Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline

Another great update!
The Kornilov coup is going to falter like IOTL, I assume, but like IOTL, it'll leave Kerensky even more in No Man's Land. He's probably going to finally issue a date for CA elections, and with counter-revolutionary rumblings continuing even after Kornilov's failure, something akin to the OCtober Revolution is probably still likely. IOTL, the idea was hotly debated among the Bolsheviks, with Kamenev and Zinoniev opposing it, and Lenin leaning on many "newcomers" among the Bolsheviks, like Trotsky, to garner support for his coup. The Left SRs didn't openly participate, but supported "sole soviet rule" and joined the People's Commissariate later.
I wonder how the three-party-makeup of the radical left plays out ITTL. Within the Bolshevik Party, the Coup faction is probably slightly weaker than IOTL, but it might still prevail. The Left SRs have coalesced earlier, but does that make a difference for their behavior on this question? It might. The Menshevik-Internationalists, while the smallest among the three, might be very interesting, too: they have people like Trotsky and Joffe, who are very pro-coup, but also Martov, who IOTL was very opposed to the coup on firm principles and led the walk-out of the anti-Bolshevik factions from the soviet...
 
I warn you - I never drink ... wine :openedeyewink:
And I warn you - I never drink just one drink. :p

Another great update!
The Kornilov coup is going to falter like IOTL, I assume, but like IOTL, it'll leave Kerensky even more in No Man's Land. He's probably going to finally issue a date for CA elections, and with counter-revolutionary rumblings continuing even after Kornilov's failure, something akin to the OCtober Revolution is probably still likely. IOTL, the idea was hotly debated among the Bolsheviks, with Kamenev and Zinoniev opposing it, and Lenin leaning on many "newcomers" among the Bolsheviks, like Trotsky, to garner support for his coup. The Left SRs didn't openly participate, but supported "sole soviet rule" and joined the People's Commissariate later.
I wonder how the three-party-makeup of the radical left plays out ITTL. Within the Bolshevik Party, the Coup faction is probably slightly weaker than IOTL, but it might still prevail. The Left SRs have coalesced earlier, but does that make a difference for their behavior on this question? It might. The Menshevik-Internationalists, while the smallest among the three, might be very interesting, too: they have people like Trotsky and Joffe, who are very pro-coup, but also Martov, who IOTL was very opposed to the coup on firm principles and led the walk-out of the anti-Bolshevik factions from the soviet...
I've been considering how best to present the various factions and the various perspectives in regards to the insurrection. Indeed, the idea of an insurrection prior to the convocation of the Soviet is unlikely to happen. The Left-SRs are only going to grow from here and will be a big influence in this regard. It's going to be an inevitability, however, that the Soviet will seize control at some point in order to prevent a counter-revolution. There's a lot of conflicting positions and, remember, in this timeline Lenin is in prison with Martov facing trial, so there's that as well. I hope I will do the complexities justice.
 
remember, in this timeline Lenin is in prison with Martov facing trial
Ah, so you've settled that ITTL they'll experience the "seizure of control by the Soviets", whatever form that will ultimately take, while still in prison?
Interesting! So two extremely opposing voices of OTL on the question of the coup are mostly muted (and possibly there's even a bit of rapprochement between the two?).
I'm at the edge of my seat.
 
Ah, so you've settled that ITTL they'll experience the "seizure of control by the Soviets", whatever form that will ultimately take, while still in prison?
Interesting! So two extremely opposing voices of OTL on the question of the coup are mostly muted (and possibly there's even a bit of rapprochement between the two?).
I'm at the edge of my seat.
I don't particularly want to spoil anything, because I want to keep some tension, but in OTL Trotsky and most of the other prisoners were released on bail in early September. I don't foresee things being too different in this timeline but I may take liberties given the differing people who've been imprisoned.
 
