Sea Lion ….. No Really

[Post]

He makes no mention of the fact that has Chief of Staff he'd played a major role in nearly bleeding the army to death.

AFAIK his diares were his personal notes at the end of each day to organise his thoughts/better remember things. So it kinda makes sense he doesn't mention that, he would be well aware of the desicion process.

That's why I argued that anything that saved the Germans 200,000 men for the 1942 campaign would make a huge difference.

On the other hand, if the Germans don't push on, that changes also the Soviet side of the battle. OTL afterwards the Soviets realised they were too agressive in their winter campaign. They thought they could encircle AGC. ITTL AGC is less exposed so they won't think that they can encircle them, and go for a less ambitious offensive. Leading to them having less losses also.

 

[Belisarius II]

AFAIK his diares were his personal notes at the end of each day to organise his thoughts/better remember things. So it kinda makes sense he doesn't mention that, he would be well aware of the desicion process.

On the other hand, if the Germans don't push on, that changes also the Soviet side of the battle. OTL afterwards the Soviets realised they were too agressive in their winter campaign. They thought they could encircle AGC. ITTL AGC is less exposed so they won't think that they can encircle them, and go for a less ambitious offensive. Leading to them having less losses also.

From the German point of view both sides taking fewer loses in the winter battles is a good thing. The Germans can't afford trading 1-1. They need encirclement battles were the loses are 5 or 6 to 1 and they can only do that with intact divisions fighting in late spring when the ground is hard, and the weather is good.

 

[TDM]

....

It takes no hindsight to know that intelligence estimates of enemy strength were wildly wrong, and that their own loses were mounting. In the plans for Barbarossa, they thought campaign would take 9-17 weeks, and by that time the end was still nowhere in sight. By the beginning of November when the campaign was supposed to be over the mud season set in and Moscow was still in the distance. The Germans thought they'd be on the Arkhangelsk–Astrakhan Line. By the time the final drive on Moscow started in November they were nowhere near, and never would be near such a line. So, in fact they were not performing per expectations, and had every reason to exercise caution.

...

The thing is while they pretty quickly worked out that their initial estimates and assumptions were wrong, they couldn't have known yet just how wrong they were.

They also knew that no plan ever goes perfectly, so some set backs and not quickly achieving total victory 100% according to the plan can be explained away as 'well that's war for you' without understanding how badly wrong they have got it. So you can see the inclination to just push a little bit more because surely that's all that will be needed

E.g "Well Ok the Red army is a bit bigger than we thought, but it can't be that much bigger than out intelligence thought because they are probably only wrong by a matter of degree, so we only need to destroy a relatively small number more and they collapse" and do


So you often see this in reports coming back from the front lines, from German commanders etc. They obviously quickly recognised that while they are killing and capturing lots of red army the plan hasn't worked as expected, but for a good long time those reports still came with the expectation that the basic assumptions where still relatively sound so just a bit more will push them over the top. Similarly when they kept meeting more Red army unts where the initial plan assumed there would be none they simply assumed that Ok these guys must but really be the last of them.

And of course sunk cost fallacy is a bitch especially when no one wants a war of attrition and you win your wars by going forward and forcing a victory.

 

[Post]

From the German point of view both sides taking fewer loses in the winter battles is a good thing. The Germans can't afford trading 1-1. They need encirclement battles were the loses are 5 or 6 to 1 and they can only do that with intact divisions fighting in late spring when the ground is hard, and the weather is good.

Why 1:1 trading? The Soviets lost 2-4 times as many men as the Germans during the battle of Moscow.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Why 1:1 trading? The Soviets lost 2-4 times as many men as the Germans during the battle of Moscow.

Which means if there is less winter fighting then while the German Army loses say 300k fewer troops, the Soviet losses will be down by at least half a million soldiers. Possibly more.

So a 1942 German offensive towards Moscow would face even stronger resistance than it would have in OTL. Soviet Reserves and the defences would both be strengthened.

 

[Look More Closely Later]

Was that his chasing Rommel after El Alemain?

Montgomery. Both slow and cautious and at the same time the fastest / longest advance in history before the 2003 thunder run on Bagdad (against porcine opposition).

