plan like this was risky but the option was just to hoard what forces the IJN had and wait for the USN to slowly whittle those forces down. Yes, in this plan the IJN might face unacceptable losses but the USN might do so as well. My question is how much and how would this effect the war in the Pacific.

the effect would be that both sides will need more effort to get their goals done. Any losses for a succesfull operation are acceptable, for both sides. However this operation will not be a successfull one if they lose all their ships. The plan was the inflict heavy losses on the Americans as fast as possible and break their strength that way. Inflicting heavy losses but losing all your strength in the process doesn't achieve that. Therefor its a failed operation. The Americans wouldn't break or come to peace terms that way.

In the long run it probably won't delay the war, it could even speed it up with all those battleships gone as well. Considdering the Manhattan project the bombs will be delivered as per OTL and even if Okinawa won't be taken yet the bombs will still be dropped around the same time since the bombers took off from Tinian.

It won't change a thing, just add a carrier loss for the Americans in the war.
 

Geon

Donor
Okay, I will concede that a second attack on Pearl Harbor is virtual suicide. So instead what about the idea of simply lying in wait as the Americans come out to meet the Japanese threat at Midway.

Remembering that the invasion of Midway is simply meant as a diversion that means that it doesn't have to succeed. In fact, just have the transports loaded with ballast instead of troops as a deception to make the Americans think an invasion is underway. It doesn't have to be a real invasion just appear to be one. The whole plan involves the American strike force sailing into a Japanese trap.

Now, granted the Americans could read the Japanese communiques by that time. But even if they could we still have two factors that played into American hands for Midway. And no I am NOT saying American skill and daring had nothing to do with the victory at Midway.

But, two factors as I see it, contributed greatly if not decisively to the Battle of Midway. Both involved luck

First - the U.S. reconnaissance and later their dive bomber squadrons found the IJN carriers before IJN air reconnaissance found the U.S. carriers.

Second-Nagumo's indecisiveness for those "five fatal minutes" spelled disaster. Here the plan is not to invade but simply to draw the U.S. carriers into a trap.

If we follow the scenario of having the actual strike force lying in wait near Midway for the fleet and not attacking Midway - which yes should be ringing alarm bells with the U.S. Pacific Command. We then have IJN reconnaissance actively looking for the carriers coming toward Midway but Nagumo also not having his carriers be sitting ducks with ordinance strewn decks. Thus evening the odds a little.

On another note, I fully never intended this to be a "how Japan can win the Pacific War thread." That as has been noted elsewhere would require a much earlier POD. My purpose is to create a scenario which is not as one-sided as Midway turned out to be. I fully understand from reading Combined Fleet's analyses on this subject that even a worst case scenario gives Japan at most just a year and a half more before she faces defeat.

Further as I've indicated on other threads I also fully comprehend the boiling mad rage Americans felt for Japan after Pearl Harbor. There is no way the U.S. would ever accept anything but Japan's complete and unconditional surrender after that. This is also a fact the Japanese themselves failed to grasp despite Yamamoto's warnings. My concern here is looking at a possible way the inevitable could have been delayed and by how long.
 
Okay, I will concede that a second attack on Pearl Harbor is virtual suicide. So instead what about the idea of simply lying in wait as the Americans come out to meet the Japanese threat at Midway.

Remembering that the invasion of Midway is simply meant as a diversion that means that it doesn't have to succeed. In fact, just have the transports loaded with ballast instead of troops as a deception to make the Americans think an invasion is underway. It doesn't have to be a real invasion just appear to be one. The whole plan involves the American strike force sailing into a Japanese trap.

Now, granted the Americans could read the Japanese communiques by that time. But even if they could we still have two factors that played into American hands for Midway. And no I am NOT saying American skill and daring had nothing to do with the victory at Midway.

But, two factors as I see it, contributed greatly if not decisively to the Battle of Midway. Both involved luck

First - the U.S. reconnaissance and later their dive bomber squadrons found the IJN carriers before IJN air reconnaissance found the U.S. carriers.

Second-Nagumo's indecisiveness for those "five fatal minutes" spelled disaster. Here the plan is not to invade but simply to draw the U.S. carriers into a trap
I've two other factors.

One the submarine picket line didn't deploy ahead of the Americans. They were late. Where you get your submarines in place you hope they have a positive effect. When you beat your submarines to get into place and they are too late then you deployed too late. With the way America deployed in two task forces on different routes there was a good chance that any present submarines would have gotten either a sighting report or in the best case an attack run.

A sighting report makes things easier for the scouts and an attack run can damage a carrier and force it to withdraw.