With the revolutionary left in a much stronger position will the reformists be as willing to arm the Bolsheviks and rely on the radicals to organise against Kornilov ITTL?
To be honest, I don't think one can suggest that the moderates turned to the Bolsheviks because they thought that they could control them, they sort of turned to the Bolsheviks out of necessity as they were greatly fearful of the counter-revolution. I mention how the moderates and the far-left worked together in the chapter in Moscow not because they suddenly became united in their programmes but because they became united in their struggle against reaction. In addition, the Red Guards and the left-wing regiments looked to the Bolsheviks and not to Kerensky/the Soviet Executive on what to do in the situation. There's an anecdote that Isaac Deutscher gives in his biography of Trotsky: "A scene of almost whimsical fantasy took place in Trotsky’s cell. The sailors of Kronstadt sent a delegation to ask him whether they ought to respond to Kerensky’s call and defend Kerensky against Kornilov or whether they should try to settle accounts with both Kornilov and Kerensky. To the hot-headed sailors the latter course certainly appealed more." In some ways the situation remains unchanged: the counter-revolution is coming and the revolutionary left is the only political force ready to organise the defence against it.
 
With the revolutionary left in a much stronger position will the reformists be as willing to arm the Bolsheviks and rely on the radicals to organise against Kornilov ITTL?
Ha, well if they don't, then a Kornilovite coup might oust them... And then, it might be the Supreme Soviet calling on all revolutionary forces to defend them(selves) against Kornilov's dictatorship. That would be "Saving Soviet Democracy" not from Lenin's dictatorship of OTL, but from an alt-dictatroship of the Right...
 
Chapter 10
Saving Soviet Democracy: A Russian Revolution Timeline
by GiantMonkeyMan


Chapter 10:


The tepid failure of the Moscow State Conference and the success of the radical left in the Petrograd City Duma elections was a signal that reached parts of Russian society other than just the reactionary right, marshalling their forces as they were in an attempt to sever the hydra's head. All across Russia, the turmoil within the Social Revolutionary Party reached its zenith. The SR party leadership in Ufa, in Kharkov, and in Pskov all made their intentions to side with the Union of Left-Social Revolutionaries and only small sections of their local organisations would remain with the parent organisation. The breaking of the party brought with it control of the Peasant Soviet in Kazan as the elected head of the local executive committee, Kalegaev, declared for the organisation of the imprisoned Natanson and the fugitive Spiridonova almost wholesale. Across Russia, district soviets were voting for Bolshevik or Left-SR resolutions and the by-elections of these democratic bodies saw a growth of vibrant radicalism.

The support for the Mensheviks in Petrograd and the other major cities had dwindled drastically and, with the exception of a few districts, Menshevik party branches were reporting a migration of support to the party of the former Menshevik leader Martov's Socialist-Internationalists. Martov and Trotsky's imprisonment had garnered a lot of sympathy with those workers and activists who might have disagreed with the naked ambitions of the Bolsheviks but could nonetheless not countenance the acts of state repression nor the lack of condemnation for those acts as the leadership of the Mensheviks had failed to do. More workers openly switched to Bolshevism, a sense that boldness was needed in this moment that the counter-revolution reared its head. The Trade Union leadership, notably of the Union of Railway Workers, signalled their support of the SIP and Martov. Workers and radical soldiers began questioning the Soviet Executive itself and why it remained in the hands of those who would collaborate with the capitalist class and the army officers in suppressing the revolutionary leaders and some workers just felt apathetic, no longer trusting any political organ to satisfy their needs. Whilst the district and local soviets could, and did, rapidly alter their make-up as the constituents triggered by-elections to remove delegates they felt no longer represented them, it was significantly more complex within the Soviet Executive and many were pressuring the moderate socialist leadership to organise a second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

The Bolsheviks themselves experienced fluctuations in both goals and organisation, particularly with Lenin and Kamenev's imprisonment - the Provisional Government was desperate to pin some crime, either real or imagined, on Lenin to discredit him and his movement once and for all. Lenin reportedly struggled within the confines of Kresty prison, his abrasive personality and stubbornness brought him into conflict with many of the other political prisoners, and only Trotsky would take him on head to head but he also presented a clarity of vision and held a charismatic ambition that made it clear why he was so revered amongst the socialist movement. He disliked bourgeois political theatre as empty gestures but recognised when it was necessary and made great pains to represent to the outside world that he was organising the political prisoners' defence and as such also took on assisting other political prisoners' in their defence. Whilst Lenin had to take a slight step back from his leadership role, he led a significant section of the party that felt that the slogan "all power to the Soviets" was outdated considering the Soviet Executive, controlled as it was by the moderate socialists, had made clear that they were not willing to take the next step towards power.

