Schlieffen Plan question

BooNZ

Banned
It is British interests that decide the issue. Going East doesn't change those interests at all. Once war is declared, one of two things must happen: Either Germany defeats France and Russia and turns on an isolated Britain or France and Russia defeat Germany and turn on their wayward allies. Haldane summed it up "I fear in two or three years we will go down to a tremendous combination."
No it is the Cabinet members who decide the issue and in July 1914 the vast majority were against war - even if you include Grey as a hawk for such purposes, which he clearly was not.

Generally people are dismissive of the French army because they misunderstand French tactics and capapbilities. France has a tremendous amount of firepower that wasn't deployed in the August offensives and the Germans will have to keep far more troops in the west than people generally assumed. Moltke made this clear in 1909 when he wrote Conrad that the defense in the west would require so many troops that the forces remaining could hardly force a decision on Russia
No, the French army had been the second strongest army on the continent since it was displaced from the top spot by Prussia/Germany in the Franco-Prussian war. Up until 1912 the French army remained formidable, but we are dismissive of the French army because we understand the limitations imposed on the French army by Joffre's obsessively offensive doctrines and disregard for heavy artillery (and artillery in general). We understand at that time neither the French not the British had the doctrine nor equipment to effectively displace well entrenched defenders, which is evidenced by OTL 1915.

We understand the French switched to an offensive mindset circa 1912 and from a German Intelligence perspective, one of the explicit selling points of an eastern focus was the potential to entice the French to attack in disadvantageous circumstances. Germans Intelligence recognized there were no good offensive options available to the French and had accurately predicted the best mediocre option available to the French. Moltke J was a disappointment, but I would be curious if you could provide a reference to such correspondence illustrating his personal fear of a French offensive...

The French launched the offensive with only two armies. They had plenty more that aren't part of that operation and would be thrown in at the proper time. The French had plenty of heavy artillery to bring forth (its located in their fortresses). Yes it will take time to bring them up and yes they lack recoil. But they are more than enough to pound a stationary fortress. Its just one of the many false doctrines of East first: If Germany doesn't attack France, neither France or Russia have to hurry
The French are limited by a condensed frontlines and terrain recognized by both the French and German leadership as better suited for defence, which is why Joffre repeatedly tried to sell a French advance through Belgium. Assuming France does not spontaneously decide to invade Belgium, any additional French forces would be attempting to navigate even less favourable terrain with predictable results.

In 1915 the French demonstrated the potency of their doctrine and heavy artillery when even with the assistance of the British on a stretched front with more favourable terrain, they struggled to displace the Germans, who were otherwise distracted by routing the Russians. The French and Russians can take their time to the extent they fulfil their committments to attack Germany within 15 days. From a military and diplomatic perspective, both Russia and France are committed to this objective. I don't think it is credible for both Russia and French to spontaneously and simultaneously abandon military plans, military doctrines and treaty commitments before the first bullet is fired.

Metz and Thionville form a modern fortress complex to protect the German concentration. Koblenz and Kaiser William fortress are also modernized in the West to protect a retreat to the Rhine. The problem in falling back to Metz is that you sacrifice the iron mines without a fight and the complex can be bypassed to the North. Metz is sighted to protect France from Germany not the Germany from France
I don't think there were indispensable German industrial assets on the wrong side of Metz. From a German military perspective the Metz and other fortresses were not seen as purely defensive structures, but also as a tool to facilitate counter-attack. Indeed, in one German war game where the Germans were held to only twenty odd divisions in the West, the chosen strategy was to abandon the upper-Rhine and counter-attack through Metz, thereby collapsing the French flank. Your suggestion the French might attempt to bypass the Metz on the North was explicitly contemplated in this particular German war-game.

Often forgotten is that if the Germans go East, they take half of their artillery, machine guns and rifles with them and that the French get to choose the place and time of the attack
If (half) the Germans go east, the Western Front is less than half as long and only a small portion of that diminished front is suitable for massed offensives - the French can be handily be defeated in detail repeatedly. Both the French and Germans recognized there were few places suited to a French offensive, so such offensives would likely be either ill conceived or predicable - both in location and outcome.

there are three plans for the Germans to go East put forth by professional soldiers. The first is Moltke the Elder's old plan of a limited attack into Poland while holding the West first at the Moselle with Metz playing a delaying action before falling back to the Saar and Vosges line. It belongs to a different era with different weapons and alliances. Its doubtful to have had much utility in 1914 and again, it means sacrificing the iron mines without a fight
The Battle of Tannenberg was more-or-less lifted from a German war game from 1894 and seemed to work ok? Further, in 1905/06 Schlieffen's final and the most comprehensive wargame featured an initial focus on the east, followed by a pivot back to France.

In context, a German east first strategy is more of a balanced deployment and prepare for an opportunities to mount decisive counterattacks. This became probable with the Franco-Russian twitch to more offensive doctrines in 1912. In this regard, the above is consistent with decades of German military doctrine, utilizing the advantages of the German rail network and internal lines of supply. In contrast, the Schlieffen Plan is the antithesis of traditional German military doctrine.

There is the so called "four four plan". Its not the East first plan that's made out around here. It was a plan for a different war than Germany would face in 1914. In 1913, they tested it under very favorable circumstances: Britain was neutral and Italy sided with Austria and Germany. France also declared neutrality. The Germans advanced but the Russians simply withdrew to the East until on M30 they had brought up their divisions from Siberia and Turkmenistan. The Austro-Germans were weakened by the need to invest the Russian forces as well as their long lines of communications. the Russians fell on the weaker Austrians and the French decided to attack. The Germans were forced to retreat in the East and Metz fell on M45.
Sorry, but this sounds like pure bullshit
 
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