Sealion Triumphant

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
So how close to your coast do the invading soldiers need to get before you are allowed to engage them with artillery when spotted, rather than sending someone close enough to see if they are surrendering?
Do the Tiger Moths not drop their bombs on the first pass, risking fire from several barges, in case (some of) the soldiers on one barge are trying to surrender? Does a destroyer have to get within hailing range before opening fire?
Just how do you tell if a barge is unpowered and adrift rather than having temporary engine trouble from a destroyer's bridge at speed at night?
 
This compares with launching nine division elements against six defending divisions.

By way of comparison the Greek Sea God force faced a reserve of one panzer division on the first day while the elite Pinniped Corps faced a mere one tank, one infantry division and one infantry brigade plus corps level troops as an immediate reserve for the allied forces.

What 6 defending divisions? I make it from east to west on coastal defence 1st London, 45th (West Country), 29th Infantry Brigade, 1st MMG with the 5 battalion NZEF & 31st Infantry Brigade in immediate reserve held just behind. In GCHQ reserve to the South of London 1st Canadian Division, 1st Armoured Division, 1st Army Tank Brigade with 42nd Infantry Division to the west of London.
i.e. in manpower terms 3 Infantry Divisions equivalent on coastal defence (1st London having 4 brigades) with 1 in immediate reserve.
Sourced from Newbold's thesis 'British planning & preparations to resist invasion on land September 1939 - September 1940'.
 
What 6 defending divisions? I make it from east to west on coastal defence 1st London, 45th (West Country), 29th Infantry Brigade, 1st MMG with the 5 battalion NZEF & 31st Infantry Brigade in immediate reserve held just behind. In GCHQ reserve to the South of London 1st Canadian Division, 1st Armoured Division, 1st Army Tank Brigade with 42nd Infantry Division to the west of London.
i.e. in manpower terms 3 Infantry Divisions equivalent on coastal defence (1st London having 4 brigades) with 1 in immediate reserve.
Sourced from Newbold's thesis 'British planning & preparations to resist invasion on land September 1939 - September 1940'.

Can I ask before we start comparing apples to oranges are you working on the assumption that the Lyme Regis and Ventnor landings would remain as part of the operational plan or be cancelled?
 

hipper

Banned
No

Basic law of the sea.

In addition there is the Geneva Convention which expressly forbids by this period any kind of "No quarter" order.

Plus getting the other lot to surrender is how wars are won, very rarely is one side strong enough to kill 'em all.


from the London Gazette Refering to Crete, Note that no thought was given to picking up German troops in the water.

At 2330/2ist, Force D (now consisting of R.A.D. in DIDO, " with ORION, AJAX, JANUS, KIMBERLEY, HASTY and HERE- WARD) encountered an enemy troop convoy of 'caiques escorted by one or two torpedo boats 18 miles north of Canea. The caiques, which were crowded with German soldiers, were engaged for two and a half hours. R.D.F. and A.S.V.* proved invaluable in leading pur forces on to fresh targets. In all, one or two steamers, at least a dozen caiques, a small pleasure steamer and a steam yacht were either sunk or left burning. One of the escorting torpedo boats, after firing torpedoes at our cruisers, was damaged by gunfire from DIDO and finally blown up by a broadside from AJAX. It is estimated that the vessels sunk carried about 4,000 German troops.

It was only hundreds of German troops lost at sea rather than thousands, although a large number spent time in the water.
Which would have been less survivable in the Channel.

Regards Hipper.
 
This raises an interesting question, if the British afterwards spot a drifting barge with survivors, what do they do?

from the London Gazette Refering to Crete, Note that no thought was given to picking up German troops in the water.

Regards Hipper.

During the pell mell engagement you are not expected to rescue survivors however customary international law still applies so afterwards barges that surrendered would most likely be rescued.