Two. The Japanese chose not to destroy the American air strips choosing to preserve them for when they conquered the island. There was two runways on Midway atoll. Judicious application of heavy bombs would have left them unable to operate fully loaded aircraft. Essentially removing them as a threat. While the planes at Midway failed to hit a ship their frequent attacks were useful for occupying and spreading out the poorly controlled Japanese CAP.
 
Okay, I will concede that a second attack on Pearl Harbor is virtual suicide. So instead what about the idea of simply lying in wait as the Americans come out to meet the Japanese threat at Midway.

Remembering that the invasion of Midway is simply meant as a diversion that means that it doesn't have to succeed. In fact, just have the transports loaded with ballast instead of troops as a deception to make the Americans think an invasion is underway. It doesn't have to be a real invasion just appear to be one. The whole plan involves the American strike force sailing into a Japanese trap.

Now, granted the Americans could read the Japanese communiques by that time. But even if they could we still have two factors that played into American hands for Midway. And no I am NOT saying American skill and daring had nothing to do with the victory at Midway.

But, two factors as I see it, contributed greatly if not decisively to the Battle of Midway. Both involved luck

First - the U.S. reconnaissance and later their dive bomber squadrons found the IJN carriers before IJN air reconnaissance found the U.S. carriers.


Second-Nagumo's indecisiveness for those "five fatal minutes" spelled disaster. Here the plan is not to invade but simply to draw the U.S. carriers into a trap.

If we follow the scenario of having the actual strike force lying in wait near Midway for the fleet and not attacking Midway - which yes should be ringing alarm bells with the U.S. Pacific Command. We then have IJN reconnaissance actively looking for the carriers coming toward Midway but Nagumo also not having his carriers be sitting ducks with ordinance strewn decks. Thus evening the odds a little.

On another note, I fully never intended this to be a "how Japan can win the Pacific War thread." That as has been noted elsewhere would require a much earlier POD. My purpose is to create a scenario which is not as one-sided as Midway turned out to be. I fully understand from reading Combined Fleet's analyses on this subject that even a worst case scenario gives Japan at most just a year and a half more before she faces defeat.

Further as I've indicated on other threads I also fully comprehend the boiling mad rage Americans felt for Japan after Pearl Harbor. There is no way the U.S. would ever accept anything but Japan's complete and unconditional surrender after that. This is also a fact the Japanese thems elves failed to grasp despite Yamamoto's warnings. My concern here is looking at a possible way the inevitable could have been delayed and by how long.

Hmm? If the US does not crack Japanese codes the carriers don't sortie Yorktown goes to Seatle for 7 months of refit and repair and the US prepares for the next Japanese offensive into Fiji and Samoa without breaking Japanese codes the US does not go to Midway Island. Japan could not take MI with its landing plan which sucked to say the least
 

SsgtC

Banned
Okay, I will concede that a second attack on Pearl Harbor is virtual suicide. So instead what about the idea of simply lying in wait as the Americans come out to meet the Japanese threat at Midway.

Remembering that the invasion of Midway is simply meant as a diversion that means that it doesn't have to succeed. In fact, just have the transports loaded with ballast instead of troops as a deception to make the Americans think an invasion is underway. It doesn't have to be a real invasion just appear to be one. The whole plan involves the American strike force sailing into a Japanese trap.

Now, granted the Americans could read the Japanese communiques by that time. But even if they could we still have two factors that played into American hands for Midway. And no I am NOT saying American skill and daring had nothing to do with the victory at Midway.

But, two factors as I see it, contributed greatly if not decisively to the Battle of Midway. Both involved luck

First - the U.S. reconnaissance and later their dive bomber squadrons found the IJN carriers before IJN air reconnaissance found the U.S. carriers.

Second-Nagumo's indecisiveness for those "five fatal minutes" spelled disaster. Here the plan is not to invade but simply to draw the U.S. carriers into a trap.

If we follow the scenario of having the actual strike force lying in wait near Midway for the fleet and not attacking Midway - which yes should be ringing alarm bells with the U.S. Pacific Command. We then have IJN reconnaissance actively looking for the carriers coming toward Midway but Nagumo also not having his carriers be sitting ducks with ordinance strewn decks. Thus evening the odds a little.

On another note, I fully never intended this to be a "how Japan can win the Pacific War thread." That as has been noted elsewhere would require a much earlier POD. My purpose is to create a scenario which is not as one-sided as Midway turned out to be. I fully understand from reading Combined Fleet's analyses on this subject that even a worst case scenario gives Japan at most just a year and a half more before she faces defeat.

Further as I've indicated on other threads I also fully comprehend the boiling mad rage Americans felt for Japan after Pearl Harbor. There is no way the U.S. would ever accept anything but Japan's complete and unconditional surrender after that. This is also a fact the Japanese themselves failed to grasp despite Yamamoto's warnings. My concern here is looking at a possible way the inevitable could have been delayed and by how long.

