Secession Without Civil War

Do you have a source for Seward's invasion of Cuba? Not doubting, just curious - I haven't heard of this before :)
"Team of Rivals"; the reasoning was more aimed towards ejecting the Spanish from the Dominican Republic which they had just recently occupied, but it was generally implied in that situation that the Spanish would be ejected from the Caribbean entirely to the benefit of the United States.
Like many northerners, Seward imagined that the seceding states could be induced to back down. He suggested evacuating Sumter to avoid an immediate military conflict. However he never suggested evacuation of Fort Pickens, which posed the same legal question, but could not be isolated by the Confederates.
Got Pickens mixed with Sumter for some reason. I have to agree, especially considering Fort Pickens was meant to become the main base for American operations against the Spanish. The build-up of military forces might still antagonize the Confederacy, but not to the level we saw with Ft. Sumter.
As to other possible Republican nominees in 1860 - Seward was the most important; another was Salmon Chase, who was an outright Abolitionist. Justice McLean had been interested; his dissent in Dred Scott was in part a bid for favorable attention. (Not how he voted, but the extended dissent in which he argued against Taney's initial findings. That dissent prompted Taney to expand his opinion, adding some of the most offensive dicta.)
If it wasn't Lincoln than it would have been Seward but, for the sake of it we'll consider the others.

Salmon Chase should almost instantly be cast out of consideration, if only because of how radical he was perceived, and his inability to hold a coalition within his own state. There was simply too much against him; enough to be a potent candidate, but not enough to be a winning candidate. Even were he nominated, it is almost certain the election would have been sent to the House given the number of voters he would alienate.

Edward Bates was the opposite in that he was considered by many as rather moderate, but he was generally considered the ahead of Chase and neck to neck with Lincoln when the convention began. He is the most likely to attain the nomination other than Seward in my opinion, despite his detractors. I can't see how his policy would be any different from Seward, if not more conciliatory towards the South.

John McLean seems to have lost his chance in the face of the other candidates, and likely would have only come about as a compromise candidate; I have some difficulty seeing that situation arise as the delegates were not as strong-willed as those at the Democratic Convention for example.
 
if you had a dead lock in the house and senate over internal improvements, tariffs and free land and slavery.
Lincoln might think he can only break the dead lock if the southern states leave.
He might take the view that the CSA is bound to fail and their states will sooner or later leave the CSA and beg to rejoin the union.
 
Salmon Chase did advocate doing nothing in order to appease the border states. In fact, there was a thread and very abortive TL that I started based on just that PoD - Lincoln deciding for whatever reason to take Chase's advice.

Basically, the situation doesn't hold. The Deep South secedes unhassled, but the remaining slave states are in an awkward position. Their delegates in Congress are now very outnumbered by the Free States, and to continue getting their way they resort to threats of secession. Anti-slavery Congressmen get frustrated with these tactics and the undesirable compromises that result. They push back for stronger laws to restrict slavery, which only worsens the crisis and drives them toward secession.

So a delayed civil war is still possible; I hadn't decided if war was still going to break out in that almost-TL. On the other hand, whoever is president could try to run around and get the remaining states to agree to be more conciliatory; but it really seems like a confrontation is coming.

If the Upper South secedes after all these efforts at compromise, the administration's credibility is seriously strained.
 
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if you had a dead lock in the house and senate over internal improvements, tariffs and free land and slavery.
Lincoln might think he can only break the dead lock if the southern states leave.
He might take the view that the CSA is bound to fail and their states will sooner or later leave the CSA and beg to rejoin the union.

Lincoln would prioritize keeping the union together far above any deadlock issue.

Salmon Chase did advocate doing nothing in order to appease the border states. In fact, there was a thread and very abortive that I started based on just that PoD - Lincoln deciding for whatever reason to take Chase's advice.

Basically, the situation doesn't hold. The Deep South secedes unhassled, but the remaining slaves are in an awkward situation. Their delegates in Congress are now very outnumbered by the Free States, and to continue getting their way they resort to threats of secession. Anti-slavery Congressmen get frustrated with these tactics and the undesirable compromises that result. They push back for stronger laws to restrict slavery, which only worsens the crisis and drives them toward secession.