If I remember right, the Nigel Hamilton biography of Montgomery indicated that there were weather problems (i.e. rain wrecking the ground for the purposes of trying very much off-road) hampering the pursuit of Axis forces in the immediate aftermath of Second El Alamein.

 

[Belisarius II]

Why 1:1 trading? The Soviets lost 2-4 times as many men as the Germans during the battle of Moscow.

Only counting the encirclement battles in October. Those ended when the rain started in November. That was the time to wrap it up. If they Red Army had concentrated on the Moscow Front, they could've destroyed Army Group Center. The effect of that could've resulted in a general collapse of the whole front forcing a pull back to the Dnieper Divina Line. As bad as it was it could've been much much worse.

 

[Belisarius II]

Which means if there is less winter fighting then while the German Army loses say 300k fewer troops, the Soviet losses will be down by at least half a million soldiers. Possibly more.

So a 1942 German offensive towards Moscow would face even stronger resistance than it would have in OTL. Soviet Reserves and the defences would both be strengthened.

Germany saving 300k men and the Soviets 500k is a victory for the Germans. The Soviets can replace 500k men, but the Germans can't as easily replace 300k. In the ACW the Union could replace its losses the Confederates couldn't. When Lee was fighting Grant even when he was winning, he was losing.

 

[Post]

Only counting the encirclement battles in October. Those ended when the rain started in November. That was the time to wrap it up. If they Red Army had concentrated on the Moscow Front, they could've destroyed Army Group Center. The effect of that could've resulted in a general collapse of the whole front forcing a pull back to the Dnieper Divina Line. As bad as it was it could've been much much worse.

Yes, it could have been far worse. Or it could have been a little bit better.
If both play a perfect game, the USSR wins.

 

[Moss]

Thank you for posting that. Over the years I've read about some of this, but that added a lot more data. I know that in the spring of 1942 they only had 8 divisions at full strength and ready for action, but he added a more involved breakdown of the depleted state of the Heer at the start of the 1942 campaign season. If I recall correctly the Germans took 800,000 casualties during 1941 and during the winter battles. They could never recover from loses like that. They hollowed out the German Army for the rest of the war. The army they had in 1941 was the best army they ever had during WWII.

That's why I argued that anything that saved the Germans 200,000 men for the 1942 campaign would make a huge difference. For an army that prided itself on its high levels of training and professionalism their leaders in their obsession with the doctrine of decisive battle were willing to bleed that army white for an elusive goal. In the Holder Diaries he laments that after the Battle of Moscow they would never be able to put the army back in their barracks again and train them. He makes no mention of the fact that has Chief of Staff he'd played a major role in nearly bleeding the army to death.

And while thats a great point it can't only be thought of in terms of 200,000 additional soliders for a campaign in 1942. These are 200,000 Veteran soliders who would be of a much higher quality than 200k greenhorns. Further the supplies and equipment not lost in the doomed advance on Moscow would have been preserved and available for the 42 show down.

And while the Soviet defenses would be much sitffer come the following spring/summer, the German supply and logistical situation is infinately improved whe compared to the endless expanse of the drive on the caucasus. Further the Soviets cant very well retreat as they did as the begining of Blau . An maneuver that allowed hundreds of thousands of Red soliders to escape the inevitable encirclment. Moscow would have to be held and there is no retreat. This could very much play to the strength of the Wehrmacht. Not that I'm saying its a definate win, but ceratinly a better probability than the gamble of Stalingrad.

 

[TDM]

And while thats a great point it can't only be thought of in terms of 200,000 additional soliders for a campaign in 1942. These are 200,000 Veteran soliders who would be of a much higher quality than 200k greenhorns. Further the supplies and equipment not lost in the doomed advance on Moscow would have been preserved and available for the 42 show down.

And while the Soviet defenses would be much sitffer come the following spring/summer, the German supply and logistical situation is infinately improved whe compared to the endless expanse of the drive on the caucasus. Further the Soviets cant very well retreat as they did as the begining of Blau . An maneuver that allowed hundreds of thousands of Red soliders to escape the inevitable encirclment. Moscow would have to be held and there is no retreat. This could very much play to the strength of the Wehrmacht. Not that I'm saying its a definate win, but ceratinly a better probability than the gamble of Stalingrad.