As such, two distinct currents emerged within the party. Alexander Shliapnikov, Timofei Sapronov, and others on the left-wing of the Bolsheviks turned away from the idea of seizing power from the Soviet Executive and towards making inroads into the local and district soviets, where the Bolshevik Party's discipline and organisational abilities helped expand their influence. The factory committees in particular, intertwined yet separate as they were from the power structures of the soviets with their focus on particular economic struggles in specific industries and plants, proved fertile ground for these worker-activist Bolsheviks. Simultaneously, a growing current led by Alexei Rykov and supported from within prison by Kamenev were seeking closer co-operation with the other anti-war parties, in particular the Socialist-Internationalists and the newly formed Union of Left-Social Revolutionaries. This current felt particularly vindicated upon the success of the Petrograd City Duma election and the propagation of the idea of an all-socialist alliance of organisations to defend against the counter-revolution appealed to great swathes of the population. It was due to the skilled organisational talents of Yakov Sverdlov in Petrograd and Nikolai Bukharin in Moscow that these two trends became united and intrinsically linked.

Ever since the Provisional Government had ordered the dissolution of the Finnish Parliament, events in Helsinki had rapidly developed and whilst Governor-General Stakovich was keen to follow his orders from the political centre and prevent the Finnish Parliament from meeting, thanks to the intervention of the Bolsheviks within the Soviet the soldiers at the Garrison refused the orders. In Ukraine at Huliaipole on the 20th August, a group of anarchist peasants led by Nestor Makhno met to discuss the future of the movement and the revolution. It was a meeting being echoed in all the peasant land committees and soviets across Ukraine and throughout Russia. The Provisional Government had failed to enact land reform, the soldiers at the front were once again subject to capital punishment, the forces of reaction were on the march. To remain as a small group publishing pamphlets was no longer tenable to Makhno, they had to draw the labouring masses to them in a coordinated movement. In Ivanovo-Voznesentsk, Kronstadt, Ekaterinburg, and in Tsaritsyn the Bolsheviks had taken control of the district soviets. In Samara and Saratov, a coalition of Bolsheviks and the ULSP had ascended to power.

All this and more would have been on Kerensky's mind when he invited Kornilov to advance on the capital but equally Kerensky was worried, and legitimately so, that endorsing a coup in this moment would have seen his own head on the chopping block. Once he had been seen by the establishment class as the saviour of Russian capitalism but with his ineffectiveness in the face of social turmoil these interests had quickly dropped him for the prospect of the iron heel of reaction. Kerensky hoped to use Kornilov but equally Kornilov hoped to use Kerensky. Both wanted to purge the undesirable elements of the Soviet but each saw themselves as the rightful inheritor of the political space that would be opened up as a result. Boris Savinkov was the middleman between these two political rivals and for a time it seemed that they would reach an equilibrium. Kornilov was perhaps the more flexible of the two and as long as the war effort continued and was not impeded then he could bend to some of Kerensky's demands - Kerensky had more to lose.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov, of no particular relation to the former Minister-President, was inserted into this relationship and as a result began a tragedy of errors that would see the end of any hopes for a quick blow against the revolution and the saving of the old order. Lvov was sent to Kornilov by Kerensky in order to continue the informal talks and report back Kornilov's intentions. Lvov, in presenting himself to Kornilov, was introduced as being able to speak on behalf of Kerensky. It's entirely possible that Lvov misunderstood his intended role or that Kerensky failed to impress upon him the gravity of the situation but regardless, as the rumour-mills in Petrograd were abound with the news of counter-revolution, Lvov presented Kornilov with three possible options: Kerensky himself as dictator, a directorate with both figures on board, or Kornilov as dictator. Kornilov expressed a preference for the third option but suggested that he felt Kerensky and Savinkov would play important roles.