So a delayed civil war is still possible; I hadn't decided if war was still going to break out in that almost-TL. On the other hand, whoever is president could try to run around and get the remaining states to agree to be more conciliatory; but it really seems like a confrontation is coming.

If the Upper South secedes after all these efforts at compromise, the administration's credibility is seriously strained.

Yeah, I'm convinced once secession has formally been declared and negotiations fail, something, something is inevitably going to be used as a causus belli on the union side. It's practically impossible for there not to be some sort of an incident, when it happens and how egregious it is would just decided how quickly and aggressively the Union moves to retake the seceded states.
 
Nope.

Ask this guy:

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"Any State, which constitutes with the other states a Federal Union...can not, from that period, possess any right to secede, because such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would result from the contravention of a compact, but it is an offense against the whole Union. To say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union is to say that the United States are not a nation, because it would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing any offense ... disunion by armed force is treason. Are you really ready to incur its guilt? If you are, on the heads of the instigators of the act be the dreadful consequences; on their heads be the dishonor, but on yours may fall the punishment. ... The consequence must be fearful for you, distressing to your fellow-citizens here and to the friends of good government throughout the world."


Once part of the union, there's no way out. There are no ex-states, just like there are no ex-marines.

Best,

Andy Jackson was many things, but impartial he was not. His concern for constitutionality can be seen with the Trail of Tears, where the SC ruled against him, and he ignored it. So his views on the constitutionality of secession are ... ironic?
 
Three northern states, four southern states counting Taney's Maryland.
You are so sure about Catron, and Wayne? I know it's not exactly the same, but are these the same members that decided Dred Scott?


If Wayne and Catron believed that secession was legal, they had no business remaining on the Supreme Court, which would be a "foreign" court. Wayne's decision to stay on seems to have been made in good faith, not as an attempt to undermine the Union from within: "Despite the secession of his home state, Wayne remained on the Supreme Court--prompting the Confederacy to label him a traitor and confiscate his property." http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/tdgh-jan/jan14.htm Likewise, Catron "opposed secession, and urged Tennessee remain in the Union. " http://www.michaelariens.com/ConLaw/justices/catron.htm

The *Dred Scott* decision was an extreme pro-slavery view of the rights of slaveholders *within the Union.* It hardly follows that because someone supported it he believed in a legal right to secession. In fact, not all *secessionists* believed in a constitutional right to secession; some instead grounded it on the right of revolution (a "right" which obviously cannot be enforced by a court). Senator Alfred Iverson of Georgia said "The President [Buchanan] may be right when he asserts the fact that no State has a constitutional right to secede from the Union. I do not myself place the right of a State to secede from the Union upon constitutional grounds. I admit that the Constitution has not granted that power to a State. It is exceedingly doubtful, even, whether the right has been reserved...But, sir, while a State has no power, under the Constitution, conferred upon it to secede from the Federal Government or from the Union, each State has the right of revolution, which all admit." http://books.google.com/books?id=19chAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA199

In any event, it would be totally impractical for South Carolina to go to the Supreme Court. First, as noted, it is by no means clear that if the Court decided the issue on the merits, it would decide it in the secessionists' favor; yet going to the Court would seem to many people to impose a duty to obey whatever the Court decided. Second, there would be all sorts of procedural reasons why the Court might dodge a decision on the merits altogether. Declaratory judgments were not recognized by the Court at this time; as for injunctive relief, it could be argued that the danger that the federal government would send troops against an independent South Carolina was too speculative (after all, until the last minute it was thought possible that Lincoln would abandon Fort Sumter); or the Court could hold that damages inflicted on a state *after it would cease to be a state* could not come under the Court's original-jurisdiction powers. Finally, court decisions take time, and for the South Carolina secessionists, time was of the essence. They had to take advantage of the panic following Lincoln's election. To allow time for tempers to cool was the last thing they wanted.
 
If a southern state sues the federal government, and the Supreme Court is very sympathetic toward slavery, the Supreme Court would rule that the restrictions against slavery are unconstitutional, and the state would remain in the union.

