Russo-Ukraine war in 2015 Year

Manman

Banned
The biggest problem is the shock of such an economic turnmoil. If the Russians stop trading then Europe is going to have a bad time for some time. In the end they cant just switch to something else considering the massive disruptions of goods and trade that such a move will bring. It will take time and unless they immediately change how they do things then expect mass riots and talks of voting for someone else do to this. Its one thing to do sanctions on a nobody nations, its another thing to do it to a large nation that makes up a large part of the world market.

Also the rest of the world will be pissed considering they just disrupted the whole economy on moral high ground and no actual bases that matters. So expect the rest of the world to hate Europe do to bean so Eurocentric and for screwing things over.
 
This likely causes the alienation of Russia from the rest of Europe, pushing Europe closer to the US and Russia closer to China. The Ukraine is cut in two at the Dniepr with Nova Rusiya in the East and South being directly annexed. Russia then has a choice - try for the Baltic States and maybe part of Poland or sit back and watch to see what happens next. International sanctions certainly appear but there is little the world is likely to so beyond that as the Ukraine is outside the NATO alliance. Putin is openly compared to an early Hitler and tries to push Estonia into its orbit unsuccessfully, maybe Moscow-backed insurgents appear there perhaps in Latvia and Lithuania too to give Russia its direct and ironic land bridge to <strikethrough> Konigsberg </strikethrough> Kalliningrad. US election is similar if not slightly more Republican and elsewhere the Conservative movement gains more steam than OTL. Otherwise very little changes unless Russia gets foolishly aggressive.
 
Sanctions would ramp up and the EU would gradually switch from russian to oil to alternative sources, i believe this would be possible within a year or two. Ofc gas prices would sky rocket but the EU has relatively good public transport and would absorb the shock better than america imo. Shale companies, OPEC, and electric car companies would see a massive rise in profits.

We're talking about infrastructure that took decades to build and billions to invest in, meaning that to switch would require a similar investment and the costs are still going to be far greater than now as the Germans found when they looked at alternative sources; it simply isn't going to happen in one or two years. This is also before factoring in who has the excess production to supply a third of the energy usage of a continent of roughly 500 Million and, considering there is likely no one with that kinda of excess capacity laying around, it's going to take them time and investments to ramp up production. In the interim of all of this, Europe just lost a third of its energy with all that entails for its economy.
 
We're talking about infrastructure that took decades to build and billions to invest in, meaning that to switch would require a similar investment and the costs are still going to be far greater than now as the Germans found when they looked at alternative sources; it simply isn't going to happen in one or two years. This is also before factoring in who has the excess production to supply a third of the energy usage of a continent of roughly 500 Million and, considering there is likely no one with that kinda of excess capacity laying around, it's going to take them time and investments to ramp up production. In the interim of all of this, Europe just lost a third of its energy with all that entails for its economy.

Well, if there will be any European sanctions in terms of cutting oil and gas purchases from Russia, they will necessarily be gradual. Europe can't afford to go cold turkey with Russian energy just like that, and Russia, on the other hand, can't afford to stop selling to Europe just like that either. So, in no scenario would Europe lose a third of its (imported) energy* in a very short timeframe.

*There is a difference between energy used in Europe and energy imported to Europe. That difference is local production. The EU imports roughly half of the energy it consumes.

Petroleum products and natural gas make up 55-60% of all European energy usage. As 90% of the oil and 66% of the gas used in Europe is imported, and one third of Europe's oil and gas imports come from Russia, Russian oil and gas imports make up roughly one sixth of all energy consumed in Europe - if my calculations are at all in the right ballpark.

Dependence on imports:

energy%20dependence.jpg
 
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Well, if there will be any European sanctions in terms of cutting oil and gas purchases from Russia, they will necessarily be gradual. Europe can't afford to go cold turkey with Russian energy just like that, and Russia, on the other hand, can't afford to stop selling to Europe just like that either. So, in no scenario would Europe lose a third of its (imported) energy* in a very short timeframe.

*There is a difference between energy used in Europe and energy imported to Europe. That difference is local production. The EU imports roughly half of the energy it consumes.

Petroleum products and natural gas make up 55-60% of all European energy usage. As 90% of the oil and 66% of the gas used in Europe is imported, and one third of Europe's oil and gas imports come from Russia, Russian oil and gas imports make up roughly one sixth of all energy consumed in Europe - if my calculations are at all in the right ballpark.

Dependence on imports:

Do you know what % of Russian GDP is made up of exports to Europe? My google-fu was weak and i was unable to find all that much about it.