Lvov, upon returning to Kerensky, told the Minister-President that Kornilov was demanding that he would be made dictator. If Kerensky had been thinking straight and with less pressing worries about the survival of his government he may have been able to continue the negotiations and clarify. As it was, Kerensky's nervousness about the situation and his fears about his survival led him to realise he could use this against Kornilov and expose him as a traitor. Kerensky, at the War Ministry in Petrograd, began a tentative conversation with Kornilov, at headquarters at Mogilev, using a Hughes Apparatus, a rudimentary teleprinter communications device. Kerensky asked him to confirm what Lvov had said, without saying what it was exactly that Lvov had been suggesting. Kornilov did so without understanding the underlying implications and asked for Kerensky to present himself to Kornilov at Mogilev. Later that night, Kerensky called a cabinet meeting, armed with the transcripts of the Hughes Apparatus discussion.

Perhaps Kerensky hoped to present himself as the hero of the hour, the saviour of the Russian Revolution, by exposing and later defeating Kornilov in order to rally the people behind him. Savinkov, horrified at the misunderstandings, demanded that Kerensky reopen communication with Kornilov immediately but Kerensky refused and the majority of the cabinet ministers agreed that it was too late, that the wheels had been set in motion. The socialist ministers in particular, with their close relationship with the Soviet Executive, expressed their desire to negate the threat of Kornilov's coup. Vitally, this bungling of negotiations and discussions with Kornilov exposed a harsh reality to the Provisional Government. Those troops who might have been called upon to suppress the revolution were under the influence of Kornilov and those troops who might have been called upon to defend the Provisional Government from the counter-revolution were under the influence of the Soviet. In order to prevent the Provisional Government receiving the wrath of a right-wing coup, they would have to turn to the very political organs that threatened their authority.

Kerensky sent a message out to headquarters: "Hold up all echelons moving towards Petrograd and its districts". Kornilov responded: "Do not carry out this order. Move the troops towards Petrograd." Kerensky's government fell apart. Prior to the advance of Kornilov, General Lukomsky warned the Kadet Party "that they should withdraw from the government before the 27th of August, so as to place the government in a difficult situation and themselves avoid any unpleasantness". In response to the shambles that surrounded Kerensky's attempts to negotiate with and mitigate the threat of the military coup, the cabinet ministers resigned. At 14:30 on the 28th, nine trains full of Kornilov's troops passed the station at Oredezh and half an hour later the garrison at Luga surrendered to the advancing troops giving Kornilov a clear shot at the capital. General Krymov arranged the forces of the Don Cossack battlions in preparation to sweep the rebellious elements of the Petrograd garrison aside and support the Union of Officers and other right-wing forces in the purge of the city.

The ministers of the Provisional Government argued furiously and pointlessly. The Kadet Kokoshkin suggested that instead of either Kornilov or Kerensky, General Alexeev should take the helm. Nekrasov bitterly opined, "in a few hours Kornilov's troops will be in Petrograd". They bickered and cawed before being interrupted by a knock on the door. A representative from the Committee of Struggle against Counter-Revolution had arrived. In the night before, representatives from the Soviet Executive, the trade unions, and all the parties met to discuss the ongoing coup. The Soviet Executive received the ire of all the assembled delegates: why had they been attempting to co-operate with this failed government who even now debated the possibility of counter-revolution in their favour? The soviet organisations had argued about whether or not to come out to support Kerensky but a representative from the Kronstadt garrison broke through. They had previously sent a delegation to Kresty prison itself to ask the revolutionary leaders what the response should be and, in a rare moment of unity, Lenin, Martov, Trotsky, Kamenev, and Natanson were all agreed. Focus on the defensive measures immediately - defeat Kornilov and sort out the political implications later. The Provisional Government agreed, hoping to bring the defence under their sway.

