Sea Lion ….. No Really

[alfredtuomi]

The Type XXI U-Boat could've reopened the Battle of the Atlantic. With its high endurance underwater speed Allied ASW ships would have a hard time coping with them. Most ASW ships were small corvettes like the British Flower Class that were slower than their top submerged speed. Compared to earlier Boats they had better sonar; ran quieter, 6 knot silent running, stay submerged for 75 hrs., reload tubes twice in 20 minutes, dive quicker, greater range, dive deeper, 6 torpedo tubes, and carried more torpedoes.

They had major short cummings but were far more survivable and deadly than any of their predecessors. They pointed the way to the future of submarines. Just imagine a U.S. Tang Class Sub running wild through the Japanese Fleet. In the Pacific if the Japanese had been able to operate their I-201 Class they might have been formidable opponents with their very high underwater speed, even faster than the Type XXI. However, they had more limited capabilities in other areas.

a yes another myth.The type 21 did not in any way live up to it's expectations.Slower,noisier and less endurance and the CO of the one that went on patrol lied.As he did on half of his patrol reports.

 

[Belisarius II]

But it wasn't enough, even in OTL, to supply itself with everything it needed. Even at the start of Barbarossa, the army still had to use considerable numbers (over 700) of Pz35 and 38, not to mention about 400 completely obsolete Pz I. The logistic arm had to steal and scrape all over Europe for an insuficiente number of trucks, having to deal with dozens of diferent models, making logistics even a greater nightmare. And there were hundreds of french tanks and armoured cars in the support units. All of this because German industry simply couldn't even meet basic army demands, not to mention expansion.

Very true, but war is about relative power. Those Czech tanks were the equivalent of Pzkw IIIs, and were a match for most Soviet tanks in 1941. The combined arms teams in the panzer divisions overwhelmed the Soviet armored forces in 1941. German industry had many shortcomings, but it was able to upgrade the German armored forces in 1942 to meet the threat of the T-34 & KV I. It was also able to provide superior aircraft to maintain air superiority on the Russian Front through early 1943. Without Lendlease aid the Soviet Economy would've been unable to meet the demands placed on it.

 

[Belisarius II]

a yes another myth.The type 21 did not in any way live up to it's expectations.Slower,noisier and less endurance and the CO of the one that went on patrol lied.As he did on half of his patrol reports.

He must have been lying if he said he penetrated the destroyer screen of a British cruiser and had it in his sights. Everyone know that would be impossible. They were slower than what, and noisier than what? We know about the production faults of the Type XXI but if the war lasted longer many would be corrected. But if the technology was so bad why did the British, Americans, and Soviets incorporated it into their new submarine classes.

 

[alfredtuomi]

I hear a lot about the "british empire" but, apart from people & maybe money, what was it's actual industrial capability? Famously, for many years, the UK used it's emprire as a supplier of raw materials and buyer of finished products, most of which would be built in the UK. Afaik, India had little to no heavy industry which, for all practical purposes, leaves Australia and Canada. Neither had any large scale industry capable of building the massive numbers of tanks, artillery and planes, not to mention the ships (cago and war) needed to ferry everything to the UK, along with hundreds of thousands of people. Creating these industries, some of which from zero, would take a lot of time and money, neither of which the UK would have.

I guess you missed the auto industry in Canada.something around 800,000 trucks built.50,000 armored vehicles,40,000 guns,1,700,000 small arms,almost half the corvettes built,348 10,000 ton merchant ships,16,000 military aircraft and the first sustained nuclear reaction outside the US on September 5 1945.not much industry .really.

 

[Sphinx]

At no time did the Soviets melt away.

From the German perspective, in a broad sense, they were being pushed back very rapidly and surprisingly so as the German general staff did not initially expect as much success as it had.

Thank you, Sphinx, for your well thought out reply.

No problem thanks to you also.

The Germans never stuck to any ridged campaign plan but shifted strategy to meet circumstances.

This is true, I was not suggesting that they did. What I meant was it is still not so simple to shift campaign plans, and that your two changes of pulling back in 1941 and attacking Moscow in 1942 in my opinion are contradictory to the campaign design thinking of the time.

