You could do a week by week calender of events if you'd like.
The air power equation has enough wiggle room in it. The historical performance of the Allied airpower was after 6 months of build up ; planning, preperation and practice. So much so that before the war began they had every single Iraqie combat unit identified and targeted for strikes. In a mobile war starting on the fly against a mobile enemy from Sept 1 , 1990, you'd have no such luck.
Further if the Allies are spread out hunting Scuds and destroying Iraqi airforce and decapitating the regime etc there will not be much left over to target the Iraqi ground units.
Going on Blackwells numbers each fighter/bomber would be able to sortie once per day while each major transport /bomber would be more like once every 2-3 days.
72 A-10 sortie per day
20-30 F-111 per day
96 F-16 sortie per day
20 C-130/C-20/21 sortie per day
24 F-4G sortie per day
96 F-15C/E sortie per day
18 F117 sortie per day
2 EC-130 sortie per day
2 U-2/TR-1 sortie per day
38 Tankers sortie per day
5 misc sortie per day
several B-52 sortie per day.
335 combat sortie per day plus USN ~150 combat sortie per day.
The F-111 , F-117 & B-52 will have to go down town to bomb strategic targets along with the F-4G for SAM suppression. Thats 72 sortie which would need similar number of F-15 escorts. The Rest of the F-15E would have to hunt for Scuds, leaving just ~260 A-10, F-16 and F-18 /F-14 & Marine Harries to conduct interdiction/cas to support the ground troops.
If Sadaam, out numbering the Kuwait 15:1 , could overrun Kuwait [175km] in just 2-3 days, They could overwhelm the Allied para brigades and drive 200km south to Dharan and half way to Riyadh in a week.
According to Corrdesmann, in 1988 the Iraqi launched three offensives in three different areas of the front from June 18 to July 12 of that year. Thats three offensives in 24 days or almost one per week. So they are capable of launching successive punches especially to expand and deepen the same penetration into Saudi soil.
BTW the notion that Iraqie forces would have to train for months prior to any attack is also missleading. The Iraqi in the 1980s showed a surprising flexibility to choose attack methods. Sometimes this meant crossing marsh and or water ways, some times attack from chopper and with gas etc. As a rule divisions selected for such missions received special training to adapt to those such missions and conditions. There is no doubt that the RG and 3rd Corps got the lions share of the training and certainly could be expected to pull of major drives of 100-200km deep into enemy territory.
No doubt the allies air power would fall upon these forces and interdict them, but it would not be enough to stop them.
Some issues:
1. Those Iraqi offensives were actually counterattacks from fixed positions against exhausted Iranian troops that had been used up. This is a far cry from conducting a mobile offensive hundreds of miles from their center of gravity (central Iraq). 100- 200 KM doesn't get you all that far into Saudi Arabia by the way, and they would be facing well equipped (moderately trained) Saudi armored and mechanized formations, with US soldiers available to call in Forward air support.
2. If the Iraqis are driving deep into Saudi, the offensives against the Scuds would become a minor issue for the time being. Sorties would not be wasted against them if tanks are driving on vital base areas. In addition, if it came to it, the US had plenty of B52s available and could readily massively increase that sortie rate. The only deep strikes would be counter air and logistical interdiction until the ground situation stabilized.
In addition, 2 carriers started off in theater, and 2 more arrived within 2 weeks. Those would each generate at least a couple of sorties per day from their F18s and A6s, with F14s flying CAP and escort (and they have their own tanker support).
The only reason to hunt Scuds is to keep the Israelis out of things, and if the Iraqis are invading Saudi Arabia, I doubt the Saudis are going to care what the Israelis do in that situation.
If Saddam used chemical weapons on those Scuds, then we start seeing the US use tactical nuclear weapons (cruise missile delivered or from B1s and F117s). Saddam knew that, and it was made very clear.
3. Finally, Saddam overran Kuwait by having complete strategic surprise. He did not have that by day 3, and the Saudis were already scrambling to cover the border while the Iraqis were still dealing with the Kuwaitis and refueling.
Remember, the Saudis have (and had) an army (and national guard too), which had armored forces with decent equipment. They would not have been simply overrun if they had US support, even though it would be from several parachute battalions, some light artillery and a few light tanks (from the 82nd) and a brigade of US Marines (which had armor and light armor and lots of anti tank systems). In short, the Iraqis were not just facing light infantry.
The only Iraqi deep offensive ever carried out during the Iran - Iraq War was the initial invasion (which failed). After that, all operations were essentially local counterattacks, in some cases multi-divisional, but in a narrow operational sector of a few kilometers wide and a few kilometers deep. Most movement was between sectors, behind the lines, not deep drives into enemy territory. In other words, from one base area to another base area and attacking from the new base area. The Iraqis never conducted a deep offensive requiring substantial mobile logistical support.
Even the invasion of Kuwait was a few dozen kilometers deep and a few dozen kilometers wide with a mere 6 divisions (including airborne elements). The same size as their larger counteroffensives during the war with Iran.