By mid 1942 the Soviets had despite the huge loses of 1941 increased their in theatre force from 2.8m in June 1941 to 5.7m (axis stayed roughly the same over the same period at 3.8m - 3.7m)

By 1942 they have despite the impact of Barbarossa and despite relocating their industry increased their war production significantly over that of 1941.

A couple of examples they increased medium tank production four fold from 3000 to 12000, and doubled heavy tank production from 1300 to 2600

By comparison Germany's entire tank production went from 3600 in 1941 to 5300 in 1942 and increase of just under 50%

If the Germans don't win in 1941 (or are right on the cusp of doing so very early 1942) they lose


And no the German logistics will not be infinitely improved it just won't be as bad as it was, even in 1941 they already had to stop supporting their initial 3 advances at the same time by September even on their original three axis of advance because of logistics issues and that's before they even got close to Moscow. Remember the logistics budget for this entire campaign was they win within 3 months and 300km of crossing the border

Also no a big siege of Moscow would very much not play to the strengths of the Wehrmacht , it's an army based around manoeuvre and blitzkrieg not bashing their head against a wall

 

[yulzari1]

Was that his chasing Rommel after El Alemain?

Montgomery. Both slow and cautious and at the same time the fastest / longest advance in history before the 2003 thunder run on Bagdad (against porcine opposition).

The run into Belgium was founded on the attrition of the German army around Caen which removed it’s ability to defend France in depth.

 

[Post]

Also no a big siege of Moscow would very much not play to the strengths of the Wehrmacht , it's an army based around manoeuvre and blitzkrieg not bashing their head against a wall

As the battles of Leningrad and Stalingrad proved.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The run into Belgium was founded on the attrition of the German army around Caen which removed it’s ability to defend France in depth.

I was referring to the 'slow and ponderous' 1400 mile advance after Rommel's retreat from El Alemain across Libya and into Tunisia (Poes law is in effect)

 

[Moss]

By mid 1942 the Soviets had despite the huge loses of 1941 increased their in theatre force from 2.8m in June 1941 to 5.7m (axis stayed roughly the same over the same period at 3.8m - 3.7m)

By 1942 they have despite the impact of Barbarossa and despite relocating their industry increased their war production significantly over that of 1941.

A couple of examples they increased medium tank production four fold from 3000 to 12000, and doubled heavy tank production from 1300 to 2600

By comparison Germany's entire tank production went from 3600 in 1941 to 5300 in 1942 and increase of just under 50%

If the Germans don't win in 1941 (or are right on the cusp of doing so very early 1942) they lose


And no the German logistics will not be infinitely improved it just won't be as bad as it was, even in 1941 they already had to stop supporting their initial 3 advances at the same time by September even on their original three axis of advance because of logistics issues and that's before they even got close to Moscow. Remember the logistics budget for this entire campaign was they win within 3 months and 300km of crossing the border

Also no a big siege of Moscow would very much not play to the strengths of the Wehrmacht , it's an army based around manoeuvre and blitzkrieg not bashing their head against a wall

I meant the logistics would certainly be far more favorable than the operations in the caucasus. They would only have to support one axis of attack instead of three as in 1941. Of course the distances involved in a press for Moscow would be astronomically closer than the 800 km advance in the south. That being on top of the distance they already were from "the fatherland". Moreover this also avoids sticking ones head out into a giant noose by ignoring the flanks as we witnessed during the ill-fated otl campaign.

Again not saying its a win persay, but never the less inearly 1942 the soviets didnt appear to have things figured out with respect to stonewalling the Blitzkreig. It wasn;t really until late 42, and of course with the benefit of Germany asininely allowing themselves to get sucked into a giant street fight house to house, which ultimately allowed the Soviets the neccesary respite and time to build up a major counter offensive. Even then Richtofen had correctly recognized and reported back to Berlin time and again his recon intel that the Russians were mounting preperations for a major counter offensive but everyones favorite morphine addict inhibbited such relevant information from being used in a valuable fashion.