The strength of the German Army was in its flexibility, rapid mobility, and strong unit cohesion. In the mud season the Germans lost the ability for rapid movement. Fighting a slogging match with the Red Army forcing them back on their supply bases was playing into their strengths not their own. Fighting their divisions to the verge of destruction, while advancing in a wide semicircle attempting to encircle Moscow while running out of supplies was setting themselves up for a counteroffensive. It takes no hindsight to see that the German Generals were operating with willful blindness and demonstrating the height of arrogance.

You have precisely just explained why it DOES take hindsight. Blindness and arrogance can't be magically removed; who wouldn't be arrogant with the advance that early Barbarossa achieved? How do you justify more cautious decision-making with such an advance? You cannot just ignore individual personality traits and characteristics in decision-making: thus, it is hindsight.

Also you ignore their biggest issue: supplies. They dig in, sure, but how are they feeding themselves? Where's the oil? The munitions? The horses? The trucks? The shells? The spare parts? Etc.

the Germans should suffer fewer casualties and inflict heavier loses on the Soviets than in the OTL Moscow counteroffensive.

Should? An impossible assumption to make. Who knows what the many factors of such changes would result in. Plus, some fewer casualties on their side won't make the core problem go away: supply and logistics.

6th Army had no hope of crossing the Volga.

You forget two things:

1. You say that they have no hope of crossing the Volga with hindsight. German officers of the time had witnessed German forces successfully cross the Dnieper and many other smaller rivers as well, they may have had doubts but they would never consider it to be "no hope."
2. Moscow also sits on a river. A smaller one, yes, but still defensible when there is a large, coordinated, and more organised force.

should've been self-evident to the German high command.

Why should it have been self-evident??? By definition if it was 'self-evident' then they would have seen it right? Obviously it wasn't self-evident otherwise military experts and generals of the time would have seen it better than some random folk of the 21st century. Also consider: you are looking at the war with near God-like omnipotence: you have access to all the dates, all the battles, all outcomes, exact weather, exact terrain, exact force compositions, strength, morale, and perhaps most importantly you have access to the exact thinking of both high commands. Individual German commanders would have shoddy intelligence of even their local areas of responsibility at best while the Staff would certainly have a very very foggy view of the strategic situation, nowhere near your or my level of sheer knowledge.

Haphazard logistics, poor intelligence, lacking any sense of time & distance, disregarding weather & terrain conditions, holding the enemy in contempt, and thinking that their tactical brilliance could overcome the limits of reality.

Exactly! Exactly. You have just explained why your assumptions are only possible with hindsight! They had poor intelligence, you don't. They lacked sense of time & distance, you don't. They disregarded battlespace conditions, you have perfect knowledge of things which to them had not even occurred yet and would be impossible to know. They held the enemy in contempt, and you can't just handwave away that attitude which you are free from. All of these are inherent truths that will be very difficult to shift.

Oh and you finally mentioned logistics, thank you. Yes, you never addressed how exactly they would fix their endemic supply issues to successfully drive on Moscow.

The two wars were very different.

This is indeed very true, but I would posit that even if Japan could threaten the American heartland they still stood no chance of an overall victory.

 

[alfredtuomi]

He must have been lying if he said he penetrated the destroyer screen of a British cruiser and had it in his sights. Everyone know that would be impossible. They were slower than what, and noisier than what? We know about the production faults of the Type XXI but if the war lasted longer many would be corrected. But if the technology was so bad why did the British, Americans, and Soviets incorporated it into their new submarine classes.

They developed the concepts instead of rushing them into production.They did not meet the design specs which everyone quotes as operational specs.And yes he lied about having the cruiser in his sights.post war the vessels two tracks were compared and they never got close enough to make contact.

 

[Belisarius II]

From the German perspective, in a broad sense, they were being pushed back very rapidly and surprisingly so as the German general staff did not initially expect as much success as it had.

The Germans had hoped to destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper, in that they failed. By November they'd discovered that instead of facing 180 divisions they'd identified 360. They'd sustained over 500,000 casualties and enemy resistance was stiffening not weakening. Remember that 500,000 is mostly out of the infantry component of the army, that means the combat power of their divisions was dwindling fast. Tank strength was below 50% and falling. All this should have made them more cautious not more reckless.

No problem thanks to you also.