One thing i was wondering about. Didn't a lot of Russian oil and LNG go through the Ukraine by 2015? Is there spare capacity to export through other means if they invade? Because otherwise won't Europe have to manage without a portion of the Russian energy imports no matter if they make the sanctions worse or not. Since the pipelines through the Ukraine would be unreliable with the fighting?
 
Do you know what % of Russian GDP is made up of exports to Europe? My google-fu was weak and i was unable to find all that much about it.

In 2016, 55% of all Russian exports were sold to Europe. At the same time, oil and natural gas revenues accounted for 47% of all Russian exports, and made up 36% of Russian state revenues. I've tried to look at the oil and natural gas trade exports impact on GDP before and it's not exactly easy to pin it down, what with the dynamic effects to other sectors of the Russian economy.

Here's one argument I've seen put forward, from 2015:

At first glance, it is absurd to call Russia “merely an oil and gas company.” The share of hydrocarbon production in the country’s GDP has not exceeded 26.5 percent for 25 years and the share of oil and gas export has not risen above 14.5 percent of GDP. Those who champion Russia’s underlying economic stability point to these very reasonable numbers. But things aren’t quite so simple. Although three quarters of Russia's official GDP is not pouring out of its oil wells, the country is still heavily dependent on oil. We also need to identify how the non-oil components of Russian GDP are financed.

A more detailed analysis is less rosy. Trade accounts for 29 percent of Russian GDP, but Russia imports about 60 percent of its total consumption and pays for imports with earnings from exports, which are overwhelmingly dominated by oil and gas. That means that the share of hydrocarbons in the GDP is in effect 17.5 percent higher.

Next, 20-22 percent of GDP is comprised of state budget expenditures. At least 60 percent of consolidated budget revenues come from the mineral extraction tax, excise duties, export duties, value-added tax on imports and other taxes attributable to the oil and gas sector directly or indirectly. This adds an additional 13 percent to our calculation of the oil-based GDP.

By this rough tally, 57 percent of Russia's GDP already depends on oil. But we also need to factor in the direct influx of petrodollars that is converted into investments and spending in other sectors of the economy and additional consumption. It is hard to put a number on this, but by various estimates it has ranged between 10 and 13 percent of GDP in recent years. So our overall figure is now up to 67—70 percent.

I think that even in the most conservative estimate, taken altogether Russia's trade with Europe accounts for 20-30% of its GDP, and any significant drop in exports towards Europe would hurt Russia sorely.


One thing i was wondering about. Didn't a lot of Russian oil and LNG go through the Ukraine by 2015? Is there spare capacity to export through other means if they invade? Because otherwise won't Europe have to manage without a portion of the Russian energy imports no matter if they make the sanctions worse or not. Since the pipelines through the Ukraine would be unreliable with the fighting?

This is a good question I have not considered. I think that the pipelines through Ukraine are more important in terms of natural gas than oil. Russia exports over 80% of its oil by ship, mainly through the Novorossiysk terminal on the Black Sea, the Primorsk and Ust-Luga terminals on the Gulf of Finland and the Kozmino terminal near Vladivostok. None of these would be directly affected by a war in Ukraine, even Novorossiysk would be safe as the Ukrainian fleet would be comically underpowered in comparison to the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. In terms of natural gas, 16% of all natural gas used in Europe comes via pipelines that run across Ukraine - roughly half of all Russian gas exported to Europe. The other half comes through the other pipelines through Belarus, the Black Sea, Turkey and the Baltic Sea.

So, on balance I'd say that a major war in Ukraine could put a big dent into Russian energy exports to Europe by default, but not one that would physically threaten more than 15-25% of all Russo-European energy trade.

This is a great source for the above information.

The gas pipelines:

gazprom-export-capacity.jpg
 
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There's a book called "War with Russia" written by the former Deputy SACEUR pretty much detailing how war could end up happening with Russia based on the 2014 Ukraine events and everything that has happened since. Certainly recommend it for all interested in this topic.
 
In 2016, 55% of all Russian exports were sold to Europe. At the same time, oil and natural gas revenues accounted for 47% of all Russian exports, and made up 36% of Russian state revenues. I've tried to look at the oil and natural gas trade exports impact on GDP before and it's not exactly easy to pin it it down, what with the dynamic effects to other sectors of the Russian economy.

Here's one argument I've seen put forward, from 2015:



I think that even in the most conservative estimate, taken altogether Russia's trade with Europe accounts for 10-30% of its GDP, and any significant drop in exports towards Europe would hurt Russia sorely.




