Sea Lion ….. No Really

That isn't how the battle would go. They wouldn't go from house to house, they'd encircle the city and raise it to the ground. The Nazis had no interest in occupying Moscow, they just wanted to destroy it and the industries around it.
You are just repeating yourself now, can you address the points I made at all?

Edit sorry just seen you next post will respond to that!
 
Last edited:

Moss

Kicked
Only by Sep 41 they already had to give up advancing on three axis and concentrate on one even before they got close to Moscow, because they had already gone past their logistical ability to supply all three advancing at teh same time.



If you mean at Stalingrad, thing is they risk the same happening at Moscow (only likely on larger scale)



Only you suggesting giving up on blitzkrieg and going to besiege Moscow so like Stalingrad but bigger



They invaded the city but they couldn't hold it and then they got trapped and lost, that is not winning it certainly not winning a siege.



Despite your insult Paulus at least had the nouse to realise the plan risked getting stuck and cut off before he went it, then he realised he was about to be surrounded and cut off and he requested to withdraw. Either way you blaming Paulus for not ignoring Hitler leading to the result at Stalingrad ignores the issues are far more fundamental for the axis in the USSR and for your plan. and those issue often involve the Soviets a lot more than your response seems to indicate*

Also Guderian was master of being right after the fact and at other's expense. And if you think he going to lead the axis to victory by ignoring Hitler (but also besieging Moscow which would be the very last thing in the world he's want to be involved in) then you need to read more books than Panzer Leader

As an aside If you think the tanks being in the street was the problem I think it again because you don't really understand the harsh reality of trying to take defended cities like Stalingrad, and you better believe there will be tanks in the Moscow streets with your plan not just conveniently defending the flanks.



Because war is not a game were you have the best of everything everywhere just in case and the plan was to get to the city take it and secure the river ASAP

It kind of like the tanks point , you want to have absolutely ironclad flanks to protect against whatever possible Soviet counter attack could come assuin you still fighting a month later, OK cool, but you just made your job taking the city much harder,



One hell of show doesn't mean anything, winning and losing matters




Nothing flippant about it I gave the reasons (and I have more), and you haven't addressed them instead blaming German Generals and Hitler, and repeating that Stalingrad is further than Moscow (which it is but that doesn't mean the issue with logistics to Moscow are now solved)_



You know a big reason why Axis forces often got split a lot in the east? It's because there wasn't the infrastructure or logistics to mass and then move them all in one place. So they had to be split so they could actually move. This isn't a computer game were all you divisions can over lap each other and happily move about by themselves. You try and pile all the Axis forces towards Moscow you will end up with a mess of epic proportions

Go look at the opening moves in 1942 even with those reduced forces moving into the caucuses they had this issue


None of this addressed the points I made, and just because you pile all your men into the same place and call it decisive it doesn't mean you are going to win.

Also go look at the French campaign what is the single decisive battle there? They did what they planned to do in Russia they out manoeuvred and then defeated the French armies ability to fight, that then left the road open to Paris. That was the plan for Barbarossa not some single heroic decisive battle.

In the opening months of Barbarossa in 1941 they out numbered the red army in European Russia and were operating within the planned engagement zone with operational surprise against an enemy with at that point clay feet, that was their chance of decisive victory.
It will cerntainly not be on a grander scale than stalingrad in the sense that they wouldn't be sticking out on a 800 km un gaurded flank. That is if the target is Moscow 42.

At no point am I sugessting that the best idea is to get sucked unto a street fight in the capitol. I belive I made it clear before the street fight in the city was a bad idea. However, the only point I was making is that despite the lack of logistics, the forces cut in two and fighting in a fashion not suitable to their strengths, the germans still for a time were able to take that city. That should be considered an impressive feat when one fully accounts for their dissadvantageous situation.

And Moscow 42 would allow them the opportunity to use the bewegung kreig advantage, cutting off and destroying large numbers of the Red Army that got away in the opening stages of Blau. The Reich cut through those defenses like a knife through butter and with Moscow they will not simply be able to retreat absurd distanced to avoid it.

As far as "winning" in Stalingrad goes the germans did for a time hold the city. The point that I'm endevoring to make that you seem to be missing is that DESPITE all the dissadvantages they still took the city breifly. I think thats worthy of note. And then when one extrapolates on what Moscow would look like wherein the Reich would not posses so many disadvantages it seems doable to win in the capitol.

And no Hitler didn't split the 6th army for logistical reasons. If anything that was a far worse decision as he sent half the army even further, deeper into the heart of the caucasus under strengthed, under supplied, and with a laughablly exposed flank.