What is notable about the action you quoted is that the heavily outnumbered torpedo boat Lupo did manage to rescue most of the survivors. This action showed that the Royal Navy could likely intercept small craft at night when operating in smaller numbers than present in the Channel and also that Italians can put up a fight against overwhelming odds if well led.

It is also worth noting that at Crete on the 22nd/23rd May 1941 Force C was able to frighten off another landing attempt in the face of persistent air attack.

However while I would agree that rescue operations would not be considered in the main engagement afterwards individual craft would most likely be recovered unless German military activity presented too great a risk. However the risk would be weighed up.
 
However while I would agree that rescue operations would not be considered in the main engagement afterwards individual craft would most likely be recovered unless German military activity presented too great a risk. However the risk would be weighed up.

I agree, if the Luftwaffe, subs or surface ships interfered then no rescue; otherwise yes as a large number of prisoners would be a great propaganda piece...
 
However while I would agree that rescue operations would not be considered in the main engagement afterwards individual craft would most likely be recovered unless German military activity presented too great a risk. However the risk would be weighed up.

The risk is great. A British ship finding a drifting barge while returning to base shortly before daylight will know that the air will be swarming with Luftwaffe aircraft at dawn. It will not hang about taking it in tow. Taking on survivors might be possible if there is room, but many of the light craft would simply not have room to take on prisoners, and even if they did, then this is still valuable time lost. As an example, in the decisive battle of convoy ONS-5, the escorts simply returned to station while watching U-125's crew abandon ship. U-125's crew were doomed, but in the Channel, a barge has much better prospects - they should wash up on a beach in a day or two. So ignoring the barge is not a death sentence for the crew. If there is spare time, it might be sufficient to simply order the crew to throw weapons overboard, and then sail off.

But I think the most likely result is that the barge just gets shot up. Shoot first, ask questions - such as whether you have power or want to surrender - later. The barge might attempt to surrender, but there is a problem communicating this to the attacking unit. How would it be done? Do they have sufficient white material to fly a flag? I would think that simply standing there with their hands up is the most practical method. But this would only be done once the attack is under way and, in the pre-dawn gloom, there is a good chance that the first warning of attack would be shells striking the barge, which might quickly prevent the kind of coordinated hands-up manoeuvre required.
 
Really would a Luftwaffe pilot attack a barge under tow? Would he be sure not to sink or damage the barge full of his country men! In all probability both the barge and the trawler (or other small powerboat) would be displaying white flags. You are also forgetting that there will be chaos in the channel as barges and damage vessels drift about at the mercy of wind and tide, it is not as if the Luftwaffe is trying to defend defined convoy routes. In The aftermath of a failed channel crossing I would suggest that the Germans would be so busy dealing with those assets that actually made it back to port or washed up on their side of the channel that anything else would be on it's own!
 
Can I ask before we start comparing apples to oranges are you working on the assumption that the Lyme Regis and Ventnor landings would remain as part of the operational plan or be cancelled?

I'm working on the assumption of using the agreed German operational plan that did not contain landings at Lyme Regis or Ventnor as part of the initial assault. They were tentative follow on landings planned as part of the breakout from the beach head. IMO purely as a sop to the Heer's desire for a broad front with no realistic prospect of them taking place even in the event of a hypothetical successful Sealion. There was no shipping available for these landings or any means of protecting them by the Kreigsmarine. They were only ever part of the Heer's initial planning which reflected their wish for broad front landings along the South Coast (with no assessment of the shipping available & the means of protecting it) & were dropped in late August when the Kreigsmarine plan narrow front plan was adopted with the addition of landings in the Brighton area.
As you've correctly identified that the German first wave would have been carried out by the forward elements of 9 divisions (plus the 4 Panzer detachments) as per the agreed plan I'm confused as to why you're bringing up the subject up. These landings would have added another 2 divisions to the German OOB but still wouldn't have made the initial British defending forces 6 Divisions as they would have been met by 50th Infantry Division in Dorset & a Brigade of 4th Infantry Division on the Isle of Wright for a total of 4 1/3 vs 11 German not 6 vs 9.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It may help in deconflicting the division count assessments if one considers that the excellent British rail network could whisk reinforcements in very quickly - without the usual Blitzkrieg disruption of the road network.
 