This is a good question I have not considered. I think that the pipelines through Ukraine are more important in terms of natural gas than oil. Russia exports over 80% of its oil by ship, mainly through the Novorossiysk terminal on the Black Sea, the Primorsk and Ust-Luga terminals on the Gulf of Finland and the Kozmino terminal near Vladivostok. None of these would be directly affected by a war in Ukraine. In terms of natural gas, 16% of all natural gas used in Europe comes via pipelines that run across Ukraine - roughly one fourth to one third of all Russian gas exported to Europe. The majority comes through the other pipelines through Belarus, Turkey and the Baltic sea.

So, on balance I'd say that a major war in Ukraine could put a big dent into Russian energy exports to Europe by default, but not one that would physically threaten more than 10-20% of all Russo-European energy trade.

This is a great source for the above information.

The gas pipelines:

gazprom-export-capacity.jpg
Any thoughts on the ability of the Ukraine to conceviably interdict oil and gas shipments that don't flow thru their territory ? (In the context of a hypothetical Ukraine / Russia conflict.)

I don't know much about the Ukranian military but perhaps there might be some opportunities for special operations forces to target pipe lines and other similar forces ? If Europe wasn't helping the Ukraine they (the Ukraine) might decide denying the foreign exchange to Russia was worth the risk of back lash from Europe.
 
Any thoughts on the ability of the Ukraine to conceviably interdict oil and gas shipments that don't flow thru their territory ? (In the context of a hypothetical Ukraine / Russia conflict.)

I don't know much about the Ukranian military but perhaps there might be some opportunities for special operations forces to target pipe lines and other similar forces ? If Europe wasn't helping the Ukraine they (the Ukraine) might decide denying the foreign exchange to Russia was worth the risk of back lash from Europe.

I think Ukraine's chances for this would be very small. I just added to my above post that the Ukrainian fleet on the Black Sea can't really do anything due to its weakness (it would be wiped out in a realistic sense during first two weeks of the war), and also otherwise Ukraine would have so much on its plate militarily anyway that going against any pipelines, terminals or ships outside Ukraine would not really be possible. And then of course such sabotage would probably be seen as an attack towards the Western nations as well. That is not something Ukraine would want to risk.
 
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So, on balance I'd say that a major war in Ukraine could put a big dent into Russian energy exports to Europe by default, but not one that would physically threaten more than 15-25% of all Russo-European energy trade.

This is a great source for the above information.

The gas pipelines:

gazprom-export-capacity.jpg

The question of these pipelines runs deeper that just the three crossing the Ukraine being shut off by warfare there. Tho the three there are not trivial. One runs through Belarus, where a portion of the population has a distaste for Russian intervention. A terrorist group there can disrupt the Yamal line, cutting another 21 bcm given on the chart. The same might occur in Poland on the same line. A 90 day shut down on that line, & where restoration may not occur after that guarantees Europe will be ramping up alternative imports whatever the many reasons why it can't. The four underwater lines are a bit less vulnerable, tho terrorist interruption can't be completely dismissed.

If the disruption of the three Urkraininan lines shoves Europes economy to the edge will Germany lead the way to putting a gun to the collective Ukrainian head and asking them to roll over for the Russians?
 
It makes me wonder, would Russia carve out a “Novorossiya“ puppet state in eastern Ukraine? or would they just Anschluss it?

The former in my opinion sounds more likely.
 
It is the 'Russian Federation' after all. A new puppet state sounds like more opportunities for guvmint jobs and opportunities for political patronage.
 
The Russian Army probably would be able to reach Kiev in about two weeks. Any attempt to occupy land on the west side of the Dnieper River is going to run into substantially more paramilitary resistance and a protracted guerrilla war will begin, while on the Eastern side of the Dnieper, things would go a lot more smoothly with a lot more local support.

My guess is that the Russians would experience substantial guerrilla and paramilitary resistance on much of the east bank as well. OTL, substantial support for unification with Russia or a Novorossiya satellite state exists only in the Donetsk heartland- and even that support needed to be trumped up repeatedly by Russia. Likewise, though there are noticeable pro Russian minorities in Odessa and say Kharkiy / Kharkov, the key word is "minorities".

In short, I think Russia would be able to defeat Ukrainian regular army and supporting militias on the east bank relatively quickly. This victory, however, would soon turn hollow as the limited number of truly capable Russian units would find themselves attacked on both the front line by continuing Ukrainian resistance and in rear areas by larger than anticipated guerrilla forces. These Ukrainian attacks would increase in effectiveness as the US supplies TOW, Javelin, Stinger and Patriot missiles, smart artillery systems, predator drones, A-10 aircraft etc.

Russian complaints that the US uhmmm "contractors" guiding the use of these weapons- or in some cases actually using them constitute US military intervention would be ignored and the damage to capable Russian units would mount steadily.
 
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