And finally the logistical situation had improved since the harsh winter and the germans had made repairs to the railroads. Its far from a perfect picture, but it wasn't as desperate as you make it sound. Again this is not December of 41 this is summer of 42. And once again the logistics will be in range to support the Reichs actions towards Moscow. You sight the failed attempt in 41 as a reason it couldn't work. But this ignores that they've had 6 months to prepare, to resupply, and improve logistics. Are the panzer divisons still only at 30 percent strength? Are the infantry divisions under manned? Is there a blizzard preventing forward movement? No to all of these questions. So with improved logistics and a group of expeirinced soliders going up against a group of Soviet rookies, within the boundaries of their logistical capabllities then Moscow is a possibility.

Finaly Paulas was not a man who was gifted at Blitzkreig. You've mentioned several times quite correctly that the strength of the Wehrmacht was found in their mobility. But Paulas was not that kind of a guy. He was an unimaginative man, who wanted to follow by book instructionals outdated even in his time. He didn't posses the drive or the vigour of a Guderian, a Manstein, even a von Bock or von Kleist. Hell, someone else could've taken the city off the march. Guderian in all likelyhood would never have allowed the 62nd and 64th to retreat into the city, rather pinning them in a cauldron before hand. Paulus was a ww1 officers guide book trying to fight in ww2, failing to take into account the changes in technology and therefore the manner in which the conflict must be played out. Finally Paulus was a coward who refused to stand up to Hitler. Many high ranking generals were unafraid of pushing back. The men I aforementioned would never have accepted the splitting of the army, the igonorance of the mounting red offensive, and the refusal to pull out. If he had guts he could've saved much of the 6th army, and that would certainly alter the course of the war.
 

Moss

Kicked
"the Reich actually won in Stalingrad"....you must be kidding. Taking most of the streets was not victory because the battleground was not just the city itself but the flanks of the city and also the other side of the river where the Soviets were building up their forces and pounding the Nazis with artillery, and where the Nazis did not have the air power or the gunboats and ferries to launch a major attack. Putting oneself in a trap which then closes on you is not a victory in any meaningful sense. But even without the trap, your assertion is like saying Lee won the Battle of Gettysburg because he temporarily seized the town of Gettysburg--as if that was the battleground, not the nearby hills and ridges where the Union troops swiftly became entrenched.
I'm saying they won the streetfight.The problem then was that the flanks were left ungaurded and the tanks moved into the city. It wasn't a defeat because they lost the street fight as say in Berlin. It was a defeat on the flanks. that was the point I was making
 

Moss

Kicked
Ok I'll make it more explicit. The Soviets outnumbered the Germans in manpower, tanks, artillery, and aircraft in 1941 and it didn't do them any good. The Germans could punch holes in the front and exploit with armor to encircle and destroy most of the Soviet army. Since most of the men with any pre-Barbarossa training were dead or dying in prison camps most of the Red Army in the spring of 1942 was made up of raw recruits. They haven't mastered any brilliant strategy to prevent the Germans from doing the same thing again. Breaking through wasn't the problem for the Germans it was where to go that was the question.

Talking about the Germans being stopped in a street battle in Moscow because they lost the Battle of Stalingrad is an analogy looking to support a conclusion. If the Germans make a breakthrough which is a near certainty and encircle Moscow, why would they fight block by block though a massive city they only wanted to destroy? There isn't going to be a street battle in Moscow. By driving south, the Germans gave the Red Army a chance to catch its breath, train men, and buildup it's material strength. Between 1942 and 43 the Soviets understood that the only way to hold the Germans was a dense defense in depth with massive reserves. They had that at Kursk they couldn't do that in 1942.

Just having more men than the Germans in 1942 ignores the qualitive difference between the two war machines. The Red Army couldn't take on the Heer in a head on fight in 1942. The Red Army lost in the Kharkov offensive, they lost in the Crimea, AGC held its front, AGN held the siege lines around Leningrad. No where in early 1942 did the Red Army show it had any mastery over the Germans. As the weather improved Stavka realized the Germans would be on the offensive again, and their biggest fear was an attack on Moscow. They breathed a sigh of relief because they could retreat in the south and trade space for time, they couldn't do that if the attack was against Moscow.
Correct
 
they'd encircle the city
That's easier said than done.

Frontline in december 1941:
Eastern_Front_1941-06_to_1941-12.png


Frontline after Soviet winter offensive:
Map_Soviet_1941_Winter_counteroffensive.jpg


(maps from Wiki)

Now you're suggesting the Germans stop their advance in 1941 earlier than they did, so the frontline will be somewhat different.

How do you suggest they encircle Moscow?
 
Aircraft like the Bf-109 and FW-190 were never near obsolete. Their later versions were competitive with the latest Allied fighters of the war.
The Bf-109 has been elevated in posterity out of all proportion by it's early-war exploits and by the actions of some truly exceptional pilots. By war's end, it certainly still had a place in the OoB but describing it as "competitive", in it's own right, by 1945 is stretching things.