Both for themselves and later what their thought the Allies would do, the Germans were fixated on the Dover - Calais crossing. They were wrong as far as the Allies were concerned in '44, but was it the best option for themselves. Apart from Dover, the port options weren't great. Just wondered if the east coast would have been better? OTOH the water distance is greater, but the current effects could be greater at the narrow point. Would it have been better to seize Harwich and Felixstowe, with a subsidiary landing at Lowestoft?
 
...with a subsidiary landing at Lowestoft?
Err, isn't it a bit low-lying and, well, wet around Lowestoft?
Are tanks or soldiers going to go anywhere any time soon if the British decide to turn off the pumps, sabotage the gates and flood the surrounding area?
Some ITV News pictures of entirely natural flooding in the area, from 2013: Link
 

Cook

Banned
No

Basic law of the sea.

In addition there is the Geneva Convention which expressly forbids by this period any kind of "No quarter" order.

Plus getting the other lot to surrender is how wars are won, very rarely is one side strong enough to kill 'em all.

There is nothing in the Convention of Maritime Warfare and the Principals of the Geneva Convention prohibiting the sinking of troop transports: with the exception of clearly identifiable hospital ships all other vessels employed by the enemy can be fairly targeted.

If you wish to check, the Convention, as it pertains to Maritime Warfare, can be found here.

It is also worth noting that during the evacuation of Dunkirk, the Germans sank 17 heavily laden troop transports, and 200 smaller troop carrying vessels. Nor was either side reluctant so sink troop transports at any other stage in the war; so no, there would have been no gentlemanly enquiries as to whether the Germans wished to surrender.
 
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There is nothing in the Convention of Maritime Warfare and the Principals of the Geneva Convention prohibiting the sinking of troop transports: with the exception of clearly identifiable hospital ships, all other vessels employed by the enemy can be fairly targeted.

If you wish to check, they can be found here.

It is also worth noting that during the evacuation of Dunkirk, the Germans sank 17 heavily laden troop transports, and 200 smaller troop carrying vessels. Nor was either side reluctant so sink troop transports at any other stage in the war; so no, there would have been no gentlemanly enquiries as to whether the Germans wished to surrender.

No the question asked was what happens after the main action is over.

There are certain guiding principals arguing for a rescue attempt but these do get balanced against risk.

Legally there is no problem with sinking troop transports but if confronted with an isolated barge trying to surrender "They're waving what appear to be brown and white cavalry guidons Sir!"

"No Curruthers those are pants pressed into service as white flags"

Then consideration will be given to accepting said surrender and attempting a rescue.

On the other hand it is not going to happen if there is a swarm of stukas overhead.
 
These landings would have added another 2 divisions to the German OOB but still wouldn't have made the initial British defending forces 6 Divisions as they would have been met by 50th Infantry Division in Dorset & a Brigade of 4th Infantry Division on the Isle of Wright for a total of 4 1/3 vs 11 German not 6 vs 9.

Well erm no.

First off a division to count as a division must included all of its artillery and support services...the traditional definition of a division being the smallest formation that can operate as an independent force or what lay men might refer to as an 'army'.

The Germans planned to deploy divisional elements...that is not entire divisions...specifically these were the rifle regiments with some attached mountain and/or rocket artillery...the difference between mountain artillery and field artillery is you can break it down into smaller loads making it more easily transportable but the price is you do not get as much bang for your buck. In terms of combat power they were much reduced from divisions, in terms of combat sustainability they were very much reduced compared to a division.