At this point in the War, any Japanese victory would be Pyrrhic at best. The Los of even a single carrier would be a devastating blow to the IJN that they could ill afford. The only way to lighten that burden is for Japan to totally change the way it fights. Instead of keeping their best crews on the front lines, they need to rotate them home to train their replacements. And that's not something Japan would readily do as it would be a "loss of face" to the crews pulled off the carriers and "relegated" to a training role.
 
At this point in the War, any Japanese victory would be Pyrrhic at best. The Los of even a single carrier would be a devastating blow to the IJN that they could ill afford. The only way to lighten that burden is for Japan to totally change the way it fights. Instead of keeping their best crews on the front lines, they need to rotate them home to train their replacements. And that's not something Japan would readily do as it would be a "loss of face" to the crews pulled off the carriers and "relegated" to a training role.

Only way they could do this is to rotate the 'unit' back to do the training, a better version of what they actually did which was to send the remnants of the their air wings back to take on and train replacements. The remnant wings were to small to act as a really good training cadre for multiple carrier wings needed, plus a replacement reserve.
 
Hmm? If the US does not crack Japanese codes the carriers don't sortie Yorktown goes to Seatle for 7 months of refit and repair and the US prepares for the next Japanese offensive into Fiji and Samoa without breaking Japanese codes the US does not go to Midway Island. Japan could not take MI with its landing plan which sucked to say the least

The Japanese landing plan definitely sucked but if we assume the US doesn't crack the Japanese naval code there is a slim chance they could carry the island. IOTL the formidable Midway garrison was only because Nimitz knew the Japanese were coming weeks in advance and reinforced Marine Colonel Shannon with everything he needed to repel a Japanese invasion attempt. Prior to that the Midway garrison consisted of one dive-bomber squadron (17 Vindicators), one fighter squadron (14 Buffaloes), and an overstrength Marine Defense Battalion (the 6th, 750 men nominal, reinforced to ~900).
 
The Japanese landing plan definitely sucked but if we assume the US doesn't crack the Japanese naval code there is a slim chance they could carry the island. IOTL the formidable Midway garrison was only because Nimitz knew the Japanese were coming weeks in advance and reinforced Marine Colonel Shannon with everything he needed to repel a Japanese invasion attempt. Prior to that the Midway garrison consisted of one dive-bomber squadron (17 Vindicators), one fighter squadron (14 Buffaloes), and an overstrength Marine Defense Battalion (the 6th, 750 men nominal, reinforced to ~900).

They will be facing what at most cruiser level bombardment due to the fact Japanese doctrine didn't allow the BBs to be used for shore bombardment and then the SNLF what 2000 of them are supposed get across the coral reef in little rubber pls shoot me boats and then try to take the island from a Marine Battalion the Japanese didn't have any equivalent to the Amtrac which enabled the USMC to get ashore at Tarawa its gonna be a one sided bloodbath in the water around midway.
 
Judging from Japanese landings on defended shores, i.e.: Khota Baru, Java, Wake, Rabaul harbor, ect... there would be two or three hours of preparatory fire from the cruisers, on visually sighted targets & little or no reference to recent air photos. As at Wake any unsuppressed guns ashore, mostly 3" would damage or sink one or more Japanese ships. I'm skeptical there would be a lot of operational aircraft ashore. Plus the Japanese intended to anchor, disembark, and launch the assault before dawn. Still, at Wake the aircraft did manage to sink a destroyer, so its possible one or more of the landing forces ships will be damaged or sunk by aircraft.

Worst case for the landing force companies is their naval gunfire spotting team/s are hors combat early on. This means the fire support is blind & liable to hit the Japanese as often as defenders, or not fire at all.
 
Judging from Japanese landings on defended shores, i.e.: Khota Baru, Java, Wake, Rabaul harbor, ect... there would be two or three hours of preparatory fire from the cruisers, on visually sighted targets & little or no reference to recent air photos. As at Wake any unsuppressed guns ashore, mostly 3" would damage or sink one or more Japanese ships. I'm skeptical there would be a lot of operational aircraft ashore. Plus the Japanese intended to anchor, disembark, and launch the assault before dawn. Still, at Wake the aircraft did manage to sink a destroyer, so its possible one or more of the landing forces ships will be damaged or sunk by aircraft.

Worst case for the landing force companies is their naval gunfire spotting team/s are hors combat early on. This means the fire support is blind & liable to hit the Japanese as often as defenders, or not fire at all.

The defenders and defensive emplacements would also be subject to dive bombing from the four Japanese carriers, which may be more effective than the naval bombardment. Hiryu and Soryu had done it at Wake.
 