The Bf-109 presents something of an interesting juxtaposition, in that it's development became somewhat stagnant in broad terms but simultaneously was subject to a crazy number of incremental changes. So that, in the end, it achieved neither production efficiency or renewed competitiveness - more of a managed obsolescence.

In any event, I really wouldn't hold it up as being an exemplar of Germany's war-winning ability. By still being in production by mid-1944, it really exemplifies the opposite.
 
Last edited:
The Bf-109 has been elevated in posterity out of all proportion by it's early-war exploits and by the actions of some truly exceptional pilots. By war's end, it certainly still had a place in the OoB but describing it as "competitive", in it's own right, by 1945 is stretching things.

The Bf-109 presents something of an interesting juxtaposition, in that it's development became somewhat stagnant in broad terms but simultaneously was subject to a crazy number of incremental changes. So that, in the end, it achieved neither production efficiency or renewed competitiveness - more of a managed obsolescence.

In any event, I really wouldn't hold it up as being an exemplar of Germany's war-winning ability. By still being in production by mid-1944, it really exemplifies the opposite.
Very much so. Even by 1944 it was strugling. It was a better high altitude interceptor than the Fw190, but that's not saying much, since that was the role the 109 (like the Spitfire) was designed for. For actual combat, as well as fighter bomber duties, the 190 was superior on all counts. Germany simply didn't have anything to replace it with...
 

Garrison

Donor
Production of armored vehicles, ammo, U-Boats, artillery, motor vehicles, bombs, small arms, and advanced weapons like missiles increased dramatically. Shifting industrial priorities from civilian uses to military purposes freed up resources for war production. Aircraft like the Bf-109 and FW-190 were never near obsolete. Their later versions were competitive with the latest Allied fighters of the war. The biggest limiting factor for fighters was engine technology and the quest for more powerful engines never stopped.
There was no armaments miracle as Speed described it. Germany industry was fully mobilized and what civilian production remained was essential goods. What genuine gains were made came from new capacity and the use of ever more ruthlessly exploited slave labour, which of course doesn't fit the narrative of rationalization and efficiency that Speer and others put about. As for the Bf-109 by the time the K models was introduced it was totally outclassed as fighter with the bigger engine making it worse not better.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
The UK will easily put more forces there than the Germans can and with more heavy weapons than the German can have with them. Just a simple 1 BB, 2 CA, 4 or 5 DD's can put enough Royal Marines plus Naval troops on land with covering fire from the ships than the UBoats or German air transport can. The Problem with the Germans is they can get some sailors and some Fallschirmjager/Mountain troops there but without any heavy support or large amount of supplies with them. Taking the crews off of the UBoats then renders the Uboats unusable for what they were meant for.
Franco and his government were absolutely sure that if Spain entered the war the Canarias would immediately fall to the UK
 

Garrison

Donor
Very much so. Even by 1944 it was strugling. It was a better high altitude interceptor than the Fw190, but that's not saying much, since that was the role the 109 (like the Spitfire) was designed for. For actual combat, as well as fighter bomber duties, the 190 was superior on all counts. Germany simply didn't have anything to replace it with...
That they had the Fw 190 and yet still kept churning out Bf 109s reflects the essential dysfunction of German armaments production, decisions made based on who had the best connections rather what made the most sense.
 
That they had the Fw 190 and yet still kept churning out Bf 109s reflects the essential dysfunction of German armaments production, decisions made based on who had the best connections rather what made the most sense.
Oooh yeah... constant changes of contracts, requests, Goering & Himmler poking, delays on decisions...
 
Ok I'll make it more explicit. The Soviets outnumbered the Germans in manpower, tanks, artillery, and aircraft in 1941 and it didn't do them any good.

No they didn't?

The Axis came in with 3.8m the Soviets started with roughly 2.7m (in the western military districts) they lost approx. 2.5m over the year they end up in by mid 1942 at about 5.3m the mobilisation while fast wasn't instant so at most they maybe outnumbered them by the very end of 1941 when the fighting was done for the season, but more likely by the time the counter attacks started (when they lost a bunch more).

Even leaving that aside things change the Red army in 1941 is not the red army in 1942,

The Germans could punch holes in the front and exploit with armor to encircle and destroy most of the Soviet army. Since most of the men with any pre-Barbarossa training were dead or dying in prison camps most of the Red Army in the spring of 1942 was made up of raw recruits. They haven't mastered any brilliant strategy to prevent the Germans from doing the same thing again. Breaking through wasn't the problem for the Germans it was where to go that was the question.

The red army improved throughout the war, so the idea that they were as bad or worse in 1942 compared to 1941 is not supported by reality.