You obviously put a lot of thought into you're posts.

This is true, I was not suggesting that they did. What I meant was it is still not so simple to shift campaign plans, and that your two changes of pulling back in 1941 and attacking Moscow in 1942 in my opinion are contradictory to the campaign design thinking of the time.

I don't understand that reasoning. If you can't achieve an objective in one campaign, why can't you achieve it in the next? Many times, in many wars armies have fought over the same ground over and over again.

You have precisely just explained why it DOES take hindsight. Blindness and arrogance can't be magically removed; who wouldn't be arrogant with the advance that early Barbarossa achieved? How do you justify more cautious decision-making with such an advance? You cannot just ignore individual personality traits and characteristics in decision-making: thus, it is hindsight.

It takes no hindsight to know that intelligence estimates of enemy strength were wildly wrong, and that their own loses were mounting. In the plans for Barbarossa, they thought campaign would take 9-17 weeks, and by that time the end was still nowhere in sight. By the beginning of November when the campaign was supposed to be over the mud season set in and Moscow was still in the distance. The Germans thought they'd be on the Arkhangelsk–Astrakhan Line. By the time the final drive on Moscow started in November they were nowhere near, and never would be near such a line. So, in fact they were not performing per expectations, and had every reason to exercise caution.

Also you ignore their biggest issue: supplies. They dig in, sure, but how are they feeding themselves? Where's the oil? The munitions? The horses? The trucks? The shells? The spare parts? Etc.
Moving forward does nothing for the supply problem except make it worse. They're not living off the Russian countryside with Soviet scorched earth. German supplies have to move forward by rail and then by truck or wagon to frontline units. They can only supply units as fast as they can repair and change the gage on the Soviet rail system. Pulling back makes it easier to supply the army. By the spring of 1942 the railroads would've caught up to the army on the front making it possible to supply another major offensive. Pushing forward toward Moscow in the mud of November & frost of December puts the army on the end of a slender thread of supply.

Should? An impossible assumption to make. Who knows what the many factors of such changes would result in. Plus, some fewer casualties on their side won't make the core problem go away: supply and logistics.

Except in the unlikely event of a major Soviet breakthrough the attacker almost always suffers greater loses than the defenders. Pulling back takes the Germans closer to their rail lines making it easier to supply them. On the other hand, the Red Army is further from their supply bases.

You forget two things:

1. You say that they have no hope of crossing the Volga with hindsight. German officers of the time had witnessed German forces successfully cross the Dnieper and many other smaller rivers as well, they may have had doubts but they would never consider it to be "no hope."
2. Moscow also sits on a river. A smaller one, yes, but still defensible when there is a large, coordinated, and more organised force.

Crossing the Dnieper was easier than crossing the Volga. There were bridges across the Dnieper. The high banks were on the west side, and Guardian's Panzer Group encircled the enemy on the other side of the river. The Volga was over a mile wide and there were no bridges.

Why should it have been self-evident??? By definition if it was 'self-evident' then they would have seen it right? Obviously it wasn't self-evident otherwise military experts and generals of the time would have seen it better than some random folk of the 21st century. Also consider: you are looking at the war with near God-like omnipotence: you have access to all the dates, all the battles, all outcomes, exact weather, exact terrain, exact force compositions, strength, morale, and perhaps most importantly you have access to the exact thinking of both high commands. Individual German commanders would have shoddy intelligence of even their local areas of responsibility at best while the Staff would certainly have a very very foggy view of the strategic situation, nowhere near your or my level of sheer knowledge.

They can see the enemy before them and count their own loses. They also have maps of the terrain and can tell if it's raining. They know from their own studies that when the rainy season starts the roads collapse, and the ground turns to a quagmire. That was why they needed the fighting to end before the rains came. Russia was supposed to be defeated in 9-17 weeks, they can also read the calendar.

Exactly! Exactly. You have just explained why your assumptions are only possible with hindsight! They had poor intelligence, you don't. They lacked sense of time & distance, you don't. They disregarded battlespace conditions, you have perfect knowledge of things which to them had not even occurred yet and would be impossible to know. They held the enemy in contempt, and you can't just handwave away that attitude which you are free from. All of these are inherent truths that will be very difficult to shift.