And despite all these dissadvantages the Reich actually won in Stalingrad. The street fight (which is often correctly considered NOT the strength of the german army, that being mobility) they did take much of the city, a bloc or two may have been holding out but the street fight was essentially won. This victory being at half strength btw after uncle adolf thought it a grand idea to split the 6th army and airforce, considerably weakening the available forces for the battle. Yet they still took the city. And then came the counter attack. On the unguarded flanks. Why? Because Paulaus (a man who shouldn't be playing toy soliders or Call of Duty, was put in charge of the operation due to the fact that Hitler didn't quite appreciate the previous, more independent minded commander Guderian actually telling the Fuhrer when he was wrong and should shove it, and in many cases just ignoring stupid orders) had decided to put all the tanks in the street instead of protecting the flanks as he shouldve. Its almost incomprehensible that the Romanian Rifles were left to gaurd the flanks and no one actually stopped that.

All this to say that despite the logistical challenges, the over extension, the massively outstreatched flanks, the ungaurded flanks, and the spliting of the 6th army, the Reich still had one hell of a showing in Stalingrad. Certainly when these condidtions are dramatically improved one cannot flipantly say that theres no chance of Moscow 42 being a sucess. An infinately shorter distance needed to advance, full army groups not split and therefore strength not dilutted, and in all likeyhood someone more fit for the job than Paulas, may just be the decisive battle for which they strove. In fact, the Reich always endeavored for the "decisive battle" that would win the campaign. They achieved this in France, they thought Barbarossa would deliver this to them on a silver platter, but in reality this may be their best shot for them to play to go all in and throw the cards down on the table. That is to say the best prospect at a decisive battle victory.

 

[Belisarius II]

By mid 1942 the Soviets had despite the huge loses of 1941 increased their in theatre force from 2.8m in June 1941 to 5.7m (axis stayed roughly the same over the same period at 3.8m - 3.7m)

Respectfully raw manpower data doesn't tell the full story. When you say in theater that really means what was in the frontier Military Districts on June 22nd. Deeper reserves were pushed forward very quickly so those 2.8 million men were massively reinforced. In the first 6 months of the war the Soviets lost over 5 million men, over 3 million of them taken prisoner. During the Battle of Moscow, the Siberian Divisions were the last major force of the pre-war army committed to combat.

In 1941 the Red Army was in the middle of an enormous expansion above its pre-war levels. This is partly what led to the poor performance of the army in 1941. The army was particularly weak in leadership lacking a strong NCO Corps. In the Soviet system Ill trained junior officers did the jobs that in Western armies were carried out by NCOs. The Germans had a very strong NCOs Corps that were the backbone of the Heer. This gave them the ability to take the initiative on the lowest command levels giving them a tactical flexibility the Soviets almost completely lacked. Stalin's purges of the armed forces officer Corps only made this command weakness worse.

The Siberian Divisions were the last of the pre-1939 army sent in against the Germans. That's why the Siberian Army did so well against the Japanese in 1938/39 because it was as professional well-trained force. By the spring of 1942 almost the whole army with any pre-Barbarossa training had been destroyed. Most of the men filling the ranks in early 1942 were raw conscripts needing time for to be brought up to a reasonable standard. The Red Army in early 1942 was basically being rebuilt from scratch. The Heer had been weakened but its basic structure was still intact. In 1942 the Germans still held a heavy qualitative advantage over the Red Army.

By 1942 they have despite the impact of Barbarossa and despite relocating their industry increased their war production significantly over that of 1941.

A couple of examples they increased medium tank production four fold from 3000 to 12000, and doubled heavy tank production from 1300 to 2600

By comparison Germany's entire tank production went from 3600 in 1941 to 5300 in 1942 and increase of just under 50%

If the Germans don't win in 1941 (or are right on the cusp of doing so very early 1942) they lose

Soviet industrial production was impressive, but those numbers didn't translate into massive tank armies. In operation Uranus the Red Army's strategic reserve had fewer than 900 tanks. The tank attrition rate was very high keeping frontline numbers at any one time at lower levels than you might expect. The improvements in the German tank force, and the introduction of assault gun types went a long way to reestablishing the superiority of their armored forces.