If a president is sympathetic toward slavery, the south isn't likely to secede, unless congress is opposed to slavery. If it secedes because congress is opposed to slavery though the president holds a favorable view of slavery, then when it secedes, congress will declare war. If the president refuses to command anyone to execute this war, that president will be impeached by congress, and the war will start.
The options are secession and war, or non-secession and peace. If a government is so opposed to an issue that it inspires part of the country actively secedes over the issue, it is opposed enough to fight a war against the people who secede on that issue.
 
If a southern state sues the federal government, and the Supreme Court is very sympathetic toward slavery, the Supreme Court would rule that the restrictions against slavery are unconstitutional, and the state would remain in the union.

If a president is sympathetic toward slavery, the south isn't likely to secede, unless congress is opposed to slavery. If it secedes because congress is opposed to slavery though the president holds a favorable view of slavery, then when it secedes, congress will declare war. If the president refuses to command anyone to execute this war, that president will be impeached by congress, and the war will start.
The options are secession and war, or non-secession and peace. If a government is so opposed to an issue that it inspires part of the country actively secedes over the issue, it is opposed enough to fight a war against the people who secede on that issue.

Can congress declare war against a us states or states in rebellion?
or can it only declare war against a foreign power?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Constitutional law includes precedent;

Andy Jackson was many things, but impartial he was not. His concern for constitutionality can be seen with the Trail of Tears, where the SC ruled against him, and he ignored it. So his views on the constitutionality of secession are ... ironic?

and Jackson pretty much set it in the Nullification Crisis.

Coming from a Southerner who was everything that antebellum mastery culture valued, I always found that entertaining as all hell.

Best,
 
if you had a dead lock in the house and senate over internal improvements, tariffs and free land and slavery.
Lincoln might think he can only break the dead lock if the southern states leave.
He might take the view that the CSA is bound to fail and their states will sooner or later leave the CSA and beg to rejoin the union.

I've always wondered if the North, and probably in particular the Northeast states, would have gotten tired of the South completely hindering its various objectives in Congress and decided that they - the North - would be better off without the South. The Old Northwest most likely didn't care, they had no really want for either the slaveholders nor the abolitionists.

I believe that there were newspaper editorials mentioning that the South should just be let go so that the North could progress without them.

I'm sure Henry Clay and his 'American System' could have driven a far greater and rendering split between the two regions.
 
I've always wondered if the North, and probably in particular the Northeast states, would have gotten tired of the South completely hindering its various objectives in Congress and decided that they - the North - would be better off without the South. The Old Northwest most likely didn't care, they had no really want for either the slaveholders nor the abolitionists.

I believe that there were newspaper editorials mentioning that the South should just be let go so that the North could progress without them.

I'm sure Henry Clay and his 'American System' could have driven a far greater and rendering split between the two regions.

"The Old Northwest most likely didn't care, they had no really want for either the slaveholders nor the abolitionists." But they sure as heck did care about not allowing any of the Mississippi River to fall into the hands of a foreign power! Stephen Douglas said that "We can never acknowledge the right of a State to secede and cut us off from the ocean and the world, without our consent." http://books.google.com/books?id=eNg7AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA228 Yes, the South assured the Northwest that it would never interfere with navigation of the Mississippi. As Kenneth Stampp explained in *And the War Came*, most Northwesterners rejected these assurances: "These were mere 'paper guarantees' which the West would enjoy by the sufferance of a hostile people. At any time navigation rights could be revoked or subjected to whatever taxes or tribute Southerners desired to levy."

There *was* some "good riddance--let them go" talk among some extreme anti-slavery men--but it is unclear how sincere it was. There is a good discussion of this in Stampp, *And the War Came*: "Charles Sumner advocated disunion--but only in private and largely as a kind of intellectual excursion into political theory. In practice he encouraged the movement to prepare the Massachusetts militia to defend Washington and enforce the laws. On November 27 Henry Ward Beecher boldly proclaimed that he cared little whether the South seceded. Two days later he preached a Thanksgiving Day sermon which raised the banners for a war against the Slave Power...For a proponent of peaceful disunion Garrison's Boston *Liberator* became surprisingly agitated about southern 'treason.' It charged that secessionists were determined to provoke a civil war and castigated the Democrats who allegedly opposed the punishment of 'traitors.'" Stampp also shows how Horace Greeley's alleged support of peaceful disunion was so qualified as to be meaningless. Most talk of voluntary disunion among anti-slavery men was really just meant to oppose the idea of saving the Union through yet another cowardly compromise with the Slave Power.
 