It was the Bolsheviks' discipline and organisation that proved vital. Practically overnight, 40,000 workers were armed and given assignments. A young, newly minted, Red Guard called Rakilov said, "The factory looked like a camp. When you came in, you could see the fitters at the bench, but they had their packs hanging by them, and their guns were leaning against the bench." The Bolsheviks and the ULSP came to an agreement after the insistence of the SIP. Despite their attacks on the moderate socialists, they would put aside these differences to co-ordinate the defence. The Petrograd City Duma, now virtually in the hands of the Bolsheviks, voted to form a commission to aid with food supplies and, more importantly, it voted on sending delegates to the troops at Luga. The grandson of Imam Shamil, a legend of the 19th century struggles for Muslim nationalism in the Caucuses, was in the city to attend a meeting of the Executive of the Union of Muslim Soviets and it was his agitation amongst the 'Savage' Division, who had previously no idea what had been their purpose in coming to Petrograd, that turned that vaunted division away from their officers.

The All-Russian Executive Committee of Railway Workers formed a special bureau just for the defence against Kornilov on the 27th. The union, Vikzhel, had recently been making overtures to the SIP and were eager to defend the revolution. They sent a telegram along to key points along the rail network directing the local workers to prevent suspicious telegrams or trains being sent through and at key locations workers even dug up the tracks to stop Kornilov's trains. Whilst long lines of workers were filling the streets to sign up for Soviet and Bolshevik militias, the Petrograd Garrison met in their soldiers committees. The Litvosky Guards Regiment's committee passed a resolution: "All troops not involved in work details or without valid medical excuse are required to participate in the detachment now being formed. Officers and men refusing to do their duty will be subject to revolutionary trial." Detachments from all the Petrograd Garrison assembled ready and waiting for any advance from counter-revolution. They were not willing to die for the nation on the front but they were willing to die for the revolution. The leaders of the Kronstadt Soviet issued the orders to take over all communications, all weapons depots, and all vessels in port whether military or private. Once more, a fleet of sailors armed to the teeth descended on Petrograd but this time they were not there for demonstrations but rather to add their bayonets to the cause.

Faced with this rapid and impressive mobilisation, a realisation was had by the forces of reaciton and by the 30th, Kornilov's advance had collapsed and the counter-revolution's opportunity had passed. The Savage Division, once numbering amongst Kornilov's most disciplined formation, raised the Red Flag. The Cossacks, thanks to agitation from the Bolsheviks, threatened to arrest their leaders if they ordered them onwards. The Union of Officers, particularly the officers schools in Petrograd, were divided with some willing to go down in a blaze of glory and others, witnessing the impressive mobilisation of the workers, realising that their time had passed. General Krymov, whose Cossacks had abandoned him, met with Kerensky on the 31st only to face a torrent of blustering abuse suggesting that he was a traitor and after the meeting retired to a private room to commit suicide. Like many others faced with the realities of the strength of the left, he initially attempted to distance himself from the coup. Rodzianko, the former attendant to the Tsar, had the gall to say, "all I know about the evils of the day is what I read in the papers". Savinkov, due to his close association with Kornilov, was stripped of his post and more than a few right-wing figures back-pedalled in an attempt to distance themselves from a coup that they had previously been cheering on from the sides.

A new government was formed by Kerensky from the political ruins of his own making - composed of younger, subordinate, Generals and junior ministers not directly associated with the coup but the Second Machine Gun Regiment summed up a lot of the feeling of the workers and soldiers in the capital: "The only way out of the present situation lies in the transferring of power into the hands of the working people. We demand the immediate liberation of our comrades arrested in July". In the following week, going into September, the revolutionary leaders in Kresty prison were finally granted bail and freed. Since the Provisional Government and the Committee of Struggle against Counter-Revolution had relied upon these people and their organisations in organising the defence against what they considered traitors then the idea that they, in turn, could be considered traitors became farcical. The pressures of the Petrograd City Duma, the shift in the air in the soviets, and the now armed and prepared workers with their Bolshevik sympathies revealed the impotence of the Provisional Government in attempting to hold them. The Soviet Alliance was free.

