As I have pointed out previously, and will do so again, the notion of Teutoberger Wald as the dramatic battle that halted the progress of Roman imperialism into Germania and ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Roman imperial structure in the west is largely erroneous -- the product of the mythology of 19th century German nationalism and romanticism. Rather like Carrhae in the popular conception, it has mistakenly come to be seen as a decisive break in Roman expansionism, and rather like Carrhae, it is a largely erroneous conception.
What the battle of Teutoberger Wald indeed did do was halt the drive of Augustan expansionism into Germania and the Danube basin, and possibly lead to a temporary halt of expansionist momentum across the entire Empire. Yet a mere couple of years later, Germanicus Iulius Cæsar conducted large-scale punitive expeditions in the area, Titus Flavius Domitianus conducted operations in the salient of the Agri Decumates and against the Chatti during the 80’s A.D., Marcus Aurelius campaigned extensively in the massive Marcomannic Wars during the 160’s-170’s A.D., and planned the annexation of Sarmatia and Marcomannia as imperial provinces. As late as the early third century Caracalla conducted a massive campaign in the Agri Decumates and in Germania Magna against the Alammani that involved a large-scale concentration of troops, and was accompanied by widespread construction of colonial outposts, and by a major extension of Roman garrisons and fortifications across the Rhine and Danube rivers. Maximinus Thrax also conducted large scale operations in Germany, and even planned the annexation of the entirety of Magna Germania. The recent archeological findings at Kalefeld, in fact quite close to the Teutoberg Wald, display an extensive battlefield with over 1,000 Roman soldiers, including archers, cavalry, and a large quantity of artillery pieces, and seem to posit a date between 230 to 250 AD, when it is known that Maximinus Thrax conducted his German campaign. Significantly, evidence found on the Kalefeld battlefield indicates the Roman forces were marching from a north-eastern direction, indicating even deeper advances. Fundamentally, Teutoberg did not have such a massive impact on the advance of Roman imperialism in Germania.
It should also noted that although the Elbe, or even the much touted Vistula-Carpathian-Dniester border line might appear superior on paper, the armies and legionary garrisons on the Rhine could be more easily and rapidly supplied from the Mediterranean via the Rhône and Moselle rivers, with only a brief stretch of portages. Armies on the Elbe would have to be supplied from the hazardous North Sea, or by extensive overland routes. Economically, the Rhine basin was already supporting towns and sizeable villages at the time of the Gaius Iulius Cæsar’s conquest of Gaul. Magna Germania and the Elbe basin, however, was far less developed, possessed few villages, and had little food surplus. Thus the Rhine was both significantly more accessible from Rome and better equipped to supply sizeable garrisons than the regions beyond. This is extremely significant, in that prior to the mid-third century, Germania was far more poor and underdeveloped in comparison to the Mediterranean basin and Gallia, and that consequently, the Germanic tribes were able to conduct lengthy guerrilla conflicts without substantial harm to their primitive infrastructure. Although the annexation of Germania might seem plausible a retrospective “grand strategy” sense, it was quite clearly not worthwhile in the first to third centuries.
It should also be noted that although Germania Magna was never annexed and provincialized, the Romans still exercised substantial control over the region through the cheaper methods of protectorates, loyal client-kings, and forward legionary garrisons. Germania in the first through early third centuries should not be regarded as a barbarian wasteland entirely divorced from the Roman Empire, but something rather like the north-western frontier of the British Indian Empire. Rather like the Raj, the Roman Empire exercised light control over Germania through frequent punitive expeditions, military garrisons, and loyal client-states.