When you're groping in the dark move cautiously. They slogged ahead in great confidence. How could they not understand time & distance? How can anyone make a battle plan or a road trip without knowing how far you have to go and how fast you can move. Are their gas stations and rest stops along the way. Is my car in good enough shape to make a long trip. Do I have AAA in case I have a problem. Where will I be sleeping tonight.

When Alexander the Great crossed the Hellespont, he had a better idea about how far he had to go, and what his opposition would be like than the Germans did when they started marching through the mud toward Moscow. It never seemed to dawn on them that Napoleon's army was destroyed by the mud before the first frost set in.

Oh and you finally mentioned logistics, thank you. Yes, you neOh and you finally mentioned logistics, thank you. Yes, you nver addressed how exactly they would fix their endemic supply issues to successfully drive on Moscow.

By the spring the railroads in the AGC area would be operating. The railroads were the main German supply line. I don't understand your logic. If you don't think the Germans could supply a drive on Moscow in 1942, why do you think they could supply a drive into the Caucasus which is much further away from Germany, and far outstrips the end of the line at Rostov on Don?

This is indeed very true, but I would posit that even if Japan could threaten the American heartland they still stood no chance of an overall victory.

Probably not, but the disparity in economic power between Germany and the USSR was nowhere near as great as the one between the USA & Japan.

 

[Belisarius II]

They developed the concepts instead of rushing them into production.They did not meet the design specs which everyone quotes as operational specs.And yes he lied about having the cruiser in his sights.post war the vessels two tracks were compared and they never got close enough to make contact.

I can't say if it happened or not, but it wouldn't be the only time that comparing ship tracks with exact times turned out to be inaccurate. The range at which the Bismarck sank the Hood is disputed by several thousand yards. Was anybody lying about that? If they launched a simulated attack at least the whole control room crew had to be in on it and the whole boat would know what was happening.

 

[Moss]

Thank you, Sphinx, for your well thought out reply. I think we are looking at this problem from different perspectives, and different levels. You're suggesting the unalterable assumption of Barbarossa was that the German Army had to keep pushing forward winning great tactical victories till the Red Army was destroyed. This thinking was also the unhealthy outgrowth of the German obsession with the doctrine of decisive battle. Well, we can both agree that Barbarossa was built on logistical sand, and gross intelligence failures about the size and capabilities of Soviet forces.

As the Germans advanced in the early stages of Barbarossa, they discovered both their logistical limits as well as the far greater strength of the Red Army. At no time did the Soviets melt away. When encircled in great pockets they fought tenaciously forcing the infantry to suffer heavy casualties to reduce them. The Germans never stuck to any ridged campaign plan but shifted strategy to meet circumstances. AGN after virtually cutting off Leningrad went over to the defense. After tough resistance in the south exposed the right flank of AGC they shifted to a southern strategy with Guderian swinging his Panzer Group south behind Kiev and achieving a great encirclement in Ukraine.

In the meantime, AGC stood on the defense enduring serious blows from the enemy. After the Ukrainian battles the Germans employed 3 Panzer Groups for a late September effort against Moscow. After another series of encirclement battles in October the mud season began ending mobile operations. It required no hindsight to understand that by early November AGC was exhausted. Most infantry divisions were below 50% in combat power with the panzer divisions even lower, and with the collapse of the roads the supply situation was becoming critical. The German advance was now well beyond the range of their rail heads.

The strength of the German Army was in its flexibility, rapid mobility, and strong unit cohesion. In the mud season the Germans lost the ability for rapid movement. Fighting a slogging match with the Red Army forcing them back on their supply bases was playing into their strengths not their own. Fighting their divisions to the verge of destruction, while advancing in a wide semicircle attempting to encircle Moscow while running out of supplies was setting themselves up for a counteroffensive. It takes no hindsight to see that the German Generals were operating with willful blindness and demonstrating the height of arrogance.

Recognizing the time to go over to defense is part of the military art. The Germans demonstrated this many times in both world wars and showed themselves highly capable of fighting successful defensive campaigns. As men who were supposed to be students of Clausewitz, they showed a very limited understanding of his dictum about attacking the enemies center of gravity. True Moscow was the Soviet Center of Gravity but to destroy the army in getting there, and then being unable to hold it wouldn't end the war. Going over to the defense enables the use of economy of force so you can have an offensive mass when the time is ripe for a renewed offensive.