And no the German logistics will not be infinitely improved it just won't be as bad as it was, even in 1941 they already had to stop supporting their initial 3 advances at the same time by September even on their original three axis of advance because of logistics issues and that's before they even got close to Moscow. Remember the logistics budget for this entire campaign was they win within 3 months and 300km of crossing the border

The German supply situation vastly improved in 1942 because the railroads were rebuilt, and the gage converted. That's why Case Blue was insane because the Germans were once again deliberately far out pacing their rail lines. In 1942 Moscow was well within German logistical range.

Also no a big siege of Moscow would very much not play to the strengths of the Wehrmacht , it's an army based around manoeuvre and blitzkrieg not bashing their head against a wall

I'm sorry you're completely misunderstanding what an attack on Moscow would involve. Other than Stalingrad the Germans never engaged in a massive urban battle. Cities fell because the Germans flanked them forcing the defenders to retreat from the city or be trapped there. The Battle of Moscow would be fought dozens or a few hundred miles from the city center in open country. If a big Russian army stayed in the city after it was encircled, they'd be starved out and the city brought down around their heads though bombing, and artillery like Warsaw was in 1939.

 

[yulzari1]

I was referring to the 'slow and ponderous' 1400 mile advance after Rommel's retreat from El Alemain across Libya and into Tunisia (Poes law is in effect)

And very sensibly, maintaining a fully supported army throughout by not outrunning his LOC as had both sides in previous campaigns there.

 

[TDM]

I meant the logistics would certainly be far more favorable than the operations in the caucasus. They would only have to support one axis of attack instead of three as in 1941.
Of course the distances involved in a press for Moscow would be astronomically closer than the 800 km advance in the south.

Only by Sep 41 they already had to give up advancing on three axis and concentrate on one even before they got close to Moscow, because they had already gone past their logistical ability to supply all three advancing at teh same time.

That being on top of the distance they already were from "the fatherland". Moreover this also avoids sticking ones head out into a giant noose by ignoring the flanks as we witnessed during the ill-fated otl campaign.

If you mean at Stalingrad, thing is they risk the same happening at Moscow (only likely on larger scale)

Again not saying its a win persay, but never the less inearly 1942 the soviets didnt appear to have things figured out with respect to stonewalling the Blitzkreig. It wasn;t really until late 42, and of course with the benefit of Germany asininely allowing themselves to get sucked into a giant street fight house to house, which ultimately allowed the Soviets the neccesary respite and time to build up a major counter offensive. Even then Richtofen had correctly recognized and reported back to Berlin time and again his recon intel that the Russians were mounting preperations for a major counter offensive but everyones favorite morphine addict inhibbited such relevant information from being used in a valuable fashion.

Only you suggesting giving up on blitzkrieg and going to besiege Moscow so like Stalingrad but bigger

And despite all these dissadvantages the Reich actually won in Stalingrad. The street fight (which is often correctly considered NOT the strength of the german army, that being mobility) they did take much of the city, a bloc or two may have been holding out but the street fight was essentially won. This victory being at half strength btw after uncle adolf thought it a grand idea to split the 6th army and airforce, considerably weakening the available forces for the battle. Yet they still took the city.

They invaded the city but they couldn't hold it and then they got trapped and lost, that is not winning it certainly not winning a siege.

And then came the counter attack. On the unguarded flanks. Why? Because Paulaus (a man who shouldn't be playing toy soliders or Call of Duty, was put in charge of the operation due to the fact that Hitler didn't quite appreciate the previous, more independent minded commander Guderian actually telling the Fuhrer when he was wrong and should shove it, and in many cases just ignoring stupid orders) had decided to put all the tanks in the street instead of protecting the flanks as he shouldve.

Despite your insult Paulus at least had the nouse to realise the plan risked getting stuck and cut off before he went it, then he realised he was about to be surrounded and cut off and he requested to withdraw. Either way you blaming Paulus for not ignoring Hitler leading to the result at Stalingrad ignores the issues are far more fundamental for the axis in the USSR and for your plan. and those issue often involve the Soviets a lot more than your response seems to indicate*

Also Guderian was master of being right after the fact and at other's expense. And if you think he going to lead the axis to victory by ignoring Hitler (but also besieging Moscow which would be the very last thing in the world he's want to be involved in) then you need to read more books than Panzer Leader

As an aside If you think the tanks being in the street was the problem I think it again because you don't really understand the harsh reality of trying to take defended cities like Stalingrad, and you better believe there will be tanks in the Moscow streets with your plan not just conveniently defending the flanks.