I think the problem is you have to look at each success and failure in the context of the time it happens, so for example were the counter offensives that pushed the Germans back from Moscow in early 1942 expensive and messy? yes! But they did push the Germans back and could you even imagine the red army in say June 1941 even attempting something similar let alone getting even that mixed result? But equally if you compare those early 1942 counter offensives to Red army operation in 1943 or 1944 they look bad.


But if you want to actually argue the 1941 red army was better than the red army in 1942, then well ok but you basically arguing against decades and tens of thousands of pages of academic writing

But remember it's not just the red army getting better the axis army was also getting worse, those nice well trained Panzer divs flush from France (where they had also taken loses of course) and doing all that dynamic attacking throughout 1941 had also suffered heavy attrition. Axis loses in 1941 were obviously less than the Soviets but not only where they less able to absorb them they took them in units they were least able to replace and most needed.

Talking about the Germans being stopped in a street battle in Moscow because they lost the Battle of Stalingrad is an analogy looking to support a conclusion. If the Germans make a breakthrough which is a near certainty and encircle Moscow, why would they fight block by block though a massive city they only wanted to destroy?

You keep making this point about destroy, how do they destroy it? What does that even really mean? They have no 1,000 4 engine bomber fleet and years to do it, they have to take it to even destroy it. Also I'm pretty sure Hitler wanted to take it in Sep/Oct 1941 once Barbarossa had failed? He certainly spent years trying to take Leningrad, or if in your view he was actually trying to destroy Leningrad well he didn't achieve that despite besieging it for 3 years and Leningrad was smaller than Moscow! (I do realise there are differences between Leningrad and Moscow)

Also no it's not certain they make a break though and encircle Moscow in 1942. As I said earlier that is where the Soviet thought they would attack so it is where the red army was prepared. and at this point out numbered the axis.

You seem think this will just be Kiev in 1941 but that ignores reality.


There isn't going to be a street battle in Moscow. By driving south, the Germans gave the Red Army a chance to catch its breath, train men, and buildup it's material strength.

The red army was already building it's material strength from the end of 1941 when they thought the axis would go for Moscow again, the going south isn't the thing that allowed that to happen

And it's not like 1942 was really a lull in hostilities either, the red army had as many men killed in actions in 1942 as it did in 1941? So this idea that the red army got a breather in 1942 isn't true



Between 1942 and 43 the Soviets understood that the only way to hold the Germans was a dense defense in depth with massive reserves. They had that at Kursk they couldn't do that in 1942.

The mobilised strength of the red army in mid June was 5.3m and they were expecting an attack at Moscow, yes they could do that

Plus Moscow will be better ground for them to defend since assaulting it would be costly



Just having more men than the Germans in 1942 ignores the qualitive difference between the two war machines. The Red Army couldn't take on the Heer in a head on fight in 1942.

That not really how it works, it not about who can fight head to head better, it more about one army being more able to pull of more complex operations from army level down to the company level, than the other.

Defending Moscow is not going to be one of those complex operations where superior training and 3C would be as material in as say co-ordinated offensives etc

Plus as I mentioned above despite your claim the red army was getting better, and the Axis army was getting worse

The Red Army lost in the Kharkov offensive, they lost in the Crimea, AGC held its front, AGN held the siege lines around Leningrad.

as per above the red army in 1942 was certainly not at it's best making co-ordinated attacks, but that's not what we're talking about. Your argument seems to be the red army didn't have a 100% success rate at all operations it launched in 1942 so therefore they can't stop the Germans if they go for Moscow, that not how war works

No where in early 1942 did the Red Army show it had any mastery over the Germans.

They don't really need to have mastery over them in all facets of war to stymie an attack against prepared positions and a massive city by an enemy operating at the end of a long supply line with inadequate logistics and who they outnumber and are out producing

As the weather improved Stavka realized the Germans would be on the offensive again, and their biggest fear was an attack on Moscow. They breathed a sigh of relief because they could retreat in the south and trade space for time, they couldn't do that if the attack was against Moscow.
Again see above

Of course it could just be the Germans realised they couldn't take Moscow and tried something else
 
Last edited:
A city of 4.5 million or so in WW2 probably occupies a similar area to Greater London today [1]. So encirclement effectively requires the practical ability to control the entire length of the M25. This is easier with mobile troops (motorised and panzer divisions), but that then ties up your best troops who probably will be needed elsewhere.

As with most things, it's not impossible but it raises questions like how many troops it requires, where and how are they to be housed, how to supply the ones on the far side of Moscow, how long it takes and what other opportunities are being missed while doing this. There is also the important matter of what it will cost the Germans to subdue Moscow, and how long it will take to recover (if they ever do - see France and WW1, for example).