The Red Army would certainly use the time to strengthen themselves and regroup, but what options would they have? The Germans pulling back 50-100 miles after the encirclement battles of October would leave them with basically 3 options. 1st keep their main forces grouped around Moscow and dig defensive lines for the coming campaign season of 1942. 2nd push forward and attack AGC. 3rd use their rail system to move forces from Moscow to support other offensive operations on other parts of the front.

Option 1 has much to recommend it since this is obviously going to be a long war and the Germans will renew their offensive in the spring. The downside is that Stalin and most of his generals will consider this strategy too passive. Option 2 gives them the chance of inflicting more damage on the Germans than staying of the defense. The downside is the Soviets lacked mobility, and moving supplies forward though the mud would prove very difficult. They don't have thousands of American trucks yet. Option 3 could gain ground in other areas in the south or try to open a wider gap in the German lines in the siege of Leningrad.

My guess is Stalin would order a combination of options 1 and 2. Build defensive lines around Moscow and attack AGC. It would take the Red Army the better part of a month to move forces up to the new German defensive front and lay in enough supplies to start an offensive. They'd probably wait till the ground was hard in December for major operations to start. Fighting from defensive positions rather than in extended lines in the open and being better supplied the Germans should suffer fewer casualties and inflict heavier loses on the Soviets than in the OTL Moscow counteroffensive.

At this point in the war the Soviets didn't have a heavy numerical advantage. Their chances of achieving a major breakthrough at least in my opinion would be small. As to German morale pushing them forward till near total exhaustion both physically and mentally was more taxing on their morale than pulling then back so they could have some hot food and shelter.

Stopping the offensive against Moscow in 1941 would simply be a recognition that they ran out of time that year. Even taking Moscow wouldn't have ended the war. In the winter battles the Red Army would've fought to take it back so the idea that the war could end in 1941 was absurd. Fighting was continuing in both the north and south regardless of what was happening in Moscow, to say nothing of the Soviet territories to the east. In the spring battles of 1942, the Germans won back control of the Eastern Ukraine. The oilfields of the Caucasus were a pipedream.

The distance between Rostov on Don and Baku is nearly 800 miles. The panzer divisions of Army Group A ran out of gas on the Steppes less than halfway there. Suppling the advance was impossible. The assumptions Blue was based on were delusional. Just looking at a map of the Caucasus show that as you advance the flanks becomes longer and the divisions in the front have to spread themselves thinner. No hindsight was needed to see that the operation was unsound. Again, the Germans were setting themselves up for a devastating counteroffensive. The 6th Army needed to cover the left flank of AGA, but they never even secured the Don Bend.

It makes sense to attack Moscow in 1942 because it is the Soviet Center of Gravity. As in 1941 the offensive would involve several thrusts over a front extending hundreds of miles in an effort to encircle the city. The defenses the German Panzer Armies would have to penetrate were nowhere near as dense as what they faced at Kursk in 1943. Comparing Moscow & Stalingrad is Apples & Oranges. Stalingrad was the kind of direct urban assault the Germans had always avoided. They captured great cities by threatening to encircle them forcing the enemy to withdraw their main forces to avoid being trapped. 6th Army had no hope of crossing the Volga.

The Red Army was less tactically mobile than the Germans, and their command structure too ridged to engage in an elastic defense. That would require an independence of action at lower command levels than the Soviet System would allow. Everyone is afraid of being shot for not following orders. The only way to prevent encirclement after a breakthrough is to order a general retreat. That didn't always work in 1942, look at what happened Kharkov. There isn't much reason to think that a renewed German offensive wouldn't go to script and tear the defending armies apart.

Nothing I've suggested is based on hindsight and should've been self-evident to the German high command. On the Eastern Front from late 1941 on they were operating far below their normal standards of planning. Haphazard logistics, poor intelligence, lacking any sense of time & distance, disregarding weather & terrain conditions, holding the enemy in contempt, and thinking that their tactical brilliance could overcome the limits of reality.