Simply put, the question should not be “is Germania enough?”, but rather “is Germania necessary at all?” The repeated insistence on Teutoberg Wald as the only plausible PoD, and an insistence of an massive and rapid drive to the Vistula-Dniestr line, along with extensive and entirely unrealistic reforms to the Roman constitution and the imperial state structure is a fundamental misunderstanding of the historical situation, the product of a unrealistic misapplication of the benefits of hindsight. A successful conquest of Mesopotamia under Marcus Ulpius Traianus, Lucius Septimius Severus or Caracalla, a minor drive across the Tigris or a campaign that weakens the loose Parthian imperial structure and ensures the political collapse and fragmentation of the Iranian plateau, or the emasculation of any major power (i.e. a Sassanid-analogue state) to arise there would probably do far more to ensure the a Europe-spanning imperium then the conquest of miles upon useless miles of under-developed, under-populated and primitive barbarian tribes. Likewise, slower but more measured expansion into Germania and the Danube basin under Marcus Aurelius following the Marcomannic wars, or the continuation of the expansionist imperial drive under Caracalla or Maximinus Thrax would probably be more realistic, both due to the fact that Germania was far more well-developed, urbanized and Romanized in these later centuries, and that the barbarian populations would soon require urgent subjugation, thus providing a legitimate and necessary reason for expansion then a “drive to nowhere” under Cæsar Augustus.
It appears to be that simply because it was the vast migration of the barbarian tribal federations across the Rhine in 406 A.D. that finally put paid to the remnants of the vastly weakened western Roman Empire that a successful Roman. The notion that a strategic imbalance between the Roman Empire and ‘barbarian’ Europe can be traced back to the failure and Teutoberg, or some similarly early PoD is largely mistaken, and appears to ignore the fact that, simply in regards to solely military manpower the Roman imperial state possessed a substantial superiority over all its enemies combined until the late 3rd/early 4th century. During the Severan age -- the numerical height of the Roman military establishment -- the Roman army possessed an estimated 442,000 legionaries and auxilia, which combined with the naval forces and irregular numerii yielded an estimated half a million troops in the Roman military establishment. The Roman problem was never (until the late 4th/ early 5th century) a fundamental numerical imbalance between its population and available military manpower vis-à-vis that of its enemies, but the issues in coordinating military movements and defenses along all the frontiers, and in the structural problems that this issue entailed. The notion that one requires such an early PoD to ensure the survival of the Roman imperial state, followed by a string of entirely implausible further massive conquests and reforms is entirely erroneous
What the battle of Teutoberger Wald indeed did do was halt the drive of Augustan expansionism into Germania and the Danube basin, and possibly lead to a temporary halt of expansionist momentum across the entire Empire. Yet a mere couple of years later, Germanicus Iulius Cæsar conducted large-scale punitive expeditions in the area, Titus Flavius Domitianus conducted operations in the salient of the Agri Decumates and against the Chatti during the 80’s A.D., Marcus Aurelius campaigned extensively in the massive Marcomannic Wars during the 160’s-170’s A.D., and planned the annexation of Sarmatia and Marcomannia as imperial provinces. As late as the early third century Caracalla conducted a massive campaign in the Agri Decumates and in Germania Magna against the Alammani that involved a large-scale concentration of troops, and was accompanied by widespread construction of colonial outposts, and by a major extension of Roman garrisons and fortifications across the Rhine and Danube rivers. Maximinus Thrax also conducted large scale operations in Germany, and even planned the annexation of the entirety of Magna Germania. The recent archeological findings at Kalefeld, in fact quite close to the Teutoberg Wald, display an extensive battlefield with over 1,000 Roman soldiers, including archers, cavalry, and a large quantity of artillery pieces, and seem to posit a date between 230 to 250 AD, when it is known that Maximinus Thrax conducted his German campaign. Significantly, evidence found on the Kalefeld battlefield indicates the Roman forces were marching from a north-eastern direction, indicating even deeper advances. Fundamentally, Teutoberg did not have such a massive impact on the advance of Roman imperialism in Germania.