In the context of the OP, it also leaves open questions about what the British Empire (and the USA) is up to between fall of France and 1942.
If no or very limited US intervention, the smart move is to try to develop manufacturing capacity in the Empire and Dominions. India, for example already made small arms and Australia developed (not particularly good) tanks and aircraft with minimal support. As for money and better designs, how many tanks and aircraft blueprints and Australian factories would the US provide in exchange for the other part of Samoa, for example? Cynical territorial exchanges become more palatable in times of need.

All of this means that even if Germany does somehow win in the east, the work required to consolidate their hold over soviet territory, rebuild their economy and armies, stabilise or clear Mediterranean Europe and the Balkans is likely beyond them for at least a decade and probably two. And they still then have to prepare for Sealion, while Britain has all that time been busy doing something.


[1] I don't know about soviet cities, but many houses in Britain had reasonable gardens at this time, so it is possible to provide at least some supplementary food during the warmer months.
 
When are we going to get back to Sea Lion II? It was set forth at the beginning of this scenario that the Russians will do much better on the Eastern Front. How do the Nazis prepare the invasion of Britain? How will the Brits prepare to wipe them out?
 
When are we going to get back to Sea Lion II? It was set forth at the beginning of this scenario that the Russians will do much better on the Eastern Front. How do the Nazis prepare the invasion of Britain? How will the Brits prepare to wipe them out?
One thing to consider is that the conditions for Sealion start with air superiority and sufficient naval power to protect the invasion fleet. If they have near-total control of the skies and enough naval power to provide supporting bombardments that's a bonus.
They then need to have air and sea landing capability, so specialist troops and suitable gliders and aircraft, plus a good number of landing/supply vessels. The vessels and aircraft will have to be made specially.
On top of that, they have to have mine-clearing technology and the ability to counter beach defences and then to break through defence lines, and enough air defence to stop attacks on fleet assembly areas.
It took the allies about two years of hard effort to get to this stage, and that was with the Germans fighting on two fronts.
Germany will take longer to build necessary assault resources (because unlike OTL Britain, the US isn't supporting it) and at least a year to batter the air defences (which can go on while ships are being built).
So that's however long to get reasonable control over the soviets, plus time to refit and rebuild forces, plus time to finish off whichever Mediterranean areas need to be held, stabilised or taken, plus about two years to build boats. Meanwhile, they also really need a proper bomber force to batter British industry, a strong sub force that hasn't antagonised the US and a way to degrade the armed forces.
Even if we handwave the victory over the soviets, it's a big ask to even be ready to invade.
And the British will have been busy developing all sorts of interesting things in that time (eg Centurions to take on the Maus battalions), so unless Britain votes in an isolationist pacifist government [1], the Germans will face a challenge that makes DDay look easy.
But it also shows that the speed of and nature of the victory in the east has a big influence over when preparing for the invasion becomes possible.

[1] the most plausible way I can think of to permit any chance of success in a Sealion
 
No they didn't?

The Axis came in with 3.8m the Soviets started with roughly 2.7m (in the western military districts) they lost approx. 2.5m over the year they end up in my mid 1942 at about 5.3m the mobilisation while fast wasn't instant so at most they only probably outnumbered them by the vey end of 1941 when teh fighting was done for teh season

Even leaving that aside things change the Red army in 1941 is not the red army in 1942,



The red army improved throughout the war, so the idea that they were as bad or worse in 1942 compared to 1941 is not supported by reality.

I think the problem is you have to look at each success and failure in the context of the time it happens, so for example were the counter offensives that pushed the Germans back from Moscow in early 1942 expensive and messy? yes! But they did push the Germans back and could you even imagine the red army in say June 1941 even attempting something similar? But equally if you compare those early 1942 counter offensive to Red army operation in 1943 or 1944 they look bad.


But if you want to actually argue the 1941 red army was better than the red army in 1942, then well ok but you basically arguing against decades and tens of thousands of pages of academic writing

But remember it's not just the red army getting better the axis army was also getting worse, those nice well trained Panzer divs flush from France (where they had also taken loses of course) and doing all that dynamic attacking throughout 1941 had also suffered heavy attrition. Axis losesin 1941 were obvioulsy less than the Sovies but not only woere they less able to absorb them they took them in units they were least able to see reduced capability in.



You keep making this point about destroy, how do they destroy it? What does that even mean? They have no 1,000 4 engine bomber fleet and years to do it, they have to take it to destroy it. Also I'm pretty sure Hiter wanted to take it in Sep/Oct 1941 once Barbarossa had failed? He certainly spent years trying to take Leningrad, or if in your view he was actually trying to destroy Leningrad well he didn't achieve that despite besieging it for 3 years and Leningrad was smaller than Moscow! (I do realise there are differences between Leningrad and Moscow)

Also no it's not certain they make a break though and encircle Moscow in 1942. As I said earlier that is whare the Soviet though they would attack it is where the red army was prepared. and at this point out numbered the axis.