The defenders and defensive emplacements would also be subject to dive bombing from the four Japanese carriers, which may be more effective than the naval bombardment. Hiryu and Soryu had done it at Wake.

True, but in terms of density and numbers of AAA guns there are a lot more available to the Army at Oahu. Plus of course radar for early warning, something lacking at Wake. If nothing else you end up with the results similar to what happened at Corregidor and Bataan where the flak was sufficient to force the Japanese to stick to high level bombing or suffer equally in terms of accuracy from being shot at while attempting to bomb. Flak isn't so much a killer (well until the proximity fuse) but a major obstacle to accurate bombing. Being shot at tends to damage the accuracy of your average bomb aimer.
 
True, but in terms of density and numbers of AAA guns there are a lot more available to the Army at Oahu. Plus of course radar for early warning, something lacking at Wake. If nothing else you end up with the results similar to what happened at Corregidor and Bataan where the flak was sufficient to force the Japanese to stick to high level bombing or suffer equally in terms of accuracy from being shot at while attempting to bomb. Flak isn't so much a killer (well until the proximity fuse) but a major obstacle to accurate bombing. Being shot at tends to damage the accuracy of your average bomb aimer.

My last few posts concerned a hypothetical Midway attack where the Japanese codes weren't broken and the garrison went unreinforced. Not an attack on Oahu. I think most everyone is in agreement that the Second Battle of Hawaii posited by OP is implausible and would've been chopped to pieces if attempted.
 
My last few posts concerned a hypothetical Midway attack where the Japanese codes weren't broken and the garrison went unreinforced. Not an attack on Oahu. I think most everyone is in agreement that the Second Battle of Hawaii posited by OP is implausible and would've been chopped to pieces if attempted.

1) Midway could not realistically be taken by the landing force sent with the doctrine the IJN used. Against a Marine defence battalion, - 750 (?) or so without the reinforcements mentioned - 2000 Special Naval Infantry is not enough, even with cruiser softening up and dive bombers, not with them in rubber boats, no real opposed landing doctrine etc.

At best the landing force would be ground to hamburger taking the place, with a handful of survivors left after that. That force would be wrecked, and Japan did not have the spare troops in the Pacific, the US did or had them on the way. Attrition is a very nasty reality.

2) In the unlikely event they take Midway they will then feel honour bound to hold it. That means Guadalcanal north, with the Japanese being the ones hanging on by their fingernails against an enemy with a major naval base comparatively near by.

Running supplies to Midway through the submarines, air patrols, whatever surface ships etc would run down the Japanese merchant transport fleet to dangerous levels rapidly. Supplies coming in from Truk or Japan with the USN knowing they had to be coming, able to build air and naval bases on Hawiian islands closer to Midway - the chain runs in that direction after all - would have to be escorted, the escorts and transports would be burning fuel from a stockpile Japan was simply not refilling... A long drawn out battle of attrition against the USN and Army Air Corps, both of which were getting stronger by the day and could really use a nearby training ground like this to sharpen their edge a bit.

Result: Japan loses faster.

Please note that the day before Pearl Harbour 35% of the merchant ship tonnage that sustained the Japanese economy was Foreign Owned, mostly American. So they instantly lost that, minus a few ships captured in port here and there. Merchant ships were desperately needed, and trying to supply Midway would be a suicide run. No the destroyer transports used at Guadalcanal would not be adequate, not at the those distances and horrendous fuel consumption per ton delivered.

Oil from the NEI was not arriving in Japan fast enough to keep up with demand, the stockpile was running out, this would make that worse. Diverting the already inadequate tonnage available to a basically useless outpost instead of running supplies, raw materials etc to keep the economy going does Japan no favours and allied war effort a huge favour.
 
The defenders and defensive emplacements would also be subject to dive bombing from the four Japanese carriers, which may be more effective than the naval bombardment. Hiryu and Soryu had done it at Wake.

Either is effective with good spotting, & both are much less effective without proper spotting. I spent a lot of hours in the Mojave desert helping get CAS bombers on target & it is not easy. Even at low speeds like 150 knots its difficult for the pilot to do target ID. I know at this point someone is looking for air photos showing clearly emplacements on the ground. But the real world is not a 8x10 out of a high res camera. To drag out Betio island yet again; the ground force had to waive off air strikes on the second day of the battle. Even with 30 days training and radio communications with the ground force USN pilots were unable to consistently attack the correct combatants. 60 dive bombers scattering bombs across two islands may not be the devastating blow the Japanese might hope for. Yes there is some cumulative damage, but the effects of imprecise bombing of a ground combat unit are more psychological than physical.
 
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