----

It is doubtful whether in any other province the rural soviets were so solidly entrenched as in the old Tatar stronghold on the Volga, and it is certain that nowhere did they display a more virulent hostility to the landowners. At the head of the Kazan Peasants' Soviet stood A. L. Kalegaev, perhaps the most able of the left SR leaders. Already in May the provincial soviet had decided that privately owned lands should be taken over by the volost land committees, for use by the peasants, but without being parcelled out, lest the soldiers' interests should suffer. The Interior Ministry under Prince Lvov had promptly annulled this "decree," only to be answered with defiance by Kalegaev, who declared that such measures were necessary to head off anarchy and that the will of the people would be carried out despite threats from the Provisional Government. The ministry had then resorted to armed coercion, causing some of its district commissars to resign, but nothing much seems to have come of its action, for by June 10 peasants' committees were reported to be in full control of estates in Spassk uezd, setting an example for other districts to follow, and the landowners of Kazan telegraphed Kerenski in July to protest the ineffectiveness of government measures against seizures, which in Sviiazh uezd had led to the full liquidation of private economies and even to the expropriation of household effects. There is no reason to question Kalegaev's assertion, made before an All-Russian conference of peasants' soviets, that by July the land of Kazan province was already in the hands of the peasantry and the soviets were supreme in the villages.34 The ministerial council at its session of September 28 took up the question of agrarian disorders, especially in Kazan province, and tried to devise a system of mixed councils for public officials to fall back upon in their effort to uphold the law, but by that time peasant communities all over Russia were following the example of the left SR's in Kazan, whether the local party organizations sought to restrain them, or wrung their hands in despair, or acquiesced in the seizures.
- The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism by Oliver Radkey

I briefly mention events in Finland. I will be going into these events in more detail in the future as they pertain to the potential success of the revolutionary movement in Finland. Suffice to say, things were polarising in Helsinki just as they were in Petrograd.

Around August 20 1917 our group reviewed the distribution and utilization of our forces. This meeting was the most serious one we had held. I have already mentioned that our group did not have in its ranks a single theoretically-trained anarchist. We were all peasants and workers. Our schools turned out half-educated people. Schools of anarchism did not exist. Our fund of knowledge of revolutionary anarchism was obtained reading anarchist literature for many years and exchanging views with each other and with the peasants, with whom we shared all that we had read and understood in the works of Kropotkin and Bakunin. We owe thanks to Comrade Vladimir Antoni (known as Zarathustra) for supplying us with literature.

In the course of this very important meeting we discussed a number of burning questions and came to the conclusion that the Revolution was having the life choked out of it by the garrotte of the State. It was turning pale, weakening, but could still emerge victorious in the supreme struggle. Help would come to it principally from the revolutionary peasant masses who would remove the garrotte and get rid of this plague – the Provisional Government and its satellite parties.
- The Russian Revolution in Ukraine by Nestor Makhno

A similar swing to the Bolsheviks took place in the Soviets. Here too grass-roots apathy deprived the Mensheviks and the SRs of their early ascendency. They had only themselves to blame. To begin with, the Soviets had been open and democratic organs, where important decisions were made by the elected assembly. This made their proceedings chaotic, but it also gave them a sense of excitement and popular creativity. As the Soviet leaders became involved in the responsibilities of government they began to organise the work of the Soviet along bureaucratic lines, and this alienated the mass of workers from them. [...] The Soviets' bureaucratization had set them apart from the lives of ordinary workers, who began to reduce their involvement in the Soviets and either lost all interest in politics or else looked instead to their own ad hoc bodies such as factory committees to take the initiative. This added strength to the Bolshevik campaign, which was largely channelled through these grass-roots organisations, for the recall of the Menshevik and SR leaders from the Soviets as part of Lenin's drive towards Soviet power.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