As for the relative economic power of Germany vs. the USSR Germany had a larger economy and was more technologically advanced. Lendlease trucks, food, fuel, chemicals, and strategic metals enabled Soviet industry to concentrate on tank, artillery, and combat aircraft production. That production didn't gain a decisive advantage till 1943. Losing Moscow in 1942 would be a massive blow to Soviet Industry, and logistics since it was the major rail hub of the country. Japan was unable to damage American war production, so time was against them, but Germany could cripple Soviet production. The two wars were very different.

Excellent post right here with lots of interesting points. Its certainly logical to assume that even without the benefits of hindshight the Germans could have made some decisions that could substantially improve their situation going forward. With dwindling supplies and the panzer divions being in many cases at only 50 percent strength or lower, having absorbed half a million casualties (assuredly higher than they had assumed going in) and having witnessed their collossal intelligence failure regarding the Soviets actualy strength, then it is certainly not ASB to postulate that the Reich may search for a different strategy. It seems to me that when ever in doubt attack was their calling card.

The Generals sat Hitler down in fall of 41 and declared that the war in the east had been lost. I've always wondered tbh why then Germany didnt accept a brest litovsk like deal at the time which they in al likelyhood could have recieved. Specualtion aside if the Fuhrer orders the war to continue it would certainly be resonable that they could dig in and avoid the mistakes of Napoleon. This would certainly save them from the massive casualties suffered from the foolhardy asssult on Moscow in the heart of the Russian winter. While one can complain about supplies and logistics, pressing forward in blizards hundreds of miles is going to do far more to damage the geramn supply chain than setting up camp in their October positions.

Further a Moscow 42 option makes much more sense than going south. The distance to the volga is not only absurd, but you are literally sticking your neck out into a giant noose. Even if Stalingrad had gone better, (some say it could have been taken off the march) the massive flanks would always be an issue and again none of that oil is ever getting to Germany, at least not during the war due to the scortched earth policy of Stalin. Moscow 42 is really everything Germany has ever wanted. It would pit the strength of the Wehrmacht against the strength of the Red Army. It would more manurverable than a street fight like in Case Blue, and with it the chance for the elusive "decisive battle" that had been the behind german military thinking. They had this oppurtinity and maximized it during Fall Gelb. If Moscow fall in that battle, along with the bulk of the soviet army, their capitol, governing officials, industry, morale, and probably Stalin himself being killed, this in all likelyhood decides the war in the east. Leningrad would surely fall in conjunction and with the logistical advantadges gained a drive on the caucasus in the south would then be thinkable, not to mention the enourmous loss of industrial capactiy for the russian war effort.

None of these things are ASB or something only possible with hindsight. In fact, the Russian understood this well and were fully expecting an assult on Moscow, so much so that even after the initutal advance in the south began, STAVKA still didnt believe that was the main thrust but only a diversion. I would argue this is a non ASB manner in which Germany could have won in the east, and again without the US in this certainly becomes fathomable.

 

[Post]

Was anyone in (or near) command in Germany in september/october 1941 actually in favor of not pushing for Moscow ? I don't think I've ever seen any, not even advocating it after the war. Most who disagreed with the actions in 1941 were in favor of ingnoring Kiev in august and pushing for Moscow earlier.

 

[NoMommsen]

you mean the ones not being built by the shiny new factory you just sunk all your companies money and credit into.

... who's "you" in your comment?
But yes, these I meant. ... only that the companies themself 'sunk' their companies money and credit into said factories.

And therefore said companies might be rather happy to get al least some money - though possibly far below their expectations and maybe only a fraction of said investments - for their investments back from the US tax payers as the US froces now buy and order at least some of the stuff developed.

 

[NoMommsen]

... I reread Moss's conditions of this thread; the USA is not in the war, but they are providing loans & Lendlease. ...

@Moss also ... both of you :

could you be so kind and show me where this is actually mentioned as I'm atm unable to find the post this is stated in (esp. not in the OP and following it posts of @Moss )...​

All I could find so far was that a comment in post #4 about Lend-Lease stayed unanswered and uncommented by the author of the thread.
... does this already counts as 'setting the conditions' ?

THX in advance

 

[Hammerbolt]

more specifically they modified the dip sticks to produce the effect you mentioned.Devious.