You seme think this will be Kiev in 1941 but that ignores reality




The red army was building it's material strength from the end of 1941 when they though the axis would go for Moscow again, the ging south didj allow that to happen

And it's not like 1942 was really a lull in hostilities, the red army lost as many men in 1942 as it did in 1941? So this idea that the red army got a breather in 1942 isn't true





teh mobilised strength of the red army in mid June was 5.3m and they were expecting an attack at Moscow, yes they could do that

plus Moscow will be better ground for them to defend since assaulting it would be costly





That not really how it works, it not about who can fight head to head better, it more about one army being more able to pull of more complex operations from army level down to the company level, than the other.

Defending Moscow is not going to be one of those complex operations where superior training and 3C would be as material as say co-ordinated offensives etc

Plus as I mentioned above despite your claim the red army was getting better, and the Axis army was getting worse



as per above teh red army in 1942 was certainly not at it's best making co-ordinated attacks, but that's not what we're talking about



They don't really need to have mastery over them in all facets of war to styme an attack against prepared positions and a massive city by an enemy operating at the end of a long supply line with inadequate logistics and who they outnumber and are out producing


Again see above

Of course it could just be the Germans realised they couldn't take Moscow and tried something else
Ok so, your heavily into overall numbers. In June 1942 the Red Army had over 5 million trained and properly organized men in units that were more effective than they were in 1941. Since they'd lost over 5 million men in 1941 the Red Army had trained and equipped 10 million men in the first year of the war. That's pretty impressive. Do you really believe that's what happened? If the Red Army was so improved, why did they suffer such massive defeats in the spring of 1942.
There was no armaments miracle as Speed described it. Germany industry was fully mobilized and what civilian production remained was essential goods. What genuine gains were made came from new capacity and the use of ever more ruthlessly exploited slave labour, which of course doesn't fit the narrative of rationalization and efficiency that Speer and others put about. As for the Bf-109 by the time the K models was introduced it was totally outclassed as fighter with the bigger engine making it worse not better.
The DB 605 engine didn't make the Bf-109K worse, the cannons in gondolas under wings made it less maneuverable. Allied fighters had the advantage of being tasked to fight German Fighters, German fighters had to also attack heavy bombers. Without being loaded down with extra cannon and aerial mortars the Bf-109K was as fast as a Spitfire Mk XIV, or a P-51D. The biggest problem with Bf-109G/K models was by late 1944 was most of their best pilots were dead. Saying the K model was hopelessly outclassed as a fighter is like saying the Japanese Ki-84 Frank was outclassed. The main problem for both fighters was the shortage of skilled pilots and the overall war situation.

It's a shame the Israelis had to settle for Avia S-199s instead of G-14 models in 1948. Even the lossy S-199 shootdown some Egyptian Spitfires. The pilot is the key to the weapons system.
 
No they didn't?

The Axis came in with 3.8m the Soviets started with roughly 2.7m (in the western military districts) they lost approx. 2.5m over the year they end up in by mid 1942 at about 5.3m the mobilisation while fast wasn't instant so at most they maybe outnumbered them by the very end of 1941 when the fighting was done for the season, but more likely by the time the counter attacks started (when they lost a bunch more).

Even leaving that aside things change the Red army in 1941 is not the red army in 1942,



The red army improved throughout the war, so the idea that they were as bad or worse in 1942 compared to 1941 is not supported by reality.

I think the problem is you have to look at each success and failure in the context of the time it happens, so for example were the counter offensives that pushed the Germans back from Moscow in early 1942 expensive and messy? yes! But they did push the Germans back and could you even imagine the red army in say June 1941 even attempting something similar let alone getting even that mixed result? But equally if you compare those early 1942 counter offensives to Red army operation in 1943 or 1944 they look bad.


But if you want to actually argue the 1941 red army was better than the red army in 1942, then well ok but you basically arguing against decades and tens of thousands of pages of academic writing

But remember it's not just the red army getting better the axis army was also getting worse, those nice well trained Panzer divs flush from France (where they had also taken loses of course) and doing all that dynamic attacking throughout 1941 had also suffered heavy attrition. Axis loses in 1941 were obviously less than the Soviets but not only where they less able to absorb them they took them in units they were least able to replace and most needed.



You keep making this point about destroy, how do they destroy it? What does that even really mean? They have no 1,000 4 engine bomber fleet and years to do it, they have to take it to even destroy it. Also I'm pretty sure Hitler wanted to take it in Sep/Oct 1941 once Barbarossa had failed? He certainly spent years trying to take Leningrad, or if in your view he was actually trying to destroy Leningrad well he didn't achieve that despite besieging it for 3 years and Leningrad was smaller than Moscow! (I do realise there are differences between Leningrad and Moscow)

Also no it's not certain they make a break though and encircle Moscow in 1942. As I said earlier that is where the Soviet thought they would attack so it is where the red army was prepared. and at this point out numbered the axis.

