Yes, I know all this. But in my War of the Two Commonwealths TL things go a bit differently. To quote myself...
Hum. Personally, I think this scenario underestimates Napoleon III's Anglophilia: the French press raised a fracas, but Napoleon III himself continued his pro-British policy, and we for our part weren't particularly interested in Indochina. 1860, with the trade treaty and before Nice and Savoy created suspicion of Wicked Bonapartist Schemes, was a high point for our relations with the Second Empire.
Some other diplomatic incident might strain things further, but I doubt it would trigger such a U-Turn. Still, that's besides the topic of the thread, so let's leave that.
But I don't think this would have prevented Italian nationalists from attempting to force Austria out of Italy. Men like Garibaldi would have continued to provoke Austria and rouse Italian nationalism. Cavour probably would have wanted to delay any direct confrontation until he had the backing of one of the major powers.
Oh, I'm certainly not saying political Italian nationalism isn't going to continue its efforts. In fact, I'd be very interested to see what would happen if Garibaldi had set off to take advantage of the perennial discontent of the Sicilian and Neopolitan peasants and the monarchy had collapsed as OTL with the Austrian boot still firmly planted in the north.
Unfortunately, if Garibaldi had moved his Hunters of the Alps through the Papal lands (Tuscany, Lombardy, Parma and Modena) thier almost certainly would have been pro-Unification uprisings.
Um, those lands weren't papal. Or are you saying the papal lands
and the bracketed ones would have experiences uprisings? If so, sorry.
Anyway, remember that Garibaldi, all around great guy though he was, couldn't win them all. I'm pretty sure the Latium was as supportive of unfication as any other part of central Italy, but nevertheless relatively small forces saw him off at Mentana. Not everywhere was the decrepit Neapolitan regime.
With Austrian forces-in-being still there to keep any foreign backers out, I think a completely private enterprise against central Italy by Garibaldi would be one of his several heroic failures.
While France may have dispatched a small force to protect Rome, in this situation it is doubtful that Napoleon would have had the support for full intervention.
Napoleon was kicking himself for his involvement in Rome, and never got involved with anything outside the Latium, its true.
Austria, though, would have had to respond as popular uprisings were bound to occur in their Italian possessions.
Although I do think Austria would have protected all the central Italian states or at least helped them to protect themselves, I must point that Radetzky's dictatorship was surprisingly effective. Two Sicilies it was not.
With central Italy in revolt against the Pope and Austria and Garibaldi leading a growing legion working towards Italian unification, I don't think Sardinia could have afforded to sit back and do nothing. Cavour was not a huge fan of Garibaldi, though the animosity would not be near the level it was in OTL since Cavour had not handed Nice over to the French, and would not have wanted him in control of a united Italy. So I think Cavour would have brought Sardinia into the fray.
Cavour was always motivated by extremely pragmatic calculations and he felt able to stand aloof from Garibaldine ventures over Rome twice. His problem is that if he fights a war with Austria, he will lose, and he knows it.
They may have had limited British support as the Brits had assisted Garibaldi in OTL.
British support would consist of a lot of hand-wringing and encouraging compromise, but we wouldn't shoot at any Austrians, and that's what cavour needs.
Napoleon III, however, would actually find it pretty hard to sit by and let Garibaldi be beaten, Plombieres or not. He might true and foist some face-saving retreat on the Austrians and tie up one of his wishful schemes to wriggle out of his commitment to the Pope.
Austria on the other hand would have been in a difficult position. Fighting a confused war in the rugged terrain of northern Italy is bad enough.
They managed okay in 1866, with half their army being shot to bits in Bohemia. The sad fact is that whatever support Italian unification may enjoy, it lacks any Italian army than can take on Austria.
They also feared another round of Hungarian revolts, which Kossuth had wanted to assist by forming a Hungarian Legion and landing it on the Dalmatian coast.
I'm rather dubious about the prospects of that scheme. Kossuth had never even managed to be recognised as regent by all the Hungarian emigres; his disconnect with opinion back in the country was huge, and he never recognised the Ausgleich.
1859 was a differant time from 1860: it was the Italian war that ended neo-absolutism. In 1859, Hungary was
de-jure still under military governance, IIRC, and certainly the national movement was much more tightly controlled, and the Serbs and Romanians closer to the ears of Vienna. I think anything in the style of 1867 - that is, organised aristocratic tax-evasion - would be frankly dealt with, and the time for mass peasant revolt had come and gone in 1848 with the abolition of feudalism. Any volunteer band in Croatia would of course have to get through the Croats, which was beyond the men of 1848.
Romania too was hoping to profit from Austria's miss fortunes.
Of course, that implies Hungarians and Romanians having a common enemy, which both would go out of their weay to avoid.
In seriousness, the Romanian movement inside Austria was young and, assuming a Hungarian revolt or the suspicion of one, loyalist. As for the Romanian state itself, less than a year old and incompletely recognised, it was wary of adventure.
But perhaps most importantly Prussia looked to expand their influence in the German states and if they mobilized their Army the Austrian would have had to confront them or accept a drastic loss of prestige.
The Prussians aren't likley to dive into a was. There were lots of contradictory trends at work in Berlin: Schleinitz, for instance, sabotaged every anti-Austrian measure. If Austria is overstretched but clearly winning, the Schleinitz policy of gaining influence north of the Main as rewards for supporting Austria elsewhere makes a lot of sense, and he
is after all the foreign minister. The generals are unlikely to get their way without the French army at large; and nationalist sentiment was fairly indifferant.
Overall, I don't think Austrian victory is so clear cut. It may come down to having to make hard decisions. Is it worth losing Hungary in order to retain the Italian lands? How important is it to keep Prussia in check, and is it even possible at this point?
Benjamin
I doubt it. Winning a military victory against both Italian and Hungarian nationalism whilst scaring Prussia into submission was not beyon Austria in 1848-1850. Prussia a lot stronger now, but also more given to a pro-Austrian course, and I suspect Hungary of being a damp squib.