Yep, that's the one! Found it too.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

I think that trying for Moscow in 1941 made reasonabke sense for people who thought
a) they had effectively destroyed the soviet armies and
b) that taking Moscow would effectively win the war.
It would also, at least in principle, provide shelter over winter.

We now know that a) was wrong and that b) might have been wrong.

We also have to remember that decisions were being made by a mad bastard who thought that Destiny, Willpower and Inherent Racial Superiority could triumph over frostbite, hunger, exhaustion and lack of supplies. Funnily enough, he wasn't out in the snow in summer clothing, hungry and far from home.

 

[Garrison]

I think that trying for Moscow in 1941 made reasonabke sense for people who thought
a) they had effectively destroyed the soviet armies and
b) that taking Moscow would effectively win the war.
It would also, at least in principle, provide shelter over winter.

We now know that a) was wrong and that b) might have been wrong.

We also have to remember that decisions were being made by a mad bastard who thought that Destiny, Willpower and Inherent Racial Superiority could triumph over frostbite, hunger, exhaustion and lack of supplies. Funnily enough, he wasn't out in the snow in summer clothing, hungry and far from home.

Also an exhausted Wehrmacht stuck in Moscow is probably going to end up the same way as Sixth Army, though I doubt it would hold out as long.

 

[Post]

Also an exhausted Wehrmacht stuck in Moscow is probably going to end up the same way as Sixth Army, though I doubt it would hold out as long.

Also reaching Moscow =/= taking Moscow. The Germans reached (and encircled) Leningrad but never took it. Arguably they did take Stalingrad (the Soviets just held a few 100s of square meters), but that took them long enough.

 

[Belisarius II]

Was anyone in (or near) command in Germany in september/october 1941 actually in favor of not pushing for Moscow ? I don't think I've ever seen any, not even advocating it after the war. Most who disagreed with the actions in 1941 were in favor of ingnoring Kiev in august and pushing for Moscow earlier.

Most of the top generals wanted to push on to Moscow. From the start of Barbarossa Moscow was the focal point for the Generals, it was Hitler who shifted focus to the economic target of Ukraine. I personally think he was right in turning south. The problem for all of them was they never wanted to face the reality that at some point a campaign has to wrap up for the year. It was always let's keep going because we never want to let the enemy gain the initiative.

Sometimes the best thing to do is let the enemy attack because when you attack you can throw yourself off balance and become vulnerable to a counter punch. It's true in martial arts and in war. The Germans were good counter punchers but Hitler in particular never wanted to give up an inch of ground even to gain a tactical opportunity. A fighter who just keeps punching with all he's got wears himself down pretty quick and the same thing can happen to an army.

 

[Post]

Most of the top generals wanted to push on to Moscow. From the start of Barbarossa Moscow was the focal point for the Generals, it was Hitler who shifted focus to the economic target of Ukraine. I personally think he was right in turning south. The problem for all of them was they never wanted to face the reality that at some point a campaign has to wrap up for the year. It was always let's keep going because we never want to let the enemy gain the initiative.

Hitler (and several others) wanted to advance to Kiev, because of the Russian forces there. That is what happened OTL (and it was the biggest German victory in the war). There was a faction that wanted to advance to Moscow instead. But that was not what I was talking about. You suggested staying put in october 1941. Was there anyone in 1941 who in september/october who was suggesting not advancing to Moscow, but just staying put?

 

[Belisarius II]

@Moss also ... both of you :

could you be so kind and show me where this is actually mentioned as I'm atm unable to find the post this is stated in (esp. not in the OP and following it posts of @Moss )...​

All I could find so far was that a comment in post #4 about Lend-Lease stayed unanswered and uncommented by the author of the thread.
... does this already counts as 'setting the conditions' ?

THX in advance

Well, I'm making another leap of faith here, but I assume Lendlease, and loans were happening because they were already in effect before America was in the war. If not than I have to go back to my earlier thesis that without Lendlease the UK has to make peace at the end of 1941. They wouldn't be able to pay for imports. For the conditions of the thread Britain has to be in the war in 1943 so they have to be getting Lendlease and loans.

 

[Post]

Well, I'm making another leap of faith here, but I assume Lendlease, and loans were happening because they were already in effect before America was in the war.

It was OTL.