"The Old Northwest most likely didn't care, they had no really want for either the slaveholders nor the abolitionists." But they sure as heck did care about not allowing any of the Mississippi River to fall into the hands of a foreign power! Stephen Douglas said that "We can never acknowledge the right of a State to secede and cut us off from the ocean and the world, without our consent." http://books.google.com/books?id=eNg7AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA228 Yes, the South assured the Northwest that it would never interfere with navigation of the Mississippi. As Kenneth Stampp explained in *And the War Came*, most Northwesterners rejected these assurances: "These were mere 'paper guarantees' which the West would enjoy by the sufferance of a hostile people. At any time navigation rights could be revoked or subjected to whatever taxes or tribute Southerners desired to levy."

There *was* some "good riddance--let them go" talk among some extreme anti-slavery men--but it is unclear how sincere it was. There is a good discussion of this in Stampp, *And the War Came*: "Charles Sumner advocated disunion--but only in private and largely as a kind of intellectual excursion into political theory. In practice he encouraged the movement to prepare the Massachusetts militia to defend Washington and enforce the laws. On November 27 Henry Ward Beecher boldly proclaimed that he cared little whether the South seceded. Two days later he preached a Thanksgiving Day sermon which raised the banners for a war against the Slave Power...For a proponent of peaceful disunion Garrison's Boston *Liberator* became surprisingly agitated about southern 'treason.' It charged that secessionists were determined to provoke a civil war and castigated the Democrats who allegedly opposed the punishment of 'traitors.'" Stampp also shows how Horace Greeley's alleged support of peaceful disunion was so qualified as to be meaningless. Most talk of voluntary disunion among anti-slavery men was really just meant to oppose the idea of saving the Union through yet another cowardly compromise with the Slave Power.

Oh, and one other point--about the North being better off without the South because the latter threatened the former's economic objectives: Insofar as the tariff was one of these, it actually was an argument *against* allowing peaceful secession. True, the absence of the Deep South from Congress had allowed Northerners to pass the Morrill Tariff. But that tariff would not work well if the South were allowed to secede permanently. After the Morrill Tariff would go into effect, the duties levied in northern ports would be almost twice those levied in the South, which re-enacted the old federal tariff of 1857. Yankee merchants feared that this would bankrupt them--European goods would avoid northern entrepots and flow directly to the South. Worse still, it was widely feared that smuggling from the South to the North would take place on an enormous scale--thus Northwesterners would be able to buy European goods from the South and avoid the Morrill Tariff. The London *Times* concluded a long denunciation of Yankee protectionists by saying "The smuggler will redress the errors of the statesman, as he has so often done before."

The tariff, in fact, was one major reason some observers believed all along that war was inevitable. (One critic of Greeley said that the *New York Tribune*'s editor would have let the South go in peace "if the Montgomery government had not made a fatal stab at the tariff system.")
 
If Seward were elected President instead of Lincoln, or just about any other Republican contender for the nomination in 1860, this is essentially what would have happened, with the original seven being the only states that make up the Confederacy. Peaceful measures would be pursued while anything that might antagonize the Confederacy would be avoided, up to and including the evacuation of all Federal forts such as Sumter.

Of course, how long such a situation could persist is up to debate.

Not long. I am surprised that no one has recognized the fact that the Southron fire-eaters, who were very much in control of the secessionist movement, actually wanted a war. They didn't care whether the onus of firing the first shot of the war was on them. They had so convinced themselves of Northern weakness and the concept of "one big battle and it'll all be over"-with Foreign Recognition-that IMO short of Union recognition of the CSA the Confederacy was bound to start a fight somewhere eventually.

It was inevitable.

1) Under a weak, southern-sympathetic president, I think it's possible, if a Southern leadership plays its cards right.

Except that under a weak southern-sympathetic president the South has no reason to secede. See Presidents Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan. The Republicans had potentially weak candidates in 1860, but no southern sympathizers. The Republicans were very much a Northern only party. Which is why the South didn't trust them.

Old Hickory would not have put up with secession; we know that much. But between him and Lincoln were a succession of weak or hobbled presidents, with the possible exception of Polk, who was shrewd enough to divert the whole question with a successful foreign war (and was southern himself, after all).

