2nd post on forum, lots of fun here, can't help but chow down on this one.
Read ABTF long time ago, good book, as were all his.
Some comments:
9th, 10th SS - I thought about 6K-9K a piece, though Wiki says about that between the two of them - wonder about that, but would argue not nothing equipment wise: Stugs, King Tigers, MkIV's ect. Between them at least a panzer brigade of combat power. Some knowledge here borrowed from Advanced Squad Leader detailed treatment done on Arnhem. Side note, one advantage Brits have in ASL is the PIAT -better to fire inside buildings, no backblast as with a bazooka.
Respect opinions posted, but I'd bet on US Para firepower over British, even considering the Bren.
Key point mentioned above - my recollection is reading that not having an assault from both ends of the big bridge was critical to failure.
Leadership & POD:
Embarrassed to not know off the top why US ends up over on left instead of on the right - but that makes it why all points above about fearing the Americans getting let down by British valid - British ground component somewhat inherent in arrangement of troops. If other way round and its Patton as the Army ground commander, 4th Armored leading Garden, Ridgeway as overall airborne commander - might make a big difference, independent of where 1st Airborne lands.
Probably a good thread there, if its not already written. for Blair Witch judging from his great Manstein threads - your assignment?
Another one would be Montgomery killed in France '40, O'Connor not captured in NA, and somehow its Wavell/O'Connor British leadership in 1944.
Pre-battle:
Dim memory, long time since read, but from Horrocks' own book, lot of problems for MG come from XXX Corps not cutting off troops when taking Antwerp, 15th Army I think, they end up fighting MG. Not to mention post MG cleaning out the Schelde Estuary. Horrock's even admits error about all this in his book. Part of overall supply problem - Antwerp not fully usable until after MG.
Leads to combination question of why and WI:
Looking at timeline, the Schelde campaign and extensive use of commandos and amtracks comes about 1 month after MG.
Then more extensive use of amtrack use in final battles after MG and Schelde getting nearer and over Rhine.
What prevented amtrack/commando use - even one or too battalions worth to go around losing a bridge, if not amtracks then DUKW's - certainly better than the boats used at Nijmegen - don't know the answer.
Would a significant amphibious capability helped and complimented?
Airborne is getting you at crossing sites normally out of reach, but they are still water obstacles which are either bridging problems or amphibious ones, bottom line - if the bridges you came to take are gone, and if your planning like you should for things to go wrong like they always do.
And further bring along the bridge stuff in column planning for bridges to go down, again looking nearby soon to what happened at Remagen - yes bridge captured, but they were building 1 or 2 others right beside, right after, over a much more physically challenging crossing I'd think - been to both crossings and seen them.
Another great WI - the Combat History of the 7th US Marine Division in NW Europe 1944-45, specialty riverine crossings, littoral work in Belgium/Holland/NW Germany. Great part of story would be how they hated Monty, hated Army even more, politics of getting put under British command thereby, and how they worked around Monty anyway, and became key part of European war ending in late March '45.
Finally, from a Military Journal on 1SS in Battle of Bulge, and something Peiper said about part of why Bulge fails for Germans from his perpective, very similar to MG problem - two few or one road spearheads - he thought they'd done better advancing over more roads, not that there were many more to advance on mind. Applied to M-G have to confess would have to look at maps and see what the options were, but seems like similar problems, similar possible approaches - - doesn't mean axis of advance isn't limited, just a little more spread out, more than one line connecting the airborne eggs.
Here's another hindsight, step back from the map too:
Let's say Allies, or at least key leadership get real about supply situation and slow down just a month, to get a more prepared M-G going, demonstrate and press Germans elsewhere to keep them pinned, mislead like Normandy meantime, avoid some of the stalemate fall battles like Hurtgen.
My opinion M-G was not a bad idea, just how to do it right.