Save the Yamato! (for another purpose)

[CalBear]

Admiral Fedishi Up-gawa listened to Captain Hara:

Captain Tameichi Hara, also fed up, related that the planned Yamato suicide sortie would not serve a military purpose and was an unethical waste of Japanese lives- thus it was a crime against Japan. As Hara was one of the few experienced captains left and had impeccably fought in action after action against the Americans and Dutch- from the glory days after Pearl Harbor to the desperate fighting around Guadacanal, his voice carried weight. Hara further related that he had directly authorized any man who was “sick” to leave his light cruiser and not take part in the useless suicide sortie. But…. the Japanese group culture being what it was, only a handful of men had opted out.

What would be the best use of the Yamato?

• Hide her the inland sea and move her constantly?
  
  
• Strip the secondary and anti anti aircraft armor off it for use as shore batteries around Tokyo?
  
  
• Try to move her to relative safety in the Hanoi area?
  
  
• Beach her and encase her in as much concrete and sand bags as possible. She then becomes the Mother of All Shore Batteries?

Any other ideas....?

She die in the Inland Sea. By April of 1945 there was no safe place there, not for 863 feet of battleship, and the amount of fuel she burned was excessive.

One of the biggest weaknesses of the Yamato was her generally underwhelming AAA mount. Her 12.7cm/40 was a less than ideal gun, relatively low velocity, very poor train rate, especially late in the war when most aircraft were making over 350 knots and not the 150 the gun mount had been designed to handle. As an example, during the TEN-ICHI-GO operation the U.S. only lost a total of ten aircraft, not all of them were hit by Yamato. Even if the guns could be removed from the ship creating a DP mount that could handle the recoil would be no easy task.

What she DID have was swarm of 25mm guns (162 of them, although 120 of them were on triple mounts). Those mounts could have been adapted, even if forced to into a fixed bunker/pintle mounted design, in the anti-boat even light anti-armor role (perhaps against amtraks) especially since the IJA had already been using the single and twin versions as land based AAA.

As far as Hanoi, that would have to happen before mid-November of 1944 when she sailed to Kure. Trying it with the U.S. owning all the water in beween Japan and the Gulf of Tonkin would be just as bad as TEN-ICHI-GO from a survival perspective.

Probably the best idea is the last one. At least she would draw a LOT of fire.
yippie.kiay23

 

[WaterproofPotatoes]

Japanese navy in WW2 sounds like Kingons.

At least the food doesn't move, unlike a plate of gagh...

The conditons on board Japanese ships, as described up thread, were very harsh.

The worst ships to be posted to were the Fuso and Ise class battleships. They were cramped to begin with, but after their reconstructions, not only were crew sizes increased making them even more cramped, the huge weight added by the pagoda masts and extra AA guns made them sit lower in the water, which flowed in through the casemates for their secondaries.

 

[MatthewB]

The conditions on board Japanese ships, as described up thread, were very harsh.

It would be interesting to see how Japanese battleships ordered from British yards differed in crew accommodations from Royal Navy ships of the era.

 

[WaterproofPotatoes]

It would be interesting to see how Japanese battleships ordered from British yards differed in crew accommodations from Royal Navy ships of the era.

From what I remember (I wish I remember where I read it!), the Kongos were better postings than the slow battleships. They were drier thanks to their higher bows and first two casemates being plated over, and the issues with the thick coal smoke their large machinery generated were eliminated when their second reconstructions replaced their mixed-firing boilers with all oil-firing boilers. The first reconstruction replaced some of the mixed-firing ones with all oil, but retained others.

The more compact yet more powerful machinery and elimination of the coal bunkers cleared up space and mitigated the issues with lack of space.

Regardless, Japanese accommodations were more Spartan than those of any of the Western navies. The RN, with its mutton, hammocks, buckets and bar soap, still had more comfortable ships than the IJN.

The RCN was in between the USN and RN in terms of crew comfort- RN levels of space and discipline, but with beef and ice cream and washing machines like the USN ships.

 

[Cryptic]

She die in the Inland Sea. By April of 1945 there was no safe place there, not for 863 feet of battleship, and the amount of fuel she burned was excessive.

What she DID have was swarm of 25mm guns (162 of them, although 120 of them were on triple mounts). Those mounts could have been adapted, even if forced to into a fixed bunker/pintle mounted design, in the anti-boat even light anti-armor role (perhaps against amtraks) especially since the IJA had already been using the single and twin versions as land based AAA.

As far as Hanoi, that would have to happen before mid-November of 1944 when she sailed to Kure. Trying it with the U.S. owning all the water in beween Japan and the Gulf of Tonkin would be just as bad as TEN-ICHI-GO from a survival perspective.