The Mexican War was a war of choice led by the South. 3/4ers of the soldiers who fought in that war were Southerners.

Buchanan's behavior is instructive. He essentially did nothing in his final months in office, which is essentially what he had been doing even before he was a lame duck. If, somehow, a breaking point had occurred in 1857, Buchanan could well have dithered for months or even years, resisting pressure to resort to force to bring back southern states. And had the southern leadership refrained from force themselves, they might gain the time needed to consolidate their position, and create a new reality of independent southern states that America would begrudgingly grow used to.

a) What could possibly cause a break with a near-Confederate POTUS like Buchanan in the White House?

b) What prevents Buchanan from being impeached (along with his VP) in this scenario? Especially with all those Southern congresscritters going South?

Of course, it would be a smaller South, at least at first, since the border states demonstrated how reluctant they were to resort to secession. If the Deep South's departure triggered a general unraveling of the United States, however, they might gain more incentive to bolt South.

With an earlier secession, Southern Unionists might also be emboldened, however, at what would be seen as much more a "Planter's Revolution".:rolleyes:

2) Likewise, there's another scenario: A truly Radical Republican is elected, like Wade or Thaddeus Stevens, and pursues a "no mercy" policy of war and immediate abolition. That might cause an exodus of *all* the border states (and more army officers), in which case you might also end up with an independent South - albeit not peacefully.

No way does the country nominate, much less elect, Benjamin Wade (supporter of women's suffrage!:eek:) or Thaddeus Stevens (Bogeyman #1 for the South, and way too unpopular with too many politicians at the time-a left wing 21st century man living out of his time). Although issuing an Emancipation Proclamation the day that Beauregard fires on Fort Sumter could do as you describe.

<snip>thus Northwesterners would be able to buy European goods from the South and avoid the Morrill Tariff. The London *Times* concluded a long denunciation of Yankee protectionists by saying "The smuggler will redress the errors of the statesman, as he has so often done before."

Incredibly ironic for the London Times to say this (and hypocritical), since it was Britain's own sudden change of policy in rabidly enforcing their anti-smuggling laws (ignored for 150 years) that went a long way towards igniting the American Revolutionary War. But hardly surprising, considering how alone among British newspapers they remained staunchly Pro-Confederate (and optimistic of eventual Southern victory:rolleyes:) in their news reportage right up to Lee's surrender and Davis' capture. To the utter contempt of the rest of Fleet Street, I should add.:p
 
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katchen

Banned
break in 1857-58

Not long. I am surprised that no one has recognized the fact that the Southron fire-eaters, who were very much in control of the secessionist movement, actually wanted a war. They didn't care whether the onus of firing the first shot of the war was on them. They had so convinced themselves of Northern weakness and the concept of "one big battle and it'll all be over"-with Foreign Recognition-that IMO short of Union recognition of the CSA the Confederacy was bound to start a fight somewhere eventually.

It was inevitable.



Except that under a weak southern-sympathetic president the South has no reason to secede. See Presidents Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan. The Republicans had potentially weak candidates in 1860, but no southern sympathizers. The Republicans were very much a Northern only party. Which is why the South didn't trust them.



The Mexican War was a war of choice led by the South. 3/4ers of the soldiers who fought in that war were Southerners.



a) What could possibly cause a break with a near-Confederate POTUS like Buchanan in the White House?

b) What prevents Buchanan from being impeached (along with his VP) in this scenario? Especially with all those Southern congresscritters going South?



With an earlier secession, Southern Unionists might also be emboldened, however, at what would be seen as much more a "Planter's Revolution".:rolleyes:(QUOTE)



No way does the country nominate, much less elect, Benjamin Wade (supporter of women's suffrage!:eek:) or Thaddeus Stevens (Bogeyman #1 for the South, and way too unpopular with too many politicians at the time-a left wing 21st century man living out of his time). Although issuing an Emancipation Proclamation the day that Beauregard fires on Fort Sumter could do as you describe.
To answer your question, it was Buchanan's failure to enforce the Dred Scott decision that could have led to secession. And the Southern states had the best chance of getting the Supreme Court to rule that secession was legal by March to June 1858 when it became apparent that nothing would be done to enforce the Dred Scott Decision, even when it came to Congress recognizing the pro-slavery Lecompton Government in Kansas. The Southern States would be going before the same court that ruled on Dred Scott with no vacancies. I can see a scenario in which the Supreme Court might set a time limit giving Northern states and the federal government 6 months to a year to enact appropriate legislation that would repeal antislavery legislation and if this legislation was not passed, the southern slave states would have the right to secede.
Secession under this circumstance would make it impossible for the North to claim that the South was in rebellion and would maximize public opposition while minimizing public support for war to force the South back into the union.
 