Its almost incomprehensible that the Romanian Rifles were left to gaurd the flanks and no one actually stopped that.

Because war is not a game were you have the best of everything everywhere just in case and the plan was to get to the city take it and secure the river ASAP

It kind of like the tanks point , you want to have absolutely ironclad flanks to protect against whatever possible Soviet counter attack could come assuin you still fighting a month later, OK cool, but you just made your job taking the city much harder,

All this to say that despite the logistical challenges, the over extension, the massively outstreatched flanks, the ungaurded flanks, and the spliting of the 6th army, the Reich still had one hell of a showing in Stalingrad.

One hell of show doesn't mean anything, winning and losing matters

Certainly when these condidtions are dramatically improved one cannot flipantly say that theres no chance of Moscow 42 being a sucess.

Nothing flippant about it I gave the reasons (and I have more), and you haven't addressed them instead blaming German Generals and Hitler, and repeating that Stalingrad is further than Moscow (which it is but that doesn't mean the issue with logistics to Moscow are now solved)_

An infinately shorter distance needed to advance, full army groups not split and therefore strength not dilutted,

You know a big reason why Axis forces often got split a lot in the east? It's because there wasn't the infrastructure or logistics to mass and then move them all in one place. So they had to be split so they could actually move. This isn't a computer game were all you divisions can over lap each other and happily move about by themselves. You try and pile all the Axis forces towards Moscow you will end up with a mess of epic proportions

Go look at the opening moves in 1942 even with those reduced forces moving into the caucuses they had this issue

and in all likeyhood someone more fit for the job than Paulas, may just be the decisive battle for which they strove. In fact, the Reich always endeavored for the "decisive battle" that would win the campaign. They achieved this in France, they thought Barbarossa would deliver this to them on a silver platter, but in reality this may be their best shot for them to play to go all in and throw the cards down on the table. That is to say the best prospect at a decisive battle victory.

None of this addressed the points I made, and just because you pile all your men into the same place and call it decisive it doesn't mean you are going to win.

Also go look at the French campaign what is the single decisive battle there? They did what they planned to do in Russia they out manoeuvred and then defeated the French armies ability to fight, that then left the road open to Paris. That was the plan for Barbarossa not some single heroic decisive battle.

In the opening months of Barbarossa in 1941 they out numbered the red army in European Russia and were operating within the planned engagement zone with operational surprise against an enemy with at that point clay feet, that was their chance of decisive victory.

 

[TDM]

Respectfully raw manpower data doesn't tell the full story. When you say in theater that really means what was in the frontier Military Districts on June 22nd. Deeper reserves were pushed forward very quickly so those 2.8 million men were massively reinforced. In the first 6 months of the war the Soviets lost over 5 million men, over 3 million of them taken prisoner. During the Battle of Moscow, the Siberian Divisions were the last major force of the pre-war army committed to combat.
In 1941 the Red Army was in the middle of an enormous expansion above its pre-war levels. This is partly what led to the poor performance of the army in 1941. The army was particularly weak in leadership lacking a strong NCO Corps. In the Soviet system Ill trained junior officers did the jobs that in Western armies were carried out by NCOs. The Germans had a very strong NCOs Corps that were the backbone of the Heer. This gave them the ability to take the initiative on the lowest command levels giving them a tactical flexibility the Soviets almost completely lacked. Stalin's purges of the armed forces officer Corps only made this command weakness worse.

The Siberian Divisions were the last of the pre-1939 army sent in against the Germans. That's why the Siberian Army did so well against the Japanese in 1938/39 because it was as professional well-trained force. By the spring of 1942 almost the whole army with any pre-Barbarossa training had been destroyed. Most of the men filling the ranks in early 1942 were raw conscripts needing time for to be brought up to a reasonable standard. The Red Army in early 1942 was basically being rebuilt from scratch. The Heer had been weakened but its basic structure was still intact. In 1942 the Germans still held a heavy qualitative advantage over the Red Army.