See I am open to the possibility I may be looking at something different after you seem to be looking at XII and XIII corps while my impression is that the German wider front landings would have also brought some of V Corps into the action on the British side. Another problem though is that neither the British defence forces nor the German plan were fixed. We know the precise plan for D-Day because D-Day happened on June 6 1944 providing us a fixed point of time. However any estimation of force deployed by either side in regards Sea Lion is only going to refer to a fixed point of time and we do not know on what day Sea Lion happened because rather awkwardly it well...didn't happen.

A further complication is that the idea of an 'agreed' plan rather ignores that there was no agreed plan...we have records of the Navy and the Luftwaffe reps actually getting up and leaving some of the meetings as the Army was not listening and were just talking among themselves. This also brings up the point that the Army's estimate of what could be carried across the Channel at a given date did not necessarily agree with the Navy's.

Even so for example there were extensive revisions. At one point the 9 division elements of the landing force (not count the airborne troops) was reduced to 7 divisional elements while at one point each divisional element of the landing force was supposed to receive a roughly battalion sized group of 49 panzers this was later reduced due to the problem of actually fitting so many panzers aboard the available landing craft.

Which is not to say that the British were without their own brand of chaos. Units of up to divisional size were formed and broken up, brigades were transferred between divisions, sometimes physically and other times just administratively. Further in counting British forces there is the difference between a Brigade Group and a Brigade to consider. A Brigade in Commonwealth military parlance is equivalent to a German regiment while a Brigade Group includes support units and would indeed function a bit like half a division.

So the options include I could simply be wrong on my 6 divisions in the landing zone count, we could be counting different areas and we could be counting different times after all even just XII and XIII Corps give me 4 Divisions and 1 Brigade (not a Brigade Group) receiving the initial landing by my count.


It may help in deconflicting the division count assessments if one considers that the excellent British rail network could whisk reinforcements in very quickly - without the usual Blitzkrieg disruption of the road network.

Well the transport infrastructure did radically change the nature of the game in the battle of the build up that would have followed any landing. Worse for the Germans the British forces were road transported by motor vehicles and motorised units proved much more difficult to interdict on the march than horse drawn ones. This was in part why the forces the German's deployed in Normandy were so disproportionately (for them) comprised of their panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions...those were the ones that could get there.

Still even holding down the British to German response capabilities (after they had been degraded by months of aerial attack by air forces many times as large) The rather worrying point emerges that the German assault and airborne troops might have faced regular forces equal in numbers to themselves but with much more artillery on day one...let alone the days after.
 
Err, isn't it a bit low-lying and, well, wet around Lowestoft?
Are tanks or soldiers going to go anywhere any time soon if the British decide to turn off the pumps, sabotage the gates and flood the surrounding area?
Some ITV News pictures of entirely natural flooding in the area, from 2013: Link

Yes it's flat, but it's not like Holland - lower than sea-level. Yes it can flood - as a result of heavy rain. Flat would be an advantage, no natural obstacles for defences to anchor on. Moreover Lowestoft being a fishing port, would be better suited to handle the 'German armada' than the minor ports/harbour on the south-east coast.
 
Yes it's flat, but it's not like Holland - lower than sea-level. Yes it can flood - as a result of heavy rain. Flat would be an advantage, no natural obstacles for defences to anchor on. Moreover Lowestoft being a fishing port, would be better suited to handle the 'German armada' than the minor ports/harbour on the south-east coast.
I had a relative who lived a few miles north of Lowestoft, and along the Waveney valley, some of that land is definitely below at least high tide level. They need embankments, ditches and pumps to keep the lowest lying land dry. The area is dotted with windmills, such as Herringfleet Windmill, which were originally used to run the drainage pumps.
Yes, there are areas of higher ground around Lowestoft, and running north along the coast from there to Great Yarmouth, but go inland and you hit The Broads.
It's not as extensive as The Fens, but it's very definitely floodable, and Lowestoft is going to be difficult to get out of without boats.

By the way, Great Yarmouth, is an ex-fishing port (turned North Sea oil industry support, in latter days) but again is surrounded by very low lying, very wet, land.
 
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