You seem think this will just be Kiev in 1941 but that ignores reality.




The red army was already building it's material strength from the end of 1941 when they thought the axis would go for Moscow again, the going south isn't the thing that allowed that to happen

And it's not like 1942 was really a lull in hostilities either, the red army had as many men killed in actions in 1942 as it did in 1941? So this idea that the red army got a breather in 1942 isn't true





The mobilised strength of the red army in mid June was 5.3m and they were expecting an attack at Moscow, yes they could do that

Plus Moscow will be better ground for them to defend since assaulting it would be costly





That not really how it works, it not about who can fight head to head better, it more about one army being more able to pull of more complex operations from army level down to the company level, than the other.

Defending Moscow is not going to be one of those complex operations where superior training and 3C would be as material in as say co-ordinated offensives etc

Plus as I mentioned above despite your claim the red army was getting better, and the Axis army was getting worse



as per above the red army in 1942 was certainly not at it's best making co-ordinated attacks, but that's not what we're talking about. Your argument seems to be the red army didn't have a 100% success rate at all operations it launched in 1942 so therefore they can't stop the Germans if they go for Moscow, that not how war works



They don't really need to have mastery over them in all facets of war to stymie an attack against prepared positions and a massive city by an enemy operating at the end of a long supply line with inadequate logistics and who they outnumber and are out producing


Again see above

Of course it could just be the Germans realised they couldn't take Moscow and tried something else
If the Red Army was so much stronger and better in 1942 how did the Germans destroy them so badly in the spring battles? From Wiki on the 2nd Battle of Kharkov.

The average Soviet soldier suffered from inexperience. With the Soviet debacle of the previous year ameliorated only by the barest victory at Moscow, most of the original manpower of the Red Army had been killed, wounded or captured by the Germans, with casualties of almost 1,000,000 just from the Battle of Moscow.[25] The typical soldier in the Red Army was a conscript and had little to no combat experience, and tactical training was practically nonexistent. Coupled with the lack of trained soldiers, the Red Army also began to suffer from the loss of Soviet industrial areas, and a temporary strategic defence was considered necessary.[26]

The results of the 2nd Kharkov Battle were as follows.

In the face of determined German operations, Timoshenko ordered the official halt of all Soviet offensive manoeuvres on 28 May, while attacks to break out of the encirclement continued until 30 May. Nonetheless, less than one man in ten managed to break out of the "Barvenkovo mousetrap".[10] Hayward gives 75,000 Soviets killed and 239,000 taken prisoner.[52] Beevor puts Soviet prisoners at 240,000[10] (with the bulk of their armour), while Glantz—citing Krivosheev—gives a total of 277,190 overall Soviet casualties.[4][9] Both tend to agree on a low German casualty count, with the most formative estimate being at 20,000 dead, wounded and missing.[8][9][10] Regardless of the casualties, Kharkov was a major Soviet setback; it put an end to the successes of the Red Army during the winter counteroffensive.

Add to this cup of poison what happened in Crimea. 170,000 prisoners taken at Kerch, and another 100,000 taken at Sevastopol. And that's with the Red Navy controlling the Black Sea. What if after these huge successes 4th Panzer Army did keep heading north after the Battle of Voronezh to tear open the Bryansk Front?
 

Moss

Kicked
If the Red Army was so much stronger and better in 1942 how did the Germans destroy them so badly in the spring battles? From Wiki on the 2nd Battle of Kharkov.

The average Soviet soldier suffered from inexperience. With the Soviet debacle of the previous year ameliorated only by the barest victory at Moscow, most of the original manpower of the Red Army had been killed, wounded or captured by the Germans, with casualties of almost 1,000,000 just from the Battle of Moscow.[25] The typical soldier in the Red Army was a conscript and had little to no combat experience, and tactical training was practically nonexistent. Coupled with the lack of trained soldiers, the Red Army also began to suffer from the loss of Soviet industrial areas, and a temporary strategic defence was considered necessary.[26]

The results of the 2nd Kharkov Battle were as follows.

In the face of determined German operations, Timoshenko ordered the official halt of all Soviet offensive manoeuvres on 28 May, while attacks to break out of the encirclement continued until 30 May. Nonetheless, less than one man in ten managed to break out of the "Barvenkovo mousetrap".[10] Hayward gives 75,000 Soviets killed and 239,000 taken prisoner.[52] Beevor puts Soviet prisoners at 240,000[10] (with the bulk of their armour), while Glantz—citing Krivosheev—gives a total of 277,190 overall Soviet casualties.[4][9] Both tend to agree on a low German casualty count, with the most formative estimate being at 20,000 dead, wounded and missing.[8][9][10] Regardless of the casualties, Kharkov was a major Soviet setback; it put an end to the successes of the Red Army during the winter counteroffensive.