It should also noted that although the Elbe, or even the much touted Vistula-Carpathian-Dniester border line might appear superior on paper, the armies and legionary garrisons on the Rhine could be more easily and rapidly supplied from the Mediterranean via the Rhône and Moselle rivers, with only a brief stretch of portages. Armies on the Elbe would have to be supplied from the hazardous North Sea, or by extensive overland routes. Economically, the Rhine basin was already supporting towns and sizeable villages at the time of the Gaius Iulius Cæsar’s conquest of Gaul. Magna Germania and the Elbe basin, however, was far less developed, possessed few villages, and had little food surplus. Thus the Rhine was both significantly more accessible from Rome and better equipped to supply sizeable garrisons than the regions beyond. This is extremely significant, in that prior to the mid-third century, Germania was far more poor and underdeveloped in comparison to the Mediterranean basin and Gallia, and that consequently, the Germanic tribes were able to conduct lengthy guerrilla conflicts without substantial harm to their primitive infrastructure. Although the annexation of Germania might seem plausible a retrospective “grand strategy” sense, it was quite clearly not worthwhile in the first to third centuries.
It should also be noted that although Germania Magna was never annexed and provincialized, the Romans still exercised substantial control over the region through the cheaper methods of protectorates, loyal client-kings, and forward legionary garrisons. Germania in the first through early third centuries should not be regarded as a barbarian wasteland entirely divorced from the Roman Empire, but something rather like the north-western frontier of the British Indian Empire. Rather like the Raj, the Roman Empire exercised light control over Germania through frequent punitive expeditions, military garrisons, and loyal client-states.
Simply put, the question should not be “is Germania enough?”, but rather “is Germania necessary at all?” The repeated insistence on Teutoberg Wald as the only plausible PoD, and an insistence of an massive and rapid drive to the Vistula-Dniestr line, along with extensive and entirely unrealistic reforms to the Roman constitution and the imperial state structure is a fundamental misunderstanding of the historical situation, the product of a unrealistic misapplication of the benefits of hindsight. A successful conquest of Mesopotamia under Marcus Ulpius Traianus, Lucius Septimius Severus or Caracalla, a minor drive across the Tigris or a campaign that weakens the loose Parthian imperial structure and ensures the political collapse and fragmentation of the Iranian plateau, or the emasculation of any major power (i.e. a Sassanid-analogue state) to arise there would probably do far more to ensure the a Europe-spanning imperium then the conquest of miles upon useless miles of under-developed, under-populated and primitive barbarian tribes. Likewise, slower but more measured expansion into Germania and the Danube basin under Marcus Aurelius following the Marcomannic wars, or the continuation of the expansionist imperial drive under Caracalla or Maximinus Thrax would probably be more realistic, both due to the fact that Germania was far more well-developed, urbanized and Romanized in these later centuries, and that the barbarian populations would soon require urgent subjugation, thus providing a legitimate and necessary reason for expansion then a “drive to nowhere” under Cæsar Augustus.
It appears to be that simply because it was the vast migration of the barbarian tribal federations across the Rhine in 406 A.D. that finally put paid to the remnants of the vastly weakened western Roman Empire that a successful Roman. The notion that a strategic imbalance between the Roman Empire and ‘barbarian’ Europe can be traced back to the failure and Teutoberg, or some similarly early PoD is largely mistaken, and appears to ignore the fact that, simply in regards to solely military manpower the Roman imperial state possessed a substantial superiority over all its enemies combined until the late 3rd/early 4th century. During the Severan age -- the numerical height of the Roman military establishment -- the Roman army possessed an estimated 442,000 legionaries and auxilia, which combined with the naval forces and irregular numerii yielded an estimated half a million troops in the Roman military establishment. The Roman problem was never (until the late 4th/ early 5th century) a fundamental numerical imbalance between its population and available military manpower vis-à-vis that of its enemies, but the issues in coordinating military movements and defenses along all the frontiers, and in the structural problems that this issue entailed. The notion that one requires such an early PoD to ensure the survival of the Roman imperial state, followed by a string of entirely implausible further massive conquests and reforms is entirely erroneous