Respectfully none of that counters what I said comparing 1941 to 1942?

Soviet industrial production was impressive, but those numbers didn't translate into massive tank armies. In operation Uranus the Red Army's strategic reserve had fewer than 900 tanks. The tank attrition rate was very high keeping frontline numbers at any one time at lower levels than you might expect. The improvements in the German tank force, and the introduction of assault gun types went a long way to reestablishing the superiority of their armored forces.

Tank attrition* was very high for both sides, the Soviets could better replace theirs the Germans struggled to maintain formations in the field, that's what those numbers mean and I never mentioned creating huge tank armies (huge soviet tank armies did come though)


*loses due to logistics removes tanks just as well as an 88" through the turret

The German supply situation vastly improved in 1942 because the railroads were rebuilt, and the gage converted. That's why Case Blue was insane because the Germans were once again deliberately far out pacing their rail lines. In 1942 Moscow was well within German logistical range.

Vastly improved? Again being better than case blue does not mean they are good

And what's your evidence for Moscow being well within German logistics range, especially as you now expanded the operation to be running around a chunk of Russia hundreds of mile around it as well as besieging a massive city. Plus your campaign season is going to be truncated by the weather so you have to get it all done May - Oct

Remember that by Jan 1942 Army group centre had been pushed back from Moscow and the Soviet exaptation ealy 1942 was that their would be attack on Moscow. Case blue was a bad idea no doubt but part of the thinking was we can't beat these guys head on so attack where the enemy was weak, we have room to manoeuvre and has all the stuff we want.

I'm sorry you're completely misunderstanding what an attack on Moscow would involve. Other than Stalingrad the Germans never engaged in a massive urban battle.

That's what an attack on Moscow would be

Cities fell because the Germans flanked them forcing the defenders to retreat from the city or be trapped there. The Battle of Moscow would be fought dozens or a few hundred miles from the city center in open country. If a big Russian army stayed in the city after it was encircled, they'd starved out and the city brought down around their heads though bombing, and artillery like Warsaw was in 1939.

The thing is you are treating this like say Kiev in 1941, but it's fundamentally not that plan

so OK your going io he teh Axis project it forces into an area hundreds of miles on all side of Moscow, how will they do that and maintain cohesion? especially in a situation where the red army will eb concentrating itself on hard point

Moscow is not Kiev the red army aren't give it up in teh same way

Warsaw vs. Moscow you get that Moscow is over 10x larger than Warsaw, by the time the axis got to Warsaw the polish army was already reeling and half way through it teh soviets invaded. In Moscow 1942 the red army is stronger than it was in 1941, where as if you look at the comparative force in teh siege of Warsaw (and Poland in general) the Germans have a distinct advantage

Artillery and bombing go look at Leningrad for how that worked out, also with regards to Warsaw teh Polish ar defences actaully did Ok until they withdrawn, and teh Luftwaffe were operating from home bases

Besieging armies trying to starve out enemy often them get starved of supplies when their logistics isn't good.

But you are right besieging cities is not how the big victories of 1941 were achieved by that is one of the things that make this a bad idea.

 

[Post]

Remember that by Jan 1942 Army group centre had been pushed back from Moscow and the Soviet exaptation ealy 1942 was that their would be attack on Moscow.

Usually it's not a good idea to do exactly what the enemy expects you to do.

Warsaw vs. Moscow you get that Moscow is over 10x larger than Warsaw

How is Moscow in size compared to Stalingrad? I'm guessing it would be larger.

You can expect the battle of Moscow being at least as fierce as Stalingrad. It took the Germans about 4 months to (almost) completely take the city. Given that the Soviets prepared for a German attack, I guess you're looking at at least 6 months. The question is when they can start. Fuhrer directive 41 for Fall Blau was issued 5 april 1942. Fall Blau started 28 june. You'll be looking at about the same time for preparing the advance and the weather being good enough. Fall Blau was further south, where it's warmer, so it's possible the weather will delay it. 28 June + 6 months mean christmas in the Kremlin (nice christmas present for Hitler) if all goes well. And then the Soviets counterattack (if not earlier).