There were 5 key CH locations on the south coast, from Ventnor on the Isle of Wight to Dover. On 12th August they were hit by small groups of Luftwaffe raiders, at Dover the CHL (used to detect aircraft from 500ft to 5000ft) was hit rather than the CH, at Pevensey and Rye the CH stations were put out of action for a few hours as was Dunkirk, although this was not one of the vital 5. Later in the day Ventnor was hit putting the station out of action for 3 days, although it was not restored to full working order for a couple of weeks. Due to good old British deception (at Ventnor they moved a mobile CHL unit in to create radio traffic), good forward planning (backup generators were on standby, as were repair crews) and a bit of luck (Poling was not hit which meant some cover was available) the Germans jumped to the conclusion that the vital radar staff were stationed underground. In fact the control rooms were highly vulnerable sited in wooden huts close to the masts. So on the basis that their bombs had little effect on the masts, that the British fighters were still able to intercept later that day and because of continued radio traffic from the radar stations the Germans thought, incorrectly, that they were not able to put the CH stations out of action.To change the subject a little:
Its always mentioned how poor the Luftwaffe's efforts against the UK's radar networks were. What if the Germans had taken radar every bit as seriously as the British? SO SERIOUS that from the very start the Germans go after the entire-reachable with Me-109 escorts-British radar network with a sustained effort using 100% of their resources? ASB I suppose, for many reasons, but if they had, how much damage could they do in X number of days before either:
a) Lasting significant damage was done to the British radar network?
OR
b) The Luftewaffe was forced to break off due to casualties?
In part the Germans were correct but if they had hit them on a daily basis the disruption, even with the rapid response of the repair crews, would have been enough to have some kind of effect. The British solution would have been to site the communications staff away from the sites reducing their vulnerability meaning the German tactics would only work for a week or two at the most. The Luftwaffe may have been lucky and taken down a mast or two reducing but not eliminating the radar coverage. The Germans would never have run out of bombers targetting the CH installations because they only ever needed to use small groups to attack them using low level flying.
If the Germans had recognised the vulnerability and continued to attack the radar stations putting them out of action for a few hours each time the effect on Fighter Command would not, in my opinion, have been incredibly significant. Early warning times would have been reduced but the British would have instituted new tactics using the limited radar cover that would still have been available from the CHL mobile units, any CH stations that were still functioning (its doubtful the whole network would be put out of action simultaneously) and by increasing standing patrols.