Ok I'll make it more explicit. The Soviets outnumbered the Germans in manpower, tanks, artillery, and aircraft in 1941 and it didn't do them any good.
No they didn't?
The Axis came in with 3.8m the Soviets started with roughly 2.7m (in the western military districts) they lost approx. 2.5m over the year they end up in by mid 1942 at about 5.3m the mobilisation while fast wasn't instant so at most they maybe outnumbered them by the very end of 1941 when the fighting was done for the season, but more likely by the time the counter attacks started (when they lost a bunch more).
Even leaving that aside things change the Red army in 1941 is not the red army in 1942,
The Germans could punch holes in the front and exploit with armor to encircle and destroy most of the Soviet army. Since most of the men with any pre-Barbarossa training were dead or dying in prison camps most of the Red Army in the spring of 1942 was made up of raw recruits. They haven't mastered any brilliant strategy to prevent the Germans from doing the same thing again. Breaking through wasn't the problem for the Germans it was where to go that was the question.
The red army improved throughout the war, so the idea that they were as bad or worse in 1942 compared to 1941 is not supported by reality.
I think the problem is you have to look at each success and failure in the context of the time it happens, so for example were the counter offensives that pushed the Germans back from Moscow in early 1942 expensive and messy? yes! But they did push the Germans back and could you even imagine the red army in say June 1941 even attempting something similar let alone getting even that mixed result? But equally if you compare those early 1942 counter offensives to Red army operation in 1943 or 1944 they look bad.
But if you want to actually argue the 1941 red army was better than the red army in 1942, then well ok but you basically arguing against decades and tens of thousands of pages of academic writing
But remember it's not just the red army getting better the axis army was also getting worse, those nice well trained Panzer divs flush from France (where they had also taken loses of course) and doing all that dynamic attacking throughout 1941 had also suffered heavy attrition. Axis loses in 1941 were obviously less than the Soviets but not only where they less able to absorb them they took them in units they were least able to replace and most needed.
Talking about the Germans being stopped in a street battle in Moscow because they lost the Battle of Stalingrad is an analogy looking to support a conclusion. If the Germans make a breakthrough which is a near certainty and encircle Moscow, why would they fight block by block though a massive city they only wanted to destroy?
You keep making this point about destroy, how do they destroy it? What does that even really mean? They have no 1,000 4 engine bomber fleet and years to do it, they have to take it to even destroy it. Also I'm pretty sure Hitler wanted to take it in Sep/Oct 1941 once Barbarossa had failed? He certainly spent years trying to take Leningrad, or if in your view he was actually trying to destroy Leningrad well he didn't achieve that despite besieging it for 3 years and Leningrad was smaller than Moscow! (I do realise there are differences between Leningrad and Moscow)
Also no it's not certain they make a break though and encircle Moscow in 1942. As I said earlier that is where the Soviet thought they would attack so it is where the red army was prepared. and at this point out numbered the axis.
You seem think this will just be Kiev in 1941 but that ignores reality.
There isn't going to be a street battle in Moscow. By driving south, the Germans gave the Red Army a chance to catch its breath, train men, and buildup it's material strength.
The red army was already building it's material strength from the end of 1941 when they thought the axis would go for Moscow again, the going south isn't the thing that allowed that to happen
And it's not like 1942 was really a lull in hostilities either, the red army had as many men killed in actions in 1942 as it did in 1941? So this idea that the red army got a breather in 1942 isn't true
Between 1942 and 43 the Soviets understood that the only way to hold the Germans was a dense defense in depth with massive reserves. They had that at Kursk they couldn't do that in 1942.
The mobilised strength of the red army in mid June was 5.3m and they were expecting an attack at Moscow, yes they could do that
Plus Moscow will be better ground for them to defend since assaulting it would be costly
Just having more men than the Germans in 1942 ignores the qualitive difference between the two war machines. The Red Army couldn't take on the Heer in a head on fight in 1942.
That not really how it works, it not about who can fight head to head better, it more about one army being more able to pull of more complex operations from army level down to the company level, than the other.
Defending Moscow is not going to be one of those complex operations where superior training and 3C would be as material in as say co-ordinated offensives etc
Plus as I mentioned above despite your claim the red army was getting better, and the Axis army was getting worse
The Red Army lost in the Kharkov offensive, they lost in the Crimea, AGC held its front, AGN held the siege lines around Leningrad.
as per above the red army in 1942 was certainly not at it's best making co-ordinated attacks, but that's not what we're talking about. Your argument seems to be the red army didn't have a 100% success rate at all operations it launched in 1942 so therefore they can't stop the Germans if they go for Moscow, that not how war works
No where in early 1942 did the Red Army show it had any mastery over the Germans.
They don't really need to have mastery over them in all facets of war to stymie an attack against prepared positions and a massive city by an enemy operating at the end of a long supply line with inadequate logistics and who they outnumber and are out producing
As the weather improved Stavka realized the Germans would be on the offensive again, and their biggest fear was an attack on Moscow. They breathed a sigh of relief because they could retreat in the south and trade space for time, they couldn't do that if the attack was against Moscow.
Again see above
Of course it could just be the Germans realised they couldn't take Moscow and tried something else