Add to this cup of poison what happened in Crimea. 170,000 prisoners taken at Kerch, and another 100,000 taken at Sevastopol. And that's with the Red Navy controlling the Black Sea. What if after these huge successes 4th Panzer Army did keep heading north after the Battle of Voronezh to tear open the Bryansk Front?
Now if this offensive had been towards moscow, and they were capturing these numbers of soviet defenders, the prospect of a decisive battle becomes relevant. A grand encirclement outside the city, would be in the realm of possibility
 
Ok so, your heavily into overall numbers. In June 1942 the Red Army had over 5 million trained and properly organized men in units that were more effective than they were in 1941. Since they'd lost over 5 million men in 1941 the Red Army had trained and equipped 10 million men in the first year of the war. That's pretty impressive. Do you really believe that's what happened? If the Red Army was so improved, why did they suffer such massive defeats in the spring of 1942.

If the Red Army was so much stronger and better in 1942 how did the Germans destroy them so badly in the spring battles? From Wiki on the 2nd Battle of Kharkov.

The average Soviet soldier suffered from inexperience. With the Soviet debacle of the previous year ameliorated only by the barest victory at Moscow, most of the original manpower of the Red Army had been killed, wounded or captured by the Germans, with casualties of almost 1,000,000 just from the Battle of Moscow.[25] The typical soldier in the Red Army was a conscript and had little to no combat experience, and tactical training was practically nonexistent. Coupled with the lack of trained soldiers, the Red Army also began to suffer from the loss of Soviet industrial areas, and a temporary strategic defence was considered necessary.[26]

The results of the 2nd Kharkov Battle were as follows.

In the face of determined German operations, Timoshenko ordered the official halt of all Soviet offensive manoeuvres on 28 May, while attacks to break out of the encirclement continued until 30 May. Nonetheless, less than one man in ten managed to break out of the "Barvenkovo mousetrap".[10] Hayward gives 75,000 Soviets killed and 239,000 taken prisoner.[52] Beevor puts Soviet prisoners at 240,000[10] (with the bulk of their armour), while Glantz—citing Krivosheev—gives a total of 277,190 overall Soviet casualties.[4][9] Both tend to agree on a low German casualty count, with the most formative estimate being at 20,000 dead, wounded and missing.[8][9][10] Regardless of the casualties, Kharkov was a major Soviet setback; it put an end to the successes of the Red Army during the winter counteroffensive.

Add to this cup of poison what happened in Crimea. 170,000 prisoners taken at Kerch, and another 100,000 taken at Sevastopol. And that's with the Red Navy controlling the Black Sea. What if after these huge successes 4th Panzer Army did keep heading north after the Battle of Voronezh to tear open the Bryansk Front?
I'll answer both at the same time because they're both basically the same post

Better in 1942 than in 1941 =/= mean they must have a 100% sucess rate and drive teh Axis from Russia

See the rest of my post for not only what I just said above in more detail (I literally raised the point about the 1942 spring offensives being a costly mess myself) as well as a bunch of other points I made that you have yet to respond too
 
Last edited:
I'm sorry if I wasn't clear. I'm not talking about the 1941 Battle of Moscow. I'm arguing the offensive toward Moscow should've stopped when the mud season started. I'm talking about a summer 1942 attack on Moscow.
That was pretty much what the Russians were expecting in the Spring/Summer of 42 but the Germans and Axis forces went case Blue instead and made a thrust for the oil fields.

Case Blue was conducted on the realisation that the 'rotten edifice' had not collapsed in 1941 as per the plan and that Germany was poorly placed with regards to resources for what had turned into a war of attrition.

The initial success of Case Blue can be partially put down to the Russians having their stronger forces ready for a 2nd attempt on Moscow.

It was many of those forces that later turned up and did for 6th Army and obliged Army Group A to abandon its advance on Baku.

Now lets surmise that the Germans go for round 2 of the Battle of Moscow instead (and ignore the actual reasons for the attempt on Baku and Caucasus) - they are now attacking where the Russians are strongest and where they were expecting such an attack and doing so with a far weaker Heer as we have established.

Now I don't doubt for a minute that the Germans would have enjoyed some success in this venture but the Russian army was far stronger and with far more tanks and artillery than the Germans appreciated and I think this attempt would have failed and we up timers would be instead arguing that the stupid Germans should have pulled a fast one and captured the Oil fields around Baku!
 
Top