Kornilov's failed coup is important in the history of the Russian Revolution. I could justify my perspective of events using Trotsky's history, he's bitingly critical, or China Mieville's narrative style, Mieville is almost embarrassed for the pair but following is in fact four extracts from respected histories of the period that are not overtly leftist or pro-Bolshevik. The simple fact of the matter is, Kornilov had ambitions and a vision of restoring order. Kerensky shared those visions somewhat but feared Kornilov expanding his targets to include him. The middlemen negotiating between them, particularly Lvov, contributed to utterly failed communications and a disintegration of their relationship. Kerensky flinched and the only force organised enough to prevent the decimation of Petrograd was the Bolshevik Party. In this timeline, this is expanded somewhat to be the entirety of the revolutionary left but the results remain somewhat the same - partly because they are an important culmination in the shift in tides towards the left and the failure of the right, and partly because I'm lazy and lack imagination.

In August, the coup from the right was finally attempted by General Lavr Kornilov, whom Kerensky had recently appointed Commander-in-Chief with a mandate to restore order and discipline in the Russian Army. Kornilov was evidently not motivated by personal ambition but by his sense of the national interest. He may, in fact, have believed that Kerensky would welcome an Army intervention to create a strong government and deal with left-wing troublemakers, since Kerensky, partially apprised of Kornilov's intentions, dealt with him in a peculiarly devious way. Misunderstandings between the two principle actors confused the situation, and the German's unexpected capture of Riga on the eve of Kornilov's move added to the mood of panic, suspicion, and despair that was spreading among Russia's civilian and military leaders. In the last week of August, baffled but determined, General Kornilov dispatched troops from the front to Petrograd, ostensibly to quell disorders in the capital and save the Republic.

The attempted coup failed largely because of the unreliability of the troops and the energetic actions of the Petrograd workers. Railwaymen diverted and obstructed the troop-trains; printers stopped publication of newspapers supporting Kornilov's move; metalworkers rushed out to meet the oncoming troops and explain that Petrograd was calm and their officers had deceived them. Under this pressure, the troops' morale disintegrated, the coup was aborted outside Petrograd without any serious military engagement
- The Russian Revolution by Sheila Fitzpatrick

Without asking what precisely Lvov had said, Kornilov confirmed his "urgent request" that Kerensky come to military headquarters. Believing this to be a trap and proof of a plot against him, Kerensky announced Kornilov's removal as commander-in-chief. A thunderstruck Kornilov responded in outrage at what he saw as betrayal and further proof of the government's weakness. He issued a statement denouncing Kerensky, the Soviet, and the Bolsheviks and ordered General Krymov, with the "Savage Division" and the Third Cavalry Corps, to take Petrograd. Now, however, Kerensky was rescued by the very Soviet and the workers and soldiers he had intended to move against. The socialist parties, always on the lookout for counterrevolution, responded energetically, calling on the workers and soldiers to rally to the defence of the revolution.
- The Russian Revolution, 1917 by Rex A Wade

On the following day, 26 August, Lvov met Kerensky again in the Winter Palace, He claimed that Kornilov was now demanding dictatorial powers for himself (he had done nothing of the sort) and, on Kerensky's request, listed the three points of his 'ultimatum': the imposition of martial law in Petrograd; the transfer of all civil authority to the Commander-in-Chief; and the resignation of all the ministers, including Kerensky himself, pending the formation of a new cabinet by Kornilov. Kerensky always claied that when he saw these demands everything instantly became clear: Kornilov was planning a military coup. In fact nothing was clear. For one thing, it might have been asked why Kornilov had chosen to deliver his list of demands through such a nonentity as Lvov. For another, it might have been sensible to check with Kornilov if he was really demanding to be made Dictator. But Kerensky was not concerned with such details. On the contrary, he had suddenly realised - and this is no doubt what he really meant by his lightning-flash of revelation - that as long as everything was kept vague he might succeed in exposing Kornilov as a traitor plotting against the Provisional Government. His own political fortunes would thus be revived as the revolution rallied behind him to defeat his rival.
- A People's Tragedy by Orlando Figes