I see your point regarding Hanoi. If she could to get to Okinawa, she was not going to make Hanoi. She probably could get to Korea, but that would be a very temporary “escape”. With all that in mind, I am thinking:

- Starting immediately, 3,000 IJA engineering troops supervised by construction engineers prepare a “shore berth” for the beached Yamato at a carefully selected site that maximizes air coverage from air coverage from any remaining effective IJN or IJA squadronse etc. Hundreds of thousands of sand bags are prepped, concrete and mining equipment are brought to the site. So is a lot of camouflage netting.

- 24- 48 hours before beaching, the crew, assisted by ship yard workers remove all AA mounts and if possible, the lighter secondary armament. Some are kept to protect the soon to be beached Yamato. Others are given to IJA units.

- Yamato is beached at dusk. Engineering troops and crew use both human labor and mining equipment (conveyer belts, tipplers etc) start encasing the hull and decks in sandbags and concrete.

- Yamato is now a shore battery defending Tokyo. Most of the crew is turned into an infantry regiment (with the exception of those needed to man 18" guns).

 

[CalBear]

I see your point regarding Hanoi. If she could to get to Okinawa, she was not going to make Hanoi. She probably could get to Korea, but that would be a very temporary “escape”. With all that in mind, I am thinking:

- Starting immediately, 3,000 IJA engineering troops supervised by construction engineers prepare a “shore berth” for the beached Yamato at a carefully selected site that maximizes air coverage from air coverage from any remaining effective IJN or IJA squadronse etc. Hundreds of thousands of sand bags are prepped, concrete and mining equipment are brought to the site. So is a lot of camouflage netting.

- 24- 48 hours before beaching, the crew, assisted by ship yard workers remove all AA mounts and if possible, the lighter secondary armament. Some are kept to protect the soon to be beached Yamato. Others are given to IJA units.

- Yamato is beached at dusk. Engineering troops and crew use both human labor and mining equipment (conveyer belts, tipplers etc) start encasing the hull and decks in sandbags and concrete.

- Yamato is now a shore battery defending Tokyo. Most of the crew is turned into an infantry regiment (with the exception of those needed to man 18" guns).

Only thing I'd change is moving it to Kyushu. The Japanese had exactly identified every one of the planned landing beaches (it was basically a simple surveying exercise involving beach front width, reefs, range arcs for land based fighters, and an educated estimate of how many troops the Allies would attempt to land based on a couple years of examples across the Pacific and ETO).

You will also need to maintain a major part of the engineering department to provide power for the gun mounts (unless an electrical power source is arranged for ashore). Something needs to get those bad boys to move.

 

[Cryptic]

You will also need to maintain a major part of the engineering department to provide power for the gun mounts (unless an electrical power source is arranged for ashore). Something needs to get those bad boys to move.

Good point.

I would go for two sources of electrical power with the ship board source being retained and mining engineers setting up land generators and running alternate electric cables to the ship (buried in very deep trenches).

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The only way I can see her surviving till the end of the war is if she was stranded at Singapore without fuel as quite a few IJN ships were. Then Britain hands her over to the US in 46 for the Bikini tests.

 

[trurle]

Beach her and encase her in as much concrete and sand bags as possible. She then becomes the Mother of All Shore Batteries?
Any other ideas....?

From what was known to the Japanese in early May 1945, the best strategy may be to beach Yamato in the Bay of Kagoshima.
See map of approximate coverage of her main guns
http://www.gcmap.com/mapui?R=55km@31.4N130.7E&MS=wls&DU=mi

This way, Yamato is likely disabled by July 1945, before tentative invasion to Kyushu, but diverts significant US air resources meanwhile. Multi-layer anti-torpedo nets would force to attacks her with dive bombers, which are virtually guaranteed to suffer heavier losses compared to OTL sinking of Yamato. Simply because Yamato will be fighting for longer, with less combustibles on board and not going to capsize or sink being supported by soil. Additional armour may be not practical though - at best some soil over her deck will give marginally positive cost/performance.

US army did not knew the Yamato main guns were worn badly enough to prevent using her as effective coastal battery for more than few hours, therefore using it as bait for enemy bombers is sensible idea for Japanese command.

Good point.

I would go for two sources of electrical power with the ship board source being retained and mining engineers setting up land generators and running alternate electric cables to the ship (buried in very deep trenches).

I do not think setting the shore power generators will give Yamato additional operational time. Onboard generators were better protected anyway - we are likely talking about hundreds kW power, meaning easily targettable shore facility, not a mobile generator or tap to residential power network (which was not powerful enough anyway)
May be the fake generator facility ashore and a lot of fake cables on surface made of painted straw will serve better to dilute aerial attack, without expending too much resources. Plus move some of tertiary 25mm AA from Yamato to small vessels (lighters, tugs) around her. This arrangement gives tactical advantages of crossfire.