Not long. I am surprised that no one has recognized the fact that the Southron fire-eaters, who were very much in control of the secessionist movement, actually wanted a war. They didn't care whether the onus of firing the first shot of the war was on them. They had so convinced themselves of Northern weakness and the concept of "one big battle and it'll all be over"-with Foreign Recognition-that IMO short of Union recognition of the CSA the Confederacy was bound to start a fight somewhere eventually.

It was inevitable.

Except that under a weak southern-sympathetic president the South has no reason to secede. See Presidents Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan. The Republicans had potentially weak candidates in 1860, but no southern sympathizers. The Republicans were very much a Northern only party. Which is why the South didn't trust them.

The Mexican War was a war of choice led by the South. 3/4ers of the soldiers who fought in that war were Southerners.

a) What could possibly cause a break with a near-Confederate POTUS like Buchanan in the White House?

b) What prevents Buchanan from being impeached (along with his VP) in this scenario? Especially with all those Southern congresscritters going South?

With an earlier secession, Southern Unionists might also be emboldened, however, at what would be seen as much more a "Planter's Revolution".:rolleyes:

No way does the country nominate, much less elect, Benjamin Wade (supporter of women's suffrage!:eek:) or Thaddeus Stevens (Bogeyman #1 for the South, and way too unpopular with too many politicians at the time-a left wing 21st century man living out of his time). Although issuing an Emancipation Proclamation the day that Beauregard fires on Fort Sumter could do as you describe.

katchen said:
To answer your question, it was Buchanan's failure to enforce the Dred Scott decision that could have led to secession.(1)

1) Actually, it was the Dred Scott decision plus herculean efforts by Buchanan to in fact enforce the Fugitive Slave Act that had the Southerners so pleased. Spending some $100,000 of federal funds to forcibly return a family of runaways from Massachusetts back down South very much impressed the Planters, to the point that they had become willing for the first time to enforce anti-kidnapping laws of Free born Blacks and return them North, IF they could ever be found. There was one case of a New Yorker from Saratoga Springs who had spent some 30 years in slavery in Louisiana before he managed to convince a Yankee passerby to carry a message to his family, and was extradited by the authorities home.

katchen said:
And the Southern states had the best chance of getting the Supreme Court to rule that secession was legal by March to June 1858 when it became apparent that nothing would be done to enforce the Dred Scott Decision, even when it came to Congress recognizing the pro-slavery Lecompton Government in Kansas.

That was nothing more than recognizing the facts on the ground. As Bleeding Kansas showed, Washington wasn't going to be able to convert by fiat an inherently Free State into a Slave State. The Southerners were cognizant enough of that fact, at least enough to not secede over.

katchen said:
The Southern States would be going before the same court that ruled on Dred Scott with no vacancies. I can see a scenario in which the Supreme Court might set a time limit, giving Northern states and the federal government 6 months to a year to enact appropriate legislation that would repeal antislavery legislation and if this legislation was not passed, the southern slave states would have the right to secede.

Wow. That would all but be a declaration of war on the union of the United States itself by its own supreme judiciary. If they did that, the members voting for it could indeed truly be held liable for being arrested for treason one day.:eek: If nothing else, it would all but mandate that they follow their states into secession. It could also mean FDR gets his court packing bill before he is even born!:p

katchen said:
Secession under this circumstance would make it impossible for the North to claim that the South was in rebellion and would maximize public opposition while minimizing public support for war to force the South back into the union.

Until, as I posted, the Southrons decided its time to "prove their manhood".:rolleyes: Most of the film "Gone With The Wind" was Lost Causer and Dunning Thesis claptrap, but if there was one thing that it got right, it was the absolute joy with which the South went into the Civil War.
 
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