Actually, there were almost no skirmishes between Kornilov's forces and those on the government's side during the entire affair. In the case of the First Don Cossack Division, agitators were soon drawing the troops to mass rallies before Krymov's very eyes. With relatively little difficulty they won soldier-representatives in most units to their point of view, and by August 30 some cossacks were expressing their readiness to arrest Krymov. Finally, late on the afternoon of August 30, a government emissary, Colonel Georgii Samarin, invited Krymov to accompany him back to Petrograd for talks with Kerensky. Given firm assurances of his personal safety, Krymov reluctantly acquiesced.
- The Bolsheviks Come to Power by Alexander Rabinowitch

Trotsky highlights the importance of how the coup's forces disintegrated so quickly when he says that, "there was no military encounter, but there was something far more dangerous: contact, social exchange, inter-penetration." Two things can be noted about the coup - firstly, that the Bolsheviks were vital in their discipline and organisation to mobilise the working class in defence; secondly, that more and more layers of society, even those who the establishment had counted on as their strongest tools, were susceptible to the agitation and propaganda of the left. In part, the Bolsheviks were just very good propagandists and, in another way, society and the Russian economy had broken down enough that such agitation struck deep. I will be talking about these developments in society in the next chapter as well as the development and building of the Soviet Alliance.

A scene of almost whimsical fantasy took place in Trotsky’s cell. The sailors of Kronstadt sent a delegation to ask him whether they ought to respond to Kerensky’s call and defend Kerensky against Kornilov or whether they should try to settle accounts with both Kornilov and Kerensky. To the hot-headed sailors the latter course certainly appealed more. Trotsky argued with them, reminding them how in May he had defended them in the Soviet and had said that if a counter-revolutionary general were to try to throw a noose around the neck of the revolution then ‘the sailors of Kronstadt would come and fight and die with us’. They must now honour this pledge and postpone the reckoning with Kerensky, which could not be far off anyhow. The sailors took his advice. While this was going on, the prosecution mechanically continued its job. The examination dragged on and Trotsky had to answer questions about his connexions with the German General Staff and the Bolsheviks. Antonov-Ovseenko and Krylenko, against whom no charges were brought after six weeks of imprisonment, threatened a hunger strike, but Trotsky tried to dissuade them. At length he decided to take no further part in the farce of interrogation. He refused to answer the examiner’s questions and gave his reasons in a letter to the Central Executive of the Soviets. Three days later, on 4 September, he was released on bail.
- The Prophet Armed by Isaac Deutscher
 
Another great chapter!
To make sure I'm still on the right track concerning the comparison between OTL and TTL:
the differences mainly consist in ULSR and SIP solidly cooperating with the Bolsheiks in the ultra-left defense of Kerensky against Kornilov, and Lenin, Trotsky, Martov, and Natanson all communicating this straight from the same prison? Or is the bit about the Muslim soviets a divergence, too? Krymov's suicide certainly is OTL.
 
Another great chapter!
To make sure I'm still on the right track concerning the comparison between OTL and TTL:
the differences mainly consist in ULSR and SIP solidly cooperating with the Bolsheiks in the ultra-left defense of Kerensky against Kornilov, and Lenin, Trotsky, Martov, and Natanson all communicating this straight from the same prison? Or is the bit about the Muslim soviets a divergence, too? Krymov's suicide certainly is OTL.
The Executive of the Union of Muslim Soviets happened in our timeline, it was one of those lucky coincidences that a lot of things were all going off at once. In mentioning it, I kind of want to make clear that the events of the Russian Revolution aren't just confined to Petrograd even if Petrograd is the confluence at which most of the action occurs. Thank you for reading and continuing to comment!

This is much cooler than the stupid "Game of Thrones" :cool:
This continues to fascinate.
Thank you both for your kind words!
 
Still following this timeline with interest, and I'm excited to see how the divergences begin to grow now that things are really about to pick up in Petrograd.
 
This is great.
Still following this timeline with interest, and I'm excited to see how the divergences begin to grow now that things are really about to pick up in Petrograd.
Thank you both! And yes, a lot of what's come before this has effectively been build up. September and October will be months where a lot of what I've been preparing for pays off - hopefully, it will be convincing and exciting.
 
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